Anil Kumar Sidar vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:21349
MANPREET
KAUR
NAFR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
Date: 2026.05.13
10:36:35 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 556 of 2013
Anil Kumar Sidar S/o Minketan Sidar Aged About 21 Years R/o Indira
Nagar, Ps Tamnar, Distt. Raigarh C.G.
--- Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Officer In Charge Of The Ps Tamnar,
Distt. Raigarh C.G.
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A.
ACQA No. 467 of 2018
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police
Station Tamnar, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant(s)
Versus
Anil Kumar Sidar S/o Minketan Sidar Aged About 21 Years R/o
Indranagar, P. S. Tamnar, Civil And Revenue District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, G.A.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ
07.05.2026
1. This appeals arise out of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 10.05.2013 passed by the Second Additional
Sessions Judge, Raigarh (C.G.) in S.T. No. 49/2011, whereby the
appellant has been acquitted from offence punishable under
Sections 366(A) and 376 of the IPC and convicted as under:
Conviction Sentence
Section 363 of the
R.I. for 03 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in
IPC
default of payment of fine 4 months
additional R.I.
2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that the complainant (father of
the victim), resident of Indiranagar Basanpali, was employed as a
driver and on the date of incident had gone for duty in the
morning hours. The victim, aged about 12 years, had gone to her
school for participation in the Republic Day programme.
3. According to the prosecution, when the complainant returned
home in the afternoon and enquired regarding the victim, he was
informed that she had not returned from school. Thereafter, he
made efforts to trace her in the locality. During the course of such
search, he allegedly received information that the accused had

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taken the victim to a vacant house situated near the roadside at
Indiranagar.
4. It is the further case of the prosecution that when the complainant
reached the said place, he allegedly heard the voice of the victim
from inside the room. Upon intervention by the complainant, the
accused allegedly fled from the spot taking the victim along with
him. Since the victim could not be traced despite search, the
complainant lodged a report at Police Station Tamnar at about
5:30 p.m., on the basis of which FIR bearing Crime No.19/2011
was registered initially for offences punishable under Sections
365 and 366-A of the Indian Penal Code.
5. The prosecution further alleged that thereafter the accused took
the victim to a secluded place and subjected her to sexual assault
during the intervening night. On 27.01.2011, the victim was
recovered from the custody/company of the accused.
6. During investigation, the victim was medically examined after
obtaining consent from her parents and the accused was also
subjected to medical examination. The clothes and other relevant
articles were seized and forwarded for forensic and chemical
examination. The investigating agency prepared the spot map
and recorded statements of witnesses including Lalitabai,
Laxminarayan, Pankaj and Jagatram under Section 161 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.

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7. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against
the accused for offences punishable under Sections 365, 366A
and 376 of the Indian Penal Code before the Court of learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gharghoda. The learned
Magistrate, upon finding prima facie material against the
accused, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial in
accordance with law.
8. The accused denied the allegations and abjured guilt. In his
statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the accused pleaded innocence and stated that he
had been falsely implicated. In defence, Rajaram Patnaik (DW-1)
was examined.
9. The prosecution in order to substantiate its case, examined as
many as 12 witnesses and exhibited as many as 19 documents
(Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-19).
10. After appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned
trial Court has convicted the accused/appellant and sentenced
him as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal.
11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/accused would
submit that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are
contrary to the evidence available on record and settled principles
governing criminal jurisprudence. It has been argued that the
prosecution has failed to establish the ingredients of offence
under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the

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conviction of the appellant is unsustainable in law, particularly
when the appellant has been acquitted of the remaining charges.
Learned counsel would further submit that the learned trial Court
has erred in determining the age of the victim and that no reliable
documentary evidence was produced by the prosecution to
conclusively establish that the victim was a minor at the relevant
point of time. Referring to the testimony of complainant Suresh
Kumar (PW-2), it has been contended that even the father of the
victim was uncertain regarding the dates of birth of his children
and, therefore, the prosecution version regarding the age of the
victim is doubtful. It has also been argued that the conviction
cannot rest solely upon oral testimony in absence of cogent
corroborative documentary evidence. Learned counsel further
submits that the version reflected in the FIR appears unnatural
and improbable inasmuch as the complainant allegedly witnessed
the victim being taken away yet failed to prevent the accused
from fleeing. It has further been contended that the testimony of
the victim suffers from material contradictions and omissions vis-
à-vis her previous statements and, as such, the prosecution has
failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore,
it has been prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and
sentence deserves to be set aside.
12. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that the
impugned judgment, to the extent it records acquittal of the
accused for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the

