Neha Jalan vs Ca Vaibhav Jalan & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 27 APRIL, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
I.A. 16974/2025
IN
+ CS(OS) 591/2023 & I.A. 18775/2023
NEHA JALAN .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Simar Pal Singh, Mr. Naveen
Kumar Yadav, Mr. Manjeet Hooda,
Advocates.
versus
CA VAIBHAV JALAN & ORS ......Defendants
Through: Mrs. Manasi Bhushan, Ms. Sanjana
Patel, Mr. Mohammad Navas. K, Ms.
Gauri Gupta, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
I.A. 16974/2025
1. The present application has been filed by the Defendants/Applicants
under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC seeking return of the plaint on the
ground that the instant matter falls within the jurisdiction of the concerned
Family Court.
2. The instant suit has been filed by the Plaintiff seeking the following
prayers:
“(A) Pass a preliminary decree for partition in respect
of the properties detailed as under:
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(i). Property / office bearing No. 405, Crowne Heights,
Sector-10, Rohini Delhi-110085, ad-measuring 1110
Sq. ft. Covered Area (103.12 sq. mtrs. approx.), by
metes and bounds, in accordance with the shares of the
parties to the suit;
(ii). Property / house No. 24, Pocket-D-13, Sector-8,
measuring 92.25 sq. mtrs., situated at Rohini
Residential Scheme, Delhi-110085, by metes and
bounds, in accordance with the shares of the parties to
the suit; and
(iii). Property / flat bearing No. 15-B, Block ED, area
measuring 61.60 sq. mtrs., Pitampura Delhi-110034,
by metes and bounds, in accordance with the shares of
the parties to the suit.
(B) Appoint a Local Commissioner to prepare a site
plan of:
(i). Property / office bearing No. 405, Crowne Heights,
Sector-10, Rohini Delhi-110085, ad-measuring 1110
Sq. ft. Covered Area (103.12 sq. mtrs. approx.);
(ii). Property / house No. 24, Pocket-D-13, Sector-8,
measuring 92.25 sq. mtrs., situated at Rohini
Residential Scheme, Delhi-110085; and
(iii). Property / flat bearing No. 15-B, Block ED, area
measuring 61.60 sq. mtrs., Pitampura Delhi-110034,
effecting effect partition of the above properties, in
terms of the preliminary decree and thereafter a final
decree of partition be passed in favour of the plaintiff,
embodying the Commissioner's report, by metes and
bounds.
(C) It is further prayed that if this Hon'ble court comes
to the conclusion that the partition of the above
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premises by metes and bounds is not possible, then a
decree for sale of the same may please be passed by
directing to sell the said properties, in the open market
against consideration and the sale proceeds so
received, may be distributed amongst the parties to the
suit as per their legal rights / shares.
(D) It is also prayed that this Hon'ble court may also
be pleased to pass a decree of permanent injunction in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants
restraining the defendants, their legal heirs,
representatives and agents etc. from selling, parting
with or creating third party interest in respect of the
properties detailed as under:
(i). Property/office bearing No. 405, Crowne Heights,
Sector-10, Rohini Delhi-110085, ad-measuring 1110
Sq. ft. Covered Area (103.12 Sq. Mtrs. approx.);
(ii). Property/house No. 24, Pocket-D-13, Sector-8,
measuring 92.25 sq. mtrs., situated at Rohini
Residential Scheme, Delhi-110085; and
(iii). Property / flat bearing No. 15-B, Block ED, area
measuring 61.60 sq. mtrs., Pitampura Delhi-110034.
(E) Award the cost of the suit in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendants.
(F) Pass such order or further orders in favour of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, which this Hon'ble
court may deem fit and proper, in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
3. The facts of the case, as mentioned in the Plaint, are as follows:-
a. The Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 were classmates at a coaching
centre run by the Plaintiff’s father under the name and style of
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“MK Gupta Tax Classes”, which is also popularly known as
“MKG CA Education”. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1
were taking CA (Inter) Level and CS (Inter) Level courses in the
said institute.
b. On 02.12.2009, the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1 got married to
each other. It is averred that the Defendant No. 1 was working at
his father’s partnership firm “Gupta Jalan and Associates” after
passing the CA Examination. It is stated that even after the
marriage, both Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 were teaching
students at “MK Gupta Tax Classes”.
c. Disputes arose between the parties regarding insufficient dowry
and it has been stated that the Plaintiff was subjected to cruelty by
the parents-in law and the Defendant No. 1. It is averred that her
finances were controlled by the Defendant No. 1, wherein he
opened the bank accounts on Plaintiff’s name, without her consent
and has withdrawn a sum of Rs. 63,57,400/-. It is also stated that
all her Income Tax Returns were filed by the Defendant No. 1
after their marriage and for the Assessment Year 2013-2014, an
amount of Rs. 65,00,000/- has been shown as sale consideration
against a commercial building.
d. It is averred that on 10.07.2023, the Defendants purchased a
property bearing No. 405, Crowne Heights, Sector 10, Rohini,
Delhi – 110085, admeasuring 1110 Sq. ft. Covered Area (103.12
sq. mtrs. approx.) out of Plaintiff’s income in the name of Plaintiff
and Defendants vide Sale Deed dated 10.07.2013.
