Dr. Preeti Nigotia vs State Of Madhya Pradesh
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34682
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W.A. No.3935/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
A T G W A L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 17 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 3935 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030305562026
DR. PREETI NIGOTIA
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Gaurav Samadhiya, Advocate for appellant
Shri G.K.Agarwal, Govt. Advocate for State.
Shri Lokendra Shrivastava, Advocate for respondent Nos.5 and 6.
Shri M.P.S.Raghuvanshi, Senior Advocate with Shri Mohd. Amir
Khan, Advocate for respondent No.7.
JUDGMENT
Per : Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
1. This Writ Appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been
filed against the order dated 13-10-2026 passed by Single Judge in W.P.
No. 43000/2026, by which the petition filed by the appellant was
dismissed in limine.
2. W.P. No. 43000/2026 was filed seeking the following relief(s) :
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“i. That, the impugned order Annexure P/1 dt.08/10/26 may
kindly be quashed and set side.
ii. That, the respondents may kindly be directed to conduct
the enquiry upon the complaint Annexure P/10 & P/12 in
respect of the financial irregularities committed by the
respondent no.7.
iii. That, the respondent no.5 may kindly be directed to put
on record as to by which order the respondent no.7 was
granted charge of HOD from 2019 till 08/09/2024.
iv. That, the other relief doing justice including cost be
awarded as the respondents have forced the petitioner to
approach this H’ble Court against the harassment by the
respondents.”
3. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal in short are that
the appellant was appointed on the post of Asstt. Professor (General
Medicine) at Shrimant Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Medical College,
Shivpuri vide order dated 9-4-2018, whereas the respondent no. 7 was
appointed as Asstt. Professor on 21-1-2019. It is submitted that in another
writ petition, the High Court had permitted the Senior Associate Professor
to hold the post of HOD by passing order in W.P. No. 37799/2026. At
present the appellant as well as respondent no. 6 are working on the post
of Associate Professor. It is the case of the appellant that she was
working as Head of Department of General Medicine Department. The
Medical Education Department, State of Madhya Pradesh, issued a
circular dated 5-8-2023 thereby providing that senior most Professor
would be appointed as HOD, however, the tenure would be of 2 years and
in case if there is only one Professor in the Department, then such
Professor would continue to work as HOD till another Professor is posted
or available. It is the case of the appellant, that taking shelter of this
circular, the respondent no. 5,6 and 8, by order dated 8-10-2026, have
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appointed respondent no. 7 as HOD of General Medicine Department for
2 years.
4. By referring to clause 3 of Circular dated 5-8-2023, it is submitted
that any candidate who has expressed his unwillingness to become HOD
or any departmental enquiry/Criminal case in Court of law is registered or
any adverse remark has been made by Dean or charge sheet has been
issued by State Govt., then next senior most Professor would be appointed
as HOD. It is submitted that in the present case, the Dean by its order
dated 17-8-2026 had issued a warning to the respondent no. 7 for
dereliction of his duties, therefore, the same has to be treated as “an
adverse remark by Dean” thereby disqualifying him from holding the post
of HOD, General Medicine Department.
5. It is submitted that in order to deny extension of tenure, one Dr.
Ashutosh Chaurishi, Professor Pharmacology Department/Superintendent
Shrimant Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia Medical College/Hospital was
appointed as HOD of General Medicine Department. The order dated 11-
9-2026 was challenged by appellant by filing W.P. No. 41057 of 2026.
Before the said writ petition could be decided, the respondent no. 8
appointed respondent no. 7 as HOD of General Medicine Department by
impugned order dated 8-10-2026. The said order was challenged by filing
W.P. No. 43000/2026 which was dismissed by impugned order dated 13-
10-2026 in limine itself.
6. As the writ petition itself was dismissed in limine on day one,
therefore, there was no response from any of the respondents.
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Accordingly, respondent no. 5 and respondent no. 7 have filed their
separate returns in the present appeal. However, the respondent no. 8
against whom allegations of bias and malafide have been made, did not
file return inspite of service of hamdast notice.
