Leelavati Alias Kalavati vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:86470
1 CR-755-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT
CIVIL REVISION No. 755 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC010512932026
LEELAVATI ALIAS KALAVATI AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Atul Choudhari - Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Ajay Ojha - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
Shri Raja Bhaiya Tiwari - Advocate for the respondent no.2 to 16.
Arguments Heard on : 28.10.2026
Pronounced on : 17.11.2026
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ORDER
The present Civil Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code of 1908”) has been
filed challenging the legality, validity, and propriety of the order dated
03.12.2025 passed by the Principal District Judge, Rewa in RCA No.
126/2025, whereby an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1963”) for condonation of delay
filed by the respondents-appellants has been allowed.
2. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that a suit for
declaration and permanent injunction was filed in respect of land bearing part
of Survey No.566 admeasuring an area of 4.10 acres and part of Survey
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No.567 admeasuring an area of 5.10 acres, situated at Village Sumeda,
Tahsil Huzur, District Rewa.
3. The suit was filed for declaration of title and possession of the
petitioners/plaintiffs against the respondent-State and other persons, who
were said to have encroached upon the land. However, on behalf of other
defendants, no appeal was filed. The State only had filed an appeal, that too
after a delay of about 7 years. It is submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioners that an application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 was filed
on the ground that, pursuant to the judgment and decree dated 30/03/2017,
the competent authority had passed an order of mutation, who was later on
trapped by the Lokayukta in some other offence and, therefore, the Collector
or the Competent Authority was not informed. It is further submitted that
when the petitioners/defendants No. 1 to 3 had filed a miscellaneous petition,
being M.P. No. 5780/2023, and the order dated 05.10.2023 was passed in the
said petition, the Collector had gathered knowledge upon such information
was given in Jan Sunwai to the Collector on 03.09.2024. The Collector, in
turn, referred the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, and thereafter, the
certified copies of the impugned order and documents were obtained, and an
appeal was filed with a delay of 7 years. It is submitted that the learned First
Appellate Court, while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, has
taken a view that as the officer of the respondent-State was not informed in
regard to the judgment and decree in question, therefore, the delay, finding it
to be bona fide, has been condoned. It is submitted by learned counsel for the
petitioners that the respondent in the application has not submitted as to who
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was the OIC in the matter as a Bi-parte judgment and decree was passed. The
officials of the respondent-State were very much aware of the said judgment
and decree. It is further submitted that, in fact, pursuant to the said judgment
and decree, the Competent Authority of the State had passed an order of
mutation in the year 2018 itself vide order dated 21.02.2018 passed in
Revenue Case No. 25/A-6/2017-18. Therefore, it was very much within the
knowledge of the authorities of the State that such a judgment and decree had
been passed. However, the respondents-defendants filed a miscellaneous
petition only because the order of mutation passed by the competent
authority was not given effect to in the documents; that cannot be a reason
for the respondent-State to gather knowledge of the judgment and decree, as
it was a Bi-parte decree and was very much executed by passing an order of
mutation. It is further submitted that the coordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Rajendra Kumar and
Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine 9626, and in other cases, has dealt
with the question of limitation in respect of appeals/cases filed by the State
Government and found that such inordinate delay could not be condoned.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that though
there is a delay of 7 years in filing the first appeal, but it was based on
bonafide, as the responsible officers of the State were not aware of the fact
that such judgment and decree has been passed. It is submitted that valuable
piece of land of the State is involved in the matter, wherein there are several
other persons who were made defendants have have been allotted the land.
Therefore, as soon as the higher officials came to know about the impugned
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judgment and decree, same was challenged by filing first appeal with an
application for condonation of delay.
5. To bolster his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Inder Singh Vs. The State
of Madhya Pradesh passed in Civil appeal [SLP (Civil) No.6145 of 2024] as
well as the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this court in First
Appeal No.568 of 2017 (The State of Madhya Pradesh & Othres Vs. Shri
Agrawal Samajik Avam Dharmik Nyas and Others) dated 04.05.2026.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The short question that falls for consideration before this Court is
whether the learned First Appellate Court was justified in condoning an
inordinate delay of nearly seven years in filing the first appeal by the
respondent-State under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, primarily on
the ground that higher authorities lacked knowledge of a contested, bi-parte
decree.
