The State of Tripura and Others vs Sri Mati Lal Bhowmik and Ors.
- Court
- Tripura High Court
Page 1 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRP No.68 of 2026
&
CRP No.82 of 2026
1. The State of Tripura, Represented by the Secretary, Department of Revenue,
Government of Tripura, Agartala, West Tripura.
2. The District Magistrate & Collector, Government of Tripura, Agartala, West
Tripura.
3. The Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Tripura, Agartala,
West Tripura.
4. The Director of Land Records & Settlement, Government of Tripura,
Agartala, West Tripura.
……. Petitioner(s).
V E R S U S
1. Sri Mati Lal Bhowmik, S/O. Late Chandra Sagar Bhowmik, Residence of
Indranagar Colony, P.O.-Abhoynagar, P.S.-East Agartala, District-West
Tripura. At present residing at Village Bagadi, P.O.-Bimangarh, P.S.-Airport,
District-West Tripura.
2. Smt. Chandrani Bhowmik (Mitra), W/O. Shri Ranjan Mitra, Residence of
Indranagar, Banler Math, P.O.-Abhoynagar-799005, P.S.-East Agartala,
District-West Tripura.
3. Smt. Indrani Bhowmik, W/O. Shri Partha Bhowmik, Residence of
Chandrapur, Madhya Para, Agartala-799007, P.S.-East Agartala, District-West
Tripura.
4. Smti. Debjani Bhowmik (Debnath), W/O. Shri Rajesh Bhowmik, Residence
of Ananga Nagar, P.O.-Bimanghar-799015, P.S.-East Agartala, District-West
Tripura.
……….. Respondents(s).
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mangal Debbarma, Addl. G.A.
For Respondent(s) : None.
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
CAV reserved on : 13.11.2026 .
Judgment delivered on : 21.11.2026 .
Whether fit for reporting : YES .
Page 2 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
COMMON JUDGMENT & ORDER
The petitioner in both these Revisions filed under Art.227 of the
Constitution of India is the State of Tripura-the Judgment debtor in TS No.117
of 1997 on file of the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Court No.1, West Tripura,
Agartala.
The Background facts:
2. One Mano Ranjan Nath had filed the said suit against the State of
Tripura and other officers of the State for declaration of his title to the plaint
schedule property with consequential relief for correction of Record of rights
u/s.11(4) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act,1960 as he was
aggrieved by order passed by the District Collector, West Tripura, Agartala
under Section 11(3) of the said Act.
3. Pending suit he died and his only daughter Smt. Chandi Rani
Bhowmik was impleaded as his legal representative.
4. After contest, the said suit was dismissed on 25.6.2002 by the
said Court.
5. Challenging the same, a Title Appeal No.36 of 2002 (for short
‘TA No.36 of 2002) was filed before the Addl. District Judge, West Tripura,
Agartala by his daughter/legal representative Smt. Chandi Rani Bhowmik.
6. The said Title Appeal was allowed on 18.9.2004 and the Court
declared that plaintiff had right, title and interest over the plaint schedule
property. It also directed that the record of rights be corrected under Section
11 (4) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 accordingly.
Page 3 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
7. The State of Tripura and other defendants filed RSA No.65 of
2005 on 6.10.2005 in this court challenging the said judgment in TA.No.36 of
2002.
8. On 11.9.2006, the said RSA was admitted.
9. Pending the RSA, Smt. Chandi Rani Bhowmik also died on
7.10.2012. Her husband Mati Lal Bhowmik and her three daughters were
brought on record as her legal representatives.
10. Subsequently after contest, the RSA also was dismissed on
4.8.2014 by this Court. Decree was passed therein on 5.11.2014.
The Execution Petition filed by respondents:
11. Sri Mati Lal Bhowmik and his daughters then filed on 31.7.2025,
Execution (Title) No.30 of 2025 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, West
Tripura, Agartala, Court No.1 praying that the judgment Debtors be directed
to correct the subsequent/present Record of Rights in name of Decree Holders
by deleting the name of Govt. of Tripura and/or its various departments as per
the Judgment and decree dt.18.9.2004 passed by the Addl. District Judge,
West Tripura, Agartala, Court No.2 and as per Judgment dt.4.8.2014 of this
Court in the RSA.
The objections raised by petitioners to the Execution Petition:
12. The Judgment Debtors filed an objection to the said Execution
Petition under Section 47 of the CPC.
