High Court Of Chhattisgarh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:10455-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPCR No. 88 of 2016
High Court of Chhattisgarh Through The Registrar General, High Court of
Chhattisgarh, Raipur Road, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh,
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1 – State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department of Home
(Police), Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
2 - Smt. Pratibha Gwal, W/o Shri Prabhakar Gwal, Aged About 39 Years R/o
Village Nanakpali, Thana And Tehsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund,
Chhattisgarh
Presently R/o At Judges Bungalow, Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh
3 - Shri Prabhakar Gwal, Aged About 45 Years Presently Posted As Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Judges Bungalow, Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Dr. N.K. Shukla, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.
Amrito Das, Advocate
For Respondent
No.1/State
: Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General
For Respondent No.2 : Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate
For Respondent No.3 : None, though served.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
28/02/2026
1. Heard Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Amrito
Das, learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as Mr. Praveen Das,

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learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/
Respondent No.1 and Ms. Sareena Khan, learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.2/complainant.
Despite service of notice, none appears on behalf of Respondent No. 3.
2.
On 13.12.2024, Mr. Jitendra Dhruw, learned counsel had appeared and
submitted that he has filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of the respondent
No. 3 and prayed for some time. Thereafter, the matter was taken up on
09.12.2025 and 23.01.2026 but on the said dates also, none appeared
on behalf of the respondent No. 3.
3. By filing of the present petition, the Petitioner has prayed for following
relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to call for the entire record, orders and proceeding of
the criminal complaint filed by respondent No. 2
complainant before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh for its kind perusal.
10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ quashing the unregistered
criminal complaint preferred by respondent No. 2 on
26.03.2016 before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh (ANNEXURE P/1).
10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue an appropriate writ quashing the order dated
26.03.2016 (ANNEXURE P/2) passed by the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, District
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court, may
deem fit and proper, in the facts and circumstances of
the case.”

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4. The present matter arises out of a criminal complaint filed by Respondent
No. 2, who is the wife of Respondent No. 3, before the Court of the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, District Raipur,
Chhattisgarh on 26.03.2016. In the said complaint, serious allegations
have been levelled against Hon’ble the then Chief Justice and a sitting
Hon’ble Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, along with several
members of the Higher Judicial Service of the State.
Respondent No. 3 was a judicial officer and was posted as Chief Judicial
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Magistrate, Sukma, District Sukma, Chhattisgarh. The complaint was
entertained by the learned Magistrate and the matter was fixed for
recording of preliminary evidence.
6. The foundation of the complaint stems from an incident allegedly
occurring on 31.10.2015 at Arang Toll Plaza on National Highway No. 6,
when Respondent No. 2 and her husband (Respondent No. 3) were
travelling to their native village. It is alleged that Respondent No. 3 was
misbehaved with and abused by certain persons, in respect of which an
FIR was registered at Police Station Arang, District Raipur. The
grievance raised in the impugned complaint is essentially that the police
did not file a chargesheet in the said FIR, allegedly due to a conspiracy
involving police officials, members of the judicial service, and even the
then Hon’ble Chief Justice and a sitting Judge of the High Court.
7. On a reading of the complaint, there are no specific allegations detailing
the commission of any overt act by the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court
or by the judicial officers arrayed therein. The allegations are
predominantly based on apprehension and suspicion that the
chargesheet was withheld pursuant to a conspiracy. There is no
assertion of any specific agreement, meeting of minds, act, omission,

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date, or circumstance to substantiate the ingredients of criminal
conspiracy or any other cognizable offence as against the said persons.
8. Further, the offences referred to in the complaint, namely under Sections
294, 323, 506, 186, 353, and 511/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short, ‘IPC’) pertain to the alleged incident at the Toll Plaza and do not
disclose any connection of the Hon’ble Judges or the judicial officers with
the alleged occurrence. It is not disputed that a separate FIR had already
been registered at the instance of Respondent No. 3 in relation to the
said incident.
9. It is also significant that the complaint has been filed by Respondent No.
2, though the alleged grievance pertains to Respondent No. 3 in his
official capacity. The averments in the complaint suggest reliance upon
information purportedly within the exclusive knowledge of Respondent
No. 3 in his official dealings. The affidavit in support of the complaint is
sworn by Respondent No. 2, though the matters alleged primarily relate
to official interactions and administrative grievances concerning
Respondent No. 3.
10. The Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 in the complaint case, have challenged
the maintainability and bona fides of the impugned complaint, contending
that the same is vague, bereft of material particulars, and filed with mala
fide intention to scandalize members of the judiciary and to ventilate
personal or service-related grievances under the garb of criminal
prosecution. In the above backdrop, the present proceedings arise for
consideration before this Court.
11. Dr. N.K. Shukla, learned Senior Advocate, at the very outset, submits
that the impugned criminal complaint is a glaring abuse of the process of
law and is liable to be quashed in limine . It is contended that initiation of