7. Respondent no. 5 i.e., Shrimant Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia
Medical College, Shivpuri in its return submitted that respondent no. 7 has
been given charge by adopting the policy of rotation as decided by
Medical Education Department by its circular dated 5-8-2023. By order
dated 9-9-2024, the appellant was given the charge of HOD (General
Medicine) for a period of 2 years which came to an end on 9-9-2026 and
by impugned order dated 8-10-2026, the respondent no. 7 has been given
the charge as HOD. It is further submitted that in the Department of
General Medicine, no Professor is available and accordingly, the
respondent no. 7 who is an Associate Professor has been given charge of
the post of HOD. It was further submitted that no “adverse remark” has
been passed against respondent no. 7 and only “a warning” was given
which does not come within the purview of punishment. The appellant
after completing her tenure of two years is trying to again take the charge
of the post of HOD General Medicine Department. It was further
submitted that the appellant and respondent no. 7 were appointed as
Associate Professor on the recommendation of Selection Committee by
order dated 13-4-2023 which was amended by order dated 26-6-2023 and
the respondent no. 7 is senior to the appellant. No proceedings for
financial irregularities are pending against the respondent no. 7.
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SHRIVASTAVA
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8. The respondent no. 7 has also filed his return. Apart from taking
the same defence which has been taken by the respondent no. 5, it is
further pleaded that in the light of Judgment passed by Supreme Court in
the case of State of Haryana Vs. S.M. Sharma reported in AIR 1993 SC
2273 no one has a right to ask for or stick to a current charge duty
accordingly, the writ petition is not maintainable. The respondent no. 7 is
senior to the appellant. It is submitted that although the appellant and the
respondent no. 7 were working as Asstt. Professor, but thereafter the post
of Associate Professor was advertised and the appellant and respondent
no. 7 appeared in the recruitment process and the respondent no. 7 was
placed above the appellant, therefore, in terms of Rule 12, the respondent
no. 7 is senior to appellant. It was also pleaded that no “adverse remark”
has been passed against the respondent no. 7 and “warning” cannot be
treated as a punishment. It is submitted that it is wrong to suggest that
administrative order (warning) specially debars a person against whom the
remark is made.
9. Challenging the order passed by Single Judge, it is submitted by
Counsel for the appellant, that from plain reading of Circular dated 5-8-
2023, it is clear that person against whom even “an adverse remark has
been made by dean”, cannot be appointed as HOD. It is further submitted
that the Single Judge, has committed a material illegality by treating
“punishment” and “adverse remark” as synonymous to each other. It is
further submitted that the appellant has become the victim of malafide and
arbitrary action on the part of the Dean. Although multiple other
arguments were also advanced by the Counsel for the appellant, but in the
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considered opinion of this Court, those arguments are not required to be
dealt with in this writ petition.
10. Per contra , the respondent no. 7 submitted that in the light of
Judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Sharma (Supra) ,
no one has a right to continue to hold the current charge. It was also
submitted by Counsel for respondent no. 7 in a very aggressive manner,
that one of the member of this Bench (Myself) has dismissed multiple writ
petitions which were filed against the Transfer Orders after relying upon
the judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Sharma
(Supra) , therefore, even notices of this appeal should not have been
issued. However, when this Court asked the Counsel for the respondent
no. 7 to explain the disqualifying words “ vf/k"Bkrk }kjk izfrdwy fVIi.kh dh xbZ
gS ” as mentioned in circular dated 5-8-2023, then except by submitting that
warning is not a punishment, no other argument was advanced by Counsel
for respondent no.7.
11. When a specific question was put to Shri M.P.S. Raghuvanshi,
Senior Advocate, that whether charge can be given to any one who
otherwise, is disqualified and whether a petition in the nature of Quo
Warranto will be maintainable, then it was submitted by Counsel for
respondent no. 7, that it is the Court which has asked a question regarding
maintainability of writ of quo warranto and the Counsel for the appellant
has not raised the same. But neither the Counsel for the respondent no. 7
answer the query raised by this Court, nor prayed for time to answer the
query.
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SHRIVASTAVA
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12. This Court was unable to understand the manner in which
arguments were being advanced. This Court is required to consider all
legal aspects which according to it are arising in a case, and if the Counsel
for respondent decides not to answer the same, then it will be at his own
risk because in spite of opportunity given by the Court, the legal question
was not answered.
13. Be that as it may be.
14. The Counsel for respondent no. 5,6 submitted that there is not a
single Adverse Confidential Report against me. This answer was again
shocking because Shri Lokendra Shrivastava is not appearing for
respondent no. 7, but he was arguing like a Counsel for respondent no. 7.
Whatever the reason for such an act may be . It is further submitted by
Counsel for respondent no. 5 and 6, that warning given to respondent no.
