D. Kalidasreddy vs Chennamma (K. Bharathi)

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 1209
CIVIL APPEAL No. 013993/2026
@ SLP (C) No(s). 19254/2026
D. KALIDASREDDY & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
CHENNAMMA (K. BHARATHI) Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
1
2. This appeal arises from an Original Suit instituted
by the first respondent against her father (i.e. the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellants) for: (a)
setting aside the Gift Deed dated 19.12.1974; (b)
delivery of possession of the suit schedule
properties; (c) mesne profits; (d) costs, etc. The
Suit was instituted on 30.08.1997.
3. The plaint case was that the plaintiff was daughter
from the first wife of the defendant; the suit
schedule properties were inherited by the plaintiff
and her three sisters from her mother who died in
1955; by 1974 all her elder sisters got married
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHETAN ARORA
Date: 2026.11.07
12:06:37 IST
Reason:
whereas the plaintiff had been pursuing her
1
1 O.S. No.359 of 1997
1

graduation, therefore, in the year 1974, plaintiff’s
elder sisters, one by one, gifted their interest in
the suit property to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
accepted those gifts and thereby became exclusive
owner in possession of the suit schedule properties;
however, she was under the care and protection of the
defendant (i.e. her father) till her marriage in
February 1975; taking advantage of his position, and
by exercising undue influence over the plaintiff, the
defendant got an instrument of Gift dated 19.12.1974
executed in his favour from the plaintiff on the
pretext that if the plaintiff gets married, and
settles with her husband, he may have no means to
maintain himself; the said gift was nominal, made on a
representation that the defendant would remain
unmarried and would safeguard the properties; acting
on those representations and the fiduciary
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff,
the gift deed was executed; however, contrary to those
representations, the defendant got secretly married,
which came to plaintiff’s knowledge sometime after her
own marriage; however, till two years before the
institution of the suit, the plaintiff had no reason
to suspect the bona fides of her father, but, in the
last two years, the attitude of the defendant changed;
2

he stopped maintaining good relations with the
plaintiff, though earlier he had been not only
visiting the plaintiff but bringing gifts in cash and
kind to her; however, in the last two years,
defendant’s affection shifted towards his second wife
and children from his second wife besides he started
planning to alienate the properties; in consequence,
upon seeing the change in attitude, on 27.02.1997 the
plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant declaring
the gift void; the defendant responded to the notice
by making false allegations; hence, the necessity to
institute the suit arose.
4. Paragraph 13 of the plaint states that the cause of
action for the suit arose on 19.12.1974 when the
plaintiff executed the Gift Deed in favour of the
defendant and, again, in the year 1995 when the
plaintiff came to know about the fraud played by the
defendant.
5. The defendant filed a written statement, inter
alia , pleading that the impugned gift was
unconditional and absolute; besides, it was acted upon
and the properties (i.e. subject matter of the gift)
were being dealt with by the defendant as his own,
therefore, there was no occasion for its revocation.
Additionally, it was pleaded, the suit as framed was
3

not maintainable and squarely barred by limitation.
6. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the
defendant being father of the plaintiff could dominate
her will; the gift was not in good faith being a
consequence of undue influence and, for this reason
alone, was liable to be set aside. While recording
such finding, the trial court rejected the contention
of the plaintiff that she was not aware about
execution of the gift deed. The observations of the
trial court in that regard are extracted below:
“21. … The contention of the plaintiff that
she was not aware about the gift deed being
executed and the gift deed was put in other
sale deeds, cannot be believed as the
plaintiff was studying B.A., and when she is
able to understand the transaction with third
parties and was doing transaction voluntarily
and at the time of transaction the elder of
the defendant S Bali Reddy was also present
and she has no dispute with the paternal
uncle, her version is contrary to her
pleadings in the plaint and further PW-1 also
speaks about the presence of Venkatesvarredy
of Vellamaddi at the time of execution of
Ex.B1.”
7. On the question of limitation, the trial court held
as under:
“28. … According to the plaintiff, from 1995
onwards when the defendant has stopped giving
share to the plaintiff, failed to explain
accounts and details of the properties, the
plaintiff has started getting her initial
suspicion and she has issued legal notice
under Ex A-5 on 27.02.1997 and therefore when
the plaintiff has got doubt about the nature
of the transaction, the point of limitation
starts and as such the suit is within time
4

and not barred by limitation.”

