Bakhat Singh Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
th
ON THE 5 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 45619 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030306492026
BAKHAT SINGH YADAV
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Pratip Visoriya - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri K.K. Prajapati - Government Advocate for the State.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by
the petitioners seeking the following reliefs:-
"1. That, order dt.21/10/2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent
No.2 may kindly be quashed.
2. That, order dt.19/11/2014 (Annexure P-2) passed by respondent No.4
with the approval of respondent No.3 may kindly be quashed.
3. That, any other relief including the cost of petition be given."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that initially, the petitioner
was appointed as a Technical Member under the Rajiv Gandhi Jal Grahan Kshetra
Prabandhan Mission vide order dated 16.07.2012. On 10.09.2014, respondent No.
4 issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner alleging certain irregularities. The
petitioner submitted his reply thereto on 19.09.2014. Thereafter, the contractor,
namely, Vinod Yadav, also submitted his explanation before the respondent
authorities and the police authorities. Thereafter, respondent No. 4 passed a non-
speaking, unreasoned and stigmatic order of termination dated 19.11.2014. It is
further submitted that the petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order;
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 06-Nov-26
11:12:05 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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however, the same was not decided by the appellate authority. Consequently, the

petitioner filed W.P. No. 7442 of 2014, which was decided vide order dated
21.07.2016. Thereafter, the aforesaid petition was dismissed as withdrawn with
liberty to the petitioner to avail appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation before respondent No. 2 and
again preferred W.P. No. 25252 of 2026, which was decided with a direction to
respondent No. 2, being the appellate authority, to decide the appeal on merits.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 03.08.2026 before
respondent No. 2 and also submitted a reminder dated 08.09.2026. It is further
submitted that the appellate authority, without considering the submissions made
by the petitioner that the impugned termination order (Annexure P-2) dated
19.11.2014 was a non-speaking, unreasoned and stigmatic order passed without
conducting a regular departmental enquiry, rejected the appeal vide order dated
21.10.2026. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that various facts
and grounds were specifically mentioned in the reply dated 19.09.2014 to the
show-cause notice. However, without considering the aforesaid facts and grounds,
the services of the petitioner were terminated by passing a stigmatic order without
conducting any regular departmental enquiry. It is contended that it is a settled
position of law that even the services of a contractual employee cannot be
terminated by passing a stigmatic order without conducting a regular departmental
enquiry. In the present case, no charge-sheet was issued, nor was any Enquiry
Officer or Presenting Officer appointed and the services of the petitioner were
terminated by passing a non-speaking, unreasoned and stigmatic order. It is further
submitted that the disciplinary authority has also failed to consider the facts and
grounds specifically mentioned in the reply submitted by the petitioner and has
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 06-Nov-26
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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passed a non-speaking and unreasoned order of termination, which is contrary to

the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates
Private Limited and Another v. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others, reported in
(2010) 9 SCC 496.
3. Per contra, learned Government Advocate, while vehemently opposing
the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that as per
the conditions mentioned in the appointment order of the petitioner, his
appointment was purely on a contractual basis for a particular period, and his
services could be terminated even before the expiry of the contractual period.
Therefore, there was no requirement of conducting a departmental enquiry before
terminating the services of the petitioner. It is further submitted that the appellate
authority has passed a detailed, reasoned and speaking order.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. The impugned order dated 19.11.2014 (Annexure P/2) is a stigmatic
order, relevant extract of which is reproduced below for ready reference and
convenience:-

माईकोवाटरशेड सिमित मेढ़पुरा के खाते से कूट रिचत द तावेज तैयार कर
1.00
रािश लाख अिधक का भुगतान ी "वनोद यादव #ारा $ा% &कया गया।

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#ारा सिमित से $ा% &कया गया ।
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म ( &दनांक को कूट रिचत द तावेज तैयार
12,356/ 1,12,356/-
कर उ C चैक को रािश D. के थान पर रािश @. का कर

