SHYAM CHANDRASHEKHAR PANDYA vs STATE OF GUJARAT

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 14373 of 2026
==========================================================
SHYAM CHANDRASHEKHAR PANDYA & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. SURAJ A SHUKLA(7185) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2,3,4
MR.MANAN MEHTA APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

Date : 26/10/2026

JUDGMENT
1. Learned advocate Mr.Darshan Dave states that he
has instructions to appear for and on behalf of original
complainant. He is permitted to file his appearance.
2. Learned advocate Mr.Dave has tendered Affidavit-
in-reply. The same is taken on record.
3. Heard learned advocate for the petitioners, learned
APP for the respondent – State and learned advocate for the
original complainant.
4. At the outset, it is required to be noted that,
present petitioners have not pressed for this application
insofar as the offence punishable under the BNSS. Thus, this
application is confined to the offence punishable under the
under the provisions of Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Page 1 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
5. Rule returnable forthwith. learned APP and learned
advocate Mr.Dave waive service of notice of rule for and on
behalf of respective respondents.
6. By way of this petition, under the provisions of
Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 528
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the
petitioners have prayed for quashment of the FIR being C.R.
No.11196030260514 of 2026 registered with Sayajigunj
Police Station against the petitioners for the offences
punishable under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes And
The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
7. Learned Advocate for the petitioners taking to the
FIR would submit that general allegations are made against
the petitioners and no such ingredients of the alleged offence
is attracted if the FIR is read at its face value. In regards to
the allegations made under the Atrocities Act, learned
advocate for the petitioners would submit that FIR does not
disclose the fact that any derogatory words was used by the
petitioner to lower the caste of the first informant. Learned
advocate for the petitioner would submit that if the FIR is
read as it is no such ingredients of the alleged offence is found
prima facie to have been attracted qua the petitioners and
therefore by making above submissions, he would submit to
allow this petition and to quash the FIR.
8. Learned APP and learned advocate for the
complainant taking this Court through the statement made in
Page 2 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
the FIR submitted that offence alleged to have been made out
against the petitioners as the petitioners have used
derogatory words to lower the caste of the complainant and
therefore prima-facie material is made out which constitute
the offence as alleged in the FIR. They would therefore submit
to dismiss the present petition.
9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for
the respective parties and examining the FIR as it is, it
appears that allegations are made to the effect that
petitioners used derogatory words about the caste of the
complainant and even the petitioners threatened the
complainant by giving life threat.
10. Prima facie , reading of the FIR does not disclose
any offence as alleged under the Atrocities Act in the FIR. It
could be noticed that offence under under the provisions of
the Atrocities Act is alleged; however none of the averments
made in the FIR attracts the said provision. What could be
noticed that at no where it is stated in the FIR that accused
belongs to general caste and first informant belongs to
schedule caste and by using such derogatory remarks he had
insulted his caste in public place. Even, which kind of the
words are used to derogate the caste of the complainant is not
coming out from the FIR. Baring allegations nothing is coming
from the FIR to satisfy the ingredient of the offence alleged
against the petitioners. To be noted that presence of third
party in whose presence if such derogatory remarks are made
is also missing in the present case and therefore also
Page 3 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
necessary ingredients to satisfy the offence under the
Atrocities Act are missing.
Karuppudayar vs State Rep. by the Deputy
11. In
Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others [2025
SCC OnLine SC 215]
, the Apex Court examined the terms
public view and has held in paragraph 10 to 11 as under:
“9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal
that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be
established that the accused intentionally insults or
intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within
public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence under
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the
accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public
view.
10. The term “any place within public view” initially came up
for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran
Singh v. State through Standing Counsel2. This Court in the
case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand3 referred to
Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as
under:
“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be
regarded as “place in public view” had come up for
consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as
Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC
435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn
distinction between the expression “public place” and “in
any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence
is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would
certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary,
if the remark is made inside a building, but some members
of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then
it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view
(sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is
stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8
SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle
Page 4 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a
building, but some members of the public are there (not
merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence
since it is in the public view.”]. The Court held as under :
(SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR
that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he
stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the
premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within
public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place
within public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and
also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is
committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a
house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road
or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly
be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is
made inside a building, but some members of the public are
there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be
an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore,
not confuse the expression “place within public view” with
the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place
but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public
place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or
leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local
body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and
not by private persons or private bodies.”
(emphasis in original)”
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public
view’, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view. ”
12. Thus, the ingredients alleged under the Atrocities
Act are missing from the FIR. None of the allegations made in
the FIR would attract the offence under the Atrocities Act.
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Georige
Pentaiah v/s. State of Andra Pradesh [2008 (12) SCC 531],
held that complainant ought to alleged that accused are not
Page 5 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
member of SC /ST caste and he was intentionally insulted or
intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in place
within public view. It is submitted that basic ingredients are
missing in the FIR, then permitting such complaint to
continue and to compel the accused to face the rigmarole of
the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse
of process of law.
14. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Hutu
Ansari @ Futu Ansari Vs. State of Jharkhan d rendered in SLP
No.6763 of 2023 , held as under:-
“7. Admittedly all the prosecution witnesses are related and
the specific case of the accused was that due to the enmity, on
account of the land dispute, the accused were framed under
the SC & ST Act alleging house trespass. Section 3 of the Act
charged against the accused is not attracted for reason of the
allegations of derogatory terms being used against the
complainants, if at all true, was not in a public place nor in the
presence of any member of the public. However, we see from
the order of the Trial Court that the specific allegation levelled
was of wrongful occupation or cultivation in any land owned by
or in the possession, allotted to or notified by any competent
authority to be allotted to a member of a Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe as coming out in sub-clause (f) of Section 3(1)
of the SC & ST Act. We cannot but notice that there is also an
allegation of derogatory terms having been used in the
presence of villagers, in the complaint filed before the Judicial
Magistrate, which brings in clause (s) of Section 3(1) dealing
with abusing any member of a Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe by caste name in a place within public view and clause
(r) relating to intentional insult or intimidation with intent to
humiliate a member of SC & ST in any place within public
view.
11. We cannot but find that there are gross inconsistencies
insofar as the complaint and the oral evidence led by way of
deposition before the Court. The place of occurrence was
stated to be the house, in the complaint, while all the witnesses
spoke of the alleged incident having occurred in the field,
which was the disputed land. In any event, there is no scope
for finding either clause (r) or (s) of Section 3(1) of the SC &
Page 6 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
ST Act since PW-1 has categorically stated that there was no
member of the public present at the time the incident
occurred. Insofar as the allegation under clause (f) of Section
3(1) there is nothing to indicate that the complainant and her
family were forcefully evicted from the disputed land or that
the accused occupied it illegally after delivery was effected on
25.04.2005. As far as the house trespass is concerned, the oral
evidence does not support it. On the above reasoning we find
absolutely no reason to sustain the conviction as entered into
by the Magistrate’s Court confirmed by the High Court. We set
aside the order of the Magistrate as confirmed by the High
Court and acquit the appellants herein.”
15. At this juncture, I may refer to the relevant
observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] .
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
Page 7 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge. ”
15.1. In view of above, allowing FIR further into trial
would be abuse of process of law. Criminal proceedings
started is found to be initiated by giving color of criminality.
The petition deserves consideration.
16. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed.
FIR being C.R. No.11196030260514 of 2026 registered with
Sayajigunj Police Station, Dist. Vadodara City, as well as
consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof qua
present petitioners for the offences punishable under the
provisions of Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is quashed and set aside.
Page 8 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026

R/SCR.A/14373/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/10/2026
(GJHC240749182026)
17. FIR in question and subsequent proceedings
arising there-from in respect of the offence punishable under
the BNSS stands continued; without being influenced by any
observations made in this order. Rule made absolute to the
aforesaid extent.
18. The request of learned APP to recover the amount
of compensation granted to the complainant/s, if any, is
acceded to.
Direct service is permitted.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
MANOJ
Page 9 of 9
Uploaded by MANOJ KUMAR(HC01092) on Tue Oct 27 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 27 20:28:24 IST 2026