DR. MOHANDAS K vs THE VICE CHANCELLOR

Court
Karnataka High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 4 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

WRIT PETITION NO. 101755 OF 2026 (S-RES)

BETWEEN:

DR. MOHANDAS K.,
AGE: 46 YEARS, OCC: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
R/O: WARD NO.30, VINAYAKA NAGAR,
HOSPET ROAD, BALLARI CANTONMENT,
TAL & DIST: BALLARI – 583 104.
…PETITIONER
(BY SMT. VAIBHAVI INAMDAR, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE VICE CHANCELLOR,
VIJAYANAGARA SRI. KRISHNADEVARAYA UNIVERSITY,
JNANA SAGARA CAMPUS, VINAYAKA NAGARA,
CANTONMENT, BALLARI – 583 104.

2. THE REGISTRAR,
VIJAYANAGARA SRI. KRISHNADEVARAYA UNIVERSITY,
JNANA SAGARA CAMPUS, VINAYAKA NAGARA,
CANTONMENT, BALLARI – 583 104.

3. THE CHAIRMAN,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
VIJAYANAGARA SRI. KRISHNADEVARAYA UNIVERSITY
JNANA SAGARA CAMPUS, VINAYAKA NAGARA,
CANTONMENT, BALLARI-583 104.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. J.S. SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
ND
CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE 2
RESPONDENT BEARING NO.SANKE.VISHRI KRU VI BA/DP A
R/BADHAK/2024-25/2653 DATED 16.01.2025 VIDE ANNEXURE-C. TO
ND
ISSUE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE 2 RESPONDENT TO
REINSTATE THE PETITIONER IN THE INSTITUTION FORTHWITH
ALONG WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS. TO ISSUE A













Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

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ND
WRIT OF MANDAMUS DIRECTING THE 2 RESPONDENT TO PAY THE
SALARY AND ALSO THE ARREARS OF SALARY OF THE PETITIONER
FOR THE PERIOD THAT HE HAS WORKED AND ETC.

THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

ORAL ORDER

The petitioner is before the Court seeking the following
reliefs:
“a) Issue a Writ of Certiorari quashing the impugned
nd
order passed by 2 respondent bearing
ಸಂ ೆ : 
ಕೃ
2024-25/ 2653 dated 16-
 ಬ /  ಎ ಆ  / ಾದ /
01-2025 vide ANNEXURE-C .

nd
b) Issue writ of mandamus directing the 2
respondent to reinstate the petitioner in the
institution forthwith along with all consequential
benefits.

nd
c) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the 2
respondent to pay the salary and also the arrears
of salary of the petitioner for the period that he has
worked.

d) Pass any other orders which this Hon’ble Court
deems fit.”


2. Heard the learned counsel Smt. Vaibhavi Inamdar
appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel Sri. J.S. Shetty
representing the respondents.

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3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
3.1. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Professor
in the Post-Graduate Department, in the Political Science
subject at Sri. Krishnadevaraya University, Ballari (hereinafter
referred to as ‘University’ for brevity). The petitioner was
eligible for promotion to the post of Associate Professor under
the Career Advancement Scheme. When things stood thus, the
petitioner gets embroiled in a crime for offences punishable
under Sections 108 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023. The allegation was that the petitioner had instigated one
Mr. Balachandra, who was working as a lab attender, to commit
suicide on the score that he had borrowed certain amount from
the petitioner. The police conduct investigation and file a ‘B’
report before the concerned Court and the ‘B’ report is said to
have been accepted and the proceedings stood closed. The
issue is not with regard to the action of registration of an FIR or
filing of a ‘B’ report.

