Smt. Sunita vs Vijay Kumar Farshwal(Deceased) Through Legal Heirs

$~74
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 02.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010232012026
+ RC.REV. 182/2026
SMT. SUNITA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Atul Kumar Sharma,
Advocate.

versus

VIJAY KUMAR FARSHWAL(DECEASED) THROUGH
LEGAL HEIRS .....Respondent
Through: Counsel (Appearance not
given).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

CM APPL. 75945/2026 (For Preponement of the case)
1. The present Application has been filed under Section 151 of the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908, seeking early hearing of the captioned
Petition, being RC.REV. 182/2026.
2. Having regard to the averments made in the present
Application, the same is allowed and the captioned matter is taken up
for hearing today.
3. Accordingly, the present Application stands disposed of in the
above terms.
RC.REV. 182/2026 and CM APPL. 75946/2026

4. The present Revision Petition has been filed under Section 25-
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:04.11.2026
09:08:41
RC.REV. 182/2026 Page 1 of 7

B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, challenging the Order dated
29.01.2026 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller
[“ learned ARC ”], Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in
Eviction Petition bearing No. RC/ARC/1006/2017 titled as “Vijay
Kumar Farshwal versus Sunita”.
5. The present Petition is accompanied by an Application, being
CM APPL. 75946/2026, which has been filed under Section 151 of
the CPC, seeking permission of this Court to place on record certain
documents which it is submitted though were already forming part of
the record before the learned ARC could not be placed on the record
of this Court while filing the Revision Petition.
6. At the outset, it is apposite to note that the jurisdiction of this
Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, 1958, is
revisional in nature and is confined to examining the legality and
propriety of the order passed by the learned Rent Controller. Such
jurisdiction is not akin to that of an appellate Court and does not
permit a re-appreciation of the entire matter or an adjudication upon
factual pleas sought to be introduced for the first time at the revisional
stage.
7. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
1
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
2 3
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of

1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:04.11.2026
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RC.REV. 182/2026 Page 2 of 7

appellate jurisdiction.
8. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner seeks to
assail the Impugned Order confined to the ground that there exists no
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. In support of
this contention, he places reliance upon the averments made in
Application No. 75946/2026, along with the documents annexed

3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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thereto, particularly the rent receipts, which are alleged to be
fabricated. It is contended that the Aadhaar Card of the Petitioner
would establish that, at the time when the said rent receipts were
purportedly issued, the Petitioner was merely eight (08) years of age
and, therefore, could not have issued the same.
10. This Court specifically called upon learned counsel for the
Petitioner to clarify whether the aforesaid factual plea had been raised
before the learned ARC and whether the Aadhaar Card, now sought to
be relied upon, formed part of the record before the learned ARC.
11. In response, learned counsel, fairly admits that neither was any
such plea raised before the learned ARC nor was the aforesaid
document placed on record before the learned ARC. Thus, the entire
challenge now sought to be raised proceeds upon a factual foundation
which was neither pleaded nor substantiated before the Court of first
instance.

12. This Court is of the considered view that a party cannot be
permitted to enlarge the scope of revisional proceedings by
introducing an altogether new factual plea, founded upon documents
which were never part of the proceedings before the learned ARC,
particularly when no such foundation was laid in the pleadings before
the said Court. The revisional jurisdiction cannot be converted into an
avenue for setting up an entirely new case or for inviting this Court to
undertake a factual enquiry in the first instance.
4
13. In Gopal Krishna Sawhney v. Vinod Kumar , the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi reiterated that a party cannot be permitted to
introduce an altogether new factual plea at the revisional stage,
particularly when no foundation for such a plea was laid before the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:04.11.2026
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RC.REV. 182/2026 Page 4 of 7