8. The record reveals that the civil suit instituted by the
petitioners/plaintiffs for declaration of title and permanent injunction was
decreed in favour of the plaintiffs vide judgment and decree dated
30.03.2017. The respondent-State was duly represented before the trial court,
participated in the proceedings, and impugned judgment and decree is a bi-
parte decree. It is an admitted position that pursuant to the said decree, the
Competent Revenue Authority acted upon it and passed an order of mutation
on 21.02.2018 in Revenue Case No. 25/A-6/2017-18.
9. In the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the respondent-
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State sought condonation of delay by asserting that the local officer who
carried out the mutation was subsequently trapped by the Lokayukta in an
unrelated matter and failed to apprise the Collector or superior authorities. It
was further asserted that the District Administration acquired knowledge of
the decree only on 03.09.2024 during Jan Sunwai, following the disposal of
M.P. No. 5780/2023 on 05.10.2023, where the direction was issued to correct
the revenue record in terms of decree. Thereafter, after obtaining necessary
sanction, the present appeal has been filed with delay.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Lalaram (Dead) Th Lrs. Bhanwari Bai and Others, reported in 2026 SCC
Online MP 23304 has held as under :-
6. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Govt. cannot
claim any special privilege in the matter of condonation of delay.
In the case of Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri)
580 : (2012) 16 GSTR 477 : (2012) 54 VST 188 : (2012) 174
Comp Cas 387 : (2012) 348 ITR 7, the Supreme Court held in
paras 27, 28 & 29 held as under:
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable Explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is
a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that
in a matter of condonation of delay when
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there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several
notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and
available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform
all the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable Explanation for the
delay and there was bona fide effort, there is
no need to accept the usual Explanation that
the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their
duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a
lew.”
7. Relying upon Postmaster General (supra), the Supreme Court in
the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC
654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 held in
paras 6 & 7 as under:
“6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid
approach is being adopted in what we have
categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The
object appears to be to obtain a certificate of
dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing
could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who
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may be at default that such a process is
followed. We have on earlier occasions also
strongly deprecated such a practice and
process. There seems to be no improvement.
The purpose of coming to this Court is not to
obtain such certificates and if the
Government suffers losses, it is time when
the officer concerned responsible for the
same bears the consequences. The irony is
that in none of the cases any action is taken
against the offcers, who sit on the files and do
nothing. It is presumed that this Court will
condone the delay and even in making
submissions, straightaway the counsel appear
to address on merits without referring even to
the aspect of limitation as happened in this
case till we pointed out to the counsel that he
must first address us on the question of
limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal
and we propose to do in all matters today,
where there are such inordinate delays that
the Government or State authorities coming
before us must pay for wastage of judicial
time which has its own value. Such costs can
be recovered from the officers responsible.”
1 1 . The question of condonation of delay cannot be examined in
isolation from the nature of the dispute and the consequences likely to
follow. The land in question is stated to have been allotted by the State
Government to several private respondents, who are poor persons and have
constructed their dwelling units thereon. It has been submitted on their
behalf that they do not possess sufficient means to independently contest the
litigation and have, therefore, been dependent upon the State Government to
protect their interests. In such circumstances, the failure of the concerned
State officials to take timely steps in challenging the decree may adversely
affect not only the public interest involved in the matter but also the interests
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of those allottees who have been relying upon the State to protect their
rights. The alleged failure of the concerned officials to bring the decree to
the notice of the competent authorities, despite the mutation order having
been passed pursuant thereto, cannot be permitted to operate to the prejudice
of such persons.
12. It is true that the law of limitation must be applied uniformly and
that the State cannot seek condonation of delay merely on account of
administrative lapses or procedural formalities. However, in cases where
substantial public interest is involved and the consequences of non-
examination of the matter on merits may result in prejudice to public
property or persons dependent upon the State, the Court is also required to
consider the nature of the dispute and the prima facie merits of the
controversy, while exercising its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The object of the law of limitation is not to defeat substantial justice,
particularly where the consequences of refusing an opportunity to contest the
matter may extend beyond the litigating State authorities and adversely affect
other persons having an interest in the subject matter.