8. Aggrieved by trial court’s decree, the defendant
went up in appeal. The first appellate court affirmed
the decree and observed that the defendant did not
enter the witness box; whereas the plaintiff succeeded
in proving that she was under the influence of her
father and used to act on his dictates, therefore, the
burden was on the defendant to prove that the gift was
executed with free consent, which he failed to
discharge. On the issue of limitation, the first
appellate court held:
“31. … The plaintiff filed this suit nearly
after lapse of 23 years after execution of
Ex.B1. The plaintiff’s counsel cited a
decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 956 wherein
it was observed that under Article 95 of the
Limitation Act - starting point of
limitation. Article 91 of the Limitation Act
- it is not the date of execution of gift
deed but time when fraud becomes known to
the party wronged. It is the date when
plaintiff discovers true nature of deed and
not the date when he escaped from influence
by which he was dominated. So, in this case
it is specific case of the plaintiff that
even after execution of Ex. B1, the defendant
had been cordial towards the plaintiff, and
he had been supplying produce realized from
the plaint scheduled properties. The
plaintiff also says that from 1995 onwards
when the defendant has stopped giving
share to the plaintiff, failed to explain
accounts and the details of the properties,
the plaintiff has started getting her initial
suspicion and he has issued legal notice. The
plaintiff came to know about the nature of
document and the defendant started to act
adverse to the interests of the plaintiff.
The period of limitation starts from the date
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of knowledge of the plaintiff about the fraud
played by the defendant. Therefore, the suit
is perfectly within time.”
9. Impugning the judgment and decree of the first
2
appellate court, the defendant filed a second appeal
3
before the High Court . The High Court affirmed the
finding on the issue that Gift was an outcome of undue
influence. On the issue of limitation, the High Court
observed that though plaintiff had knowledge of the
true nature of the deed executed by her, however, the
start point of limitation was the year 1995 when she
came to know about the fraud (i.e. false
representation) played by the defendant, that is, when
the defendant stopped sharing the fruits of the
properties. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the
second appeal by the impugned judgment and order dated
08.04.2026.
10. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High
Court, this appeal has been filed, inter alia , on the
ground that the suit was ex facie barred by
limitation, therefore, there was no option but to
dismiss the suit under Section 3 of the Limitation
4
Act, 1963 .
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
2
2 Second Appeal No.611 of 2006
3
3 The High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati
4
4 Limitation Act
6

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants
12. The submission on behalf of the appellants is
that a gift can be revoked on such grounds as are
5
specified in Section 126 of the Transfer of Property
6
Act, 1882 . The Gift in question is not conditional;
therefore, it can be rescinded only if grounds for
rescinding a contract are made out. A plain reading of
the plaint would indicate that the plaintiff was
throughout aware of the nature of the instrument i.e.
Gift Deed dated 19.12.1974 and she was conscious of
the influence of her father, which resulted in
execution of the Gift Deed. In such circumstances, the
limitation period for rescission of the gift would
commence from the date of execution of the Gift Deed
and not from any date later. Insofar as the allegation
of fraud is concerned, there is no proper pleading
except that promise to safeguard the property and not
to marry again was breached by the defendant. Failure
to fulfill a promise does not amount to fraud. Besides
no such promise appears in the gift deed. Even if
5
5 Section 126. When gift may be suspended or revoked. - The donor and donee may agree that on
the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be
suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the
mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be.
A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it
were a contract, it might be rescinded.
Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for
consideration without notice.
6
6 T.P. Act
7