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Indian Penal Code, is contrary to the evidence available on
record. It has been contended that the testimony of the victim
(PW-3) is natural, cogent and trustworthy and that she has
consistently supported the prosecution case in material
particulars. Learned State counsel would further submit that the
victim was a minor child at the time of the incident and her
evidence clearly establishes that the accused had taken her away
and subjected her to sexual assault. It has also been argued that
the learned trial Court erred in discarding the testimony of the
victim merely on the ground that no external injuries were noticed
during medical examination and that the medical expert did not
render any definite opinion. According to learned State counsel,
absence of injuries cannot by itself negate the prosecution case,
particularly in cases involving a child victim. It has further been
submitted that the learned trial Court itself recorded a finding
regarding the minority of the victim on the basis of the material
available on record and, therefore, the question of consent was
wholly immaterial. Learned State counsel would also submit that
non-production of the FSL report could not have been treated as
fatal to the prosecution case when the substantive evidence of
the victim otherwise inspires confidence and is sufficient to
establish the offence. Accordingly, it has been prayed that the
appeal preferred by the accused deserves to be dismissed and
the appeal against acquittal filed by the State merits acceptance.

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13. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record with utmost circumspection.
14. The principal issue which falls for consideration before this Court
is whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, insofar
as they relate to conviction of the accused for the offence
punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and
acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the
Indian Penal Code, are sustainable in light of the evidence
available on record.
15. It is pertinent to observe that the question whether conviction of
the accused can be based on the sole testimony of the victim in
cases of sexual assault/rape is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in a catena of judgments
and has held that the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable
can be the sole ground for convicting the accused and that the
creditworthy testimony of the victim in cases of such nature
deserves acceptance.
16. The question for consideration is whether learned trial Court has
rightly acquitted the respondents despite the presence of the
testimony of victim (PW-2) along with other material evidence
available on record.
17. This State has preferred appeal against the judgment of acquittal
filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. The
appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the trial Court

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had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and
observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box
and also required to keep in mind that even at that stage, the
accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be
such as a reasonably person would honestly and conscientiously
entertain as to the guilt of the accused.
18. The Supreme Court in C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair, AIR 2003
SC 182 has held that unless the High Court arrives at definite
conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse,
it would not substitute its own view on a totally different
perspective.
19. The Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha,
AIR 2004 SC 1053 has held that the appellate Court in
considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to
interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons
for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable
and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably
eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for
interference.
20. The scope of interference in appeal against the judgment of
acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 the Supreme Court has held in para
6 as under:-

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“6.……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is
inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a
conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in
the order of acquittal passed by the Court below will not
constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside
the acquittal. The jurisdiction of the appellate Court in
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is
circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to
be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach
made by the lower Court to the consideration of the
evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest
illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below
is such which could not have been possibly arrived at
by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is,
therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. Where
two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence
adduced in the case and the Court below has taken a
view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court
cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal even
if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court
below on its consideratio n of the evidence is erroneous.”
21. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of
acquittal the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully
empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence
adduced on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of
the trial Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the
grounds given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to
dispel those reasons.

