Deewan vs Comm. Of Police
- Court
- Central Administrative Tribunal
1
OA No. 519/2017
Item No. 74 (C-4)
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O.A. No. 519/2017
Reserved on: 28.09.2026
Pronounced on: 22.10.2026
Hon’ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon’ble Dr. Anand S Khati, Member (A)
Deewan
S/o Sh. Suresh Kumar
R/o Village Mundhalia,
P.O. Bikaner, Dist. & Teh. Rewari,
Haryana-123401
(Aged about 30 years)
(Constable in Delhi Police)
…Applicant
(By Advocates: Mr. Ajesh Luthra, Ms. Meenu Sharma)
Versus
1. The Commissioner of Police
Police Headquarters,
I.P. Estate, New Delhi
2. The Deputy Commissioner of Police
(Recruitment)
New Police Lines, Delhi
3. The Deputy Commissioner of Police
th
6 Battalion DAP, New Police Lines,
Kingsway Camp, Delhi
....Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar)
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
In the instant Original Application, the applicant seeks
the following relief(s):-
“a) Quash and set aside the impugned order of the
respondents and
b) Direct the respondents to continue the applicant
in service with all consequential benefits.
c) Award costs of the proceedings; and
d) Pass any order/relief/direction(s) as this
Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the
interests of justice in favour of the applicant.”
2. Highlighting the facts of the case, learned Counsel for
the applicant submitted that the impugned action of the
respondents in withdrawing the applicant’s appointment is
illegal, arbitrary and without proper application of mind.
The Screening Committee has merely referred to the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.P./Delhi vs.
Shani Kumar , CA No. 4965/2013 and Jainender Singh
vs. Stateof U.P. , CA No. 5671/2012 without examining
the actual facts and manner of acquittal in the applicant’s
criminal cases.
2.1. It was submitted that in FIR No. 71/2006, the
prosecution witnesses, including the injured complainant,
did not support the prosecution case; the accused’s
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was dispensed with for
want of incriminating material; and the Trial Court
ultimately found that there was nothing on record
connecting the applicant with the offence. Further, there
was no material regarding any weapon or serious injury
attributed to the applicant.
2.2. Likewise, in FIR No. 28/2010, the prosecution
witnesses deposed that the injuries were not caused by the
accused, and the Trial Court found no incriminating
evidence against the accused, consequently dispensing with
the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
2.3. Learned Counsel further submitted that the allegation
that the applicant is unsuitable on the ground that he has no
regard for the dignity of women is wholly unfounded, and
the findings of the Screening Committee are contrary to the
findings recorded by the competent criminal courts.
2.4. It was argued that the acquittals were recorded after
full-fledged trials, wherein the prosecution witnesses were
examined and the prosecution failed to establish the
charges. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the
acquittals amount to honourable acquittal, making the
principles relied upon by the respondents in Shani Kumar
(supra) /Jainendra Singh (supra) inapplicable.
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
2.5. In support of applicant’s case, reliance is placed upon
the following case laws:
(i) R.K. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors., 2005 (3)
AISLJ 390 wherein, according to the learned counsel, it is
held that acquittal for want of evidence constitute an
honourable acquittal.
(ii) Bhag Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank, 2006 (1) SCT
175, wherein, according to the learned counsel, it is held
that where the prosecution fails to prove the criminal charge
for want of evidence, the acquittal is an honourable
acquittal.
(iii) Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 10
SCC 450 wherein, according to the learned counsel, it is
held that acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence.
(iv) Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal
Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541 wherein, according to
the learned counsel, it is held that where the prosecution
fails to prove the charges after consideration of its evidence,
the acquittal is an honourable acquittal.
(v) Jogender Singh v. UT of Chandigarh & Ors. and
Manoj v. Union of India & Ors., W.P. (C) No.
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11979/2015 are also relied upon as covering the applicant’s
case.
2.6. Learned counsel submitted that the respondents have
treated the mere existence of past criminal cases as
determinative, without properly appreciating the evidence
and the nature of the acquittals, and have consequently
withdrawn his appointment on an arbitrary and legally
unsustainable basis.
