Kesha V Kumar Nachani vs Encore Asset Reconstruction Company Private Limited & Anr. & Ors.

1

NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI

Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1324 of 2026
&
I.A. No. 5174 of 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:
Keshav Kumar Nachani …Appellant(s)

Versus
Encore Asset Reconstruction Company
Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
…Respondent(s)
Present:
For Appellant : Mr. Manoj Munshi, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Jatin
Sehagal, Mr. Mayank Munshi, Advocates
For Respondents : Mr. RP Agrawal, Ms. Reema Mishra, Advocates for R-1.

O R D E R
(Hybrid Mode)
[Per: Justice Mohd. Faiz Alam Khan, Member (Judicial)]
Instant IA No. 5174 of 2026 has been moved by the applicant/appellant in
Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 1324 of 2026, which has been filed by the appellant
against the impugned order dated 17/4/2026 pronounced by the National
Company Law Tribunal Indore Bench (Adjudicating Authority) Indore in CP(IB) No.
60 of 2021, praying to condone the delay of 43 days which has occurred in filing
the appeal.
2. We have already heard Shri Manoj Munshi, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the
appellant, as well as Shri RP Agarwal, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Respondent
No. 1, and have perused the record.
3. Learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant at the outset submits that the
impugned order was pronounced on April 17, 2026, however, the appellant was not
promptly informed of the passing of the order by his Counsel, who had been
conducting the proceedings before the Learned Adjudicating Authority.
CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1324 of 2026 & IA No. 5174 of 2026

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4. It is further submitted that immediately upon learning about the passing of
the impugned order, the appellant acted with utmost diligence and contacted the
present Counsel for the purpose of challenging the impugned order by filing an
appeal. The appellant also took immediate steps for obtaining the certified copy by
th
applying on 19 May 2026, which was made available thereafter.
5. It is further submitted that upon receipt of the certified copy and the
relevant record, considerable time was necessarily consumed in examining the
various pleadings, the report submitted under Section 99 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the documents relied on by the parties and thereafter,
the appeal has been filed.

6. It is further submitted that the delay which has occurred in filing the appeal
is neither deliberate nor intentional, and the same has occurred due to the bona
fide circumstances narrated herein before. Despite the appellant acting with due
diligence, the appeal could not be filed immediately within the time stipulated, and
therefore the delay occurred in filing the appeal may kindly be condoned.
7. Ld. Sr. Counsel for Appellant has relied on the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sagufa Ahmed and Others versus Upper Assam Plywood
Products Private Limited and others, Civil Appeal Nos. 3007-3008 of 2020,
decided on September 18, 2020 .
8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 at the outset submits that the
appeal has been filed after 43 days (beyond the 45 days) within which the delay
may be condoned by this Appellate Tribunal and this Appellate Tribunal does not
have jurisdiction to condone the delay.
9. It is further submitted that the precedent which has been relied on by
learned counsel for the appellant may not provide any benefit to the Appellant, as
the same pertains to the proceedings of the Companies Act and there is a
CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1324 of 2026 & IA No. 5174 of 2026

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remarkable difference between Section 421 of the Companies Act and Section 61 of
the IBC.
10. While Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submits that the delay has not been
properly explained, and the appellant was in knowledge of the impugned order from
the date of its filing and has not filed the appeal within the prescribed period,
therefore the same is liable to be dismissed .
11. We, have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It is
reflected that the factual situation with regard to the facts of the instant case, so
far as the same are related to the limitation, is admitted to the parties. It appears to
be an admitted fact that the impugned order was passed on 17 April 2026 and
thus, the limitation would start ticking from 18 April 2026, and the 30-day period
would be over by 17 May 2026, while the Appeal has been e-filed on 29 June 2026.
Thus, the appeal has been filed with a delay of 43 days.
12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in V Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd.
and Ors., (2021) ibclaw.in 157 SC , considered the law laid down in
Sagufa Ahmad as under;
“ 14. In Sagufa Ahmed (supra) a three-judge Bench of
this Court dealt with the interpretation of Section 421(3)
of the Companies Act and whether limitation would
start running once a free certified copy is made
available to the party, sans an application from the
aggrieved party. It held, in the context of a winding up
petition under the Companies Act, that the aggrieved
party could wait till it received its free copy under
Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with
Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules, and was not obligated to file
an application for a certified copy for the purposes of the
computation of limitation. Justice V Ramasubramanian
held:
“12. Therefore, it is true, as contended by the
appellants, that the period of limitation of 45 days
prescribed in Section 421(3) would start running only
from the date on which a copy of the order of the
Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved. It
is also true that under Section 420(3) of the Act read
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with Rule 50, the appellants were entitled to be
furnished with a certified copy of the order free of cost.
13. Therefore if the appellants had chosen not to
file a copy application, but to await the receipt of
a free copy of the order in terms of Section 420(3)
read with Rule 50, they would be perfectly
justified in falling back on Section 421(3), for
fixing the date from which limitation would start
running ….”