3.2. On the registration of the crime, it transpires that
the respondents/University send the petitioner on compulsory
leave, which action itself did not have a sanction in law. This is

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on 16.01.2025. The petitioner then makes representations to
the respondents on the score that sending the petitioner on
compulsory leave upon registration of a crime was contrary to
law. It transpires that prior to filing of the ‘B’ report, the
impugned action of sending the petitioner on compulsory leave
is withdrawn. In the light of the withdrawal, learned counsel for
the respondent/University submits that the petition is rendered
infructuous and should be closed as having become infructuous.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner Smt. Vaibhavi
Inamdar would now submit that the petitioner is no doubt
taken back to duties on 17.06.2026, but has not been paid
salary from 16.01.2025 to 17.06.2026 and the salary pursuant
to the petitioner being taken back to duty is also not paid. The
learned counsel would further submit that though the order
sending the petitioner on compulsory leave was passed on
16.01.2025, it was not even communicated to the petitioner.
Therefore, throughout the period, the petitioner has continued
to work.

5. The learned counsel Sri. J.S. Shetty appearing for
the respondents/University would dispute the said position of

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non-payment of salary after the petitioner was taken back to
duties with effect from 17.06.2026. The learned counsel would
however submit that for the payment of salary for the period
between 16.01.2025 till 17.06.2026, the petitioner may be
directed to submit a representation, which would be considered
in accordance with law.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have
perused the material available on record.

7. In the light of the submission and contra
submission, as also the fact that the impugned action itself has
stood withdrawn today, the examination of whether the order
could be sustained or otherwise is not necessary. However, the
effect of the order is what is required to be considered.

8. On 16.01.2025, the petitioner, on account of
getting embroiled himself in the aforesaid crime, which is today
closed on filing of the ‘B’ Report, has been sent on compulsory
leave. This action is wholly unsustainable in law, as the
petitioner could, at best, have been placed under suspension

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pending the departmental enquiry. However, the petitioner
could not have been sent on compulsory leave merely on the
ground that an FIR had been registered against him.
Registration of the FIR cannot be equated with a charge sheet
or a greater aggravated circumstance of conviction. The filing
of the charge sheet could not have led the petitioner to be sent
on compulsory leave as obtaining in law. In that light, the
petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits between
16.01.2025 to 17.06.2026. The petitioner has to that effect
submitted a representation on 28.07.2026. The representation
reads as follows:

“To
The Registrar
Vijayanagara Sri Krishnadevaraya University
Ballari – 583105

Subject: Submission of Court-Accepted B Report,
Request for Immediate Release of Withheld Salary
and Expeditious Processing of Promotion under CAS

Respected Sir,

I respectfully submit that the FIR registered against
me has now culminated in the acceptance of the B Report
by the Hon'ble Jurisdictional Court. A certified copy of the B
Report and the Hon'ble Court's order is enclosed herewith
for your kind perusal, record and necessary action.

It is pertinent to state that my salary was withheld
solely on account of the pendency of the FIR, as stated by
the University. Since the Hon'ble Court has now accepted

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the B Report, the very basis on which my salary was
withheld no longer exists. Consequently, there remains no
legal or administrative justification for the continued
withholding of my salary and other legitimate service
benefits.

The prolonged non-payment of my salary has caused
immense financial hardship to me and my family. Despite
rendering my services to the University, I have been
subjected to severe financial distress due to the non-
release of my legitimate salary. In view of the closure of
the criminal proceedings, I respectfully request the
University to restore my service benefits without any
further delay. I further respectfully bring to your kind
notice that my promotion under the Career
Advancement Scheme (CAS) has been pending since
December 2024.

I had become due for consideration for promotion
under CAS in December 2024, and the matter has
remained pending for a considerable period. The prolonged
pendency of my promotion has adversely affected my
career progression and consequential financial and service
benefits.

Now that the Hon'ble Jurisdictional Court has
accepted the B Report and the criminal proceedings arising
out of the FIR have consequently come to an end, I
respectfully request the University to take up my pending
CAS promotion immediately and complete the
process of consideration and promotion at the
earliest, strictly in accordance with the applicable
UGC Regulations, University rules and other relevant
service regulations.

I therefore humbly request you to kindly:


1. Take the enclosed B Report and the Hon'ble
Court's order on record and place the same before
the competent authority for necessary action.