2.7. Learned counsel further drew our attention to the
relevant portion of the Trial Court judgment dated
06.12.2008 in Criminal Case No. 649/2006 and judgment
dated 12.05.2010 in Criminal case No. 37 of 2010, which
read as under:
“ relevant portion of judgment dated 06.12.2008 ”
7. I have heard the argument advanced by learned
APP for the State and learned defence counsel and
have gone through the case file very carefully.
8. In order to prove its case, the prosecution
examined three witness at all. Complainant Smt.
Saroj when stepped into witness box as PW.1
deposed that in the evening 30.07.2006 at about
6/6.30 PM, a quarrel, of she, Nimbo and Rekha
sustained injuries as they were trying to pacify. On
the previous day, she also sustained some injuries
as she. fell down and she took treatment in Civil
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Hospital, Rewari on 30.07.2006. She specifically
deposed that she could not see the persons who
inflicted injuries to them. At this stage, this witness
was declared hostile at the instance of learned APP
for the State and was allowed to be cross-examined
by him. During her cross-examination, she deposed
that she has seen, heard and understood the
statement contained in Ex.PW1/A and deposed that
she has not made any such statement to the police.
She admitted, her signature Ex.PW1/A but deposed
voluntarily the police on had obtained her
signature on blank paper. was cross-She denied all
the suggestions put forwarded by learned APP to
her. She examined at length by learned APP for the
State but nothing fruitful has been elicited. She
specifically denied the suggestion that he was
deposing falsely in collusion with the accused
persons. sons. He was not cross-examined by
learned defence counsel, however, opportunity was
granted.
9. The prosecution met with the same fate when it
examined other, injured l.e. Nimbo Devi as PW2
and Rekha as PW3. When these witnesses stepped
into witness box, they also did not support the
prosecution case and also declared hostile at the
instance of learned APP for the State. In their
cross-examination, they also resiled statements
from their and Ex.PW2/A previous Ex.PW3/A They
respectively made before the police. also denied the
suggestions put forwarded by learned APP for the
State and even that they were deposing falsely in
collusion with the accused. They were also not
cross-examined by learned defence counsel,
however, opportunity was granted.
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10. The aforesaid witness i.e. PW1, PW2 and PW3
are the material and concerned witnesses of the
prosecution. Their hostility towards the
prosecution left the prosecution in dilemma. No
useful purpose would be served by examining the
remaining witnesses, who are formal in nature;
rather it would have been unnecessary burden on
the State Exchequer. Learned APP for the State had
no other option except to close of the the evidence
prosecution and evidence of the prosecution was
closed accordingly.
11. From the evidence referred to above, there is
nothing on record to connect the accused persons
with the offence charge-sheeted. In these
circumstances, the court is left with no option
except to acquit the accused persons of the charge
framed against them. I order accordingly. The
accused are acquitted. Bail bonds and surety bonds
of accused stand discharged. File be consigned to
the record room.
relevant portion of judgment dated 06.12.2008
8. After hearing both counsel and perusing the
contents, it is observed as follows:
9. In the present case prosecution -has examined
Happy Yadav as PW1 and in his evidence he has
deposed that he has going to the fair, where fight
has taken place. He also suffered injuries. He
denied any injury being inflicted by the accused
persons in the court. The statement Ex.PW1/A has
been denied to him to have been given to the police
and stated that no injury has been inflicted by the
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Similarly, Manish complainant has failed to depose
anything regarding the injury accused. being
inflicted by the accused persons present in the court
and has only deposed the fact that he suffered
injuries in the fight. He denied having any
statement given to the police. Further he has stated
that no injury was inflicted by the accused.
Similarly, testimony has been given by PW3
Mahinder Nath and he failed to depose anything
regarding the alleged incident and denied any
statement given to the police.
12. This court is of the opinion that all the witnesses
of the prosecution have failed to depose anything
regarding the guilt of the accused and that the
accused have committed the offence charged with.
They denied giving their respective statement
Ex.PW1/A, EX.PW2/A and Ex.PW3/A to the police
and failed to identify the accused present in the
court. As the complainant as well as eye witnesses
did not support the case of the prosecution,
therefore, evidence of the prosecution was closed by
learned APP, as after examination of remaining
witnesses there were no chances of improvement in
the case of prosecution. Therefore, no
incriminating evidence has come against the
accused, so statement of accused under Section 313
Cr.P.C. stands dispensed with. Thus, accused are
acquitted from the charges framed against them
under section 323/506/146 IPC.”