जमा कराया गया ।
3- 7/5/2014
ी "वनोद यादव के खाते से &दनांक को ी ब )त िसंह को रािश D.
50000/-
का भुगतान &कया गया ।
( )
कले Eटर एवं िमशन लीडर आरजीएम #ारा आदेिशत
Signature Not Verified
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BHARGAV
Signing time: 06-Nov-26
11:12:05 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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6. Before issuing impugned order dated 19.11.2014 (Annexure P-2), the

respondents have neither consider the reply to show-cause notice to petitioner nor
regular department enquiry has been conducted and by stigmatic order services of
petitioner have been terminated.
7. The services of petitioner have been terminated without holding any
enquiry. Since impugned order Annexure P-2, dated 19.11.2014 is stigmatic in
nature, therefore, regular departmental enquiry ought to have been held by
respondents. The judgment passed by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in WP
No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar vs. Panchayat and Rural Development &
Ors.), also the order dated 12.09.2023 passed in WP No.19117/2022
(Hukumchand Solanki vs. Panchayat and Rural Development & Ors.) and the
order dated 19.07.2023 passed in WP No.14663/2022 (Arvind Malviya vs. State
of MP & Ors.) are worth mentioning.
8. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rahul Tripathi Vs. Rajeev
Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal & Others reported in 2001(3) MPLJ 616 and
Jitendra Vs. State of M.P. & Others reported in 2008(4) MPLJ 670 has rightly
held that the order of termination is stigmatic in nature as the same entails serious
consequences on future prospects of respondent and therefore, the same ought to
have been passed after holding an inquiry. This Court is further supported in its
view by the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Malkhan Singh Malviya Vs. State of M.P. reported in ILR(2018) MP 660. The
Apex Court while deciding the case of Khem Chand vs. The Union of India and
Ors. reported in 1958 SC 300, had an occasion to summarize the concept of
reasonable opportunity, relevant para of which reads as under:-
"(19) To summarize: the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the
provision under consideration includes-
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(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his
innocence, which he can deny only do if he is told what the
charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which
such charges are based;
(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the
witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or
any other witnesses in support of his defence;
(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the
proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which
he can only do if the competent authority, after the enquiry is
over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise
of the charges proved against the government servant
tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments
and communicates the same to the government servant."

9. From the aforesaid, it is clear that impugned order is stigmatic in nature,
therefore, without conducting proper regular departmental enquiry impugned order
cannot be issued. The impugned termination order has been issued without giving
any proper opportunity of hearing to petitioner and without conducting proper
regular departmental enquiry. From the language of impugned order, it is clear that
it is a stigmatic termination order.
10. It is settled position that if the order of termination is stigmatic in nature,
the same entails serious consequences on future prospects of the petitioner and
therefore the same ought to have been passed after holding a proper regular
departmental enquiry. In Arvind Malviya (supra), it is held as under:-
"3) After hearing learned counsel for the parties and taking into
consideration the fact that the present petition is covered by the
order dated 25/4/2022 passed in WP No.23267/2019 (Omprakash
Gurjar (supra)), the present petition is allowed. The impugned
order is hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate
the petitioner in service with 50% backwages within a period of 2
months from the date of communication of the order. However,
liberty is granted to the respondents to proceed against the
petitioner afresh in accordance with law, if so advised. The said
order passed in W.P. No.23267/2019 shall apply mutatis mutandis
to the present case."
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Signing time: 06-Nov-26
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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11. The Division Bench of this Court, at Principal Seat, Jabalpur, in the case

of Rajesh Kumar Rathore vs. High Court of M.P. and another (W.P. No.18657 of
2018) vide order dated 23/11/2021 has held as under:-
“6. The short question of law involved in the present case is as to
whether the services of an employee under the Rules relating to
Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Contingency Paid
(District and Sessions Judge Establishment) Employees Rules,
1980, can be terminated without conducting a departmental
enquiry when an order of termination casts stigma on the
employee.

7. We are in full agreement with the legal position expounded in
various judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent. However, in the instant case, the question that arise for
consideration, as stated above, is squarely covered by the decision
of co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Krishna Pal Vs.
District & Sessions Judge, Morena (supra). In the present case, it
is an admitted fact that neither charge-sheet was issued nor
departmental enquiry was conducted and order of termination
attributes dereliction of duty amounting to misconduct, and hence,
the same is clearly stigmatic order. The petitioner’s services are
admittedly governed under the Rules of 1980. If the facts and
situation of the present case is examined in the context of the facts
and situation of the case of Krishna Pal (supra), it is found that this
Court had taken a view (para-5 of the said judgment) that Normally
when the services of a temporary employee or a probationer or
contingency paid employee is brought to an end by passing
innocuous order due to unsatisfactory nature of service or on
account of an act for which some action is taken, but the
termination is made in a simplicitor manner without conducting of
inquiry or without casting any stigma on the employee, the
provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules 1980 can be taken aid of.
However, when the termination is founded on acts of commission
or omission, which amounts to misconduct. Such an order casts
stigma on the conduct, character and work of the employee and
hence, the principle of natural justice, opportunity of hearing and
inquiry is requirement of law.

8. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, we are not
inclined to take a different view, therefore, in view of the
aforesaid, the impugned order dated 06.06.2017 (Annexure-P-6)
and order dated 20.06.2018 (Annexure-P-9) are set aside.”
Signature Not Verified
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Signing time: 06-Nov-26
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12. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 02.02.2024 passed

in WP.5856/2020 [Devkaran Patidar Vs. State of M.P. And others (Indore Bench)]
has also decided the similar issue in the following manner:
"4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders are illegal and arbitrary. He further submits that the
respondent no.4 without considering the provisions of 15.01, 15.02
and 16 of the scheme according to which the respondent no.4, is
not empowered to terminate the service of the petitioner, and the
aforesaid impugned order Annexure-P/1 has been wrongly uphold.
He further submits that the respondents have acted in high handed
manner and without following the instructions/guidelines issued
by the Higher Authorities, issued the impugned termination order.
Thus, the action of the respondents is unjust and arbitrary. In the
present case, neither any charge-sheet has been issued against the
petitioner nor any enquiry has been conducted before passing of
the impugned stigmatic order. In such circumstances, he prays that
the impugned orders be set aside. He further relied on the
judgment passed by this Court in the case of Rahul Tripathi vs.
Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal 2001 (3) MPLJ 616 and
Prakash Chandra Kein vs. State of M.P. and others 2010 (3) MPLJ
179.

5. The respondents have filed the reply and has submitted that a
number of complaints has been received against the petitioner.
After receiving the complaints a Committee was constituted for
conducting an enquiry against the petitioner and on the basis of the
enquiry report submitted by the Committee a show cause notice
was issued to the petitioner and after giving opportunity to the
petitioner to file reply, the respondent has terminated the services.
In such circumstances, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on the
post of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any charge-sheet has
been issued to the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry
was conducted with the participation of the petitioner. This Court
has passed the judgment in the case of Ramchandra vs. State of
M.P. and others decided in W.P. No.16572/2014 on 02/08/2017
and several other writ petitions on the subject are under
consideration before this Court.

8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to the
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the
impugned orders dated 12.06.2017(Annexure-P/1) and
27.08.2016(AnnexureP/2), passed by the respondents deserves to
be quashed and are accordingly, quashed. The respondents are
directed to reinstate the petitioner in service; however a liberty is
granted to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law,
in case if need so arises in future."

13. The co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 18.10.2019 in
Writ Petition No.7916/2019 [Mahesh Kumar Maru S/o Bhagirah Maru Vs. State of
M.P. and others – Indore Bench] has held as under:
6. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner is working on the post
of Gram Rojgar Sahayak and neither any chargesheet has been issued to
the petitioner at any point of time nor any enquiry was conducted with
the participation of the petitioner. This Court in the case of Ramchandra
vs. State of M.P. and others decided in W.P. No.16572/2014 on
02/08/2017 several other writ petition on the subject under
consideration before this Court in the present petition.
7. So far availability of the alternative remedy is concerned, the
impugned stigmatic order of termination has been passed contrary to the
settled law and without following the principle of natural justice. Hence,
as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool
Corporation and other vs. RegistrarTrade Mark and others reported in
AIR 1999 SC 22 alternative remedy is no bar for filing a petition under
Article 226 of Constitution of India.
8. In the light of the aforesaid as no charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner and no enquiry has been conducted, the impugned order dated
22/02/2019 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondents deserves to be
quashed and is accordingly, quashed. The respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service; however a liberty is granted to
proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law, in case if need so
arises in future.
14. Also the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti
Associates (supra) highlights this point. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph
15 opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi judicial authority or even an
administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be
like the inscrutable face of a sphinx. In paragraph 47 the Honb'le Supreme Court
summarized its discussion. The relevant sub-paragraphs of the said summary are
quoted as under:-
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“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a
decisionmaking process as observing principles of natural justice by
judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law
and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based
on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-
making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different
as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve
one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for
sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system.