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criminal proceedings has serious civil and criminal consequences,
particularly when allegations are levelled against constitutional
functionaries and members of the Higher Judicial Service. The
complaint, on its plain reading, does not disclose any specific overt act
attributable to the then Hon’ble the Chief Justice, a sitting Hon’ble Judge
of the High Court, or the judicial officers arrayed therein. The entire
edifice of the complaint is built upon a mere “apprehension” expressed
by the complainant that the chargesheet in an FIR lodged by her
husband has not been filed due to some alleged conspiracy. Such vague
suspicion, bereft of material particulars, cannot form the foundation of
criminal prosecution.
12. Dr. Shukla further submits that the complainant has herself admitted in
the body of the complaint that it is her apprehension that the police did
not file the chargesheet on account of a conspiracy. There is neither
mention of any specific date, nor the particulars of any meeting of minds,
nor any material to suggest an agreement among the accused persons to
commit an illegal act. The allegations are sweeping, omnibus and lacking
in essential ingredients of any cognizable offence. It is also argued that
criminal law cannot be set into motion on surmises, conjectures or
unverified assumptions. The complaint, even if taken at its face value,
does not make out any case whatsoever against Respondent Nos. 11 to
19.
13. Dr. Shukla next submits that so far as the allegation of criminal
conspiracy is concerned, the complaint is completely silent with regard to
the basic ingredients of Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, i.e., an
agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a
legal act by illegal means. There is not even a whisper of any specific

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communication, interaction or understanding between the judicial officers
and the police authorities. The mere non-filing of a chargesheet, even if
assumed to be true, does not constitute an offence, much less criminal
conspiracy, against judicial officers of the High Court.
14. It is further contended that the offences under Sections 294, 323, 506,
186, 353 and 511/34 IPC, as referred to in the complaint, pertain to an
alleged incident dated 31.10.2015 at Arang Toll Plaza. In respect of the
said incident, Respondent No. 3 himself has already lodged an FIR. The
present complaint seeks to drag in members of the judiciary who have
absolutely no connection with the said occurrence. The allegations,
therefore, are manifestly absurd and inherently improbable. Dr. Shukla
submits that the complaint is nothing but an attempt to sensationalize a
personal grievance and to scandalize the judicial institution.
15. Dr. Shukla further argues that Respondent No. 3, being a member of the
judicial service, has sought to ventilate his alleged service grievances
relating to work allotment, postings and assignments through the medium
of his wife, Respondent No. 2. The complainant has no personal
knowledge of the alleged administrative or official interactions between
Respondent No. 3 and his superior officers. The affidavit filed in support
of the complaint is thus based on hearsay and cannot sustain criminal
prosecution. It is submitted that Respondent No. 3 has deliberately used
Respondent No. 2 as a front to level reckless and insinuating allegations
against constitutional authorities, thereby misusing the criminal process
for oblique purposes.
16. Dr. Shukla submits that the continuation of such proceedings would have
a chilling effect on the independence of the judiciary and would amount to
permitting vexatious litigation against judicial officers without any

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substantive material. The complaint is clearly malicious, vindictive and
instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking personal vengeance.
Therefore, this is a fit case where the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
deserves to be exercised to secure the ends of justice and to prevent
abuse of the process of Court.
17. In support of the above submissions, Dr. Shukla places reliance on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Shrivastava v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287 , wherein the Apex Court
has cautioned that the authority of the Magistrate cannot be invoked at
the mere whim of a litigant and that perverted or motivated litigation must
be curbed at the threshold. It is submitted that the present complaint,
being founded solely on apprehension and devoid of material particulars,
squarely attracts the ratio laid down therein.
18. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the celebrated judgment in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has illustratively enumerated categories of cases
where criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed in exercise of
inherent powers. It is submitted that the present case falls squarely within
the categories where the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not
constitute any offence and where the proceedings are manifestly
attended with mala fide intention.
19. Further reliance is placed upon Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter
and criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of routine. It is urged
that the mechanical entertainment of the complaint in the present case is
contrary to the principles laid down therein. On the aforesaid grounds, Dr.