3. Opposing the grant of relief, learned Counsel for the
respondents submitted that the impugned action is legal
and justified, as the applicant’s suitability for appointment
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in the Delhi Police was duly examined by the Screening
Committee having regard to the nature and gravity of the
offences, his role therein, the grounds and manner of
acquittal and the overall circumstances of the case.
3.1. Learned Counsel relied upon Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi & Anr. v. Mehar Singh & Anr.,
Civil Appeal No.4842 of 2013 and Commissioner of
Police, New Delhi & Anr. v. Shani Kumar (supra),
wherein, according to the learned counsel, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court emphasized that a candidate seeking
appointment in the police force must possess impeccable
character and integrity and that even an acquittal has to be
examined to determine whether the candidate has been
completely exonerated.
3.2. It was further submitted that the principles laid down
in Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2016) 8 SCC
471 and Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P., (supra) were
duly considered by the Screening Committee, which
examined the FIRs, the applicant’s role, the Trial Court
judgments, the grounds and manner of acquittal and the
applicant’s representation.
3.3. Learned Counsel also relied upon R.
Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police & Ors.,
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
(2008) 1 SCC 660, to submit that the standard of suitability
expected from a person seeking appointment in a uniformed
service is different from that applicable to other services.
Reliance was also placed on P.U. Joshi & Ors. v.
Accountant General, Ahmedabad & Ors., (2003) 2
SCC 632, to contend that matters relating to recruitment
criteria and suitability fall within the domain of the State
and that the Tribunal ought not to substitute its own view
for that of the competent authority.
3.4. Concluding the arguments, learned counsel submitted
that the Screening Committee, after considering all relevant
factors, rightly found the applicant unsuitable for a
disciplined police force and, therefore, the present O.A. is
liable to be dismissed.
4. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the
applicant on 14.05.2026, it is submitted that the applicant
was selected in the Delhi Police Constable (Executive)
recruitment of 2009, subject to verification of his character
and antecedents. Although his candidature was initially
cancelled on account of his involvement in two criminal
cases, both cases had already culminated in acquittal. The
applicant challenged the cancellation in O.A. No. 1968/2011,
which was allowed by this Tribunal vide order dated
06.02.2012, and the respondents’ challenge thereto before
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the Hon’ble Delhi High Court was dismissed on 07.05.2012.
Thereafter, the applicant was issued an offer of appointment
dated 27.08.2012 and subsequently joined service and was
confirmed on 19.02.2016.
4.1. It is further submitted that pursuant to the common
order dated 22.11.2016 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in SLP No.34248/2012 and connected matters, the
respondents reconsidered the applicant’s case in the light of
Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. , (supra), and
thereafter passed the impugned order dated 17.01.2017
withdrawing his appointment. According to the applicant,
the respondents failed to properly consider the relevant
facts concerning the nature and manner of his acquittals.
4.2. With regard to FIR No.71 dated 30.07.2006, it is
submitted that the statement of the applicant under Section
313 Cr.P.C. was dispensed with for want of incriminating
material and the Trial Court specifically recorded that there
was nothing on record connecting the accused with the
offences. The applicant therefore contends that the acquittal
was a clean and honourable acquittal. Reliance is placed
upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
Sandeep Singh’s case, W.P.(C) No.5675/2017, decided on
10.12.2019, wherein, according to the applicant, it was held
that where the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is
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dispensed with, the acquittal is not on the benefit of doubt
but for want of evidence.
4.3. It is similarly submitted that in FIR No.28 dated
06.03.2010 also, the applicant was acquitted and his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was dispensed with for
want of incriminating evidence. The applicant therefore
contends that the same principle laid down in Sandeep
Singh (supra) applies to this case as well.
4.4. The applicant further relied upon GNCT of Delhi v.
Vishambar Dayal , W.P.(C) No.15272/2023, decided on
06.02.2025, to contend that merely because prosecution
witnesses turned hostile, it cannot automatically be
presumed that they had been won over by the accused, as
winning over a witness requires a positive act such as
inducement or threat.