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e. It is stated that out of the Plaintiff’s income, the Defendant No. 1
purchased a property bearing House No. 24, Pocket D-13, Sector
8, Delhi – 110085, measuring 92.25 sq. mtrs. in the names of
Defendant No. 1 and 3 vide Sale Deed dated 05.10.2016.
f. The Plaint further reveals that the Plaintiff was subjected to
various incidents of cruelty by the Defendants in the name of
dowry and has been repeatedly tortured. Resultantly, a Settlement
Deed dated 24.06.2021 was executed between the parties, wherein
the Defendants agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,75,00,000/- to the
Plaintiff as full and final settlement.
g. It is stated that the Defendants only paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-
and when the Plaintiff demanded the remaining amount of Rs.
2,65,00,000/-, the Defendants refused to pay.
h. The Plaintiff was constrained to file a suit for partition and
permanent injunction bearing CS DJ No. 665/2021 before the Ld.
District Judge (NW), Rohini Court, Delhi, against the Defendants,
however, the same was retuned with a direction to file it in the
Family Courts. Accordingly, suit was filed before the Principle
Judge, Family Court, North-West, Rohini Court, Delhi
( hereinafter referred to as the “ concerned Family Court ” ),
however, the same was withdrawn by the Plaintiff with the liberty
to file it before this Court in lieu of the pecuniary jurisdiction.
i. A legal notice dated 18.08.2021 was sent by the Plaintiff to the
Defendants to effectuate partition by metes and bounds in the suit
properties, however, the same was refused by the Defendants,
which led to filing of the instant suit.
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4. Learned Counsel for the Defendants raised a preliminary objection
that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to try the instant suit as the
same falls within the jurisdiction of Family Courts and hence, the plaint has
to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC on this ground alone.
5. It has been contended that the suit properties, for which partition and
permanent injunction is sought for, was purchased from the funds of
Plaintiff and Defendants and the disputes have arisen out of the marital
relationships, hence, the same is liable to tried by the Family Courts.
6. Learned Counsel for the Defendants has drawn the attention of this
Court to Section 7 & 8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 ( hereinafter referred
to as “ FC Act ” ), which reads as follows:-
“ 7. Jurisdiction .—(1) Subject to the other provisions of
this Act, a Family Court shall—
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by
any district court or any subordinate civil court under
any law for the time being in force in respect of suits
and proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such
jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court, as
the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the
area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court
extends.
Explanation.—The suits and proceedings referred to in
this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the
following nature, namely:—
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring
the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be,
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annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal
rights or judicial separation or dissolution of
marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the
validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status
of any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage with respect to the property of the parties or
of either of them;
(d) a suit of proceeding for an order or injunction in
circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;
(e) a suit of proceeding for a declaration as to the
legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit of proceeding in relation to the guardianship
of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family
Court shall also have and exercise—
(a) the Jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the
first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for
maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by
any other enactment.
8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending
proceedings.— Where a Family Court has been
established for any area,—
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(a) no district court or any subordinate civil court
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, in
relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction
in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature
referred to in the Explanation to that sub-section;
(b) no magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have
or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter
IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974);
(c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in
the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 and
every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(i) which is pending immediately before the
establishment of such Family Court before any
district court or subordinate court referred to in that
sub-section or, as the case may be, before any
magistrate under the said Code; and
(ii) which would have been required to be instituted
or taken before such Family Court if, before the date
on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or
taken, this Act had come into force and such Family
Court had been established,
shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the
date on which it is established.” (emphasis supplied)
7. It has been submitted that a perusal of Section 7 of the FC Act reveals
that the matters enumerated under Explanation are to be adjudicated by the
Family Courts only. In light of the same, the instant suit is not maintainable
before this Court as Explanation (c) of Section 7(1) of the FC Act
specifically states that Family Courts have the jurisdiction to try suits or
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proceedings with respect to the properties belonging to the parties in
marriage. Therefore, the suit properties which are alleged to have been
purchased out of the funds of the parties and the disputes having been arisen
during the subsistence of marriage, the jurisdiction lies with the Family
Courts only.
8. It is further submitted that the Plaintiff has initially filed a suit bearing
CS DJ 665/21 claiming the same reliefs before the Ld. District Judge, North-
West, Rohini, Delhi, however, the plaint was returned directing it to be filed
before the Principle Judge, Family Court, North-West, Rohini Court, Delhi.
Accordingly, suit bearing CS DJ No. 665/2021 was filed before the
concerned Family Court, however, the same was withdrawn seeking liberty
to file it before this Court on the grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction.
9. Learned Counsel for the Defendants also placed reliance on the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Geeta Anand v. Tanya
Arjun, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2327 , wherein it was held that the matters
where there is an intrinsic and unwavering connection between the suit
proceedings and marital relationship falls within the ambit of Family Court’s
jurisdiction.
10. Per Contra , learned Counsel for the Plaintiff states that the reliefs
sought in the instant suit are purely civil in nature and the same cannot be
construed to be tried by the Family Courts merely because the parties are in
a marital relationship. It is stated that the disputes concerning parties in
marriage does not ipso facto fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Family
Courts.
11. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on
record.
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12. The short question that arises for due consideration is that whether the
plaint is liable to be retuned under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC or not for it
being filed before the Family Court.
13. Section 7 of the FC Act confers jurisdiction of those matters
enumerated under the Explanation of the same provision on the Family
Courts. The instant suit is clearly one for partition of the suit properties
wherein the Plaintiff’s husband contends that the suit properties have been
purchased from her funds in the name of the Plaintiff and the Defendants
who were married at the time when the properties were purchased. It is
therefore the contention of the Defendants that since the plaint indicates that
the suit properties have been purchased by the Defendants during the
subsistence of the marriage, the same is to be adjudicated by the Family
Courts as per Explanation (c) of Section 7(1) of FC Act.
14. The Division Bench of this Court in Geeta Anand (supra) dealt with
the issue of jurisdiction of the Family Courts vis-à-vis Civil Courts in
matters arising out of matrimonial dispute. The relevant portion of the
judgment is as follows:
“1. A learned Single Judge of the court noticing a
situation of conflict of opinion with regards to the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts vis-à-vis civil courts
as to certain kinds of matrimonial disputes propounded
in Manita Khurana v. Indra Khurana (2010 SCC
OnLine Del 225) and Meena Kapoor v. Ayushi Rawal
(2020 SCC OnLine Del 2481) on the one hand
and Avneet Kaur v. Sadhu Singh (2022 SCC OnLine
Del 4815) on the other hand, has referred the
following questions for our consideration:
“(a) Whether a suit for possession/injunction filed
by the in-laws of the defendant or either of them,
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claiming themselves or either of them to be the
exclusive owner of the property of which the
possession is sought or with respect to which
injunction is prayed for from or against the
defendant daughter-in-law, is to be tried exclusively
by the Family Court established under the Family
Courts Act, and the jurisdiction of the civil court is
barred?
(b) Whether the impleadment or non-impleadment of
the husband of the defendant son of the plaintiff has
any effect on the maintainability of such a suit
before a civil court?”
2. The issue arises in the context of interpretation,
scope and ambit of Explanation (d) of Section 7(1) of
the Family Courts Act, 1984 (FC Act) (hereinafter
referred to as “subject provision”) wherein a suit,
proceeding for an order or injunction “arising out of a
marital relationship” is to fall under the ambit of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts. The primary
contestation centres around the question whether the
claim of a third-party against or involving a party to a
marriage, even if he/she is a parent of one of the
spouses, should be exclusively tried before the Family
Court, thereby ousting the jurisdiction of civil court. It
flows from the conflicting observations of the court in
the abovementioned cases wherein while the learned
Single Judge in Avneet Kaur case held that a suit
seeking eviction would be maintainable before Family
Courts as marriage is the foundation of this dispute,
the learned Single Judges in the earlier decisions
in Manita Khurana case and Meena Kapoor case have
taken a different view holding that such suits would be
outside the purview of the Family Courts. The
aforesaid issue forms the core of question (a).
3. Question (b) flows from the learned Judge
concluding that there is an apparent conflict between
the abovementioned decisions regarding the
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jurisdiction of Family Court depending upon who the
litigating parties are, since in Avneet Kaur case it was
opined that upon the reading of subject provision it
cannot be inferred that jurisdiction of Family Courts is
limited to litigation between husband and wife. It has
been observed that the above is in direct conflict with
the judgments in Manita Khurana case and Meena
Kapoor case; and that the same have not referred
while giving the decision in Avneet Kaur case. The
courts in Manita Khurana case and Meena Kapoor
case had held that based on a mother-in-law's
exclusive title to property, a suit seeking injunction or
eviction filed by her against the daughter-in-law
cannot be said to be a suit “in circumstances arising
out of a marital relationship”, thus it cannot be
exclusively tried by a Family Court.
xxx
31. It is a well ordained principle in law that exclusion
of the jurisdiction of the civil court should neither be
readily inferred nor be construed liberally. There must
be either a specific exclusion of its jurisdiction or it
must be shown to be ousted by necessary implication. A
bare perusal of the entire scheme and structure of the
Family Courts Act would show that Section 8 of the FC
Act does create a specific provision for excluding the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. Section 8 provides that
where a Family Court has been established for an
area, no District Court or any subordinate civil court
referred to in Section 7(1) in relation to such area shall
exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or
proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation to that sub-section. Section 8(c) further
provides that upon establishment of a Family Court,
any proceedings pending immediately before the
establishment of such Family Court before any District
Court or subordinate court shall stand transferred to
such Family Court on the date on which it is
established. However, the situations provided for by
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the legislature in the Explanation forming part of the
Section 7(1)(a) of the FC Act and exclusion provided
for under Section 8 of the FC Act does not illustrate the
whole gamut of eventualities and disputes that may
arise in a matrimonial relation. In Darshan
Singh v. Ram Pal Singh (1992 Supp (1) SCC 191), the
Supreme Court observed in the said context as under :
(Supp SCC p. 207, para 24)
“24. …Neque leges neque senatus consulta ita scribe
possunt ut omnes casus qui quandoque inciderint
comprehendatur; sed sufficet ea quoe pleramque
accident contineri. Neither laws nor Acts of a
Parliament can be so written as to include all actual or
possible cases; it is sufficient if they provide for those
things which frequently or ordinarily happen. What is
material is to see the expressed objects and reasons
and the language used….”