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Shukla prays that the impugned criminal complaint and all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed.
20. Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
State, submits that the State has been arrayed as a formal party in the
present proceedings. He submits that the controversy involved is
essentially inter se between the private parties and that no specific relief
has been claimed against the State. It is further submitted that the State
would abide by any order that may be passed by this Court and has no
independent objection to the adjudication of the dispute on its own
merits.
21. Placing reliance on the reply affidavit filed by the respondent No. 2, Ms.
Sareena Khan, learned counsel submits that the present writ petition is
wholly misconceived, malicious and filed with the intent to shield certain
high constitutional functionaries from legitimate scrutiny. It is contended
that the petitioner has deliberately suppressed material facts and has
approached this Court on fabricated and baseless grounds, without any
legal authority or locus to maintain the present proceedings. She submits
that Respondent No. 3 has been deliberately and conspiratorially arrayed
as a party in the writ petition only to create prejudice and to malign his
reputation. It is argued that the failure of the petitioner to array the
original complainant in an appropriate capacity reflects mala fide
intention and establishes that the writ petition itself is a product of
conspiracy intended to stifle a lawful criminal process. It is further
submitted that the complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 before the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur was supported by
foundational facts and prima facie material. The learned Magistrate, by
order dated 26.03.2016, merely fixed the matter for recording of

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preliminary evidence. At such a nascent stage, when only an inquiry
under Section 200 CrPC was underway and cognizance had not even
been taken, interference by this Court by way of stay was wholly
unwarranted and without jurisdiction. Ms. Khan contends that the law
does not permit stifling of a complaint at the threshold before evidence is
led, particularly where serious allegations of conspiracy and abuse of
authority are involved.
22. Ms. Khan further submits that Respondent No. 3, a judicial officer at the
relevant time, had earlier been subjected to adverse proceedings and
criminal registration during the tenure of the then Chief Justice and a
sitting Judge of the High Court. It is alleged that no such intervention was
made by the High Court administration in those proceedings. Thus,
according to her, the present writ petition reveals a selective and
conspiratorial exercise of power intended to cause harm to the family of
Respondent No. 2 and to protect influential individuals. She contends
that the grievance of Respondent No. 2 is not confined merely to non-
filing of a charge-sheet in the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 3, but
relates to a larger conspiracy allegedly involving illegal transfer, stoppage
of increment, repeated issuance of notices, and eventual termination of
service of Respondent No. 3. It is submitted that these events form part
of a coordinated sequence of actions beginning with certain
administrative decisions and culminating in punitive measures, which
according to Respondent No. 2, were designed to target her family. It is
further argued that Respondent No. 3 was transferred to a Naxal-affected
area pursuant to a meeting alleged to have taken place between high
constitutional authorities and political executives, and thereafter
subjected to repeated administrative harassment, including stoppage of
annual increment by order dated 04.02.2016 and eventual termination of

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service by order dated 01.04.2016. These actions, taken together, lend
credence to the allegation that the family of Respondent No. 2 was
systematically targeted.
Ms. Khan submits that the complaint filed under Section 200 CrPC is a
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statutory right available to every citizen, and Respondent No. 2, not being
legally trained, cannot be faulted for not initially invoking any in-house
mechanism. According to her, the existence of an internal procedure
does not bar access to ordinary criminal law remedies when serious
allegations of criminal misconduct are made. It is further submitted that
the judicial precedents relied upon by the petitioner, including those
relating to quashing of proceedings, have been misapplied, as the
complaint is at a preliminary stage and no investigation or trial has yet
occurred. Learned counsel argues that the truth or otherwise of the
allegations can only be determined after recording of evidence and not at
the threshold by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction. Ms. Khan also
contends that the stay order granted in the writ petition was beyond
jurisdiction and violative of principles of natural justice, as the
complainant was deprived of an opportunity to substantiate her case.
According to her, the writ petition has been filed with oblique motive to
pre-empt disclosure of material facts and to obstruct lawful inquiry into
serious allegations of conspiracy.
24. In conclusion, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that the writ
petition deserves to be dismissed, the stay order vacated, and the
complaint restored to its original file for proceeding in accordance with
law. She further prays for appropriate directions, including compensation
for alleged harassment and liberty to pursue remedies under applicable
statutory and procedural frameworks.

