Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd vs M/S. Creative Entrepreneurs Llp Through Its Designated Partners, Mr. Gagan Aggarwal

$~58
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 05.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010538102026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 307/2026, CM APPL. 77457/2026, CM
APPL. 77458/2026 & CM APPL. 77459/2026

DAKSHINANCHAL VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM LTD
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Harsh Som, Adv.

versus

M/S. CREATIVE ENTREPRENEURS LLP THROUGH ITS
DESIGNATED PARTNERS, MR. GAGAN AGGARWAL
.....Respondent
Through:

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)
1. This appeal is filed against the order dated 14.08.2026
(hereinafter ‘impugned order’) dismissing the objection petition filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as time-
barred.
2. The facts in brief are that the appellant floated a tender for
construction of 33/11 KV sub-station and associated 33 KV lines and
11 KV lines at Ganjdundwara, District Kasganj on turnkey-basis. On
12.05.2015, Letter of Intent (LOI) was awarded in favour of the
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respondent at a value of Rs.3,47,16,453. The agreement was executed
between the parties on 04.02.2016.
2.1 Dispute arose between the parties inter alia execution of work,
alleged delay and deficiencies, outstanding payments and contractual
deductions. On 22.12.2021, the respondent filed a reference to the
Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council under Section 18 of
the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for
short ‘MSMED Act’). On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the
dispute was referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre
(DIAC). The arbitral proceedings culminated in award dated
21.05.2024 and was served on the appellant on 28.05.2024.
2.2 The objection petition of the appellant filed in August, 2024
under Section 34 of the Act challenging the award dated 21.05.2024
before the Commercial Court, Agra was dismissed vide order dated
08.01.2026 for want of territorial jurisdiction. Thereafter the objection
petition was filed before this Court on 10.06.2026 and was dismissed
being barred by limitation. Hence, the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the respondent
was not a company registered under the MSMED Act when the contract
was entered between the parties.
3.1 The argument is that the arbitral award was passed without
jurisdiction. No other issue is pressed.
4. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to reproduce
Section 34(3) of the Act:-
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“ 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if
a request had been made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
5. Section 34(3) of the Act provides that the limitation for filing the
objection petition under Section 34 of the Act is three months from the
date of receipt of the award. The proviso provides the power to condone
delay of thirty days beyond the prescribed limitation period of three
months. The language of Section 34(3) is unambiguous and
consequence is that by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is ousted. The Court has
the power to condone the delay only for a period of thirty days beyond
the prescribed limitation period of three months.
6. The issue is no longer res integra in view of the settled position
of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the following judgments:
6.1 In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others , (2008) 7 SCC 169 held
as under:
“20. When any special statute prescribes certain period of
limitation as well as provision for extension upto specified
time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period
of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail
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and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall
stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting
sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application
for setting aside the award should be made within three
months and the period can be further extended on sufficient
cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not
thereafter, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
would not be applicable because the applicability of Section
5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the
provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.”
6.2 In Singh Enterprises vs. CCE , (2008) 3 SCC 70 held as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also
the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with
jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible
period provided under the statute. The period up to which the
prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily
provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Limitation Act') can be
availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section
35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred
within three months from the date of communication to him
of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause
from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60
days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period
of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal
has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso
further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority
to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate
authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented
beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the
position clear that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up
to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal
period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
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Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in
holding that there was no power to condone the delay after
the expiry of 30 days' period.”
6.3 In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo
India (P) Ltd. and Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 791 held as under:
“32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections35,
35- B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that
an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made
within 180 days only from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the language used in other
provisions makes the position clear that the legislature
intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by
condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60
days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring
an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay
by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there
is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The
High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was
no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed
period of 180 days.”
6.4 In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission (2010) 5 SCC 23 held as under:
“25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any
decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this
Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the
decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125
empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a
further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period
of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed
for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is
substantially different from the period prescribed under the
Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression
‘within a further period of not exceeding 60 days’ in the
proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for
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filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act
under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against
the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120
days.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In the case in hand, the initial objection petition filed before the
Commercial Court, Agra was within ninety days and was dismissed for
want of territorial jurisdiction vide order dated 08.01.2026. Thereafter,
the objection petition was filed before this Court on 10.06.2026 after a
delay of approximately five months. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
applicable despite the language of Section 34(3) of the Act. Even if the
period from August, 2024 to January, 2026 during which the appellant
was pursuing the objection petition before the Commercial Court, Agra
is excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the objection
petition filed before this Court was beyond the prescribed period of
hundred and twenty days under Section 34(3) of the Act. The learned
Single Judge rightly dismissed the objection petition as time barred,
more so, there was no sufficient cause explaining the delay. Section 14
of the Limitation Act excludes the period in pursuing proceedings
before a Court that lacked jurisdiction. The delay in filing the objection
petition before the competent court after excluding the period under
Section 14 of the Limitation Act has to be dealt as per the proviso to
Section 34(3) of the Act.
8. The objection petition under Section 34 of the Act was dismissed
as time-barred and the merits were not rightly gone into by the learned
Single Judge. The contentions raised by learned counsel for the
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appellant on merits need no adjudication. In appeal it is to be considered
that the objection petition was decided within the four corners of
Section 34 of the Act. The dismissal of the objection petition as time-
barred is upheld and the challenge on merit cannot be gone into.
9. It is a settled law that in appeal under Section 37 of the Act, it is
to be considered that the exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act
was within the four corners of the provisions. Reference in this regard
be made to the following decisions of the Supreme Court:-
9.1 In AC Chokshi Share Broker (P) Ltd. v. Jatin Pratap Desai ,
(2025) 5 SCC 321 it was held:
“29. The limited supervisory role of courts while reviewing
an arbitral award is stipulated in Section 34 of the Act, be-
yond whose grounds courts cannot intervene and cannot cor-
rect errors in the arbitral award. [McDermott International
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181, para 52]
The appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is also limited, as
it is constrained by the grounds specified in Section 34 and
the court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the
merits of the award by reappreciating evidence or interfering
with a reasonable interpretation of contractual terms by the
Arbitral Tribunal. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4
SCC 163, para 14 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293; Konkan Railway
Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project, (2023) 9 SCC 85, para
25 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ) 458.] The court under Section 37
must only determine whether the Section 34 court has exer-
cised its jurisdiction properly and rightly, without exceeding
its scope. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163,
para 14 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293; Bombay Slum Redevelop-
ment Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, (2024) 7
SCC 218, para 26.]”
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9.2 In SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn. v. GMR
Kamalanga Energy Ltd., (2026) 2 SCC 542 it was held:
“72. The decision in MMTC [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , as referenced
recently by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Reliance In-
frastructure Ltd. [Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of Goa,
(2024) 1 SCC 479 : (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 412] , unfolds in an
involute manner that a court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act
can only determine as to whether the court concerned under
Section 34 has not travelled beyond the parameters of the
scope therein. No independent evaluation is permitted on the
merits of the award.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. There is no factual or legal error calling for interference in the
impugned order. The appeal is dismissed.
11. All pending applications are disposed of.

AVNEESH JHINGAN, J

SHAIL JAIN, J
NOVEMBER 5, 2026
Anjali

Reportable: Yes
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