13. After considering the law laid down in Sagufa Ahmad (Supra)
Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scheme of the IBC and came to the
following conclusions;
15. The IBC is a complete code in itself and over-rides any
inconsistencies that may arise in the application of other
laws. Section 61 of the IBC, begins with a non-obstante
provision – “notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained under the Companies Act, 2013” when
prescribing the right of an aggrieved party to file an appeal
before the NCLAT along within the stipulated period of
limitation. The notable difference between Section 421(3) of
the Companies Act and Section 61(2) of the IBC is in the
absence of the words “from the date on which a copy of
the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person
aggrieved” in the latter. The absence of these words
cannot be construed as a mere omission which can be
supplemented with a right to a free copy under Section
420(3) of the Companies Act read with Rule 50 of the NCLT
Rules for the purposes of reckoning limitation. This would
ignore the context of the IBC’s provisions and the purpose
of the legislation.
16. The law on limitation with respect to the IBC is settled
and emphatic in its denunciation of delays. The power to
condone delay is tightly circumscribed and conditional
upon showing sufficient cause, even within the period of
delay which is capable of being condoned. The IBC is a
watershed legislation which seeks to overhaul the previous
bankruptcy regime which was afflicted by delays and
indefinite legal proceedings. The IBC sought to structure
and streamline the entire process of insolvency, right from
the initiation of insolvency to liquidation, as a one-stop
mechanism. Section 12(3) of the IBC prescribes a strict
time-line for the completion of the corporate insolvency
resolution process of one hundred and eighty days which
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is extendable by ninety days. The proviso to Section 12(3)
imposes an outer-limit of three hundred and thirty days,
including time taken in legal proceedings. While a three-
judge bench of this Court in Essar Steel India Ltd v.
21
Satish Kumar Gupta [ (2019) ibclaw.in 07 SC ] held
such a time-limit on court proceedings as violative of Article
14, only the word ‘mandatorily’ was struck down and a
narrowly defined extension to the outer-limit was allowed
in exceptional circumstances if the process is at a near
conclusion and serves the ends of the IBC. Regulation 40A
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
(Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons)
Regulations, 2016 provides for a detailed model timeline
for the corporate insolvency resolution process, including
extensions that are granted as discretionary powers under
the procedural eventualities of the IBC framework. The
Resolution Professional is responsible for ensuring the
timeliness of the process and has to file several forms, as
detailed under Regulation 40B, and explain all delays that
occur in the intervening period, when filing the final Form
H upon submitting a successful resolution plan under
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Section 30 of the IBC. Notably, Section 64 of the IBC
imposes an obligation on the NCLT and NCLAT to
expeditiously dispose applications pending before it, along
with recording of reasons for any delay from the
prescribed limit to the President of the NCLT/NCLAT,”
“ 17. In this background, when timelines are placed even
on legal proceedings, reading in the requirement of an
“order being made available” under a general enactment
(Companies Act) would do violence to the special
provisions enacted under the IBC where timing is critical
for the workability of the mechanism, health of the
economy, recovery rate of lenders and valuation of the
corporate debtor. The IBC, as a prescriptive mechanism,
affecting rights of stakeholders who are not necessarily
parties to the proceedings, mandates diligence on the part
of applicants who are aggrieved by the outcome of their
litigation. An appeal, if considered necessary and
expedient by an aggrieved party, is expected to be filed
forthwith without awaiting a free copy which may be
received at an indefinite stage. Hence, the omission of the
words “from the date on which the order is made
available” for the purposes of computation of limitation in
Section 61(2) of the IBC, is a consistent signal of the
intention of the legislature to nudge the parties to be
proactive and facilitate timely resolution.”
(Emphasis ours)
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18. On the question of a certified copy for filing an appeal
against an order passed by the NCLT under the IBC, Rule
22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates that an appeal has to
be filed with a certified copy of the ‘impugned order’:
“22. Presentation of appeal. – (1) Every appeal shall be
presented in Form NCLAT-1 in triplicate by the
appellant or petitioner or applicant or respondent, as
the case may be, in person or by his duly authorised
representative duly appointed in this behalf in the
prescribed form with stipulated fee at the filing counter
and non-compliance of this may constitute a valid
ground to refuse to entertain the same.
(2) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a
certified copy of the impugned order….”
(emphasis supplied)