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25. Though none appears on behalf of Respondent No. 3 at the time of
hearing, it is noticed that Respondent No. 3 has filed a detailed
return/reply-affidavit on record contesting the averments made in the writ
petition. In the said reply-affidavit, Respondent No. 3 has, in substance,
contended that the writ petition is founded on false, fabricated and
baseless allegations and has been instituted with mala fide intent to
shield certain influential persons and to thwart a lawful criminal process
initiated at the instance of Respondent No. 2. It is asserted that the
petitioner has neither any legal right nor authority to maintain the present
proceedings at the stage when the complaint before the learned ACJM,
Raipur, is only at the stage of preliminary inquiry under Section 200
CrPC. Respondent No. 3 has further stated that he has been
unnecessarily and conspiratorially impleaded as a party in the present
writ petition and that his impleadment is intended only to prejudice him
and to give a colour of legitimacy to the challenge. According to him, the
complaint filed by Respondent No. 2 was based on foundational facts
and documentary material, and no cognizance had been taken at the
relevant stage; therefore, there was no occasion for the proposed
accused to seek quashing or stay of the proceedings.
26. It is also contended by Respondent No. 3 that a larger conspiracy had
been carried out against him and his family, beginning with alleged
administrative actions including transfer to a Naxal-affected area,
issuance of repeated notices, stoppage of annual increment, and
eventual termination from service. These actions, according to
Respondent No. 3, form part of a coordinated attempt to victimise him for
having acted bona fide in discharge of his judicial functions. Respondent
No. 3 has further alleged that the non-filing of the chargesheet in the FIR
lodged by him was not an isolated act, but part of a broader design to

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shield certain persons. He contends that the complaint filed by
Respondent No. 2 was bona fide and intended to bring these facts before
a competent court of law, and that the stay order passed in the present
writ petition has unlawfully stalled the inquiry, thereby denying an
opportunity to substantiate the allegations through evidence. It is also
stated that, if required, appropriate remedies under the applicable legal
framework, including criminal law and internal disciplinary mechanisms,
may be pursued by him in accordance with law. On these premises,
Respondent No. 3 has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition, vacation
of the interim stay, and for permitting the complaint proceedings before
the learned Magistrate to continue in accordance with law.
27. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also
meticulously examined the pleadings on record, the impugned complaint,
the order dated 26.03.2016 passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raipur fixing the matter for preliminary evidence, and
the rival submissions advanced at length.
At the outset, it deserves emphasis that initiation of criminal proceedings
28.
is not an empty formality. The summoning of constitutional functionaries
and members of the Higher Judicial Service entails serious
consequences, not only to the individuals concerned but also to the
institutional integrity of the judicial system. Criminal law cannot be
permitted to be invoked as a tool of harassment, intimidation or to
ventilate administrative or service grievances under the guise of criminal
prosecution.
29. Upon a plain and meaningful reading of the impugned complaint, this
Court finds that the entire edifice of allegations against the Hon’ble the
then Chief Justice, a sitting Judge of the High Court, and other judicial

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officers is founded on mere apprehension and suspicion. The
complainant herself has categorically recorded that it is her
“apprehension” that the chargesheet in the FIR lodged by her husband
was not filed on account of some conspiracy. Apart from such
apprehension, there is no specific averment disclosing any overt act, any
meeting of minds, any agreement, or any material particulars constituting
the essential ingredients of the offences alleged, particularly that of
criminal conspiracy.
30. It is trite that for constituting an offence under Section 120-B of the IPC,
there must be specific allegations indicating an agreement between two
or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a lawful act by illegal means.
The complaint in question is conspicuously silent on these foundational
aspects. The allegations are omnibus, vague and inherently improbable
so far as Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the trial Court are concerned.
Even if the entire complaint is taken at its face value and accepted in its
entirety, no offence is made out against the said respondents.
Equally significant is the fact that the offences under Sections 294, 323,
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506, 186, 353 and 511/34 IPC pertain to an incident dated 31.10.2015 at
Arang Toll Plaza, in respect of which a separate FIR had already been
lodged at the instance of Respondent No. 3. The judicial officers and
Hon’ble Judges arrayed in the impugned complaint are not alleged to
have any connection whatsoever with the said occurrence. The attempt
to link them to the non-filing of the chargesheet, without any factual
substratum, is clearly an overreach.
32. The law relating to quashing of criminal proceedings is well crystallized.
In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court illustratively enumerated categories where