learned Rent Controller. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act cannot be invoked to set up a new case or seek
adjudication of a factual controversy for the first time. The relevant
portion of the aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 14. I will now deal with the first contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner, namely, that the area in question is a commercial
area where the suit property is located and can only be used for
commercial purpose. Hence, it is pleaded that the requirements for
bona fide residence cannot be entertained inasmuch as such a user
is contrary to the Masterplan and will be in violation of the
provisions of the DDA Act. Admittedly, this plea has not been
taken before the ARC and it is for the first time sought to be raised
before this court. Petitioner has also filed in court an extract of the
Delhi Masterplan dated August 1990 modified and corrected upto
7-9-2006 where it is claimed that the area Shahzada Bagh is stated
to be part of an industrial estate.
15. In National Textile Corporation Limited v. Naresh Kumar
Badri Kumar Jagar , (2011) 12 SCC 695 the Supreme Court held
as under:
“12. Pleadings and particulars are necessary to enable the
court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial.
Therefore, the pleadings are more of help to the court in
narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the
parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the
parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue.
It is a settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not
founded on the pleadings should not be granted”. A
decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the
pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to
ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the
area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ.
(Vide Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar , [AIR 1953 SC
235], State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction
Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207 :
(2010) 4 SCC 518 : AIR 2010 SC 1299] and Kalyan
Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi [(2011) 11 SCC 786.
--—
18. In view of the above, the law on the issue stands
crystallised to the effect that a party has to take proper
pleadings and prove the same by adducing sufficient
evidence. No evidence can be permitted to be adduced on
a issue unless factual foundation has been laid down in
respect of the same.

4
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8064
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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19. There is no quarrel to the settled legal proposition that
a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual
controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising a
pure legal issue for which no inquiry/proof is required can
be permitted to be raised by the court at any stage of the
proceedings. [See Sanghvi Reconditioners (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India [(2010) 2 SCC 733 : AIR 2010 SC 1089]
and Greater Mohali Area Development Authority v.
Manju Jain [(2010) 9 SCC 157 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 639
: AIR 2010 SC 3817]”
16. In J. Jermons v. Aliammal [(1999) 7 SCC 382] while dealing
with a similar issue, the Supreme Court held as under:
“31. … there is a fundamental difference between a case
of raising additional ground based on the pleadings and
the material available on record and a case of taking a new
plea not borne out by the pleadings. In the former case no
amendment of pleadings is required whereas in the latter it
is necessary to amend the pleadings. …
32. … The respondents cannot be permitted to make out a
new case by seeking permission to raise additional
grounds in revision.”
17. These facts which are now pleaded before this Court were
available with the petitioner when the written statement was filed.
In fact the eviction petition was filed in 2005 and has now been
disposed of after 11 years in 2016. During this entire period no
such plea was raised before the ARC. It is not as if a new fact is
sought to be introduced which was not known or could not have
been known to the petitioner, at that stage.
18. Further, it cannot be said that this plea now raised about the
Master Plan is a pure question of law. The exact location of the
premises and as to whether it is covered by the description as stated
in the Master Plan are issues which had to be determined by
evidence led by the parties before the ARC. If necessary,
appropriate Revenue Authorities would have to be summoned as
witness to identify as to whether the area falls in a commercial area
or not. The petitioner cannot, at this belated stage be permitted to
rely upon additional evidence in this manner and introduce new
pleas. Introduction of such a plea at this stage would cause grave
prejudice to the respondent. The plea is accordingly rejected.”

14. Significantly, learned counsel for the Petitioner, upon being
specifically queried, has confined his challenge to the Impugned Order
solely to the aforesaid contention. No other ground has been urged to
demonstrate any illegality, material irregularity or impropriety in the
Impugned Order warranting interference by this Court in exercise of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:04.11.2026
09:08:41
RC.REV. 182/2026 Page 6 of 7

its limited revisional jurisdiction.
15. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the sole ground
urged on behalf of the Petitioner is wholly untenable in the present
proceedings, having been sought to be introduced for the first time at
the revisional stage. No ground warranting interference with the
Impugned Order is, therefore, made out.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Revision
Petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed accordingly.
17. The present Petition, along with the pending Application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in the above terms.
18. The date already fixed before this Court, i.e., 21.01.2027, stands
cancelled.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 02, 2026 /pt/ma

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:04.11.2026
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