Therefore, it cannot be said that the parties can automatically dispense with
their obligation to apply and obtain a certified copy for filing an appeal. Any
delay in receipt of a certified copy, once an application has been filed, have
been envisaged by the legislature and duly excluded to not cause any
prejudice to a litigant’s right to appeal. Hon’ble Supreme Court in V
Nagararjan (Supra) further held as under:
“19. Section 12 of the Limitation Act provides guidance on
reckoning the period of limitation and excludes the time
taken by a party for obtaining a certified copy of the order
it seeks to appeal. However, the explanation clarifies that
the time taken by the court in preparing the order before
an application for a copy is filed by the aggrieved party, is
not excluded from the computation of limitation:

“12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings. — (1) In
computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or
application, the day from which such period is to be
reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an
appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for
revision or for review of a judgment, the day on
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which the judgment complained of was
pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed
from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be
excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought
to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is
made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment 3[ ] *
shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an
application to set aside an award, the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
Explanation. — In computing under this section the
time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or
an order, any time taken by the court to prepare
the decree or order before an application for a
copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.”
(emphasis supplied)
The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its
explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a
certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to
file an appeal is expected to file an application for a
certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period,
upon which the “time requisite” for obtaining a copy is to
be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to
prepare the decree or order before an application for a
copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a
certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In
fact, the explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of
the legal position that the time which is taken by the court
to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before
the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said
that the right to receive a free copy under Section 420(3) of
the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the appellant
to seek a certified copy through an application. The
appellant has urged that Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules
empowers the NCLAT to exempt parties from compliance
with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of
substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in
favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified
copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an
appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the
purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an
automatic right on an applicant to dispense with
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compliance and render Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules
nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified
copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of
limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the
aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely
fashion. In a similar factual scenario, the NCLAT had
dismissed an appeal as time-barred under Section 61(2) of
the IBC since the appellant therein was present in court,
and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of
the pronouncement of the order.
20. The appellant had argued that the order of the NCLAT
notes that the NCLT registry had objected to the appeal in
regard to limitation, to which the appellant had filed a
reply stating that the limitation period would begin from
the date of the uploading of the order, which was 12
March 2020. The appellant submitted that the suo motu
order of this Court dated 23 March 2020, taking
retrospective effect from 15 March 2020, made under
Article 142 of the Constitution, extended the limitation until
further orders, which renders the appeal filed on 8 June
2020 within limitation. However, it is important to note
that this Court had only extended the period of limitation
applicable in the proceedings, only in cases where such
period had not ended before 15 March 2020. In this case,
owing to the specific language of Section 61(1) and 61(2), it
is evident that limitation commenced once the order was
pronounced and the time taken by the Court to provide the
appellant with a certified copy would have been excluded,
as clarified in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, if the
appellant had applied for a certified copy within the
prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the
IBC. The construction of the law does not import the
absurdity the appellant alleges of an impossible act of
filing an appeal against an order which was uploaded on
12 March 2020. However, the mandate of the law is to
impose an obligation on the appellant to apply for a
certified copy once the order was pronounced by the NCLT
on 31 December 2019, by virtue of Section 61(2) of the IBC
read with Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. In the event the
appellant was correct in his assertion that a correct copy of
the order was not available until 20 March 2020, the
appellant would not have received a certified copy in spite
of the application till such date and accordingly received
the benefit of the suo motu order of this Court which came
into effect on 15 March 2020. However, in the absence of
an application for a certified copy, the appeal was barred
by limitation much prior to the suo motu direction of this
court, even after factoring in a permissible fifteen days of
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condonation under Section 61(2). The Court is not
empowered to condone delays beyond statutory
prescriptions in special statutes containing a provision for
limitation.
D Conclusion
21. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of
the judgement- (i) when will the clock for calculating the
limitation period run for proceedings under the IBC; and (ii)
is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an
appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed under the
IBC – must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the
applicable legal regime, given that the IBC is a Code in
itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) of
the IBC consciously omit the requirement of limitation
being computed from when the “order is made available to
the aggrieved party”, in contradistinction to Section 421(3)
of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of the
IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due
diligence and apply for a certified copy upon
pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in
consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the
NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for
an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of
the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a
person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the
receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the
Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and
prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a
construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC.
The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which
can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no
more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of
interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat
the substantive objective of a legislation that has an
impact on the economic health of a nation.
(Emphasis Ours)

22. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules
mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal,
which continues to bind litigants under the IBC. While it is
true that the tribunals, and even this Court, may choose to
exempt parties from compliance with this procedural
requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as re-
iterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, the discretionary
waiver does not act as an automatic exception where
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litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of
their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a
certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the NCLAT
as clearly barred by limitation.”

14. In Tata Steel Ltd. Vs Raj Kumar Banerjee, (2025) ibclaw.in 177
SC, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under;
“ 11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e.,
30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to
entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay.
In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software
Private Limited [(2017) ibclaw.in 01 SC], while interpreting
Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC’s strict
procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly
conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained.
This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under
section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must
operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding
equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute.
This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment
Advisors Limited & Another [(2021) ibclaw.in 40 SC] has
categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any
delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and
that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-
bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the
insolvency resolution process.

11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay
beyond the period stipulated under the statute.
Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us.”

15. It is crystal clear that the appellants were represented before the NCLT
on 17.04.2026 when impugned order was passed/pronounced. The
appellant has demonstrated no effort on their part to secure certified copy of
the said orders within the stipulated period of 30 days and though no
documentary proof has been placed on record to show that Appellant has
applied for certified copy of order on 19/05/2026, but for the sake of
argument even if it is believed the appellant may not get any benefit of the
same as the certified copy has been applied after 30 days of pronouncement
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of the order. The period of limitation for filing the appeals under Section
61(1) against the orders of the NCLT 17.04.2026, expired on 17.05.2026 in
view of the thirty-day period prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code. Any
scope for condonation of delay expired on 01/06/2026, in view of the expiry
of outer condonable limit of 15 days prescribed under the proviso to Section
61(2).
16. Therefore, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case,
we are of the considered view that the impugned order was pronounced
17.04.2026, and since the appeal was, filed on 29 June 2026, beyond the
stipulated 45 days, while this appellate tribunal has jurisdiction only to
condone the delay up to 15 days, beyond the stipulated 30 days, thus, the
application moved by the appellant to condone the delay of 43 days appears
to be not maintainable and is dismissed as such.
17. Since the delay condonation application has been dismissed, the
Appeal is also dismissed .


[Justice Mohammad Faiz Alam Khan]
Member (Judicial)



[Naresh Salecha]
Member (Technical)
New Delhi
02.09.2026
sr



CA (AT) (Ins) No. 1324 of 2026 & IA No. 5174 of 2026