4.5. Lastly, it is submitted that the findings recorded by
this Tribunal in the applicant’s earlier O.A. No.1968/2011
continue to hold the field and have not been overturned.
The applicant also relied upon his approximately 14 years of
continuous and unblemished service, including his
confirmation in service, to submit that his suitability stands
tested by his actual service record.
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
5. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
perused the pleadings available on record.
6. ANALYSIS :
6.1. Having considered the rival submissions and perused
the material available on record, including the judgments of
the learned Trial Courts in the two criminal cases, we find
that the controversy essentially turns upon whether the
respondents, while reconsidering the applicant’s suitability
pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
have meaningfully examined the nature and manner of his
acquittal, as required in terms of the law laid down in
Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors .(supra). It is not
in dispute that the applicant had disclosed his involvement
in the aforesaid criminal cases and, therefore, the issue of
concealment of material facts does not arise. The Screening
Committee was thus required to consider the actual material
emerging from the criminal proceedings and not merely the
allegations contained in the FIRs.
6.2. In the first criminal case arising out of FIR No.71/2006,
the judgment dated 06.12.2008 shows that the prosecution
examined three material witnesses, including the
complainant/injured witnesses, but none of them supported
the prosecution case. PW-1 specifically stated that she could
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
not identify the persons who had inflicted the injuries and
denied having made the statement attributed to her before
the police. The other material witnesses also did not support
the prosecution and denied their previous statements. The
learned Trial Court, after noticing that these were the
material witnesses of the prosecution and that nothing
useful had emerged from their cross-examination by the
learned APP, recorded a categorical finding that “there is
nothing on record to connect the accused persons with the
offence charge-sheeted” , and consequently acquitted the
accused.
6.3. More significantly, in the second criminal case arising
out of FIR No.28/2010, the prosecution witnesses failed to
depose anything regarding the guilt of the accused; they
denied having made statements to the police and failed to
identify the accused in Court. The learned Trial Court
specifically recorded that “no incriminating evidence has
come against the accused” and, consequently, dispensed
with the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
before recording the acquittal.
6.4. The aforesaid findings of the learned Trial Courts
assume significance because the Screening Committee,
while observing that the applicant had merely obtained
acquittal on technical grounds and that the cases involved
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
conduct rendering him unsuitable for a disciplined police
force, was required to demonstrate from the record as to
what material survived against the applicant
notwithstanding the acquittals. However, the impugned
decision does not satisfactorily deal with the categorical
findings of the Trial Courts that there was no incriminating
material connecting the applicant with the offences. The
mere reference to the FIR allegations and the nature of the
offences, without reconciling them with the findings
recorded after trial, cannot by itself constitute a meaningful
consideration of the manner of acquittal.
6.5. We are conscious of the settled position that an
acquittal by itself does not confer an indefeasible right to
appointment in a disciplined force and that the employer is
entitled to assess the suitability of a candidate having regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner of acquittal.
However, such discretion is required to be exercised on the
basis of relevant material and by applying the principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the present case,
the question is not whether the respondents possess the
power to assess the applicant’s suitability, but whether such
power has been exercised upon a proper consideration of
the material actually emerging from the criminal trials.
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
6.6. In this regard, the distinction between a case where an
accused is acquitted on technical grounds or on account of
benefit of doubt and a case where the prosecution fails to
produce incriminating evidence is material. In the present
case, the Trial Courts have recorded specific findings that
the material prosecution witnesses did not support the
prosecution case and that there was no incriminating
evidence connecting the applicant with the offences. The
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was also dispensed
with in both cases for want of incriminating material. These
aspects could not have been brushed aside merely by
describing the acquittals as having been obtained on
“technical grounds”.
6.7. We also find substance in the applicant’s contention
that the fact that certain prosecution witnesses were
declared hostile cannot, by itself, lead to an inference that
the applicant had procured or won over such witnesses. The
material placed on record does not disclose any finding by
the learned Trial Courts that the witnesses had been won
over by the applicant. On the contrary, the Trial Court
judgments record that the witnesses themselves denied the
prosecution version and that nothing useful could be elicited
from them despite their cross-examination by the learned
APP.