2. Immediately release my withheld salary, along with
all consequential benefits and arrears due to me.
3. Issue necessary directions to the Finance Section for the
expeditious processing and disbursement of my
salary and all arrears.

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4. Take up and process my pending promotion under
the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), which has
been due since December 2024, without any
further delay, in accordance with the applicable UGC
Regulations and University rules.

5. Direct the concerned authorities/section to complete
all formalities relating to my CAS promotion at the
earliest and extend to me all consequential benefits,
including pay fixation and monetary/service benefits
arising from such promotion, as admissible under the
rules.

6. Restore all my legitimate service and career benefits
which have remained pending or withheld on account of
the now-closed FIR proceedings.

I hope that the University will take prompt and appropriate
action in the interest of justice, fairness, administrative
propriety and protection of the legitimate service
rights of an employee, particularly in view of the Hon'ble
Court's acceptance of the B Report.

I therefore earnestly request your good office to
kindly ensure that my withheld salary and arrears are
released immediately and my long-pending CAS
promotion, due since December 2024, is processed
and finalized at the earliest, without any further
administrative delay.

I shall be grateful for your kind consideration and
immediate action in the matter.”


9. The representation is in detail as to how the
petitioner has not been paid salary for the period he was sent
on compulsory leave, which by itself in the considered view of
this Court is illegal. If the petitioner has any documents to
demonstrate that he has continued to work throughout the

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relevant period, the same shall be furnished to the
respondents/University, if not already submitted.

10. The Apex Court in the celebrated judgment
rendered in the case of PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC
1
RIGHTS v. UNION OF INDIA , observes that any form of
work that is extracted from any person without paying any
remuneration would amount to ‘begar’ under Article 23 of the
Constitution of India. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. Article 23 enacts a very important fundamental
right in the following terms:

“23. Prohibition of traffic in human beings
and forced labour.— (1) Traffic in human beings
and begar and other similar forms of forced
labour are prohibited and any contravention of
this provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law.

(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the
State from imposing compulsory service for
public purposes, and in imposing such service the
State shall not make any discrimination on
grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or
any of them.”

Now many of the fundamental rights enacted in
Part III operate as limitations on the power of the State
and impose negative obligations on the State not to
encroach on individual liberty and they are enforceable
only against the State. But there are certain fundamental
rights conferred by the Constitution which are enforceable
against the whole world and they are to be found inter

1
(1982) 3 SCC 235

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alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24. We have already discussed
the true scope and ambit of Article 24 in an earlier portion
of this judgment and hence we do not propose to say
anything more about it. So also we need not expatiate on
the proper meaning and effect of the fundamental right
enshrined in Article 17 since we are not concerned with
that article in the present writ petition. It is Article 23
with which we are concerned and that article is
clearly designed to protect the individual not only
against the State but also against other private
citizens. Article 23 is not limited in its application
against the State but it prohibits “traffic in human
being and begar and other similar forms of forced
labour” practised by anyone else. The sweep of
Article 23 is wide and unlimited and it strikes at
“traffic in human beings and begar and other
similar forms of forced labour” wherever they are
found. The reason for enacting this provision in the
Chapter on Fundamental Rights is to be found in the
socio-economic condition of the people at the time when
the Constitution came to be enacted. The Constitution-
makers, when they set out to frame the Constitution,
found that they had the enormous task before them of
changing the socio-economic structure of the country and
bringing about socio-economic regeneration with a view
to reaching social and economic justice to the common
man. Large masses of people, bled white by wellnigh two
centuries of foreign rule, were living in abject poverty and
destitution, with ignorance and illiteracy accentuating
their helplessness and despair. The society had
degenerated into a status-oriented hierarchical society
with little respect for the dignity of the individual who was
in the lower rungs of the social ladder or in an
economically impoverished condition. The political
revolution was completed and it had succeeded in
bringing freedom to the country but freedom was not an
end in itself, it was only a means to an end, the end being
the raising of the people to higher levels of achievement
and bringing about their total advancement and welfare.
Political freedom had no meaning unless it was
accompanied by social and economic freedom and it was
therefore necessary to carry forward the social and
economic revolution with a view to creating socio-
economic conditions in which every one would be able to
enjoy basic human rights and participate in the fruits of