7 was not punishment, but fairly conceded that there is a difference
between “remark” and “punishment”. It was further submitted that
allegations against the respondent no. 7 which invited adverse remark in
the form of warning were not serious. However, when his attention was
drawn towards the allegations, then he fairly conceded that the allegations
were that “he did not attend the patient and referred the patient without his
signatures which ultimately resulted in death of patient”. Shri
Shrivastava, fairly conceded that it is the primary duty of a Doctor to
attend each and every patient timely and sincerely. The Counsel for the
respondent no. 5 and 6 did not try to clarify that whether the impugned
order dated 8-10-2026 is an order of appointment for a fixed term or it is
an order giving current charge of a vacant post.
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SHRIVASTAVA
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15. In reply it is submitted by Counsel for respondent no. 7 that the
allegations were enquired into by a committee of three members, out of
which, the appellant was one of the member. However, it is not the case
of the respondent no. 7, that the warning given by Dean by order dated
17-8-2026 was ever challenged by him.
16. Considered the submissions made by Counsel for the parties.
17. The first question for consideration is that whether the writ appeal
sans merit in the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of
S.M. Sharma (Supra) and Circular dated 5-8-2023 or not?
18. It would be appropriate for this Court to reproduce the impugned
order dated 8-10-2026 which reads as under :
“ 7538/ / /2026 08/10/2026
क्रभ ांक: स्थ . य ज. ददन ांक:
//
आदेश //
,
भध्मप्रदेश श सन चिदकत्स चशऺ विब ग भांत्र रम बोऩ र के ऩरयऩत्र क्रभ ांक
3/3/1/0001/2023/55-1 05.08.2023
एप/ बोऩ र ददन ांक के द्व य चनदेशों के ऩ रन भें िक्रीम क्रभ
,
अऩन ते हुए श्रीभांत य जभ त विजम य जे चसांचधम चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम चशिऩुयी के जनयर
02
भेदिचसन विब ग के विब ग ध्मऺ क प्रब य आदेश ज यी होने के ददन ांक से िर्ष हेतु िॉ.
, ,
रयतेश म दि सह प्र ध्म ऩक जनयर भेदिचसन को ददम ज त है।
भुख्म क मषऩ रन अचधक यी एिां अचध् त
श्रीभांत य जभ त विजम य जे चसांचधम
, )”
चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम चशिऩुयी (भ.प्र.
19. Similarly, clause 1 of circular dated 5-8-2023 reads as under :
izFker% ’kS{kf.kd fpfdRlky;ksa es lacaf/kr fof’k"Brk ds ofj"Bre ofj"B
izk/;kid@ izk/;kid dks foHkkxk?;{k
fd;k tkosxk tks ,d ckj es
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SHRIVASTAVA
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vf/kdre 2 o"kZ ds fy, foHkkxk?;{k jgsaxsaA ;g fu;qfDr ifji= tkjh djus dh
fnukad ls izHkkoh gksxhA orZeku es dk;Zjr foHkkxk?;{k
frfFk ls 2 o"kZ
rd dk;Z dj ldsaxsA
20. Although in order dated 8-10-2026, it is mentioned that charge of
the post of HOD General Medicine is given to respondent no. 7 for a
period of 2 years, but the said order has been passed in the light of circular
dated 5-8-2023 which provides for “appointment” and not “current
charge”. Therefore, the mere use of words “Charge ( izHkkj )” would not
make much difference, because it is not the case of the respondents that
the charge has been given till the Professor is appointed/ transferred to the
General Medicine Department. As per circular dated 5-8-2023, a fixed
term appointment to the post of HOD is to be made for a term of 2 years.
In the present case, the charge has been given for a specific term of 2
years without any further stipulation. Therefore, by way of necessary
implications, it is clear that whatever words might have been used by the
respondents, but in fact the respondent no. 7 has been given fixed term
appointment on the post of HOD General Medicine Department.
21. There is a basic difference between “appointment for fixed term”
and “current charge/conditional appointment”.
22. Fundamental Rule 49, provides for “Current Charge” which reads
as under :
F.R. 49. The State Government may appoint a Government
servant already holding a post in a substantive or officiating
capacity to officiate, as a temporary measure in one or more of
other independent posts at one time under that Government. In
such cases, no additional pay shall be admissible irrespective of
the period of dual charge.