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22. When a person is charged for offence punishable under the
POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the
age of the victim is significant and essential ingredients to prove
such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when
the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years.
Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the “child” which means
any person below the age of eighteen years.
23. The next issue that arises for consideration in the present appeal
is whether the age of the victim on the date of commission of the
offence concerned, was below 18 years of age.
24. Regarding the age of the victim, the learned trial Court has
elaborately considered the oral as well as documentary evidence
available on record and recorded a categorical finding that the
victim was a minor at the time of the incident.
25. Suresh Kumar Sahu (PW-2), father of the victim, in his deposition
before the Court, stated that the victim was about 11 years of age
at the time of the incident. He further deposed regarding the
circumstances in which the victim had gone missing on the date
of occurrence and the subsequent lodging of the First Information
Report. His testimony in material particulars remained
substantially unshaken during cross-examination.
26. The victim (PW-3), in her statement before the Court, specifically
disclosed her date of birth as 21.02.1998. She also stated that at
the relevant point of time she was studying in school and had

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gone for participation in the Republic Day programme on the date
of occurrence. Her testimony regarding her age finds support
from the school record brought on record by the prosecution.
27. The evidence of the victim further indicates that after being taken
away by the accused, she was kept confined at different places
and was subsequently recovered by the police in presence of her
family members and other witnesses. The testimony of
prosecution witnesses namely Pankaj Kumar Sahu (PW-4),
Jagatram Sidar (PW-5), Laxminarayan Yadav (PW-11), Assistant
Sub-Inspector L.R. Bhagat (PW-7) and Investigating Officer
Pramod Kumar Khes (PW-12) substantially corroborates the
prosecution version regarding recovery of the victim from the
company/custody of the accused.
28. Learned counsel for the accused sought to assail the finding
regarding minority of the victim on the ground that the
prosecution did not produce the original birth certificate, Kotwari
register or any radiological examination report for scientific
determination of age. Reliance was also placed upon certain
judicial precedents to contend that in absence of reliable
documentary evidence, the age of the victim cannot be said to
have been conclusively proved.
29. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. Merely
because radiological examination was not conducted or certain
documents were not produced, the otherwise reliable evidence

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available on record cannot be discarded altogether. The victim
consistently stated her date of birth and the same finds support
from the school record available on record. Furthermore, the
father of the victim clearly deposed that she was about 11 years
of age at the relevant time.
30. The evidence available on record further reflects that at the
relevant point of time the victim was studying in Class VI and
subsequently, at the time of her deposition, was studying in Class
VII. No material contradiction or effective challenge was brought
during cross-examination to probabilise that the victim was major
at the relevant point of time.
31. The defence sought to highlight that the father of the victim was
unable to state the exact dates of birth of all his children.
However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, such
omission by itself cannot be treated as sufficient to discard the
otherwise cogent evidence regarding age, particularly when the
witness categorically stated that the correct age had been
mentioned at the time of school admission.
32. The evidence available on record, taken cumulatively, clearly
establishes that the victim was about 12 years of age on the date
of incident and, therefore, was a minor.
33. Once it stands proved that the victim was a minor at the relevant
point of time, her alleged willingness or absence of active
resistance loses legal significance. In cases involving a minor

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victim, consent in the strict legal sense becomes immaterial and
the act of taking away the victim from the lawful guardianship of
her parents without their consent squarely attracts the ingredients
of the offence punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal
Code.
34. The prosecution witnesses namely Pankaj Kumar Sahu (PW-4),
Jagatram Sidar (PW-5), Sanjay Kumar Dadsena (PW-6)
Laxminarayan Yadav (PW-11), Assistant Sub-Inspector L.R.
Bhagat (PW-7) and Investigating Officer Pramod Kumar Khes
(PW-12) have consistently supported the prosecution version
regarding recovery of the victim from the custody/company of the
accused.
35. Pankaj Kumar Sahu (PW-4), in his deposition before the Court,
stated that he was acquainted with both the accused and the
victim. According to him, on 27.01.2011, upon receiving
telephonic information from the father of the victim regarding her
missing condition, he reached the house of the complainant at
Indiranagar, Tamnar and joined in the search for the victim. He
further stated that during such search, the accused was found
near Tyagi Dhaba situated at Salihabhata and upon being
questioned regarding the whereabouts of the victim, the accused
attempted to evade the query. The witness further deposed that
after arrival of the police, the victim was recovered from a room
on the information furnished by the accused and that the room