32. It is no longer res integra that the question as
regards exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is to
be considered having regard to the scheme of the FC
Act as also the objects that the enactment seeks to
subserve. Whenever there is an express bar on the
jurisdiction of the civil court, it becomes imperative to
examine the nature of the Act and the provision of the
adequate remedies can be relevant but cannot be
considered to be the sole ground to sustain the ouster
of the jurisdiction of a civil court. In M.
Hariharasudhan v. R. Karmegam ((2019) 10 SCC 94),
it was observed by the Supreme Court that “we say no
more but reiterate that the plea of bar to jurisdiction of
civil court must be considering having regard to the
contention raised in the plaint, which is to be read as
whole and for that purpose the averments must
disclose cause of action and the reliefs which are
sought must be considered in its entirety”. The
jurisdiction of civil court or exclusion thereof, cannot
and must not depend only on few averments made in
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the plaint or petition and/or all the reliefs claimed
thereupon.
xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we
unhesitatingly hold that the term “marital
relationship” has to be interpreted dehors the meaning
and import of the term “family”. The expression,
“marital relationship” when bifurcated brings out that
the word “marital” has been defined as “of or relating
to marriage or relations between husband and
wife” while “marriage” has been defined as a “formal
union of a man and a woman, typically as recognised
by law, by which they become husband and wife”.
35. A fortiori every suit or legal proceeding when
brought before the court must invariably explain the
“cause of action”, which is the fundamental
requirement of law in any given case, and it must
invariably include the narration of the
“circumstances” that arise out of marital relationship
in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court.
There is no gainsaying that the expression “cause of
action” is not defined under any statute and the
Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union
of India held that it was to mean “every fact which
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed in order to support his right of judgment i.e.
the essential facts that must be proven by a party to
obtain a decree, which are material to the case”.
36. The interplay as between the expressions “cause of
action” and the term “circumstances” in the context of
the subject provision must be deciphered in the follow
manner; firstly, the averments in the plaint must
explain the “cause of action” for instituting a suit or
legal proceedings for injunction; and secondly that this
“cause of action” is one which falls within the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts. The cause of action,
in order to bring the case under the subject provision
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and so as to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court
must encapsulate a tangible averment that the dispute
is one which has an intrinsic nexus with the marital
relationship. The circumstances should be of such a
nature that it is demonstrable that the dispute is closely
emanating from and surrounded by such matters which
are integral to the marital relationship. Mere existence
of a marital relationship between the litigating parties
howsoever tangential cannot be the basis or the
foundation for the proceedings being brought before a
Family Court. We hasten to add that if we allow the
interpretation that has been placed to the subject
provision in Avneet Kaur case, it is likely to open a
pandora's box, which would risk inclusion of all
disputes as between the parents and their married
children and even siblings within its ambit.
37. We are in agreement with the submission of
learned amicus that while the subject provision may
encompass a range of “circumstances”, including
those preceding, surrounding, influencing and
emanating from a marital relationship, the emphasis is
on a direct connection between the “cause of action”
and the “marital relationship”. He has rightly urged
that prioritising the cause of action in determining the
correct jurisdictional forum also ensures that family
courts can maintain their specialised focus on
matrimonial matters, avoiding a situation of becoming
overburdened with cases unrelated to marital
relationships, which could inter alia lead to overreach
of jurisdiction and a potential straining of resources.
38. Although research on foreign jurisprudence by the
learned amicus curiae is very impressive and we do not
restrain ourselves in borrowing words of wisdom from
such source, we need to appreciate that the ethos of
family and/or marital relationship that exist in our
country are distinct from those jurisdictions owing to
our peculiar social, educational, regional and cultural
factors. However, unhesitatingly the “functional test”
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which was propounded in Bate case is one that
provides necessary wisdom and suffice it to state that
while a dispute as amongst those who are in a
matrimonial relationship may be traced back to
marriage or matrimony, the judicial scrutiny would
envisage and evolve objective parameters to ascertain
the origin of the dispute and what lies at the core of the
cause of action. The provisions of the FC Act are such
that it provides for a relaxed procedural machinery for
adjudication of disputes, and does away with the
technicalities of the Evidence Act,1872 as well
the CPC, so as to encourage and create an
environment conducive for reconciliation or amicable
resolution of disputes between the parties.