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
6.8. The respondents have relied upon C.P./Delhi v.
Shani Kumar , (supra), C.P./Delhi v. Mehar Singh ,
(supra), Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors. , (supra),
and Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. , (supra). There
can be no quarrel with the proposition that antecedents and
the manner of acquittal are relevant considerations while
assessing suitability for appointment in the police force.
However, the said authorities do not dispense with the
requirement of considering the actual facts and
circumstances of the particular criminal case. Such an
exercise must necessarily be undertaken by the Screening
Committee on a case-to-case basis, and a mechanical order
founded merely on the judgments of the Hon’ble Court
ought not to be passed without due consideration of the
facts and circumstances of each individual case.
6.9. We are also conscious of the fact that the applicant had
earlier approached this Tribunal in O.A. No.1968/2011,
which was allowed on 06.02.2012, followed by dismissal of
the respondents’ challenge before the Hon’ble Delhi High
Court. Thereafter, the applicant was appointed and
continued in service, and was subsequently confirmed on
19.02.2016. Though such subsequent service cannot, by
itself, override the requirement of suitability, his actual
service record was certainly a relevant circumstance which
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
ought to have been taken into consideration while
undertaking the exercise of reconsideration.
6.10. In the totality of the facts, we are of the considered
view that the respondents were entitled to undertake an
assessment of the applicant’s suitability, but the said
exercise was required to be undertaken by applying the
correct legal parameters to the actual material on record.
The impugned order, however, proceeds substantially on the
allegations contained in the criminal cases and the
perceived gravity thereof, without adequately addressing the
categorical findings recorded by the Trial Courts that the
prosecution had failed to produce incriminating evidence
connecting the applicant with the offences. The decision-
making process, therefore, suffers from non-consideration
of material and relevant circumstances and cannot be
sustained.
6.11. Before parting with the matter, we may also take note
of the recent judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Santosh Gurung v. State of Sikkim , Criminal
Appeal No. 107 of 2018, reported as 2026 INSC 1073,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“(ii) We may in this connection refer to the decision in Raj
Kumar Singh @ Raju @ Batya Vs. State of Rajasthan(2013
INSC 313 ). While explaining the relevance of statements made
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
by the accused under Section 313 of the Code, it was held as
under:
“36. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is recorded to meet the requirement of the principles of
natural justice as it requires that an accused may be given an
opportunity to furnish explanation of the incriminating
material which had come against him in the trial. However,
his statement cannot be made a basis for his conviction. His
answers to the questions put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution
witnesses in their depositions. Thus, the statement of the
accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and therefore, it
can be used only for appreciating the evidence led by the
prosecution, though it cannot be a substitute for the evidence
of the prosecution. In case the prosecution’s evidence is not
found sufficient to sustain conviction of the accused, the
inculpatory part of his statement cannot be made the sole
basis of his conviction. The statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is not recorded after administering oath to the
accused.”
Therefore, it cannot be treated as an evidence within the
meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the accused
has a right if he chooses to be a witness, and once he makes
that option, he can be administered oath and examined as a
witness in defence as required under Section 315 Cr.P.C. An
adverse inference can be taken against the accused only and
only if the incriminating material stood fully established and
the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the
same. However, the accused has a right to remain silent as he
cannot be forced to become witness against himself.” Thus,
when it is found that the chain of circumstances relied upon by
the prosecution is not complete and that the same does not
inspire confidence for its acceptance, the response of the
appellant recorded in his statement under Section 313 of the
Code cannot be a circumstance against him, especially when
other circumstantial evidence is not found to be satisfactory
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Item No. 74 (C-4)
pointing out to the guilt of the appellant alone and none
other. (emphasised)”
7. CONCLUSION :
7.1. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order dated
17.01.2017 withdrawing the applicant’s appointment is
liable to be quashed and set aside. Ordered accordingly.
7.2. The respondents shall accordingly treat the applicant
as continuing in service, with consequential benefits on a
notional basis in accordance with law.
7.3. The O.A. is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
7.4. Pending M.A.(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No
order as to costs
(Dr. Anand S Khati) (Manish Garg)
Member (A) Member (J)
/ as/
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