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had been locked from outside. Thereafter, the accused and the
victim were taken to the police station by the police authorities.
36. During cross-examination, the witness stated that he was resident
of village Padigaon and had received telephonic information from
the complainant on the morning of 27.01.2011. Though certain
omissions and contradictions with reference to his police
statement were brought on record, no material contradiction
affecting the core of the prosecution case could be elicited. The
witness remained consistent on the material aspect that the
victim was recovered from the room at the instance of the
accused and that the accused was present at the relevant place
and time.
37. The testimony of this witness substantially corroborates the
prosecution version regarding recovery of the victim from the
company/custody of the accused and also lends assurance to the
evidence adduced by the complainant and the investigating
agency.
38. Jagatram Sidar (PW-5) has reiterated that he knows the accused
Anil and has narrated the sequence of events leading up to the
intervention of the police. According to him, on the date of
incident, he along with Suresh Sahu, father of the victim
Jayshree, had gone on a motorcycle to a hotel near Urjanagar
Power Plant, where accused Anil and Jayshree were found
together. He has further stated that Suresh Sahu immediately

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informed the police, pursuant to which the police arrived at the
spot, apprehended both the accused Anil and the victim
Jayshree, and took them to the police station. The witness also
stated that he accompanied them to the police station and
thereafter expressed ignorance about further facts.
39. The testimony of PW-5, thus, remains confined to the aspect of
alleged last seen circumstance and subsequent police
intervention. His statement lends some support to the prosecution
version regarding the presence of the accused and the victim
together at the hotel and their being taken to the police station by
the police thereafter.
40. PW-2, being the father of the victim, is a material witness for the
prosecution and has deposed in detail regarding the occurrence
and subsequent events.
41. He has identified the accused Anil Kumar present in Court and
stated that his daughter, aged about 11 years at the time of
incident. He has narrated that on 26.01.2011, his daughter had
gone to school for Republic Day celebrations at about 7:00 a.m.,
and later did not return home. Upon enquiry, he was informed
that she had not returned from school. He has further stated that
at about 2:00-2:30 p.m., he was informed by a person on the way
that the accused had taken his daughter to a room in Indira
Nagar locality. On reaching the place, he found his daughter
there and also confronted the accused, who allegedly tried to

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fight with him. He then raised alarm and reported the matter to
Police Station Tamnar.
42. PW-2 has further stated that on the next day at about 9-10 a.m.,
his daughter and the accused were found at a dhaba at
Hukaradipa, from where the police recovered the victim and
handed her over to him. He has also proved his consent for
medical examination (Ex. P/4) and his signature on the spot map
(Ex. P/5). He has further stated that his statement was recorded
by the police during investigation.
43. In cross-examination, PW-2 has been extensively questioned
regarding his family background, knowledge of dates of birth of
his children, and entries in school records. He has admitted
certain facts relating to family composition and schooling of the
victim but expressed inability to recall exact dates of birth.
44. He has also made admissions regarding absence of documentary
proof at the time of school admission and variation in his
recollection of dates mentioned in FIR and police statement. He
has, however, consistently maintained the core prosecution
version regarding missing of the victim, information received, and
recovery from the accused.
45. On careful appreciation, the testimony of PW-2 is of significant
evidentiary value as it provides the initial complaint, missing
report, alleged last seen information, and recovery narrative.
Though certain minor discrepancies and omissions have

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emerged during cross-examination, they do not materially
discredit the core prosecution case, particularly regarding the
missing of the victim and subsequent recovery.
46. Accordingly, PW-2’s evidence inspires confidence on material
particulars and substantially supports the prosecution version,
subject to corroboration from other evidence on record.
47. PW-3 (victim) herself is the most material witness of the
prosecution. She has identified the accused Anil Kumar in Court
and has deposed that she was residing with her maternal uncle at
Indira Nagar, Tamnar, and that the accused also resided in the
same locality, a few houses away from her residence.
48. She has stated that on 26.01.2011, while returning home on foot
after attending the Republic Day function at her school, the
accused came from behind, covered her mouth, forcibly caught
hold of her hands, and dragged her to a nearby dilapidated
house. She further deposed that she became unconscious as she
had not eaten anything since morning.
49. According to her, when she regained consciousness, she found
herself in another room where her hands and legs were tied, her
mouth was gagged, and her clothes were found in a disarranged
condition. She stated that she was in severe pain in her private
parts and was unable to raise alarm due to being gagged and
tied. She further stated that the room was locked from outside.