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SHRIVASTAVA
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Provided that if in any particular case where a Government
servant is formerly appointed to hold charge of a higher post in
addition to his original post a competent authority may grant to
the Government servants double duty allowance at the prescribed
rates up to a period of one year.
23. Thus when a post, all of a sudden, falls vacant on account of leave,
transfer or retirement, then another is asked to look after the office/desk so
that basic administrative work does not come to a stand still and this
interim arrangement continues till the regular incumbent joins. Therefore,
there is no fixed term for current charge and it will continue till the
regular incumbent joins.
24. However, the “fixed term appointment” means an appointment for a
definite duration thereby creating a binding obligation on the employer to
retain the employee for the said period. It is not the stand of the
respondent no. 5 that after a Professor or any other Senior Associate
Professor is posted in General Medicine Department, then the respondent
no. 7 would automatically stand relieved of the current charge of the post
of HOD General Medicine Department.
25. The Supreme Court in the case of Sadachari Singh Tomar Vs.
Union of India decided on 28-4-2026 in Civil Appeal No. 9330-9331 of
201 has held as under :
2. The relevant facts, as they emerge from the record, may be
summarised briefly. The appellant joined ICAR as a Scientist on
24.08.1978. Subsequently, he rose in service to the post of
Senior Scientist at CIAE, Bhopal. On the basis of a selection
process conducted by the Agricultural Scientists Recruitment
Board (“ASRB”), the appellant applied for and was offered the
post of ADG-ARIS through Office Order F. No. 2(5)/96-Per. III
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W.A. No.3935/2026
dated 07.01.1998. He accepted and was subsequently appointed
to the post of ADG-ARIS w.e.f. 15.01.1998 “...for a period of
five years or until further orders, whichever is earlier,” in terms
of the Office Order F. No. 4(2)/93-Per. III dated 11.02.1998.
(Underline supplied)
10. On the merits of the dispute, the CAT, at the first instance,
had correctly observed that the appellant had no “enforceable
right” to complete the full five- year term. The instant case is not
one of the respondents-Authorities cutting short a prescribed
minimum tenure having basis in some statute and/or binding
judicial direction. Rather, at the time of appointment, the
concerned Authority had expressly reserved the power to curtail
the tenure at any point before five years by issuing further
orders. Of course, this power is not absolute, but the judicial
review of its exercise is subject to the well-settled standards
governing administrative discretion i.e., review must be
narrowly confined to assessing whether the action was arbitrary
or irrational, tainted by mala fides, or colourable in nature,
particularly vis-à-vis whether it imposes penal or stigmatic
consequences without following the required disciplinary or
natural-justice procedures. Our assessment must proceed within
this limited framework, and cannot serve as an evaluation of the
substance of the action. As a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs.
Ajai Kumar Srivastava had expounded:
“25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the
Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making
process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure
fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion.
The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held
against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or
finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no
evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon
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consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could
be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be
extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of
a decision of authority as a matter of fact.”
26. Thus, it is clear that where the appointment order contains the
condition that the tenure would be of fixed term or until further orders ,
then the incumbent cannot claim an enforceable right to continue for the
entire fixed term of tenure. However, where there is no stipulation like
“until further order” or “holding of current charge till regular incumbent
or any other eligible person joins”, then the said order has to be treated as
an order of appointment for fixed term and not “current charge” only.
27. Therefore, it is clear that in fact the respondent no. 7 has been
appointed on the post of HOD General Medicine Department for a period
of 2 years in the light of circular dated 5-8-2023. Therefore, submission
made by Counsel for the respondent no. 7 that handing over of charge for
a fixed term of 2 years on the post of HOD General Medicine Department
is merely a current charge of the said post cannot be accepted.
28. Even otherwise, if it is presumed that the respondent no. 7 has been
given the current charge of the post of HOD General Medicine
Department, then the next question for consideration would be that
whether an illegible person can be given the current charge of a post or
not?
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SHRIVASTAVA
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29. The Counsel for the respondent no. 7 relied upon para 12 of
Judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Sharma (Supra)
in which it has been held as under :
10. It is only a posting order in respect of two officers. With the
posting of Ram Niwas as Executive Engineer Sharma was
automatically relieved of the current duty charge of the post of
Executive Engineer. Sharma was neither
appointed/promoted/posted as Executive Engineer nor was he
ever reverted from the said post. He was only holding current
duty charge of the post of Executive Engineer. The Chief
Administrator never promoted Sharma to the post of Executive
Engineer and as such the question of his reversion from the said
post did not arise. Under the circumstances the controversy
whether the powers of the Board to appoint/promote a person to
the post of an Executive Engineer were delegated to the
Chairman or to the Chief Administrator, is wholly irrelevant.