13. Their principal contention was that Art.135 of the Limitation
Act,1963 applies and the respondents/Decree Holders ought to have
approached for the execution of the decree within 3 years from the date of the
decree of the First Appellate Court i.e. within 3 years from 18.9.2004 in Title
Page 4 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
Appeal.No.36/2002. They contended that the Decree Holders had filed the
Execution petition in 2025 basing on the dismissal of the RSA 65 of 2025 on
4.8.2014 and so the same is time barred. Alternatively, they also contended
that even if limitation is to be counted from 4.8.2014 when RSA No.65 of
2005 was dismissed, the period of limitation expires on 3.8.2017 in view of
Art.135 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which prescribes only 3 years and so the
execution petition is to be dismissed.
14. The Decree Holders/respondents filed reply refuting the said
contentions. They pointed out that Art.135 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does
not apply and that Art.136 thereof would be attracted which gives 12 years
time to execute the decree. They contended that the decree in Title
Appeal.No.36/2002 is not a decree for mandatory injunction. They further
contended that the State should act as a responsible litigant and implement the
Court orders in letter and spirit and it cannot take technical pleas to defeat the
legitimate rights and interests of the public.
The order dt.17.6.2026 of the Executing Court dismissing the objection petition of the
State to the Execution Petition filed by respondents:
15. The Executing Court dismissed on 17.6.2026 the objection
petition.
16. The Executing Court held that the relief granted in the judgment
dt.18.9.2004 in TA No.36 of 2002 was not merely an abstract declaration. The
Appellate Court had examined the claim of title over the land under the
Kayemi taluk No.191/Jote No.820, disapproved the placement of the land in
the Govt. Khas Khatian, declared the right, title and interest of the plaintiff,
and then directed that the record of rights be corrected accordingly. It held that
Page 5 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
the latter portion is not an independent equitable relief granted to prevent the
breach of an obligation, but a natural and necessary consequence of the
adjudication made in a suit arising out of a revenue record dispute. It held that
the suit TS No.117 of 1997 was specifically brought under Section 11(4) of
the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960 following the
rejection of a revenue petition under Section 11(3). It held that the direction
issued by the First Appellate Court to correct the record of rights is a
consequential statutory relief which flows naturally from the declaration of
title. It is a ministerial directive issued to public authorities to bring the
revenue registers in conformity with the declaration of title made by a
competent court. It does not metamorphose into a decree for ‘mandatory
injunction’ simply because it commands an action.
17. It also held that the form of the decree in TA No.36 of 2002 is
also material. The appellate Court did not frame the relief as one of mandatory
injunction. The suit itself arose after the plaintiff’s attempt for correction of
record of rights under the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, 1960
failed. It held that the civil court’s declaration would be rendered substantially
ineffective if the revenue record, which was the subject matter of the
controversy, is allowed to remain uncorrected despite the express direction of
the appellate Court. Execution in the present case seeks only that direction. It
does not seek any relief beyond the decree.
18. It held that since the decree under execution, in its relevant part,
is not a decree granting mandatory injunction, Art.135 is not attracted and
only Art.136 is attracted.
Page 6 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
19. It further held that the judgment in TA No.36 of 2002 stood
confirmed in the RSA before the High court. Upon such confirmation, the
operative decree for the purposes of execution has to be understood in the
light of the appellate process having reached finality. The present execution
petition filed in 2025 is within 12 years from the decree dt.5.11.2014 in RSA
No.65 of 2005.
20. Challenging the same, the Judgment Debtors have filed CRP
No.68 of 2026.
The order dt.17.6.2026 of the Executing Court allowing the Execution Petition filed
by respondents:
21. After dismissing the objection petition on 17.6.2026, the
Executing Court also passed a separate order on 17.6.2026 allowing the
Execution petition. Challenging the same the Judgment Debtors have filed
CRP No.82 of 2026.
Consideration by this Court:
22. Since common issues arise for consideration, they were heard
together and are being disposed of by this common order.
23. Firstly I shall consider:
“whether time for the purpose of counting period of
limitation for execution is to be counted from 5.11.2014 (when
the decree in RSA No.65 of 2005 was passed) or from
dt.18.9.2004 (when TA No.36 of 2002 was decided)?”
The Supreme Court decision in Chandi Prasad ( 1 supra):
24. This issue was decided authoritatively by the Supreme court in
1
Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad .
1
(2004) 8 SCC 724, at page 730
Page 7 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
25. The Supreme court held that a ‘decree’ is defined in Section 2(2)
of the Code to mean ‘the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as
regards the court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the
parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and
may be either preliminary or final’; as against a judgment and decree unless
otherwise restricted, a first appeal would be maintainable under Section 96 of
the Code and a second appeal under Section 100 thereof; and that a decree
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code would be enforceable
irrespective of the fact whether it is passed by the trial court, the first appellate
court or the second appellate court.