13. In the present case, the private respondents are stated to be
beneficiaries of land allotted by the State Government and their residential
houses are situated over the land in question. They cannot be made to suffer
solely on account of the failure of the concerned officials to pursue the
appropriate legal remedy within the prescribed period. Therefore, while the
explanation furnished by the State for the delay cannot be regarded as
satisfactory in its entirety, the nature of the dispute, the public interest
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involved and the rights of the private allottees constitute relevant
circumstances warranting an opportunity to the State to have the matter
examined on merits.
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Inder Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339, in paragraphs 17 and 18, has
held as under:-
"16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of
Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 held:
‘10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years
in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint,
and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to
disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32
of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail
with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule
which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale
claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound
and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule
that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to
entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The
question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110, 116 :(1969) 2 SCR
824] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to
case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will
all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the
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remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.’
(emphasis supplied)
17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates
to a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo
Raj Singh (supra) has also considered the impersonal nature of the
functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed in State
of Manipur v Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408. In A B
Govardhan v P Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613, the Court
considered as under:
‘37. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107], the Court noted that it had been adopting a
justifiably liberal approach in condoning delay and that “justice on
merits” is to be preferred as against what “scuttles a decision on
merits”. Albeit, while reversing an order of the High Court therein
condoning delay, principles to guide the consideration of an
application for condonation of delay were culled out in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC
649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2
SCC (L&S) 595]. One of the factors taken note of therein was that
substantial justice is paramount [Para 21.3 of Esha Bhattacharjee
[Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12
SCC 649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450:
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(2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]].
38. In N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [N.L. Abhyankar
v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ
503], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur
considered, though in the context of delay vis-à-vis Article 226 of
the Constitution, the decision in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co.
Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co.
Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598] , and held that:
(N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994
SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine Bom
para 22) “22. … The real test for sound exercise of discretion by
the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as
such, but the test is whether by reason of delay there is such
negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has
given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved the
writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being
which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is
reasonable explanation for the delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
39. The Bombay High Court's eloquent statement of the
correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar
v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ
503] found approval in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah
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Hyder Beig [Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig,
(2000) 2 SCC 48] and Mool Chandra v. Union of India [Mool
Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625: 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1878]. 40. In the wake of the authorities abovementioned,
taking a liberal approach subserving the cause of justice, we
condone the delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019, subject to
payment of costs of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand) by the
appellant to the respondent.’
(emphasis supplied) "
15. However, the aforesaid circumstances do not absolve the State
from its responsibility for the inordinate delay occasioned by the failure of
its officials. The respondent-plaintiffs have been compelled to contest the
proceedings and have suffered prejudice on account of the delayed filing of
the appeal. In the considered opinion of this Court, such prejudice deserves
to be compensated by imposing reasonable costs upon the State. The
imposition of costs would also ensure that the consequences of
administrative negligence are not entirely borne by the private litigants,
therefore, the learned First Appellate Court was justified in allowing the
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, having regard to the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the public interest involved.
Nevertheless, the order dated 03.12.2025 passed by the learned Principal
District Judge, Rewa, in RCA No.126/2025 deserves to be modified to the
extent of imposing costs upon the respondent-State.
16. Consequently, the civil revision is dismissed, subject to
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modification of the impugned order to the extent that the respondent-State
shall pay costs of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) to the
petitioners/plaintiffs as compensation for the prejudice occasioned to them
due to the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The aforesaid amount shall
be paid within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy
of this order.
(DEEPAK KHOT)
JUDGE
rk.
RAVIKAN
T KEWAT
Digitally signed by RAVIKANT KEWAT DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
JABALPUR,
2.5.4.20=d496fb68be2e8fae27904bd56f99fb430afe
d46c9a55d5619fe6609b1a5e9464, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH JABALPUR,CID - 7056546,
postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=b4adf2781367121a8c6194ca0d70e6 499c424f691eb777334632e1b1713fb624,
cn=RAVIKANT KEWAT
Date: 2026.11.19 14:47:17 +05'30'