11. Sharma was given the current duty charge of the post of
Executive Engineer under the orders of the Chief Administrator
and the said charge was also withdrawn by the same authority.
We have already reproduced above Rule 4(2) of the General
Rules and Rule 13 of the Service Rules. We are of the view that
the Chief Administrator, in the facts and circumstances of this
case, was within his powers to issue the two orders dated June
13, 1991 and January 6, 1992.
12. We are constrained to say that the High Court extended its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to a frivolity. No one has a right to ask for or stick to a
current duty charge. The impugned order did not cause any
financial loss or prejudice of any kind to Sharma. He had no
cause of action whatsoever to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court. It was a patent misuse of the process of the court.
30. This Court has already reproduced the relief(s) sought by the
appellant in the writ petition. The appellant has no where claimed that her
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discontinuance from the post of HOD is bad in law. She has not claimed
that She should be appointed as HOD. However, it is the submission of
Counsel for respondent no. 7 that in case if the appointment/current
charge of respondent no. 7 on the post of HOD is quashed, then the
inevitable consequence would be that the appellant would get appointed
or would get current charge as HOD, because there is no other
Professor/Associate Professor in General Medicine Department.
31. This Court is not concerned with the fact that whether appellant
would get another chance to serve the institution as HOD or somebody
else would be appointed. It is the Statute, Rules, or Circular which would
prevail.
32. Furthermore, even if it is presumed that appointment on the post of
HOD of General Medicine Department is nothing but a current charge of
a post, still any person who is otherwise disqualified, cannot be given the
current charge. The law laid down by Supreme Court in the case of S.M.
Sharma (Supra) deals with a situation where a person was trying to
continue to hold current charge of a post, whereas in the present case, the
question is that whether respondent no. 7 is eligible to hold the current
charge of post of HOD of General Medicine Department or not? When
this Court tried to explain this thin distinction, then none of the Counsel
for the respondents were ready to answer the query of this Court and
continued to argue in a very aggressive manner. Be that as it may be.
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33. The Court cannot decide the legal questions merely on the basis of
responses by the Counsel for the parties, but Court has to decide a legal
question whether it is answered by lawyers or not?
34. The writ of Quo Warranto can be issued against a person, who is
not eligible to hold a public office. No distinction can be drawn between
regular appointment or current charge for the purposes of Writ of Quo
warranto. If it is held that in case of a current charge, a writ of quo
warranto would not lie, as the appointment is not regular appointment,
then such a situation would allow the respondents to do something which
is otherwise not permissible under the law. What cannot be done
directly, can also not be allowed to be done indirectly. The Supreme
Court in the case of Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal, reported in
(2013) 1 SCC 501 has held as under :
19. A writ of quo warranto will lie when the appointment is
made contrary to the statutory provisions. This Court in Mor
Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana held
that a writ of quo warranto can be issued when appointment is
contrary to the statutory provisions. In B. Srinivasa Reddy , this
Court has reiterated the legal position that the jurisdiction of the
High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is limited to one
which can only be issued if the appointment is contrary to the
statutory rules. The said position has been reiterated by this
Court in Hari Bansh Lal wherein this Court has held that for the
issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy
itself that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules.
35. The Supreme Court in the case of Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v.
State of Gujarat, reported in (2022) 5 SCC 179 has held as under :
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SHRIVASTAVA
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16. When a writ of quo warranto will lie has been dealt with by
this Court in Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal . In para 19, it
has been observed and held as under : (SCC p. 514)
“ 19 . A writ of quo warranto will lie when the appointment is
made contrary to the statutory provisions. This Court in Mor
Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. &
Secy to Govt. of Haryana held that a writ of quo warranto can be
issued when appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions.
In B. Srinivasa Reddy , this Court has reiterated the legal position
that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo
warranto is limited to one which can only be issued if the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. The said position
has been reiterated by this Court in Hari Bansh Lal wherein this
Court has held that for the issuance of writ of quo warranto, the
High Court has to satisfy itself that the appointment is contrary
to the statutory rules.”