26. It held that where a statutory appeal is provided for, subject, of
course to the restrictions which may be imposed, it is a continuation of suit
and that when a higher forum entertains an appeal and passes an order on
merit, the doctrine of merger applies.
27. It explained that when a judgment is pronounced by a High Court
in exercise of its appellate power upon entertaining the appeal and a full
hearing in the presence of both parties, the same would replace the judgment
of the lower court and only the judgment of the High Court would be treated
as final.
28. It also held that when an appellate court passes a decree, the
decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court and even
if and subject to any modification that may be made in the appellate decree,
the decree of the appellate court supersedes the decree of the trial court. In
other words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of the fact as to
Page 8 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
whether the appellate court affirms, modifies or reverses the decree passed by
the trial court.
The Supreme Court judgment in Surinder Pal Soni( 2 supra):
29. This was also reiterated by the Supreme Court in Surinder Pal
2
Soni v. Sohan Lal wherein the Supreme Court clarified that upon the decision
of the appellate court, there was a merger of the judgment of the trial court
with the decision which was rendered in appeal. Consequent upon the passing
of the decree of an appellate court, the decree of the trial court merges with
that of the appellate court. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale
that there cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. It
also held that once the appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree of
the trial court, there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the trial court
with the decision of the appellate court. Once the appellate court renders its
judgment, it is the decree of the appellate court which becomes executable.
Hence, the entitlement of the decree-holder to execute the decree of the
appellate court cannot be defeated.
30. In the instant case too, the judgment of the first appellate court in
TA.No.36 of 2002 got merged in the judgment of this Court in RSA even
though it had merely affirmed the same.
31. So the limitation for seeking enforcement commences only from
date of judgment in the RSA i.e. from 5.11.2014 and not from the date of
judgment in the TA No.36 of 2002.
32. The next question to be considered is:
2
(2020) 15 SCC 771, at page 778
Page 9 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
“whether Art.135 of the Limitation Act,1963 (which
prescribes 3 year period applies) or Art.136 of the said Act
(which prescribes 12 years applies)?
33. Art.135 deals with execution of the decree for mandatory
injunction. In the decree passed in TA No.36 of 2002, the words ‘mandatory
injunction’ have not been used.
34. As rightly held by the Executing Court the appellate Court had
examined the claim of title over the land under the Kayemi taluk No.191/ Jote
No.820, disapproved the placement of the land in the Govt. Khas Khatian,
declared the right, title and interest of the plaintiff and then directed that the
record of rights be corrected accordingly. The latter portion is not an
independent equitable relief granted to prevent the breach of an obligation, but
a natural and necessary consequence of the adjudication made in a suit arising
out of a revenue record dispute.
35. It is undisputed that the suit TS No.117 of 1997 was specifically
brought under Section 11(4) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms
Act, 1960 following the rejection of a revenue petition under Section 11(3). So
as rightly held by the executing Court, the direction issued by the First
Appellate Court to correct the record of rights is a consequential relief which
flows naturally from the declaration of title. It is a ministerial directive issued
to public authorities to bring the revenue registers in conformity with the
declaration of title made by a competent court. It does not metamorphose into
a decree for ‘mandatory injunction’ simply because it commands an action.
36. So Art.135 has no application to the facts and circumstances of
the case and only Art.136 applies. If the time is counted from 5.11.2014 when
Page 10 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
the decree in RSA was passed, the Execution Petition filed in 2025 is
undoubtedly within time.
37. There is one another way of looking at this.
38. Section 11 of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act,
1960 states:
“Section 11. (1) All lands, public roads, lanes and paths
and bridges, ditches, dikes, and fences on or beside the same, the
beds of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, and all canals
and water courses, and all standing and flowing water, and all
rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, which are not
the property of any person, are and are hereby declared to be the
property of the Government.
(2) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in the terms of
a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, quarries,
minerals and mineral products including mineral oil, natural gas
and petroleum shall vest in the Collector whose order shall,
subject to the provisions of this Act, be enjoyment of such rights.
(3) Where any property or any right in or over any property
it claimed by or on behalf of the Government, or by any person
as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such
dispute shall be decided by the Collector whose order shall,
subject of the provisions of this Act, be final.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-
section (3) or in appeal or revision there from may institute a
civil suit to contest the order within a period of six months from
the date of such order and the decision of the civil court shall be
binding on the parties.’ (emphasis supplied)
39. Section 11 (4) of the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms
Act,1960 entitles a party like the plaintiff who was unsuccessful in a getting
Page 11 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
the record of rights corrected before the Collector under subsection (3) of
Section 11 to file a Civil Suit to contest the Collector’s order.
40. The said provision itself makes the Civil Court decision ‘ binding
on both parties ’.
