Ram Kumar And Ors vs Union Of India And Ors

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
103 -.-
RFA-411-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 30.10.2026


Ram Kumar and others ..Appellants
Vs
Union of India and others …..Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present: Mr. Mohit Rathee, Advocate
For the applicants/appellants

Mr. Sunil Kumar Sharma, Advocate
Mr. Vijay Pal, Advocate
Mr. Ankit Sihag, Advocate
For the non-applicants/respondents
-.-
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (Oral)
CM-957-CI-2026
1. The applicants/appellants through instant application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are seeking condonation of delay of 4295
days in filing the main appeal.
2. The applicants are seeking condonation of delay on the ground of
lack of awareness of status of the case. The similarly situated landowners filed
appeals which stand allowed by this Court. They are entitled to compensation
at par with similarly situated landowners.
3. Notice in the application.
4. Learned counsel for non-applicants/respondents submits that
claim of the applicants/appellants is covered by judgement of this Court,
however, Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that landowners would
not be entitled to statutory benefits and interest for the period of delay.
MOHAN LAL BIMBRA
2026.10.31 10:13
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


5. Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority Vs. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma (Dead) Through
Legal Heir & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1599 while adverting to the
inordinate delay in filing the appeals before the High Court has held that delay
may be condoned and enhanced compensation may be granted, however, the
beneficiary/acquiring body cannot be saddled with the liability of statutory
benefits and interest. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:-
“5.2 Even otherwise as rightly observed by the High Court,
the landowners are not entitled to the compensation at
Rs.297/- per sq.yard considering the decision of this Court in
the case of Nanak (Deceased) through LRS. (supra). Nothing
was pointed out that how the case of the land owners was
comparable with that of the case of Nanak (Deceased) through
LRS. (supra). On the contrary with respect to the acquisition
of the year 1982, this Hon'ble Court determined the
compensation at Rs.149/- per sq.yard in the case of Deo Karan
& Ors.(supra).
5.3 However, at the same time the acquiring body and the
beneficiary of acquisition shall not be saddled with the liability
of statutory benefits and the interest which may be available
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period.
In the present case the delay of 22 years can be said to be a
substantial delay. However, as the claimants are held to be
entitled the enhanced amount of compensation, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court can be said to be
justified in condoning the delay. However, at the same time,
the High Court has erred in awarding other statutory benefits
and interest for the delayed period. To saddle with the liability
to pay statutory benefits and interest for the delayed period
upon the beneficiary/acquiring body would be a financial
burden upon the public body and it may increase the project
cost which shall be against the public interests. It cannot be
MOHAN LAL BIMBRA
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


disputed that the liability towards the statutory benefits and
the interest under the Act, 1984 would be a huge liability
considering the interest at the rate of 15% per annum,
solatium, price rise etc. Therefore, while condoning the delay
and enhancing the amount of compensation at par with other
landowners, the High Court ought not to have saddled the
liability upon the appellant to pay statutory benefits and the
interest payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the
delayed period. To the aforesaid extent the impugned common
judgment and order passed by the High Court is required to be
modified and the present appeals are required to be partly
allowed to the aforesaid extent.”
[Emphasis supplied]
6. The Supreme Court vide judgment dated 23.04.2025 passed in
Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 896 has
reiterated that applications seeking condonation of delay ought to be
considered by adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach. It has been
observed that the discretion vested in the Courts under the law of limitation
should be exercised to advance substantial justice, and that a technical or
pedantic approach should not defeat the adjudication of disputes on their
merits. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:-
“9. Implementing in letter and spirit, the observations made as
above, i, e., a liberal approach in condonation of delay, we
notice that this Court in quite a few judgments has condoned
substantial delay. We may refer to some of them. In Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana The Court observed that even
though there was long delay in filing the appeals, it was a case
of compulsory acquisition and there had been a difference in
the amount of compensation granted to some land losers vis-a-
vis others. References were also made to Market Committee
Hodal v. Krishan Murari wherein delay of 3240 days arising
from the same acquisition has been condoned. In
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


Huchanagouda v. Assistant Commissioner and Land
Acquisition Officer., this Court, taking into account the
poverty and illiteracy of the land loser, condoned the delay of
more than 2000 days. It was observed that equities had to be
balanced by ensuring that the determination of market value
relates back to the preliminary notification - making sure that
there is no prejudice to the acquiring authorities, as also no
undue advantage to the land loser. In other words, the
appellants who approached the Court with delay, would not be
granted interest for such period.
10. In Executive Engineer, Nimna Dudhna Project Selu,
District Parbhani, Maharashtra v. State of Maharashtra, this
Court held that the Body acquiring land cannot be saddled
with the liability of paying interest for the period of delay in
preferring the appeals. The order of the High Court, which
granted interest also for five and half years' delay, was
modified to such an extent that interest shall not be payable for
delay. [See also Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer.]
11. In all judgments referred supra, the common thread that
can be observed is that delay is not a reason to deny the land
losers their compensation, which is just, fair and reasonable
for the land they have lost.
12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech Services Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of U.P., with reference to Coffee Board,
Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commission of Commercial Tax,
Karnataka that while the State has the power of eminent
domain, the owner of a land can only be divested thereof in
accordance with the procedure established by law after
appropriately compensating them. This is in view of Article
300 A and 31A of the Constitution of India.”
7. The Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Vidhya
Devi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725 while adopting a liberal approach in
condoning the delay in appeals preferred by landowners in land acquisition
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


matters, has deprecated a hyper-technical approach. It has been observed that
having regard to the beneficial nature of land acquisition jurisprudence and the
rights involved the matters ought to be adjudicated on their merits rather than
being rejected on technical ground of delay. The parameters laid down by the
Court are reproduced below:
“47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this
Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2
SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It
will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction
to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [ P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.,
(1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22 ]”
[Emphasis supplied]
49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval, which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied] ---
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the
right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires
that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness and
non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases of
acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in approaching
the court, while a significant factor, cannot override the
necessity to address illegalities and protect right to property
enshrined in Article 300A. The court must balance the need for
finality in legal proceedings with the need to rectify injustice.
The right of an individual to vindicate and protect private
property cannot be brushed away merely on the grounds of
delay and laches.”
8. Learned counsel for the applicant/appellant on being confronted
with the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (supra), Suresh Kumar (supra) and Urban
Improvement Trust (supra) expressed his inability to controvert that in view of
inordinate delay, the applicant/appellant is not entitled to statutory benefits and
interest.
9. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court reveals that liberal approach in case of application of a landowner
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RFA-411-2026 (O&M)


seeking condonation of delay in land acquisition matter should be adopted. The
Court has approved condonation of delay of more than 20 years. Cases of
landowners must not be treated at par with other cases. Delay irrespective of
number of years ought to be condoned.
10. In the wake of afore-cited judgments, application for condonation
of delay stands allowed and delay in filing enclosed appeal is hereby condoned
subject to denial of statutory benefits and interest.
Main case
1. The appellants through instant appeal under Section 54 of Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 are seeking modification of award dated 01.02.2024
passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sonipat.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that issue involved
herein is no more res integra as it stands settled vide order dated 16.02.2016
passed by this Court in RFA-3397-2014 titled as ‘Kartar Singh and Others vs
State of Haryana and Others’.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents has expressed his inability to
distinguish present case from the aforesaid order.
4. In the backdrop, present appeal is hereby allowed in terms of
order dated 16.02.2016 passed by this Court in RFA-3397-2014. It is made
clear that appellants shall not be entitled to interest for the delayed period i.e .
4295 days and statutory benefits.

October 30, 2026 (JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
Mohan Bimbra
JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether reportable Yes/No
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