REDACTED vs PRAKASH KUMAR YADAV

Court: Chhattisgarh High Court
Case type: ACQUITTAL APPEAL [ APPEAL U/S 378 ]
Decided on: 07-04-2026

<div> Digitally signed by AMIT PATEL 1 2026:CGHC:15710-DB </div><table><thead><tr><th>The date when the judgment is reserved</th><th>The date when the judgment is pronounced</th><th>The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Operative</td><td>Full</td></tr><tr><td>17.02.2026</td><td>07.04.2026</td><td>--</td><td>07.04.2026</td></tr></tbody></table><div> HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 159 of 2023 XYZ ... Appellant versus 1 - Prakash Kumar Yadav, S/o Krishnachand Yadav, Aged About 30 Years, R/o Goshala Para, Police Line Raigarh, Thana-City Kotwali, District Raigarh (C.G.) 2 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through Police Station Chandrapur, District- Janjgir Champa (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause Title Taken From CIS System) For Appellant : Mr. Arvind Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No. 1 : Ms. Shristi Singh along with Mr. Arpan Verma, Advocates. For Respondent No. 2 : Mr. Himanshu Yadu, Panel Lawyer Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J. Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, J. C A V Judgment Per, Rajani Dubey, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment dated 21.02.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions 2 Judge (F.T.C.), Sakti, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 54/2021 whereby the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No. 1 of offence under Sections 376 (2) (n) and 417 of IPC. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the prosecutrix aged about 30 years, met with the accused/respondent No.1 in the year 2013, when she was studying in Girls College, Raigarh, they got acquainted with each other. In the year 2014, the marriage of prosecutrix was fixed with resident of village Jatri. The accused proposed marriage to the prosecutrix over phone and on 12.03.2014 came to Chandrapur around 4:00 a.m. He took her to a hut near her residence and under the pretext of marriage, forced her into physical relationship, despite her refusal. On the same day, the accused, under the pretext of marriage, took her by bus to Raigarh, kept her in a hospice ( dharmshala) for about seven days and continued to have sexual relationship with her. On 19.03.2014, the accused took the prosecutrix to House No. 25, Vasundhara Vihar, Govardhanpur, Ambikapur and on pretext of marriage kept the prosecutrix with him for seven years and in this duration he used to make sexual relationship with the prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage. Whenever the prosecutrix asked that when will the accused marry her, he used to sideline the same by giving different excuses. She also asked the accused to have a child, but he kept delaying the same by saying that they will have children only after their marriage. When the prosecutrix asked the accused to marry her, he used to blackmail her by giving various threats like death and defamation and also the accused used to harass her. Being frightened from him, she remained silent, hoping that he would marry her. She was also not 3 allowed to meet or speak with her family by the accused. On 20.08.2021, two days before Rakshabandhan the accused took the prosecutrix to Chandrapur under the pretext of meeting her parents, abandoned her on the road and fled. Her family approached the accused’s parents, who supported him, causing the prosecutrix’s father to suffer paralysis from the mental stress. Then, the prosecutrix lodged a report at Police Station Chandrapur on 09.11.2021 registered as Crime No. 126/2021 under Sections 376 and 417 IPC, and the police initiated an investigation. During the investigation, the prosecutrix was medically examined and her statement was recorded. On finding evidence against the accused, he was arrested. A spot map was prepared and the following items were seized: vaginal slide, axillary and pubic hair and a panty of the prosecutrix vide Ex.P/21; a Vivo 15 Pro mobile phone with two SIM cards vide Ex.P/10; the accused’s underwear vide Ex.P/11; and semen slides of the accused vide Ex.P/14 and after completion of due and necessary investigation, charge-sheet was led before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate who, in turn, </div><table><thead><tr><th>committed the case for trial.</th><th>On the basis of the material contained in</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div> the charge-sheet, learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent </div><table><thead><tr><th>No.1 of offence under Sections 376 (2) (n)</th><th>& 417 of IPC.,</th><th>against which</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div> the present appeal has been filed by the complainant/appellant. 3. Learned counsel for the complainant/appellant submits that the learned trial Court passed the impugned judgment without appreciating the material available on record. Learned trial Court has given grandness to minor contradictions and omissions and passed the impugned judgment which is bad in law and liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel further submits that the facts and circumstances available on 4 record indicate that right from day one, the intention of the accused was not to marry with the prosecutrix and was just to satiate his lust upon her and he gave wrong commitments of marriage to the prosecutrix, gained her trust and took an undue advantage of the same for his personal agenda. The trial Court has failed to appreciate that if the accused has not projected the pretext of marriage to physically abused the prosecutrix, the prosecutrix would not have allowed the accused to make sexual relationship with him. In her entire evidence the prosecutrix has clearly impressed upon the fact that it was the promise of marriage given by the accused due to which, without protesting, she allowed the accused to make sexual relationship with her. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that in absence of such believable promise the prosecutrix would not have allowed the accused to have sexual relationship with her not only at the first occasion, but subsequently also. Such conduct falls squarely within the ambit of Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes sexual intercourse by a man with a woman under a false promise of marriage. Each occasion of physical intimacy, entered into under this deceit, constitutes a separate act of sexual assault and the accused is liable for each such act. It is further submitted that the accused’s conduct also satisfies the elements of cheating under Section 417 IPC. The essence of cheating is the deliberate inducement of a person to act to their prejudice by false representations. Here, the accused by falsely representing his intention to marry the prosecutrix, dishonestly induced her to consent to physical intimacy, thereby causing her grave emotional and psychological prejudice. This conduct is deliberate, calculated, and clearly dishonest, and the accused cannot claim 5 ignorance or lack of intention. The learned trial Court has erred in failing to appreciate that such deceit, resulting in serious harm to the prosecutrix, fulfills all the necessary ingredients for a conviction under Section 417 IPC. He next submits that the prosecutrix’s testimony is coherent, consistent, and believable. The evidence demonstrates a clear causal connection between the accused’s false promise of marriage and the prosecutrix’s consent to the relationship. The accused exploited this trust to satisfy his personal desires, without any intention of honoring his promise. The trial Court’s failure to recognize this deliberate deception amounts to a grave oversight and does not reflect a correct application of law or appreciation of facts. Furthermore, it is submitted that in a society where the dignity, safety, and bodily autonomy of women are of paramount concern, the courts must adopt a protective and sensitive approach towards the prosecutrix. Allowing the accused to escape liability on the ground that the prosecutrix voluntarily entered into a relationship, when such voluntariness was obtained through deliberate fraud, would set a dangerous precedent and undermine the legal protections intended to safeguard women against sexual exploitation. Hence, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Deepak Gulati 1 vs. State of Haryana. , Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of 2 3 Bihar & Phool Singh vs. State of M.P . 1 (2013) 7 SCC 675 2 (2005) 1 SCC 88 3 (2022) 2 SCC 74 6 4. Learned counsel for the State supporting the argument of counsel for the appellant/complainant submits that the learned trial Court has passed the impugned order in a cryptic and laconic manner without appreciating the material available on record and the accused/ respondent No. 1 is liable to be convicted for the said offences. The impugned judgment, finding and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, improper,incorrect and is liable to be set aside. 5. Ex adverso, learned counsel for the respondents No. 1/accused supporting the impugned judgment submit that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly acquitted the respondent No. 1/accused of the aforesaid charges. Therefore, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any irregularity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court in the instant appeal. In support of their contention, they relied upon the judgments of the 4 Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Uday vs. State of Karnataka , 5 Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra , Sonu @ 6 Subhash Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Anr. and Naim Ahamed vs. 7 State (NCT of Delhi) 6. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is evident from the record of the learned trial Court that it framed charges against the accused/respondent No.1 for offence under 4 (2003) 4 SCC 46 5 (2019) 9 SCC 608 6 (2021) 18 SCC 517 7 (2023) 15 SCC 385 7 </div><table><thead><tr><th>Sections</th><th>376 (2) (n) and 417 of IPC</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><div> documentary evidence available on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondent No.1 of the aforesaid charges on this ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 8. PW-1, the prosecutrix, stated that while she was studying at Women’s College, Raigarh, she met the accused and exchanged contact numbers and they used to talk regularly. Later, when the accused came to know that her marriage was fixed in Village Jatri, he said that he would marry her and refused to let her marry there. On 12.03.2014, around 4:00 PM, the accused called the prosecutrix from her home and took her to a hut near her residence and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. He then took her by bus from Chandrapur to Raigarh and kept her in a hospice ( dharmsala ) for about seven days and made continuous sexual relations with her on the pretext of marriage. On 20.03.2014, the accused took her by bus from Raigarh to Ambikapur and kept her there as his wife at House No. 25, Vasundhara Vihar and he used to say that she is his wife when people asked. Further stated that the accused threatened to kill her and harassed her by threatening to defame her when she asked him about marriage. On 20.08.2021, on the occasion of Rakshabandhan , the accused took her by car to Chandrapur on the pretext of meeting her parents, but abandoned her on the road and returned. She then informed her parents and brothers and lodged a written report against the accused at Police Station- Chandrapur, vide Ex. P/1 and on the basis of said report an F.I.R. was lodged by the Police vide Ex.P/2 and she gave her consent for medical examination vide Ex. P/3. 8 In her cross-examination, she admitted that on 12.03.2014, the accused arrived at Chandrapur around 4:00 am and called her over the phone to meet him, but she did not inform her parents and brother about this incident and that her report (Ex. P/1) and FIR (Ex. P/2) omitted her refusal to let him enter the hut. In para 11 of his cross-examination, she admitted as under:- “11. यहकहनासहीहैकि अभियुक्तजबमुझेखींचकरझोपड़ीअंदरलेजानेलगातोमैं चिल्लाकरशोरनहींकीथी।यहकहनासहीहैकि जबअभियुक्तमुझेझोपड़ीकेअंदरमेरे साथशारीरिकसंबंधबनानेलगातोमेंचिल्लाकरशोरशराबानहींकी।यहकहनासहीहैकि अभियुक्तउससमयमेरेहाथपैरकोनहींबांधाथा।यहकहनासहीहैकि अभियुक्तअपना कपड़ावगैरहखोलातोमेंउसेमनानहींकी।स्वतःकहतीहैकि अभियुक्तउससेशादी करूंगाबोलाथाइसलिएमनानहींकी।यहकहनागलतहैकि मैंअपनेकपड़ेकोस्वतः निकालीथी।स्वतःकहतीहैकि अभियुक्तनिकालाथा।यहकहनासहीहैकि अभियुक्तमेरे कपड़ेकोउताररहाथातोमैंशोरशराबानहींकी।स्वतःकहतीहैकि मैंमनाकररहीथी कि शादीकेबादयेसबकरनातोआरोपीनहींमाना।यहकहनासहीहैकि मैंवहांसेभागने काप्रयासनहींकी।स्वतःकहतीहैकि हमदोनोएकदूसरेकोपसंदकरतेथेऔरअभियुक्त मुझेशादीकरूंगाबोलाथाइसलिएमैंभागनेकाप्रयासनहींकी। " In para 12 of his cross-examination, she herself stated that she and the accused love each other and he said that he would marry her, hence, she did not refuse him from having physical relationship. In para 13 of his cross-examination, she stated as under:- “ 13. जबसेअभियुक्तमेरेसाथशारीरिकसंबंधबनानाप्रारंभकियातबसेले कररिपोर्टकरनेतक 7 सालकीअवधि मेंइसबातकोबीचबीचमेंअपनेमाँबाप कोकेवलबतायीथी . लेकिनसमाजमेंयाअन्यकिसीव्यक्तिकोमैंनहींबतायी थी।यहकहनासहीहैकि अभियुक्तकेसाथमैं 7 वर्षोंतकरहनेकेदौरान अभियुक्तद्वारामेरेसाथशादीनकरनेसेमैंनेआजदिनांकतकअभियुक्तके 9 विरूद्धमेरेसाथविवाहकरनेसंबंधीकोईदावामुकदमाकिसीन्यायालयमेंपेश नहींकीहूं। " In para 14 of her cross-examination, she admitted that there were other passengers on the bus and that she did not inform anyone that the accused was taking her to Raigarh and that she willingly had sexual relationship with him at the Dharmshala. In para 15, she admitted that when the accused took her to Vasundhara Vihar, Ambikapur, she raised no objection and that the colony is inhabited by other residents. In para 16, she admitted that on 20.08.2021, she did not file any complaint at the police station regarding the accused taking her to Chandrapur and abandoning her on the road, nor did she or her parents convened any social meeting with family or community members. She further admitted that she lodged the report (Ex. P/1) after passage of 2 months and 18 days. She further stated that since the year 2013, the accused was giving her false commitments regarding marrying her, at that time, she did not tell to her parents about the said fact, she told this fact after 3-4 years. She also admitted this suggestion that she is an educated lady, she has knowledge about physical relationship and also admitted that a boy and girl have physical relationship after the marriage. 9. PW-2- mother and PW-3- brother of the prosecutrix have supported the statement of the prosecutrix (PW-1). Both the witnesses have admitted this suggestion that they did not lodge any report to the Police 10 regarding the prosecutrix who left home and did not return for years. They also admitted that no social meeting was convened for the same. 10. PW-9- Dr. Madhuri Chandra, examined the prosecutrix, but she did not find any external or internal injuries on her body and she gave her report vide Ex. P/4 and vaginal slide sent for chemical examination. During cross-examination, the witness stated that a thorough medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted, which included both external and internal examinations. The results of these examinations showed no signs or evidence of recent sexual intercourse and there were no injuries, marks or other indications to suggest that any force or physical coercion had been used against her in any manner 11. From the F.S.L. report (Ex. C/1), it is clear that no semen was found in the seized articles i.e, vaginal slide, pubic hair, axillary hair and cloth of the prosecutrix (A,B,C,D) 12. Close scrutiny of statements of all the witnesses clearly shows that prosecutrix is a consenting party to the act of the appellant and she is an educated major lady. 13. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra) in para 18 as under:- “18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to 11 marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act. ” 14. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Naim Ahamed (supra) in paras 17 and 18 as under:- “17.In Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana 5, this Court gave one more dimension of the word ‘consent’ by distinguishing ‘Rape’ and ‘consensual sex’ and observed as under: “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether 12 the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on 5 (2013) 7 SCC 675 account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact 13 must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her”. 18. Again in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), this Court interpreting the Section 90 and the Clause – Secondly in Section 375 of IPC, observed as under: - “23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of 14 circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC.” 15. It has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Deepak Gulati (supra) in paras 18, 19, 20, 21 and 24 as under:- “18. Section 114-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1872 Act") provides, that if the prosecutrix deposes that she did not give her consent, then the court shall presume that she did not in fact, give such consent. The facts of the instant case do not warrant that the provisions of Section 114-A of the 1872 Act be pressed into service. Hence, the sole question involved herein is whether her consent had been obtained on the false promise of marriage. Thus, the provisions of Sections 417, 375 and 376 IPC have to be taken into consideration, along with the provisions of Section 90 IPC Section 90 IPC provides that any consent given under a misconception of fact, would not be considered as valid consent, so far as the provisions of Section 375 IPC are concerned, and thus, such a physical relationship would tantamount to 15 committing rape. 19.This Court considered the issue involved herein at length in Uday v. State of Karnataka, Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar. Yedla Srinivasa Rao v State of A.P.4 and Pradeep Kumar v. State of Bihars and came to the a conclusion that in the event that the accused's promise is not false and has not been made with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would not amount to rape. Thus, the same would only hold that where the prosecutrix, under a misconception of fact to the extent that the accused is likely to marry her, submits to the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act cannot be said to be consensual, so far as the b offence of the accused is concerned. 20. Rape is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, as it is an assault on the body, mind and privacy of the victim. While a murderer destroys the physical frame of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim, and therefore a rape victim is placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. Rape is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being the most hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a woman, and offends both, her esteem 16 and dignity. It causes psychological and physical harm to the victim, leaving upon her d indelible marks. 21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had e actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after f wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention g to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion 17 that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time Le. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is 9 unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 16. In the light of the aforementioned judgments, it becomes apparent that in the present case as well, the prosecutrix (PW-1) has herself admitted that she voluntarily chose to accompany the accused and cohabit with him over an extended period of approximately seven years. This admission clearly indicates that the relationship between the prosecutrix and the accused was consensual in nature, and it underscores the fact that she willingly participated in the cohabitation, thereby demonstrating her autonomy and capacity to make personal 18 decisions during the entire period in question. It is further noted that the prosecutrix is aged about 30 years, which means that seven years ago she was around 23 years old, indicating that she was a mature adult capable of making her own decisions during the period in question. As per the prosecutrix, despite alleging that the accused abandoned her on 20.08.2021 at Chandrapur, she did not lodge any FIR at the relevant time and remained silent for about 02 months and 18 days before filing the complaint/FIR, for which no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming on record. Thus, the learned trial Court after minutely appreciating the oral and documentary evidence and observed guidelines of the Hon’ble Apex Court rightly finds that offence under Sections 376 (2) (n) and 417 of IPC are not proved against the appellant. 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 in the case 8 of Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka , has held in para 36 as under:- “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- “(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive 8 (2024) 3 SCC 544 19 inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re- appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” 18. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and the view 20 which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. 19. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) JUDGE JUDGE </div><table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>AMIT PATEL</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>