39. A careful perusal of the provisions of the FC Act
would show that the scheme of this Act is such that it
provides for certain distinct measures for settlement of
disputes in matrimonial cases, for instance, Section
4(3) provides for preference to be given for
appointment of women as Judges of the Family Courts;
Section 5 provides for framing of rules for the
association of institutions or organisations engaged in
social welfare or professionally engaged persons for
assistance of the Family Courts so as to promote
family welfare; Section 9 involves the spirit of
providing opportunity to the parties to arrive at a
settlement in an amicable manner so much so that is
specifically empowering the Family Courts to adjourn
the proceedings for such period, as it may deem fit, to
enable the parties to effect a settlement, the underlying
purpose of which is to provide a cooling off period so
as to enable the parties to take an informed decision
about their fate; Section 10(3) empowers the Family
Courts to lay down its own procedure in addition to the
procedure prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code,
1908 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in order
to arrive at a settlement in respect of subject-matter of
the suit or proceedings or find out the truth of the fact
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alleged by one party and denied by others. The Family
Courts are also empowered to hold in camera
proceedings vide Sections 11 and 13 takes away the
right to legal representation in proceedings before the
Family Courts. Section 14 enables the court to receive
any evidence in the nature of any report statement,
document, information, or matter that may, in the
opinion of the Family Court effectively deals with a
dispute irrespective of whether the same is relevant or
admissible under Evidence Act, 1972; Section 15
empowers the Family Courts to record a memorandum
of the substance of what the witness deposes instead of
recording the testimony of witnesses at length, as
normally is the practice in the civil courts; Section 19
provides for an appeal against judgment and order of
the court to the High Court within 30 days of such
orders and the matters are mandated to be heard by a
Bench of two or more judges in the appeal.
40. The relaxation of procedural and evidentiary
safeguards which otherwise attach to proceedings
before civil courts might lead to a situation where the
substantive rights of third-parties would be
compromised, especially in disputes involving complex
factual and/or legal issues. It is also noteworthy that
even where Family Courts may exercise jurisdiction
over matters ordinarily within the purview of civil
courts, the actual exercise of pronouncing and
enforcing orders within the scope of such purported
jurisdiction may be fraught with practical and legal
difficulties.
41. We find much weight in the submissions of the
learned amicus curiae that in cases incidental to or not
directly related to matrimonial issues, such flexibility
might severely prejudice the third parties inasmuch as
parties legitimately expect a legal framework that
strictly adheres to procedural and evidentiary rules for
ultimate and effective resolution of disputes.
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42. Thus, in our considered opinion, the question
whether the claim laid before the Family Court or the
civil court falls within the ambit of the expression “in
circumstances arising out of marital relationship”
must be examined and answered on an identification of
the foundation of the claim, the underlying basis for
the institution of the suit or the proceedings. Thus,
there must be an intrinsic and unwavering connection
between the proceeding and the marital relationship.
This would necessarily entail the court analysing the
cause of action and its relation with the marital
relationship—the interrelation and interdependence
between the two being determinative of the question.
An assertion of a particular suit or proceeding being
liable to be tried exclusively by the Family Court
would succeed only if it is established that there is a
direct nexus between the “cause of action” and the
“marital relationship”. A cause of action which is
shown to exist independent of the marital relationship
would clearly take the matter outside the purview of
the Family Court. What needs to be emphasised is that
a matter would fall under the purview of Family Court
only where the circumstances have a direct bearing on
the marriage. It is not the relationship of the various
parties which could be said to be conclusive. What
needs to be ascertained and identified is the
fundamental basis for the institution of the action. That
underlying basis must have an ineffaceable link to the
marital relationship. The marital relationship must
constitute the point of origin for the action in order to
bring it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family
Courts.
xxx
44 . Accordingly, the present reference is answered as
under:
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(a) Whether a suit for possession/injunction filed by
the in-laws of the defendant or either of them,
claiming themselves or either of them to be the
exclusive owner of the property of which the
possession is sought or with respect to which
injunction is prayed for from or against the
defendant daughter-in-law, is to be tried exclusively
by the Family Court established under the Act, and
the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred?
Answer to question (a):
Each of the categories under Section 7(1)(a) of the
Act are undoubtedly civil in nature. Since the
principal question therein relates to a civil right,
there is no gainsaying that when claim is made
about ownership rights and relief is sought in the
nature of possession or injunction and/or damages,
such legal rights are to be considered de hors the
matrimonial relationship. The proprietorship rights
or ownership rights to immovable property are not
integral to maintaining the matrimonial
relationship. Such rights may be claimed as against
a third person or anyone in the family or for that
matter somebody connected through matrimonial
relationship.
Indeed, when it comes to a dispute as between
mother-in-law and/or father-in-law on the one side
and their estranged daughter-in-law on the other
side, the claim of proprietorship or ownership of a
property and thereby seeking relief in the nature of
possession and/or injunction by its very nature
incidentally indicates a matrimonial relationship,
but such relationship is not a foundational fact so as
to lay a claim. Such relationship is not at the core of
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the dispute but exists independently in civil law, and
thus, the Family Courts do not exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over such disputes and as an inevitable
corollary the jurisdiction of civil courts is not
barred.
(b) Whether the impleadment or non-impleadment of
the husband or the defendant son of the plaintiff has
an effect on the maintainability of such a suit before
a civil court?
Answer to question (b):
In light of our answer to question (a), the answer to
this question would necessarily have to be in the
negative. The mere impleadment or non-
impleadment of the husband or the defendant son of
the plaintiff would not be determinative of the
question relating to the jurisdiction of the Family
Court. The joinder or non-joinder of parties would
have to be considered in light of the plethora of case
law which already exists on that issue. Ultimately
and irrespective of whether a husband is joined or
not, the jurisdiction of the Family Court would have
to ascertained based on the cause of action and
whether that is founded on the marital relationship
or has a mere casual or incidental connection to the
cause.”