17. In Armed Forces Medical Assn. v. Union of India , it has
been observed by this Court that strict rules of locus standi are
relaxed to some extent in a quo warranto proceedings. It is
further observed in the said decision that broadly stated, the quo
warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any
person, who holds an independent substantive public office or
franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he
holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it
may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the
holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that
office by a judicial order. It is further observed that in other
words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the judiciary a
weapon to control the executive from making appointments to
public office against law and to protect citizens from being
deprived of public office to which they have a right. These
proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of
public office. It is further observed that it will, thus, be seen that
before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he
has to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public
office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that
inevitably would lead to an enquiry, as to, whether, the
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appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance
with law or not.
18. Thus, as per the law laid down in a catena of decisions, the
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a
limited one, which can only be issued when a person is holding
the public office does not fulfil the eligibility criteria prescribed
to be appointed to such an office or when the appointment is
contrary to the statutory rules. Keeping in mind the law laid
down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on the jurisdiction
of the Court while issuing a writ of quo warranto, the factual and
legal controversy in the present petition is required to be
considered.
36. Thus, it is clear that strict rule of locus standi are relaxed to some
extent in a quo warranto proceedings. Therefore, any one can challenge
the eligibility of a person to hold a public office and writ of quo warranto
would lie when appointment is made contrary to the statutory provision.
Therefore, the appointment/handing over of current charge to respondent
no. 7 of the post of HOD, General Medicine Department can be tested by
exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.
37. Therefore, it is held that whether it is the appointment of respondent
no. 7 for a fixed term of 2 years or it is a current charge of the post of
HOD for a fixed term of 2 years without any further condition that in case
if Professor is posted then the current charge for a period of 2 years would
automatically come to an end, this Court is of considered opinion that the
eligibility of respondent no. 7 to hold the post of HOD General Medicine
Department can be looked into and the contention of the Counsel for the
respondent no. 7 that this Court should not have even issued notices of
this writ appeal are unwarranted, misconceived and baseless.
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38. The next question for consideration is that whether the respondent
no. 7 had incurred disqualification for his appointment for fixed term of 2
years to the post of HOD or in the alternative even to hold the current
charge of the post of HOD for a fixed term of 2 years or not?
39. Clause 3 of circular dated 5-8-2023 reads as under :
3- ;fn ofj"B izk?;kid@izk?;kid }kjk foHkkxk/;{k cuus es fyf[kr :Ik ls
vfuPNk izdV dh tkrh gS
mlds fo:} foHkkxh; tkap@U;k;ky; es
vijkf/kd izdj.k ntZ gS
vf/k"Bkrk }kjk izfrdwy fVIi.kh dh xbZ gS
jkT; ljdkj }kjk vkjksi i+=kfn tkjh fd;s x;s gS rks lacaf/kr foHkkx es
dk;Zjr vxys ofj"B izk?;kid@ izk?;kid dks foHkkxk/;{k fu;qDr fd;k tkosxkA
40. The use of word “or (
)” in clause 3 of circular dated 5-8-
2023 clearly shows that the conditions are disjunctive. Thus, even if
any of the condition is proved then it would amount to
disqualification for fixed term appointment on the post of HOD.