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50. PW-3 has further deposed that the police subsequently arrived at
the spot along with her father, maternal uncle, and other relatives,
and she was rescued and taken to the police station. Thereafter,
she was medically examined with her consent at the Government
Hospital, Tamnar, and her signature appears on the consent form
(Ex. P/6).
51. At the initial stage, the witness was declared hostile by the
prosecution and permission was granted to put leading questions.
In such examination, she admitted that the accused had taken
her to another room where she was confined overnight and
further stated that the accused had committed sexual assault
upon her during that period. She also supported the prosecution
version that she was recovered from a room at Tyagi Hotel by the
police in the presence of her father and relatives.
52. In cross-examination by the defence, PW-3 was confronted with
several suggestions regarding alleged consensual relationship,
false implication, and alleged prior intimacy with the accused.
However, she denied all such suggestions. She consistently
maintained that she was forcibly taken by the accused, kept
confined, and subjected to sexual assault.
53. It is also significant that she admitted having made a similar
statement before the police during investigation. She further
explained that she was under fear and shock at the initial stage,
which affected her ability to make prompt statements.

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54. On careful appreciation, the testimony of PW-3 is cogent, natural,
and substantially consistent on the core aspect of forcible taking
away, confinement, and subsequent recovery. Minor variations in
narration are natural considering her age and the traumatic
nature of the incident and do not affect the substratum of the
prosecution case.
55. The defence has not been able to elicit any material contradiction
or improbability which would discredit her testimony on material
particulars. Her evidence is further corroborated by PW-2 (father),
PW-4, PW-5, and PW-12 regarding recovery and surrounding
circumstances.
56. Accordingly, the evidence of PW-3 inspires confidence and
stands as the strongest foundation of the prosecution case,
clearly establishing the occurrence and the role attributed to the
accused.
57. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v.
State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:-
“22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling witness’
should be of a very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more

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relevant would be the consistency of the statement
right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the
time when the witness makes the initial statement and
ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and
consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the
accused. There should not be any prevarication in the
version of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the cross-examination of any
length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under
no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to
the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as
well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should
have co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be
any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold
the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him.
Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the
above test as well as all other similar such tests to be
applied, it can be held that such a witness can be
called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version can be
accepted by the Court without any corroboration and
based on which the guilty can be punished. To be
more precise, the version of the said witness on the
core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while
all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the
said version in material particulars in order to enable

21
the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version
to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the
offender guilty of the charge alleged.”
58. When considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual
offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost
accurate account of the incident. Instead, the emphasis is on
allowing the victim to provide her version based on her
recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to
recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free
from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that
version. In State of H.P. v. Shree Kant Shekar (2004) 8 SCC
153 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as follows:“
“21. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of
having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an
accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that
her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in
material particulars. She stands on a higher pedestal
than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is
injury on the physical form, while in the former it is
physical as well as psychological and emotional.
However, if the court on facts finds it difficult to accept
the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may
search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance,
short of corroboration, as understood in the context of
an accomplice, would suffice.”

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59. On these lines, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivasharanappa
and Others v. State of Karnataka , (2013) 5 SCC 705 observed
as follows:
“17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely
upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form
the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful
and is corroborated by other evidence brought on
record. Needless to say as a rule of prudence, the
court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from
other reliable evidence placed on record. The
principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary
statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is
true and correct and is of quality and cannot be
discarded solely on the ground of lack of
corroboration, apply to a child witness who is
competent and whose version is reliable.”
60. Upon a holistic evaluation of the entire oral and documentary
evidence on record, it is evident that the prosecution case does
not rest upon a solitary or isolated piece of evidence but is
founded upon a consistent chain of natural and mutually
corroborative circumstances.
61. The evidence of PW-2 (father of the victim), PW-3 (victim herself),
PW-4, PW-5, PW-11 and PW-12, when read in conjunction,
establishes a coherent narrative commencing from the missing of