15. Applying the same to the facts of the present case, it is observed that
the Plaintiff has sought for the relief of partition of the suit properties, which
are purchased out of her funds by the Defendant No.1, without her consent,
during the subsistence of their marriage. The allegations made in the Plaint
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reveal that the Plaintiff is being subjected to cruelty by the Defendants
regarding dowry and as a result, utilised the funds of the Plaintiff to
purchase the suit properties, thereby showing a direct nexus of the dispute
herein to their marital relationship. Had there been no marital relationship
between the parties, the dispute would have not been arisen in the first place.
The foundation of the dispute being one of arising out of matrimonial
relationship is sufficient to bring it within the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts and the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court Geeta
Anand (supra) is binding on this Court.
16. At this juncture, another question arises as to whether this Court has
the jurisdiction to try the instant case under FC Act or not as the value of the
suit properties is above Rs.2 crores.
17. The said question also no longer survives as the same has been
elaborately dealt by the Division Bench of this Court in Amina Bharatram
vs. Sumant Bharatram and Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3929 . The relevant
portion of the same is as under:-
“ 1 . These proceedings emanate from an order of
reference dated 09.06.2014 (“Reference Order”) made
by the Learned Single Judge in CS(OS) No. 411/2010
(“Suit”), formulating the following questions of law for
adjudication by this Court:
“(i) Whether the High Court while exercising the
Original Civil Jurisdiction is deemed to be a District
Court within the meaning of Section 2(4) of CPC in
the context of Section 7(1)(a) of the Family Courts
Act, 1984?
(ii) Whether the original civil jurisdiction of the
High Court excluded (sic) for any suit or petition by
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virtue of Sections 7 & 8 of the Family Courts Act,
1984?”
2 . This Court notices that the second question would
necessarily involve a determination on the first.
Accordingly, we proceed to examine as to whether this
Court's original civil jurisdiction in respect of matters
outlined in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) is ousted by virtue of the
provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Having
examined this issue of statutory interpretation from
both a literal as well as a purposive lens, we answer
the question in the affirmative. Since this reference
involves a pure question of law, we do not delve into
the specific facts of the case.
xxx
36 . Learned counsel for the plaintiff had submitted
that there is nothing to indicate that Family Courts in
Delhi have been released from the pecuniary
jurisdiction limit. However, this Court is of the
opinion that no such formal notification extending
the Family Courts‟ pecuniary jurisdiction is required.
Once it has been held that „District Court‟ includes
the High Court exercising its original civil
jurisdiction, and in the absence of a bar limiting the
pecuniary jurisdiction of Family Courts to any
pecuniary limit, they would assume jurisdiction
exclusively regardless of pecuniary values.
xxx
43 . It is evident from the above excerpt that the Act was
intended to create a separate procedure for resolution
of disputes of the nature provided therein, such that
ordinary rules of procedure would not always apply to
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such proceedings. The rationale behind this is the
endeavor to amicable resolve disputes concerning
family. Accordingly, the procedure prescribed under
the Act, specifically Chapter IV, applies to the
exclusion of any contrary provision in the CPC
(Section 10). In the event that the term „District Court‟
in Sections 7 and 8 was to be interpreted to exclude
this Court's exercise of ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, the benefits of the procedure prescribed
under the Act would not be available to parties
contesting the suit for the sole reason that the
pecuniary value of the suit exceeds Rs. 20 lakhs (or
now, in excess of Rs. 2 crores). Indeed, this would be
contrary to the object and purpose of the Act.
44 . Another important circumstance, which this court
has to keep in mind, is the provision for appeals and
revisions, in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act. It
reads as follows:
“19. Appeal
(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any
other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment
or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a
Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on
law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order
passed by the Family Court with the consent of the
parties 2[or from an order passed under Chapter IX
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974):
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PROVIDED that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or
any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the
commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment)
Act, 1991.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be
preferred within a period of thirty days from the date
of judgment or order of a Family Court.
(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or
otherwise, call for and examine the record of any
proceeding in which the Family Court situate with in
its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of the order, not being an
interlocutory order, and, as to the regularity of such
proceeding.
[(5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall
lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree
of a Family Court.
[(6)] An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall
be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more
Judges.”
45 . Section 19 clearly establishes the role of the High
Court as an appellate and revisional forum. Unlike
provisions of the Delhi High Court Act, which
specifically provide for intra court appeals, Section 19
casts the High Courts - in relation to family matters-as
an exclusive court of appeal. Furthermore, the creation
of a revisional power and its vesting it in the High
Court - from proceedings and orders of the Family
Court-rules out the possibility of certain High Courts
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exercising intra court appellate jurisdictions. The
appellate jurisdiction is cast in decisive terms, and
conferred upon the High Court-evidenced by clear and
unambiguous language i.e. against every “…order, not
being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the
High Court both on facts and on law.” Lastly,
revisional and appellate power is conferred in respect
of both criminal jurisdiction exercised by the Family
Court (i.e. under Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure) and civil matters. Here, it is noteworthy
that the Family Court under Section 7(2) exercises
jurisdiction that is conferred upon a Magistrate:
“(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a
Family Court shall also have and exercise-
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the
First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for
maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by
any other enactment.”