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freedom and liberty in an egalitarian social and economic
framework. It was with this end in view that the
Constitution-makers enacted the directive principles of
state policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting out the
constitutional goal of a new socio-economic order. Now
there was one feature of our national life which was
ugly and shameful and which cried for urgent
attention and that was the existence of bonded or
forced labour in large parts of the country. This evil
was the relic of a feudal exploitative society and it
was totally incompatible with the new egalitarian
socio-economic order which “we the people of
India” were determined to build and constituted a
gross and most revolting denial of basic human
dignity. It was therefore necessary to eradicate this
pernicious practice and wipe it out altogether from
the national scene and this had to be done
immediately because with the advent of freedom,
such practice could not be allowed to continue to
blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it
would not have been enough merely to include
abolition of forced labour in the directive principles
of state policy, because then the outlawing of this
practice would not have been legally enforceable
and it would have continued to plague our national
life in violation of the basic constitutional norms
and values until some appropriate legislation could
be brought by the legislature forbidding such
practice. The Constitution-makers therefore decided
to give teeth to their resolve to obliterate and wipe
out this evil practice by enacting constitutional
prohibition against it in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights, so that the abolition of such
practice may become enforceable and effective as
soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the
reason why the provision enacted in Article 23 was
included in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. The
prohibition against “traffic in human beings and
begar and other similar forms of forced labour” is
clearly intended to be a general prohibition, total in
its effect and all pervasive in its range and it is
enforceable not only against the State but also
against any other person indulging in any such
practice.


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13. The question then is as to what is the true
scope and meaning of the expression “traffic in human
beings and begar and other similar forms of forced
labour” in Article 23? What are the forms of “forced
labour” prohibited by that article and what kind of labour
provided by a person can be regarded as “forced labour”
so as to fall within this prohibition? When the
Constitution-makers enacted Article 23 they had before
them Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights but they deliberately departed from its language
and employed words which would make the reach and
content of Article 23 much wider than that of Article 4 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They banned
“traffic in human beings” which is an expression of much
larger amplitude than “slave trade” and they also
interdicted “begar and other similar forms of forced
labour”. The question is what is the scope and ambit of
the expression “begar” and other similar forms of forced
labour'? Is this expression wide enough to include every
conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true
scope and meaning of the words “forced labour”? The
word “begar” in this article is not a word of
common use in English language. It is a word of
Indian origin which like many other words has
found its way in the English vocabulary. It is very
difficult to formulate a precise definition of the
word “begar”, but there can be no doubt that it is a
form of forced labour under which a person is
compelled to work without receiving any
remuneration. Molesworth describes ‘ begar ’ as
“labour or service exacted by a Government or
person in power without giving remuneration for
it”. Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and Revenue
Terms gives the following meaning of the word
“begar”:“a forced labourer, one pressed to carry
burthens for individuals or the public. Under the old
system, when pressed for public service, no pay
was given. The begari , though still liable to be
pressed for public objects, now receives pay. Forced
labour for private service is, prohibited.” “Begar”
may therefore be loosely described as labour or
service which a person is forced to give without
receiving any remuneration for it. That was the
meaning of the word “begar” accepted by a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v.