second marriage amounted to fraud, the plaintiff came
to know about it sometime after her own marriage which
took place in February 1975, therefore, even if the
period of limitation is to be counted from that date
(i.e. when the defendant entered into a second
marriage), the period of limitation had lapsed long
before the date of institution of the suit. Based on
the aforesaid submission, the learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that this was a suit plainly
barred by limitation and, therefore, there was no
option but to dismiss the suit as barred by
limitation. Hence, the appeal is entitled to be
allowed.
Submissions on behalf of Respondents
13. Per contra, on behalf of respondents it was
submitted that if the plaint is read as a whole, it
would indicate that though there was a transfer by way
of gift from the plaintiff to the defendant, the
transfer created a trust whereunder the defendant had
an obligation to safeguard the interest of the
plaintiff and, therefore, the suit would not be barred
by limitation having regard to the provisions of
7
Section 10 of the Limitation Act. Besides, fraud came
7
7 Section 10. Suits against trustees and their representatives. - Notwithstanding anything
contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, no suit against a person in whom property has
become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not
being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such
property, or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by
8

to the knowledge of the plaintiff in 1995 when the
defendant stopped sharing usufruct of the property.
Further, there is no specific disclosure in the plaint
as to when the defendant’s second marriage came to the
knowledge of the plaintiff. Hence, to non-suit the
plaintiff on the ground of limitation, the burden was
on the defendant to demonstrate as to when the
plaintiff derived knowledge of the fraud. Since the
defendant did not step into the witness box, the said
burden was not discharged. Therefore, the suit cannot
be said to be barred by limitation. Thus, it was
prayed that there being concurrent findings of all
courts that the Gift was vitiated by undue influence,
the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
14. We have accorded due consideration to the
rival submissions and have perused the record
carefully.
15. In our view, the short question that arises
for our consideration is whether the suit in question
is barred by limitation or not.
16. On the question of limitation, the submission
on behalf of the plaintiff is two-fold. First, the
gift was in fact creation of a trust for the benefit
any length of time.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or
Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a
specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.
9

of the plaintiff and, therefore, by virtue of section
10 of the Limitation Act, there would be no
limitation. Second, if Article 59 of the Limitation
Act is considered applicable, the period of limitation
would be counted from the date when the fraud came to
be known, that is, from the year 1995 when the
defendant had stopped sharing the usufruct of the
properties.
17. Insofar as the submission that the gift
created a trust is concerned, there is nothing in the
gift deed to indicate that the suit schedule
properties were to be held by the defendant for the
benefit of the plaintiff. In fact, creation of any
kind of trust is negated by the recitals in the gift
deed. The relevant recitals in the gift deed are
extracted below:
“As a result of the love and affection I have
developed in your favor, I have decided to
give the scheduled property worth rupees
25,000 to you as a land gift through this
Gift Deed Document on the basis of which you
are free to enjoy all its undisputed rights
in the future from now onwards. … I hereby
further admit that I will not have anything
on said property due to any reason without
retaining any of its rights with me, its
rights and title is being hereby conferred
upon you the receiver of this gift…”
18. The above recital in the Gift deed makes it
clear that the title in the subject matter of gift
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vested in the defendant (i.e. the done) absolutely
without creating any corresponding obligation on the
donee either to safeguard the property or to share the
usufruct of the property with the donor. It was an
unconditional gift whereunder the interest in the
properties stood transferred absolutely in favour of
the donee. Thus, there was no creation of trust.
Hence, the submission that Section 10 of the
Limitation Act would come to the rescue of the
plaintiff is rejected.
19. Though the plaintiff has also sought
possession, the limitation for instituting the suit
would not be governed by Article 65 inasmuch as even
if the plaint case is accepted, the Gift would be
voidable and not void, therefore, unless the Gift is
set aside, relief of possession cannot be granted.
Hence, the limitation period for the suit seeking
setting aside of the Gift would be governed by Article
59 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:
Article
Nos.
Description of Suit Period of
Limitation
Time from which
period begins to
run
59. To cancel or set
aside an instrument
or decree or for
the rescission of a
contract.
Three years When the facts
entitling the
plaintiff to have
the instrument or
decree cancelled or
set aside or the
contract rescinded
first become known
11