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inherent powers may be exercised to prevent abuse of process or to
secure the ends of justice, including cases where the allegations, even if
taken at face value, do not constitute any offence, or where the
proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide intention. The present
case squarely falls within such parameters. The Supreme Court, in the
said celebrated judgment, laid down that quashing is justified particularly
where: (i) the allegations in the FIR or complaint do not prima facie
constitute any offence; (ii) the allegations are absurd or inherently
improbable; (iii) there is an express legal bar to the institution or
continuance of proceedings; and (iv) the proceedings are manifestly
attended with mala fide or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance.
33. The principle that criminal process cannot be set in motion at the mere
whim or on bald allegations has been reiterated in Pepsi Foods Ltd.
(supra), wherein it has been held that summoning of an accused is a
serious matter and the Magistrate must apply his mind to ascertain
whether a prima facie case is made out. Likewise, in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra), the Apex Court cautioned that perverted and
motivated litigations should not be allowed to abuse the criminal justice
machinery.
34. In more recent pronouncements such as Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Supreme Court
has delineated the contours of judicial interference at the threshold stage
and underscored that while ordinarily investigation should not be stifled,
the High Court would be justified in exercising jurisdiction where the
complaint ex facie does not disclose commission of any cognizable
offence or is maliciously instituted. The Court emphasized that: (i) at the

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stage of quashing, the Court is required to examine whether the
allegations disclose a cognizable offence; (ii) Courts should ordinarily not
interfere with investigation; and (iii) however, where the allegations do
not disclose any offence or fall within the parameters laid down in Bhajan
Lal , interference would be justified.
35. The submission by filing reply-affidavits on behalf of Respondents No. 2
and 3 that the matter is at the stage of preliminary inquiry and, therefore,
immune from interference, cannot be accepted as an absolute
proposition. When the complaint on its very face fails to disclose the
essential ingredients of the alleged offences and is founded purely on
conjectures and surmises, this Court, in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot remain a
silent spectator and compel individuals to undergo the rigours of a
criminal prosecution which is ex facie untenable.
36. We are also conscious that allegations have been made regarding
administrative actions such as transfer, stoppage of increment and
termination of service of Respondent No. 3. However, such matters lie
squarely within the realm of service jurisprudence and cannot be
camouflaged as criminal conspiracy in the absence of tangible and
cogent material. Permitting such omnibus accusations against members
of the judiciary and public servants to proceed without foundational facts
would seriously impair institutional integrity and open floodgates for
disgruntled litigants or officers to level reckless allegations.
37. Though the present petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and not under Section 482 CrPC, it is well settled
that the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is wider and is meant to
ensure that the process of law is not abused. The extraordinary writ

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jurisdiction can certainly be invoked to prevent miscarriage of justice and
to quash criminal proceedings which are manifestly attended with mala
fides or do not disclose any offence. This Court is satisfied that the
impugned complaint is devoid of material particulars, does not disclose
commission of any cognizable offence against the then Chief Justice and
one sitting Judge of this Court as also Respondent Nos. 11 to 19, and is
an attempt to convert administrative or personal grievances into a
criminal prosecution.
38. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon an anxious consideration of
the factual matrix as well as the settled principles of law governing
interference at the threshold stage, we are of the considered opinion that
the continuance of the impugned complaint proceedings against the
Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the learned trial Court would amount to
a gross abuse of the process of law. The allegations contained in the
complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, fail
to disclose the essential ingredients of the offences alleged. The
proceedings appear to be manifestly attended with mala fide intention
and founded upon conjectures rather than concrete material. Permitting
such prosecution to proceed would not serve the ends of justice but
would instead subject the concerned persons to unnecessary
harassment and the rigours of a criminal trial without foundational basis
in law.
39. Accordingly, the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The
impugned criminal complaint instituted by Respondent No. 2 before the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur, in so far as it
pertains to the Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the trial Court, is

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quashed and set aside. Consequently, the order dated 26.03.2016
passed by the learned Magistrate, whereby the matter was fixed for
recording of preliminary evidence against them, also stands set aside to
that extent. It is, however, clarified that this order shall operate only in
respect of Respondent Nos. 11 to 19 before the trial Court and shall not
be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, if
any, qua other accused persons in the said complaint case.
40. The writ petition stands allowed in the above terms. Pending
interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of. There shall
be no order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu / Amit
AMIT
KUMAR
DUBEY
Digitally signed
by AMIT KUMAR
DUBEY
Date: 2026.03.02
18:39:16 +0530