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S.D. Mital [AIR 1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 :
(1961-62) 21 FJR 441] . “Begar” is thus clearly a
form of forced labour. Now it is not merely “begar”
which is unconstitutionally ( sic ) prohibited by
Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced
labour. This Article strikes at forced labour in
whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is
violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic
human values. The practice of forced labour is
condemned in almost every international
instrument dealing with human rights. It is
interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into
being, International Labour Organisation adopted
Convention No. 29 laying down that every member of the
International Labour Organisation which ratifies this
convention shall “suppress the use of forced or
compulsory labour in all its forms” and this prohibition
was elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted by the
International Labour Organisation in 1957. The words
“forced or compulsory labour” in Convention No. 29 had
of course a limited meaning but that was so on account of
the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2
of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention
of Human Rights and Article 8 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced
or compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the same strain and
it enacts a prohibition against forced labour in whatever
form it may be found. The learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents laid some emphasis on the
word “similar” and contended that it is not every form of
forced labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but only
such form of forced labour as is similar to “begar” and
since “begar” means labour or service which a person is
forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it,
the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of
forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a
person without paying any remuneration at all and if
some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it
would not fall within the words “other similar forms of
forced labour”. This contention seeks to unduly restrict
the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour
enacted in Article 23 and is in our opinion not well
founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated
by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978)

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1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] that
when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court
should be to expand the reach and ambit of the
fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their
meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the
Constitution-makers should have intended to strike
only at certain forms of forced labour leaving it
open to the socially or economically powerful
sections of the community to exploit the poor and
weaker sections by resorting to other forms of
forced labour. Could there be any logic or reason in
enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or
service to another without receiving any
remuneration at all, it should be regarded as a
pernicious practice sufficient to attract the
condemnation of Article 23, but if some
remuneration is paid for it, then it should be
outside the inhibition of that article? If this were
the true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced
to a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the
easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person
belonging to a socially or economically dominant
class to exact labour or service from a person
belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of
the community by paying a negligible amount of
remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article
23. We do not think it would be right to place on the
language of Article 23 an interpretation which
would emasculate its beneficent provisions and
defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are
clearly of the view that Article 23 is intended to
abolish every form of forced labour. The words
“other similar forms of forced labour” are used in
Article 23 not with a view to importing the
particular characteristic of “begar” that labour or
service should be exacted without payment of any
remuneration but with a view to bringing within the
scope and ambit of that article all other forms of
forced labour and since “begar” is one form of
forced labour, the Constitution-makers used the
words “other similar forms of forced labour”. If the
requirement that labour or work should be exacted
without any remuneration were imported in other
forms of forced labour, they would straightaway

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come within the meaning of the word “begar” and
in that event there would be no need to have the
additional words “other similar forms of forced
labour”. These words would be rendered futile and
meaningless and it is a well-recognised rule of
interpretation that the court should avoid a
construction which has the effect of rendering any
words used by the legislature superfluous or
redundant. The object of adding these words was
clearly to expand the reach and content of Article
23 by including, in addition to “begar”, other forms
of forced labour within the prohibition of that
article. Every form of forced labour, “begar” or
otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article 23 and
it makes no difference whether the person who is
forced to give his labour or service to another is
remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid,
labour supplied by a person would be hit by this
article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied
not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion.
Take for example a case where a person has entered into
a contract of service with another for a period of three
years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other
person before the expiration of the period of three years.
If a law were to provide that in such a case the contract
shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled to
serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly
amount to forced labour and such a law would be void as
offending Article 23. That is why specific performance of a
contract of service cannot be enforced against an
employee and the employee cannot be forced by
compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of
course, if there is a breach of the contract of service, the
employee would be liable to pay damages to the
employer but he cannot be forced to continue to serve
the employer without breaching the injunction of Article
23. This was precisely the view taken by the Supreme
Court of United States in Baily v. Alabama [219 US 219 :
55 L Ed 191] while dealing with a similar provision in the
Thirteenth Amendment. There, a legislation enacted by
the Alabama State providing that when a person with
intent to injure or defraud his employer enters into a
contract in writing for the purpose of any service and
obtains money or other property from the employer and
without refunding the money or the property refuses or

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fails to perform such service, he will be punished with a
fine. The constitutional validity of this legislation was
challenged on the ground that it violated the Thirteenth
Amendment which inter alia provides:“Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United
States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” This
challenge was upheld by a majority of the Court and Mr
Justice Hughes delivering the majority opinion said:

“We cannot escape the conclusion that
although the statute in terms is to punish fraud,
still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose
to conviction for crime those who simply fail or
refuse to perform contracts for personal service
in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose
by its effect that it seeks in this way to provide
the means of compulsion through which
performance of such service may be secured. The
question is whether such a statute is
constitutional.”