to him.
20. A holistic reading of the plaint would indicate
that the plaintiff executed the Gift Deed under the
influence of her father by relying on his assurance
that he would safeguard the property of the plaintiff
and would not remarry. The plaint itself makes it
clear that the plaintiff was conscious of her father’s
influence on her and that she had executed the gift
deed under that influence. Thus, in view of this
Court’s decision in Ningawwa vs. Byrappa Shiddappa
8
Hireknrabar and Ors. , the limitation period would run
from the date she was aware of the true nature of the
instrument and not from the date she came out of the
influence. Even otherwise, she came out of the
influence of her father in 1975 when she got married.
Thus, even as per the finding of the courts below she
was not only conscious of her father’s influence but
also aware of the nature of the instrument executed by
her. In such circumstances, the limitation expired
much prior to 1997 when the suit was instituted.
21. Insofar as the allegation of fraud is concerned,
firstly, there is no specific pleading that the
defendant suppressed any material fact at the time the
gift was made, and, secondly, even assuming that he
8
8 1968 SCC OnLine SC 206
12

promised not to marry again, mere subsequent breach of
promise does not indicate fraud. In Reliance Salt Ltd.
9
v. Cosmos Enterprises & Another , this Court held that
fraud, which vitiates the contract, must have a nexus
with the acts of the parties prior to entering into
the contract. It was held subsequent breach of promise
on the part of a party would not vitiate the contract
itself. Here, fraud is alleged because the defendant
remarried and did not safeguard the property as it was
transferred. In that regard, it be observed, firstly,
the Gift did not stipulate any kind of condition
proscribing marriage by donee; secondly, it
transferred the interest in the property absolutely to
the donee without any kind of restriction on either
his right to transfer or enjoy; and, thirdly, there is
nothing to indicate that fraudulent intention was
there from the very beginning. Insofar as sharing of
gifts are concerned, sharing of gifts by a father with
his daughter is not indicative of any kind of legal
obligation because it is quite normal for a father to
share his income with his children; therefore, if such
gifts were stopped in 1995, that by itself would not
generate a cause of action to sue, particularly, for
setting aside a Gift made in 1974. Hence, in our view,
the courts below committed manifest error in holding
9
9 (2006) 13 SCC 599, see paragraph 17
13

that the period of limitation for instituting the suit
to rescind the Gift would commence from the date when
the defendant stopped sharing the profits. In our
view, the suit was clearly barred by limitation and
was liable to be dismissed as such.
22. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The
impugned judgment and decree of the courts below are
set aside.
23. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent shall
stand dismissed.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
…………………………………………………………….J
[MANOJ MISRA]
…………………………………………………………….J
[MANMOHAN]
New Delhi;
October 29, 2026
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ITEM NO.29 COURT NO.9 SECTION XII-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL No. 013993/2026
@ SLP (C) No(s). 19254/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 08-04-2026
in SA No. 611/2006 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Amravati]
D. KALIDASREDDY & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
CHENNAMMA (K. BHARATHI) Respondent(s)
IA No. 167905/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
IA No. 167906/2026 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES

Date : 29-10-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
For Petitioner(s) :Mr. V. Giri, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Ankita Gupta- 3391, AOR
Mr. Kushagra Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Ved P. Singh, Adv.
Ms. Aishwarya Mishra, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :M/S. Veritas Legis- 2581, AOR
Mr. Ananga Bhattacharyya, Adv.
Mr. Krishanu Barua, Adv.
Ms. Devahuti Tamuli, Adv.


UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is allowed in terms of the Reportable
order placed on the record.
3. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
(CHETAN ARORA) (PARVEEN KUMAR RAWAT)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
15