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of
Stasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553,
at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford 2001 EWCA Civ 405
(CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,“adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions”.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Oryx Fisheries Pvt.Ltd vs Union
Of India & Ors; (2010) 13 SCC 427 has held as under:-

"41. In M/s Kranti Associates (supra), this Court after
considering various judgments formulated certain principles
in para 51 of the judgment which are set out below
a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support
of its conclusions.
c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial
or even administrative power.
e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
superior Courts.
h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
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rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually
the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as
different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to
the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or `rubber-stamp reasons' is
not to be equated with a valid decision making process.
m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non
of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision making not only makes the judges and decision
makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to
broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).
n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the
broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See
(1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs.
University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the
Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of
Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent
reasons must be given for judicial decisions". o. In all
common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in
setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due
Process".
42. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons.
However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be
compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order.
43. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K.
Ratna and others,(1986) 4 SCC 537, it has been held:


"......after the blow suffered by the initial
decision, it is difficult to contemplate complete
restitution through an appellate decision. Such a
case is unlike an action for money or recovery of
property, where the execution of the trial decree
may be stayed pending appeal, or a successful
appeal may result in refund of the money or
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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restitution of the property, with appropriate
compensation by way of interest or mesne profits
for the period of deprivation. And, therefore, it
seems to us, there is manifest need to ensure that
there is no breach of fundamental procedure in the
original proceeding, and to avoid treating an
appeal as an overall substitute for the original
proceeding."

44. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court quashes the show
cause notice as also the order dated 19.03.2008 passed by the
third respondent. In view of that, the appellate order has no
legs to stand and accordingly is quashed."


16. In light of aforesaid discussion, it is seen that no charge-sheet was
issued to petitioner and no regular departmental enquiry has been conducted and
the impugned stigmatic order has been passed.
17. The mere non-mention of the background situation or the SCNs in the
order dated 19.11.2014 (Annexure P/2) cannot, by itself, be determinative of the
nature of the order. As held by this Court in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab,
(1974) 2 SCC 8315 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 6,
the form of an order is not its final determinant and the Court can find out the real
reason and true character behind terminating/removing an employee.
18. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid
down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and
every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in
rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a
contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by
this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC
420: (1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by
compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the
conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment
and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court
in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of
the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not
carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under
Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct,
negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
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the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action
under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service
rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to
terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the
Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union
of India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In
short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from
contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a
punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311
is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under
the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through
the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless,
choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought
to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article
311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a
right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or
the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated
otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good
and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on
such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or
removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right
and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and
allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future
career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it
may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a
particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a
penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank.
If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an
officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily
be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the
post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or
implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does
not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank
cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for
determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of
punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the
servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or
provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his
seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his
future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that
although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to
terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under
the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and
reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way
of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not
conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court
has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the
servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been
visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If
the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the
servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be
taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 06-Nov-26
11:12:05 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:34054
13 WP-45619-2026
substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the
requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to
government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the
service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in
violation of the constitutional right of the servant.”

19. Considering the aforesaid pronouncements, entire gamut of the matter
and also the fact that the present petition is covered by order dated 25.04.2022
passed in W.P.No.23267/2019 (Omprakash Gurjar Vs. Panchayat and Rural
Development & Ors.), the impugned termination order dated 19.11.2014
(Annexure P/2) is hereby set aside. As the appellate authority has also not
considered the aforesaid aspects, consequently, appeal rejection order dated
21.10.2026 (Annexure P/1) is also hereby set aside. The respondents are directed
to reinstate the services of petitioner within a period three months from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.
20. The petitioner is not entitled to backwages on the principle of ‘no work,
no pay’. However, notional seniority is granted at par with similarly situated
persons. However, respondent/State would be at liberty to proceed against
petitioner in accordance with law, in case if need so arises.
21. With the aforesaid, present petition stands disposed of.
22. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is disposed of.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
AVI

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 06-Nov-26
11:12:05 AM