The learned Judge proceeded to explain the scope
and ambit of the expression “involuntary servitude” in the
following words:

“The plain intention was to abolish slavery
of whatever name and form and all its badges
and incidents, to render impossible any state of
bondage; to make labour free by prohibiting that
control by which the personal service of one man
is disposed of or coerced for another's benefit,
which is the essence of involuntary servitude.”

Then, dealing with the contention that the
employee in that case had voluntarily contracted to
perform the service which was sought to be compelled
and there was therefore no violation of the provisions of
the Thirteenth Amendment, the learned Judge observed:

“The fact that the debtor contracted to
perform the labour which is sought to be
compelled does not withdraw the attempted
enforcement from the condemnation of the
statute. The full intent of the constitutional
provision could be defeated with obvious facility if
through the guise of contracts under which
advances had been made, debtors could be held
to compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the

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service that the statute inhibits, for when that
occurs, the condition of servitude is created
which would be not less involuntary because of
the original agreement to work out the
indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to
liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to
enforce labour.”

and proceeded to elaborate this thesis by pointing
out:

“Peonage is sometimes classified as
voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply a
difference in the mode of origin, but none in the
character of the servitude. The one exists where
the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the
service of his creditor. The other is forced upon
the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage
however created, is compulsory service,
involuntary servitude. The peon can release
himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of
the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A
clear distinction exists between peonage and the
voluntary performance of labour or rendering of
services in payment of a debt. In the latter case
the debtor though contracting to pay his
indebtedness by labour or service, and subject
like any other contractor to an action for
damages for breach of that contract, can elect at
any time to break it, and no law or force compels
performance or a continuance of the service.”

It is therefore clear that even if a person has
contracted with another to perform service and there is
consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation
of debt or even remuneration he cannot be forced, by
compulsion of law or otherwise, to continue to perform
such service, as that would be forced labour within the
inhibition of Article 23. This article strikes at every form
of forced labour even if it has its origin in a contract
voluntarily entered into by the person obligated to
provide labour or service (vide Pollock v. Williams [322
US 4 : 88 L Ed 1095] ). The reason is that it offends
against human dignity to compel a person to provide
labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so,
even though it be in breach of the contract entered into
by him. There should be no serfdom or involuntary
servitude in a free democratic India which respects the

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dignity of the individual and the worth of the human
person. Moreover, in a country like India where there is
so much poverty and unemployment and there is no
equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may
appear on its face voluntary but it may, in reality, be
involuntary, because while entering into the contract, the
employee, by reason of his economically helpless
condition, may have been faced with Hobson's choice,
either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms
dictated by the powerful employer. It would be a travesty
of justice to hold the employee in such a case to the
terms of the contract and to compel him to serve the
employer even though he may not wish to do so. That
would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which
the employee even otherwise suffers on account of his
economically disadvantaged position and lend the
authority of law to the exploitation of the poor helpless
employee by the economically powerful employer. Article
23 therefore says that no one shall be forced to provide
labour or service against his will, even though it be under
a contract of service.

14. Now the next question that arises for
consideration is whether there is any breach of
Article 23 when a person provides labour or service
to the State or to any other person and is paid less
than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that
ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or
service to another for less than the minimum wage,
when he knows that under the law he is entitled to
get minimum wage for the labour or service
provided by him. It may therefore be legitimately
presumed that when a person provides labour or
service to another against receipt of remuneration
which is less than the minimum wage, he is acting
under the force of some compulsion which drives
him to work though he is paid less than what he is
entitled under law to receive. What Article 23
prohibits is “forced labour” that is labour or service
which a person is forced to provide and “force”
which would make such labour or service “forced
labour” may arise in several ways. It may be
physical force which may compel a person to
provide labour or service to another or it may be
force exerted through a legal provision such as a