46 . It is inconceivable that the Parliament intended
that in respect of the categories of matters enumerated
in Section 7(1), especially maintenance, the powers of
a Magistrate were to be vested in High Courts,
depriving them of normal appellate and revisional
remedies.
47 . In light of the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the
term „District Court‟ in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act
includes the High Court to the extent that it exercises
ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Accordingly, its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction in respect of matters
enumerated in Explanation to sub-section (1) of
Section 7 of the Act stands excluded.
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48 . Therefore, the reference is answered as follows:
Point No. 1 : It is held that the Delhi High Court is a
“district court” under Section 8 in respect of all
matters enumerated in Explanation to Section 7(1)
of the Act;
Point No. 2 : The Delhi High Court does not
possess jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide
cases and causes referred to in Sections 7 and 8 of
the Family Courts Act.” (emphasis supplied)
This Court has held that Delhi High Court does not possess the
jurisdiction to entertain and decide cases referred to in Section 7 of the FC
Act.
18. Keeping in line with the law laid down by the Division Bench of this
Court in Amina Bharatram ( supra ), practice directions were issued in this
regard on 23.12.2026 by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court of Delhi.
The said practice directions are being reproduced and reads as under:-
“1. In view of the Judgment dated 19.07.2016 passed
by the Hon‟ble Division Bench of this Court on
reference in CS (OS) No. 411/2010 & I.A. No.
12186/2010 titled “Amina Bharatram Vs. Sumant
Bharatram and Others”, all matters enumerated in
Explanation to Sub-Section (i) of Section 7 and Section
8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 shall be exclusively
triable by the Family Courts and the jurisdiction of the
High Court to the extent it exercises Ordinary Original
Civil Jurisdiction in respect of such matters stands
excluded by virtue of Section 8 (c)(ii) of the said Act.
Such matters listed before this Court shall be
transferred to the Family Courts by passing the
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necessary Orders in this respect on their dates of
listing.
2. The Registry, henceforth, is directed not to accept
such matters as enumerated in Explanation to Sub
Section (i) of Section 7 and Section 8 of the Family
Courts Act, 1984.”
19. At this juncture, it is necessary to reproduce the Statement of Objects
and Reasons for the FC Act, which reads as under:-
“ Statement of Objects and Reasons.— Several
associations of women, other organisations and
individuals have urged, from time to time, that Family
Courts be set up for the settlement of family disputes,
where emphasis should be laid on conciliation and
achieving socially desirable results and adherence to
rigid rules of procedure and evidence should be
eliminated. The Law Commission in its 59th report
(1974) had also stressed that in dealing with disputes
concerning the family the court ought to adopt an
approach radically different from that adopted in
ordinary civil proceedings and that it should make
reasonable efforts at settlement before the
commencement of the trial. The Code of Civil
Procedure was amended in 1976 to provide for a
special procedure to be adopted in suits or proceedings
relating to matters concerning the family. However, not
much use has been made by the courts in adopting this
conciliatory procedure and the courts continue to deal
with family disputes in the same manner as other civil
matters and the same adversary approach prevails. The
need was, therefore, felt, in the public interest, to
establish Family Courts for speedy settlement of family
disputes.
2 . The Bill inter alia, seeks to:—
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(a) provide for establishment of Family Courts by the
State Governments;
(b) make it obligatory on the State Governments to set
up a Family Court in every city or town with a
population exceeding one million;
(c) enable the State Governments to set up, such courts
in areas other than those specified in (b) above;
(d) exclusively provide within the jurisdiction of the
family Courts the matters relating to:—
(i) matrimonial relief, including nullity of marriage,
judicial separation, divorce, restitution of conjugal
rights, or declaration as to the validity of a marriage
or as to the matrimonial status of any person;
(ii) the property of the spouses or of either of them;
(iii) declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;
(iv) guardianship of a person or the custody of any
minor;
(v) maintenance, including proceedings under Chapter
IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure;
(e) make it obligatory on the part of the Family Court
to endeavour, in the first instance to effect a
reconciliation or a settlement between the parties to a
family dispute. During this stage, the proceedings will
be informal and the rigid rules of procedure shall not
apply;
(f) provide for the association of social welfare
agencies, counsellors, etc., during conciliation stage
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and also to secure the services of medical and welfare
experts;
(g) provide that the parties to a dispute before a Family
Court shall not be entitled, as of right, to be
represented by legal practitioner. However, the Court
may, in the interest of justice, seek assistance of a legal
expert as amicus curiae;
(h) simplify the rules of evidence and procedure so as
to enable a Family Court to deal effectually with a
dispute;
(i) provide for only one right of appeal which shall lie
to the High Court.
3 . The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”
20. The exclusion of jurisdiction of district courts or any subordinate civil
courts in trying Family matters as enumerated in the Explanation of Section
7(1) of the FC Act only goes on to establish that the Family Courts were
specifically established to expedite the process of resolving matrimonial
disputes. The objective itself is sufficient to show that the Family Courts
have a subject matter jurisdiction and does not concern itself with pecuniary
jurisdiction.