41. Thus having lost in the Civil Court which held that the petitioners
had no title, it is not open to petitioners to avoid the binding nature of the
decree in favour of the respondents/decree holders by taking the untenable
plea that the execution petition is time barred. The civil court’s declaration
would be rendered substantially ineffective if the revenue record, which was
the subject matter of the controversy, is allowed to remain uncorrected despite
the express direction of the appellate Court. Execution in the present case
seeks only that direction. It does not seek any relief beyond the decree.
42. I also hold that the relief to correct the record of rights granted in
favour of the respondents against the petitioners cannot be said to be referable
to Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 which deals with mandatory
injunctions. It is referable to sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Tripura Land
Revenue and Land Reforms Act,1960 and the State was obligated to give
effect to the decision of the Civil Court declaring title of the respondents to the
plaint schedule property by correcting record of rights.
43. In Daroga Singh v. B.K. Pandey 3 , the Supreme Court
emphasized that for the survival of the rule of law the orders of the courts
have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless overturned, modified or
stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court does not have any
agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive authority of the State
3
(2004) 5 SCC 26 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1521, at page 46 :
Page 12 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
has to come to the aid of the party seeking implementation of the court orders.
The might of the State must stand behind the court orders for the survival of
the rule of the court in the country. If the judiciary has to perform its duties
and functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the
courts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all concerned
failing which the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary
runs the risk of being lost.
44. The judgment of the Orissa High Court in Ishteyaque Ahamad
4
and another v. Kitawan Bibi and others cited by counsel for the petitioners
which holds that Art.135 of the Limitation Act,1960 applies to execution
petition for enforcing of a mandatory injunction has no relevance because in
that case there was a direction granted by the Civil Court to demolish
constructions made by defendants in addition to declaration of plaintiff’s title
and also a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from making further
construction. It was held that the direction to demolish structures is in the
nature of mandatory injunctive relief granted under Section 39 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 as the defendants were compelled for performance of the act
of demolition of the structures.
5
45. The decision in State of M.P. v Mangilal Sharma cited by
counsel for petitioners is distinguishable because in that case the Civil Court
declared that plaintiff is still in continuous service of the defendant and that
his services were not terminated. The plaintiff filed execution application
stating that he should also be given all consequential benefits, salary, dearness
allowance, promotion etc. The executing court allowed the said application.
4
AIR 1985 ORISSA 102
5
(1998) 2 SCC 510
Page 13 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
The Supreme Court held that the suit was filed for a mere declaration, that
consequential relief was not sought therein, and cannot be taken to have been
granted. So the Executing Court could not have granted the relief sought by
the plaintiff in the Execution Petition.
6
46. In Babu Singh (D) Thr.Lrs v. Jalandhar Improvement Trust
cited by the petitioner, the Civil Court while declaring that cancellation of
allotment of a plot by respondents was illegal, wrong and unconstitutional
specifically held that the appellant was entitled to a mandatory injunction
against the respondents directing them to comply with an order by
defenadnatno.1 dt.18.2.1988. In that situation an Execution petition filed on
12.8.2010 to implement the mandatory injunction was held barred by Art.135
of the Limitation Act, 1963.
47. The judgment of the Telangana High Court in Nagubandi
7
Pulliah v. Maduri Srinivasa Rao also is distinguishable because in that case
too there was a specific relief of mandatory injunction granted by the Civil
Court in the decree granted to the plaintiff and so Art.135 was held applicable.
48. As pointed out above, there was no mandatory injunction granted
in the instant case. So these decisions have no application.
49. I am also of the view that the stand taken by the petitioners is
vexatious, unjust and unconscionable since it has without justifiable grounds
delayed compliance with the direction of the civil court to correct the Record
of Rights from 5.11.2014 till date for 12 years.
6
SLP.No.4284 of 2023 dt.17.2.2026
7
CRP No.4172 of 2009 dt.11.10.2022
Page 14 of 14 2026:THC:1559
TRHC010013652026
8
,
50. In Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra the
Supreme Court emphasized that the State should act as a model litigant. It held
that Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants
and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust)
contentions to obstruct the path of justice.
51. For all the above reasons, I hold that the executing Court was
correct in rejecting the objections filed by petitioner in Execution Petition
filed by respondents/Decree Holders and also in consequently allowing the
same.
52. So both revisions are dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/- to be
paid to the Respondents/Decree Holders by the appellants within 8 weeks.
All pending Miscellaneous Applications stand disposed of.
(M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO), CJ
PULAK BANIK
Digitally signed by PULAK BANIK
Date: 2026.11.21 17:05:05 +05'30'
8
(2020) 19 SCC 241, at page 245