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provision for imprisonment or fine in case the
employee fails to provide labour or service or it may
even be compulsion arising from hunger and
poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which
deprives a person of a choice of alternatives and
compels him to adopt one particular course of
action may properly be regarded as “force” and if
labour or service is compelled as a result of such
“force”, it would be “forced labour”. Where a
person is suffering from hunger or starvation, when
he has no resources at all to fight disease or to feed
his wife and children or even to hide their
nakedness, where utter grinding poverty has
broken his back and reduced him to a state of
helplessness and despair and where no other
employment is available to alleviate the rigour of
his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept
any work that comes his way, even if the
remuneration offered to him is less than the
minimum wage. He would be in no position to
bargain with the employer; he would have to accept
what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be
acting not as a free agent with a choice between
alternatives but under the compulsion of economic
circumstances and the labour or service provided by
him would be clearly “forced labour”. There is no
reason why the word “forced” should be read in a
narrow and restricted manner so as to be confined
only to physical or legal “force” particularly when
the national charter, its fundamental document has
promised to build a new socialist republic where
there will be socio-economic justice for all and
everyone shall have the right to work, to education
and to adequate means of livelihood. The
Constitution-makers have given us one of the most
remarkable documents in history for ushering in a new
socio-economic order and the Constitution which they
have forged for us has a social purpose and an economic
mission and therefore every word or phrase in the
Constitution must be interpreted in a manner which would
advance the socio-economic objective of the Constitution.
It is not unoften that in a capitalist society economic
circumstances exert much greater pressure on an
individual in driving him to a particular course of action
than physical compulsion or force of legislative provision.

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The word “force” must therefore be construed to include
not only physical or legal force but also force arising from
the compulsion of economic circumstances which leaves
no choice of alternatives to a person in want and compels
him to provide labour or service even though the
remuneration received for it is less than the minimum
wage. Of course, if a person provides labour or service to
another against receipt of the minimum wage, it would
not be possible to say that the labour or service provided
by him is “forced labour” because he gets what he is
entitled under law to receive. No inference can reasonably
be drawn in such a case that he is forced to provide
labour or service for the simple reason that he would be
providing labour or service against receipt of what is
lawfully payable to him just like any other person who is
not under the force of any compulsion. We are
therefore of the view that where a person provides
labour or service to another for remuneration which
is less than the minimum wage, the labour or
service provided by him clearly falls within the
scope and ambit of the words “forced labour” under
Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come
to the court for enforcement of his fundamental
right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct
payment of the minimum wage to him so that the
labour or service provided by him ceases to be
“forced labour” and the breach of Article 23 is
remedied. It is therefore clear that when the
petitioners alleged that minimum wage was not
paid to the workmen employed by the contractors,
the complaint was really in effect and substance a
complaint against violation of the fundamental right
of the workmen under Article 23. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

In the light of the afore-quoted judgment of the Apex Court,
the respondents/University shall take due note of the fact that,
if the petitioner has been made to work without payment of
salary for the entire period, such an act would amount to

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‘begar’ as obtaining under Article 23 of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, the respondents/University shall bear in mind
this fact also to consider the representation, as is directed.


11. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

ORDER

i) The writ petition stands disposed .


ii) The representation of the petitioner dated
28.07.2026 submitted to the
respondents/University shall be considered
in accordance with law. While so
considering the same, the
respondent/University shall bear in mind
the observations made in the course of the
order.


iii) While considering the petitioner's
representation, the respondents/University
shall bear in mind that, if the petitioner
was made to discharge his duties during
the period he was placed on compulsory
leave without payment of salary, such an
act would amount to ‘begar’, as obtaining
under Article 23 of the Constitution of
India.

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iv) The representation of the petitioner shall
merit consideration within eight weeks
from the date of receipt of the copy of this
order.





Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE



JTR
CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 44