21. Furthermore, Section 19 of the FC Act, which provides for appeal
reads as under:-
“ 19. Appeal .—(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2)
and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code or
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other
law, an appeal shall lie from every judgement or order,
not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to
the High Court both on facts and on law.
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(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed
by the Family Court with the consent of the parties [or
from an order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to
any appeal pending before a High Court or any order
passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the commencement
of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991].
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred
within a period of thirty days from the date of the
judgement or order of a Family Court.
[(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or
otherwise, call for an examine the record of any
proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its
jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for
the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness,
legality or propriety of the order, not being an
interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such
proceeding.]
[(5)] Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall
lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of
a Family Court.
[(6)] An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall
be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more
Judges.”
22. The foregoing provision clearly establishes the High Court as Court of
Appeal against the order (excluding interlocutory order), or Judgment
passed by the Family Courts. Furthermore, the language of the provision
shows that the High Court is only vested with the power to decide appeals. If
there exists pecuniary jurisdiction for adjudication of the Family matters, the
matters with a valuation of Rs. 2 Crores and above will have to be sent to the
High Court for adjudication, however, an appeal from a High Court’s order
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cannot lie to the High Court, thereby defeating the entire purpose of Section
19 of the FC Act and therefore the legislative intent to confer on the Family
Court all matters under Section 7 of the FC Act whatever be the value of the
suit.
23. This Court has also come across a judgment passed by a Bench of five
Judges of the High Court of Madras in S. Annapoorni v. K. Vijay, 2022 SCC
OnLine Mad 4367 . The High Court of Madras constituted the Five Judges
Bench to answer the following questions which is being reproduced and
reads as under:-
“2. This Special Bench has been constituted to answer
the following questions referred by our learned brother,
V. Parthiban, J. by an order dated 28.10.2021:
“(i) Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court, on its
Original Side, over matters of child custody and
guardianship is ousted, in view of the provisions of
Explanation (g) to Section 7(1) read with Sections 8
and 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 ? and
(ii) Whether the decision of a Full Bench of this Court
in Mary Thomas v. Dr. K.E. Thomas (AIR 1990 Mad
100) is still good law?”
24. The Five Judges Bench of the Madras High Court answered the
reference by holding as under:-
“370. Though we have written/penned separate orders,
for the purpose of clarity and specificity, we deem it
appropriate to set out in one voice that the reference is
answered per majority in the following manner:
(i) Reference : Whether the jurisdiction of the High
Court, on its Original Side, over matters of child
custody and guardianship is ousted, in view of the
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provisions of Explanation (g) to Section 7(1) read with
Sections 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984?
Answer : The jurisdiction of the High Court on its
Original Side over matters of child custody and
guardianship is not ousted in view of the provisions of
Explanation (g) to Section 7(1) read with Sections 8
and 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
(ii) Reference : Whether the decision of a Full Bench of
this Court in Mary Thomas v. Dr. K.E. Thomas (AIR
1990 Mad 100) is still good law?
Answer : The decision of Hon'ble Full Bench of this
Court in Mary Thomas v. Dr. K.E. Thomas (AIR 1990
Mad 100) continues to be good law.”
25. A reading of the abovementioned Judgment discloses that it has not
expressed its disagreement with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in
Amina Bharatram ( supra ) but has actually relied on the provisions of Clause
17 of the Letters Patent, 1865, which deals with the matters of child custody
and guardianship. Clause 17 of the Letters Patent, 1865 reads as under:
“ 17. Jurisdiction as to infants and lunatics : - And we
do further ordain that the said High Court of
Judicature at Madras shall have the like power and
authority with respect to the persons and estates of
infants, idiots and lunatics within the presidency of
Madras, as that which is now vested in the said High
(„ours immediately before the publication of these
presents. ”
26. This issue is not relevant for the present case which deals with
Explanation (c) of Section 7(1) of the FC Act, which relates to a suit or
proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of
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the parties or of either of them. This Court is, therefore, not dwelling into
that facet of the Judgment rendered in S. Annapoorni (supra). Further, it is
pertinent to mention that the Division Bench of this Court in Amina
Bharatram ( supra ) has also expressed its disagreement with the decision of
the Full Bench of Madras High Court in Mary Thomas v. Dr. K.E. Thomas,
AIR 1990 Mad 100 , which was being reconsidered in S. Annapoorni
(supra). The Division Bench of this Court in Amina Bharatram ( supra ) has
also expressed its disagreement with the Judgment of the Full Bench of
Bombay High Court in Romila Jaidev Shroff v. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff,
AIR 2000 Bom 356 . It is pertinent to mention that Madras High Court and
Bombay High Court are Chartered High Courts which are governed by
Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, whereas Delhi High Court, which is a Non-
Chartered High Court and is governed by Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of
the Lahore High Court and, therefore, the provisions are entirely different.
27. Be that as it may. In view of the fact that this Court is bound by the
Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Amina Bharatram ( supra )
and also in view of the fact that practice directions have been issued
pursuant to that Judgment, the Application is allowed and the instant Plaint
is returned to the Plaintiff for filing it in the Court of competent jurisdiction.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
APRIL 27, 2026
SM
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