41. In the present case, the following remarks were made by Dean
against the respondent no. 7 :
6439/ 2026 , 17/08/2026
क्रभ ांक: स्टेनो/ चशिऩुयी ददन ांक:
,
प्रचत
, ,
िॉ. यीतेश म दि सह प्र ध्म ऩक
,
भेदिचसन विब ग
चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम चशिऩुयी।
विर्म:- सोशर भीदिम ऩय भृतक के ऩुत्र की ि मयर िीदिमो क्लरऩ के सांफांध भें
िेत िनी।
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1. 20262026/701 ,
सांदबष:- अऩय करेलटय क ऩत्र क्रभ ांक/स्टेनो/एिीएभ/ चशिऩुयी ददन ांक
15 2026
अगस्त ।
2. ,
चिदकत्स अधीऺक चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम चशिऩुयी क ऩत्र क्रभ ांक
974/ 2026 , 17.08.2026
अधी.क मष/ चशिऩुयी ददन ांक ।
*
1
उऩयोक्त विर्म ांतगषत रेख है दक अऩय करेलटय के सांदचबषत ऩत्र के तहत
सोशर भीदिम ऩय ि मयर हो यही िीदिमो क्जसभें भृतक क ऩुत्र िीदिमो ऩय फम न
कय यह है दक चशिऩुयी भेदिकर कॉरेज उसके वऩत को उऩि य हेतु र म गम थ ।
िॉ. य ज म दि एिां िॉ. वप्रमांक के द्व य उसके वऩत को अटेंि नहीां दकम गम औय
,
उन्हें येपय कय ददम गम उसक कहन है दक जफ उसके वऩत भेदिकर कॉरेज
उऩि य हेतु आमे थे तफ िह नॉभषर थे। एम्फुरेंस एिां भेदिकर कॉरेज के िॉलटसष उसे
वऩत की भृत्मु के उत्तयद मी हैं।
,
उऩयोक्त प्रकयण की ज ांि हेतु चिदकत्स अधीऺक चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम
963-967/ 2026 , 16.08.2026
चशिऩुयी के आदेश क्रभ ांक/ अधी.क मष/ चशिऩुयी ददन ांक के
द्व य तीन सदस्मीम ज ांि सचभचत क ग न दकम गम । चिदकत्स अधीऺक के ऩत्र
974/ 2026 , 17/08/2026
क्रभ ांक अधी.क मष/ चशिऩुयी ददन ांक के द्व य इस क म षरम को
प्र प्त सचभचत की ज ांि रयऩोटष भें ज ांि सचभचत द्व य आऩको सांफांचधत भयीज को शीघ्र-
अचतशीघ्र सभम ऩय नहीां देखने एिां वफन हस्त ऺय के येपय दकमे ज ने क क्जम्भेद य
ऩ म गम । आऩक उक्त कृत्म श सकीम एिां अचतआि्मक सेि ओां भें र ऩयि ही की
श्रेणी भें आत है अतः आऩको िेत िनी दी ज ती है दक बविष्म भें इस प्रक य की
,
ऩुनय िृवत्त न हो अन्मथ आऩके विरुद्ध अनुश सन त्भक क मषि ही की ज िेगी।
भुख्म क मषऩ रन अचधक यी एिां अचधष्ठ त
श्रीभांत य जभ त विजम य जे चसांचधम
श सकीम चिदकत्स भह विद्य रम चशिऩुयी
, 17/08/2026
चशिऩुयी ददन ांक :
42. From the plain reading of this order, it is clear that there were
serious allegations against the respondent no.7. It was rightly and
fairly conceded by Counsel for respondent no. 5 that it is the primary
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duty of a Doctor to provide timely and sincere treatment to a patient.
If the allegations levelled against the respondent no. 7 are considered
then it is clear that the allegations of dereliction of his noble duty
were found proved and accordingly, warning was issued to him. It is
true that warning is not a punishment, but the only question is that
whether it would amount to “adverse remark by Dean” as provided in
circular dated 5-8-2023 or not?
43. It is well established principle of law that when the words of a
statute/documents are clear, plain, or unambiguous i.e., they are
reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to
give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences and meaning
should be given to each and every word. The Supreme Court in the
case of Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra,
reported in (2001) 4 SCC 534 has held as under :
26. Further we wish to clarify that it is a cardinal principle of
interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be
understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such
construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is
something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest
to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute
must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet
another rule of construction that when the words of the statute
are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to
give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It
is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the
law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts
should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by
the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to
brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if
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they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable
within the contemplation of the statute….
44. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Govind
Singh, reported in (2005) 10 SCC 437 has held as under :
10. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous
i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the
courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of
consequences. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be
gathered from the language used, which means that attention
should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not
been said. (See J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan .)
11. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its
support addition or substitution of words or which results in
rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As was
noted by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner :
“We cannot aid the legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act,
we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up
deficiencies which are left there.”
The view was reiterated by this Court in State of M.P. v. G.S.
Dall and Flour Mills and State of Gujarat v. Dilipbhai
Nathjibhai Patel . Speaking briefly, the court cannot reframe the
legislation, as noted in J.P. Bansal case for the very good reason
that it has no power to legislate.
12. It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The
elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to
gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.
13. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of
the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to
communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the
“language” is often misunderstood even in ordinary
conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in
the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who
has spoken the words or used the language can be approached
for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as the
legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio
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so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself
interpret it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend
or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but
that can be done only by making another law or statute after
undertaking the whole process of law-making.
14. Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it
is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In spite of
courts saying so, the draftsmen have paid little attention and
they still boast of the old British jingle
“I’m the parliamentary draftsman
I compose the country’s laws
And of half the litigation
I’m undoubtedly the cause”,
which was referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v.
Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran (SCC at p. 244, para 21 :
AIR at p. 1195, para 21). In Kirby v. Leather the draftsmen were
severely criticised in regard to Section 22(2)( b ) of the UK
Limitation Act, 1939, as it was said that the section was so
obscure that the draftsmen must have been of unsound mind.
15. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity,
there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is
clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or
take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory
provisions. In that situation the judges should not proclaim that
they are playing the role of a lawmaker merely for an exhibition
of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line,
though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That
line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by
“an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and
instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so”. (See
Frankfurter:“ Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes ” in
Essays on Jurisprudence , Columbia Law Review, p. 51.)
45. The Supreme Court in the case of JSW Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Kakinada Seaports Ltd., reported in (2017) 4 SCC 170, has held as
under :
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6. We have given our careful consideration to the arguments.
This Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India held that the words used in documents cannot
be treated to be surplusage or superfluous or redundant and must
be given some meaning and weightage. It was held as follows :
(SCC p. 500, para 7)
“ 7 . … It is a well-settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to
documents as to statutes that, save for compelling necessity, the
Court should be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of
a document “and should be rather at the outset inclined to
suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some
use”. To reject words as insensible should be the last resort of
judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on
common sense that no author of a formal document intended to
be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words
without a meaning. The court must, as far as possible, avoid a
construction which would render the words used by the author
of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any
part of the document and make it altogether inapplicable.”
This view has consistently held the field and was recently
reiterated in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture
Consortium) .
46. Thus, it is clear that words used cannot be treated to be superfluous
or redundant and must be given same meaning and weightage.
47. If the words “adverse remark ( izfrdwy fVIi.kh )” is considered then it is
clear that it cannot be treated as “punishment”. From plain reading of
clause 3 of circular dated 5-8-2023, it is clear that four
eventualities/disqualifications have been mentioned i.e., (i) If the
Professor has expressed his unwillingness in writing; (ii) if any
departmental enquiry/ criminal prosecution is registered ; (iii) if any
adverse remark has been made by Dean; (iv) or any charge sheet has been
issued by the State Govt. If the intention of the Medical Education
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Department was to debar only that person against whom “Punishment”
has been imposed, then it would not have used the word “adverse remark
by Dean” and would have used the word “punishment”. Therefore, it is
clear that Medical Education Department wanted to include even that
eventuality where even an adverse remark which might not be a
punishment in the light of M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, or relevant Service Condition Rules, would debar a person
from holding the post of HOD.
48. Furthermore, if the allegations made against the respondent no. 7
which invited “adverse remark by the Dean” are considered, then it is
clear that on account of negligent act of respondent no. 7, one patient had
died. At the cost of repetition, it is once again observed that it is the
bounden duty of a Doctor to make every effort to save the life of a patient.
49. The learned Single Judge, has ignored the aforementioned aspects
of the matter and dismissed the petition in limine on day one without
inviting return from the respondents.
50. For the reasons mentioned above, it is held that word “Adverse
remark by Dean” as mentioned in circular dated 5-8-2023 cannot be read
as “punishment” as suggested by Counsel for respondent no. 5 and 7 as
well as held by learned Single Judge. Therefore, it is held that since there
is an “adverse remark by Dean” against the respondent no. 7, he could not
have been given fixed term appointment or even current charge of the post
of HOD (As pleaded by respondents), specifically when the respondent
no. 7 has never challenged the “adverse remark by Dean”.
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51. Accordingly, the order dated 8-10-2026 passed by the respondent
no. 8 thereby appointing the respondent no. 7 or even giving charge of the
post of HOD for a fixed term of 2 years is hereby quashed . The
respondent no. 7 shall stop functioning as HOD of General Medicine
Department with immediate effect. The respondents no. 5,6 and 8 are free
to pass fresh order in accordance with law.
52. So far as relief(s) no. (ii) and (iii) are concerned, this Court is of
considered opinion, that the same cannot be considered in this Case as
they are the misjoinder of multiple cause of actions. The appellant is free
to pursue those relief(s) in appropriate proceedings.
53. With aforesaid observations, the appeal is allowed and order dated
13-10-2026 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 43000/2026 is
hereby set aside.
54. No order as to costs.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA) (ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE JUDGE
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