23
the victim, receipt of information regarding her whereabouts,
tracing of the victim, recovery from a confined place, and her
subsequent medical examination.
62. The testimony of the victim (PW-3), which is the pivot of the
prosecution case, is not only cogent and consistent but also
inspires inherent confidence. Her statement is corroborated in
material particulars by independent witnesses and the
investigating officer. The defence has failed to discredit her
testimony on any material aspect.
63. In order to constitute an offence under Section 363 IPC, it is
sufficient to establish that a minor was taken or enticed away
from the lawful guardianship without consent.
64. Similarly, Section 366 IPC stands attracted where such
kidnapping is coupled with intent that the victim may be
compelled or forced to engage in illicit intercourse or is otherwise
subjected to sexual exploitation.
65. In the present case, once the minority of the victim stands
conclusively established, and once it is proved that she was
taken away without the consent of her lawful guardian, the
foundational ingredients of Section 363 IPC stand fully satisfied.
66. Further, the surrounding circumstances, including confinement,
recovery from a secluded place, and subsequent sexual assault,
clearly bring the case within the ambit of Section 366 IPC.

24
67. Section 376 IPC deals with punishment for rape. The essential
ingredients stand satisfied when it is established that sexual
intercourse took place and it was without the consent of the
victim, or in the case of a minor, consent is legally irrelevant.
68. In the present case, the victim has categorically deposed
regarding sexual assault committed upon her by the accused
during the period of unlawful confinement. Her testimony is
natural, consistent, and unshaken on material particulars.
69. The minor contradictions pointed out by the defence do not dilute
the core allegation of sexual assault. The law is well settled that
in cases of sexual offences, particularly involving minors, the
Court is required to give due weight to the testimony of the victim
if it is otherwise trustworthy.
70. Accordingly, the offence under Section 376 IPC stands clearly
established beyond reasonable doubt.
71. The defence plea of alleged consensual relationship, false
implication, or prior acquaintance does not stand scrutiny. Firstly,
the victim is a minor, and therefore the question of consent in law
does not arise. Secondly, no credible material has been brought
on record to substantiate any prior intimacy or motive for false
implication. Thirdly, the defence version remains inconsistent and
unsupported by any independent evidence. Mere suggestions in
cross-examination cannot dislodge a well-established prosecution
case. It is well settled that minor discrepancies, omissions, or

25
irregularities in investigation do not affect the core of the
prosecution case unless they go to the root of the matter.
72. In the present case, the alleged deficiencies in documentation,
procedural lapses, or absence of certain formal records do not
create any reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence of the
incident. The substratum of the prosecution case remains intact
and unimpeached. The prosecution evidence, when tested on the
anvil of probability and natural human conduct, appears wholly
reliable. The sequence of events as deposed by the victim and
corroborated by independent witnesses is natural and inspires
confidence. The prompt reporting of the incident, immediate
search for the victim, recovery from a confined place, and
medical examination further strengthen the prosecution version.
There exists no plausible alternative hypothesis consistent with
innocence of the accused.
73. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon reappreciation of the
entire evidence available on record, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the findings recorded by the learned trial
Court acquitting the accused of offences punishable under
Sections 366A and 376 of the IPC are unsustainable in law and
on facts. The learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the
cogent and reliable testimony of the victim (PW-3), which stands
duly corroborated by the evidence of PW-2, PW-4, PW-5, PW-11

26
and PW-12 as well as the surrounding circumstances established
by the prosecution.
74. This Court further finds that the prosecution has successfully
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was a minor at
the time of the incident and that the accused had taken her away
from the lawful guardianship of her parents and thereafter kept
her confined and subjected her to sexual assault. The testimony
of the victim is trustworthy, natural and inspires confidence. The
defence has failed to create any reasonable doubt regarding the
prosecution case.
75. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court
is fully empowered to reappreciate the entire evidence on record
and to interfere where the findings of the Trial Court are perverse,
unreasonable or suffer from material illegality. The jurisdiction of
the appellate Court is co-extensive with that of the Trial Court,
though the rule of prudence requires due deference to the view
taken by the trial Court.
76. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively laid down that an
appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded, and that there is no limitation in law on its power to
review such evidence. Relevant paras of the judgment are
hereinbelow:

27
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view,
the following general principles regarding powers of the
appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an
order of acquittal emerge:
[1]An appellate Court has full power to review, re-
appreciate andreconsider the evidence upon which the
order of acquittal is founded.
[2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such
power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it
may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact
and of law.
[3] Various expressions, such as,“substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain
extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the
reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with
acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review
the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
[4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in
favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the fundamental
principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption

28
of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial Court.
[5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the
basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by [4]
the trial Court.”
77. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate
powers, even if two reasonable views/conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court.
78. Similarly, in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that interference with an order
of acquittal is justified where the Trial Court’s conclusions are
manifestly erroneous, based on misreading of evidence, or where
material evidence has been ignored, leading to miscarriage of
justice.
79. In the present case, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court
has misread and misappreciated the evidence on record,
particularly the testimony of the victim (PW-3), which is cogent,
consistent and inspires confidence. The rejection of such
testimony is not based on any material contradiction but on an
erroneous approach, contrary to the settled principles governing
appreciation of evidence in sexual offence cases.

29
80. The Trial Court has further failed to properly appreciate the
corroborative testimonies of PW-2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-12,
which collectively establish a continuous chain of circumstances
relating to the missing of the victim, her unlawful confinement,
and recovery from the custody of the accused. Non-consideration
of such material evidence amounts to a serious infirmity in the
impugned judgment.
81. The approach adopted by the Trial Court, therefore, suffers from
palpable infirmities and misreading of evidence, rendering the
findings perverse and unsustainable in law. The conclusions
arrived at are not a possible or plausible view on the evidence
available on record.
82. In view of the principles laid down in Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka (supra) and Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. (supra) , this
Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case where
interference is not only justified but necessary in the interest of
justice. Accordingly, the acquittal recorded by the learned Trial
Court in respect of offences under Sections 366A and 376 of the
IPC deserves to be set aside, and the accused is liable to be
convicted on reappreciation of the evidence.
83. Consequently, the acquittal appeal i.e. ACQA No.467/2018
preferred by the State against acquittal deserves to be allowed.
The judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court
insofar as it relates to offences punishable under Sections 366A

30
and 376 of the IPC is hereby set aside . Accordingly, the
accused/respondent is held guilty and convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 366A and 376 of the IPC.
84. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, considering the
age of the victim, nature and gravity of the offence, the manner in
which the victim was taken away and confined, the overall facts
and circumstances of the case and further the fact that since the
date of incident is of the year 2011, the provisions of law as
applicable at the relevant time under Section 376 of the IPC, the
minimum prescribed sentence was rigorous imprisonment for
seven year, this Court deems it appropriate to impose the
following sentence:
(i) For offence punishable under Section 366A of the
IPC, the accused/respondent is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine
of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall
further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month.
(ii) For offence punishable under Section 376 of the
IPC, the accused/respondent is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a
fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he
shall further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one
month. Substantive sentences shall run concurrently.

31
85. Consequently, the criminal appeal preferred by the accused /
appellant being CRA No.556/2013 stands dismissed and his
conviction & sentence under Section 363 of the IPC are hereby
affirmed , whereas the acquittal appeal preferred by the State
stands allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.
86. The accused / respondent is on bail in CRA No.556/2013. His bail
bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged. He shall surrender
within two weeks from today before the concerned trial Court for
serving the sentence as awarded by this Court while allowing the
acquittal appeal filed by the State and dismissing the criminal
appeal filed by the accused / appellant, failing which he shall be
taken into custody by the Trial Court and sent to jail.
87. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted
to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
( Ravindra Kumar Agrawal ) (Ramesh Sinha )
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet