Dr. Xxxxxxxx And Anr. vs University Of Delhi & Ors.

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 10.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010429152026
+ W.P.(C) 13218/2026 & CM APPL. 61510/2026
DR. XXXXXXXX AND ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Snigdha Singh and Mr.
Vaibhav Chaurasiya, Advocates
versus

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Mohinder Rupal, Mr.
Hardik Rupal, Ms. Aishwarya
Malhotra and Ms. Tripta
Sharma, Advocates for R-1
Mr. Anurag Dayal Mathur,
Advocate for R-2
Mr. Onkar Singh, Ms. Yashika
Vimal Advocates for
Respondent no. 14

CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT

DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioners – who are
complainants under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 [hereafter ‘PoSH
Act ‟], assail ( i ) the order dated 28.07.2026 issued by respondent no.
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2/Kalindi College [hereafter „ the College ‟], constituting a fresh
Internal Committee [hereafter „ new IC ‟] to inquire into their
complaint, and ( ii ) the Speaking Order dated 16.07.2026 passed on
behalf of the Vice-Chancellor of respondent no. 1/University of Delhi
[hereafter „ the University ‟], alongwith consequential directions,
including for constitution of a fresh committee at the level of the
University.
2. Since the present proceedings arise out of a complaint under
the PoSH Act, the identity of the petitioners, is not being disclosed in
this judgment, in view of Section 16 thereof.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case, as set out in the petition,
are that, the petitioners are Associate Professors in the Departments
of Zoology and Political Science of the College, which is a
constituent college of University of Delhi. On 07.07.2025, a joint
written complaint to the Principal of the College was submitted by
the petitioners alleging that respondent nos. 10 to 13, who are
members of the teaching faculty of the College, had subjected them
to harassment, intimidation and derogatory as well as sexually
coloured remarks, including in the Staff Association WhatsApp
group and in a meeting of the Staff Association held on 03.07.2025,
thereby creating a hostile work environment. Respondent no. 14, who
was then a member of the Internal Complaints Committee of the
College [hereafter „ the earlier ICC ‟], was alleged to have deleted a
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message of one of the said respondents from the WhatsApp group.
4. On 22.07.2025, the petitioners had objected to the continuance
of respondent no. 14 as a member of the earlier ICC. Thereafter,
respondent no. 14 had himself sought recusal on 30.07.2025,
however, the said request was declined by the College on 05.08.2025.
The earlier ICC had concluded its inquiry vide report dated
19.09.2025, holding that the allegations were “not sexual in nature”,
and the said report was accepted by the Governing Body of the
College on 22.01.2026. Representations were made to the
Chairperson of the governing body, and the petitioners thereafter
preferred an appeal dated 22.12.2025 to the Vice-Chancellor,
praying, inter alia , that the report be set aside and a fresh inquiry be
conducted “by a newly constituted, impartial, and unbiased Internal
Committee”.
5. The said appeal remained undecided. The petitioners, in the
meantime, approached this Court by way of W.P.(C) 1793/2026,
which was disposed of vide order dated 18.05.2026 in the following
terms:
“1. The petitioner has made various submissions and has stated
that the entire inquiry is vitiated on many accounts, more
particularly, since the allegations are against the Chairman of
the governing body.
2. The Court, however, finds that the appeal against the Internal
Complaints Committee‟s recommendations has not been
decided by any of the authorities.
3. Under these peculiar circumstances, it would be appropriate
to direct the Vice Chancellor to decide the appeal
independently.
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4. Let the decision be taken within a period of six weeks from
the receipt of a copy of the order passed today.
5. If the grievance of the petitioners is not mitigated, the
petitioner shall be at liberty to take appropriate recourse in
accordance with law.
6. With these observations, petition stands disposed of.
7. All rights and contentions are left open.”

6. An application was thereafter moved by the petitioners and
paragraph 1 of the above mentioned order was modified, vide order
dated 26.05.2026, to the extent that it would read that „the allegations
are against the Governing Body and ICC‟.
7. The Vice-Chancellor of the University, thereafter, upon
considering the appeal, further representations of the petitioners and
the comments of the College, passed the impugned Speaking Order
dated 16.07.2026, holding that respondent no. 14, despite having
been named in the events forming the subject matter of the complaint,
had participated in the inquiry and signed the report, giving rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the requirement of an
external member under the University Grants Commission
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal of Sexual Harassment of
Women Employees and Students in Higher Educational Institutions)
Regulations, 2015 [hereafter „ UGC Regulations ‟] had not been duly
complied with. The operative part of the said order reads as under:
“13.3. It is therefore concluded that: -
13.3.1. The inquiry conducted by the existing Internal
Complaints Committee be set aside and treated as
unsustainable.
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13.3.2. A fresh inquiry be conducted in accordance with law
and the applicable statutory regulations.
13.3.3. Internal Complaints Committee be formed strictly in
compliance with the provisions of the UGC regulations, 2015
and other applicable legal requirements.
13.3.4. No person who is directly or indirectly connected with,
involved in, or interested in the subject matter of the complaint
shall be included as a member of the Committee conducting the
fresh inquiry or be part of the proceedings in any manner.
13.3.5. The fresh inquiry shall be conducted by an impartial
and independent Committee by the Kalindi College in
adherence to the principles of natural justice and procedural
formalities within the time period of 60 days.
14. Accordingly, the appeal of Dr. XXXXXX and Dr. XXXX
is disposed on the above terms.”

8. In compliance thereof, the Principal of the College, in her
capacity as the Executive Authority, constituted the new IC vide
order dated 28.07.2026, comprising (i) a woman faculty member of
the Department of Botany as the Presiding Officer (respondent no. 6);
(ii) two faculty members, being Associate Professors of the
Departments of Zoology and Political Science (respondent nos. 4 and
7); (iii) two non-teaching employees, being the Section Officer
(Administration) and the Senior Personal Assistant to the Principal
(respondent nos. 8 and 5) and (iv) a Professor of Law Centre-I,
Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, as the external member
(respondent no. 9). Concededly, none of the members of the earlier
ICC formed part of the new IC.
9. The petitioners were thereafter called upon to appear before the
new IC on 31.08.2026 vide notice dated 18.08.2026. On their request,
copies of the speaking order and of the order constituting the new IC
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were furnished to them on 24.08.2026. It is also on this date that they
represented, to the Vice-chancellor, seeking reconstitution of the new
IC.
10. Eventually, one petition i.e. W.P.(C) 12725/2026 filed by the
petitioners was dismissed as withdrawn on 02.09.2026, with liberty
to file afresh. Thereafter, the present petition has been filed,
impleading the members of the new IC as respondent no. 4 to 9 and
the persons complained against as respondent no. 10 to 14, and
additionally assailing the speaking order dated 16.07.2026.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argues that
the new IC is flawed from the outset, as it has been constituted by the
Principal of the College, who is the Member-Secretary of the
Governing Body against which, along with the earlier ICC, the
allegations of the petitioners stand recorded by this Court vide order
dated 26.05.2026. It is further submitted that the Principal had earlier
rejected the request of respondent no. 14 for recusal on 05.08.2025,
even before the petitioners had appeared before the earlier ICC, and
had permitted him to present the report before the Governing Body. It
is further submitted that such bias was pleaded in W.P.(C)
1793/2026. It is argued that permitting the Principal to select the
members of the new IC offends the maxim nemo judex in causa sua .
It is further argued that the test is one of reasonable apprehension of
bias in the mind of a fair-minded person, and that actual bias need not
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be established. It is also argued that respondent no. 4 was present at
and participated in the Staff Association meeting dated 03.07.2025,
which forms part of the subject matter of the complaint, and that her
inclusion in the new IC is, therefore, in direct opposition to paragraph
13.3.4 of the Speaking Order. Respondent no. 5, on the other hand,
being the Senior Personal Assistant to the Principal, is in direct
administrative subordination to her and cannot be expected to
function independently. It is also argued that no material has been
furnished to show that the defect relating to the external member has
been cured, and that only a list of names was supplied to the
petitioners despite a specific request.
12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further
contends that the Speaking Order dated 16.07.2026 was passed
without affording the petitioners a hearing and that the Vice-
Chancellor, instead of deciding the appeal on merits as directed by
this Court, merely recorded procedural lapses and referred the matter
back to the College, i.e., the very authority against which bias is
alleged. It is argued that this is akin to an appeal against an order of a
High Court being decided by another Bench of the same High Court,
and that an independent body ought to have been constituted at the
University level. It is further submitted that the impugned Speaking
Order was communicated to the petitioners only on 24.08.2026. It is
also submitted that the petitioners' request for in camera proceedings
was never acceded to, the CCTV footage and minutes of the relevant
meetings were never supplied, and the petitioners continue to face a
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hostile work environment, as illustrated by their registration, without
consent, for a University event in January 2026 and the imposition of
unbroken duty during the Holi festival in February–March 2026.
13. Per contra , the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no. 1/the University submits that the Speaking Order was
passed in compliance with the directions of this Court, after
considering the appeal, all subsequent representations made by the
petitioners, and the College's record, and that it grants the very reliefs
sought by the petitioners in their appeal, namely, setting aside the
report of the earlier ICC and directing a fresh inquiry by a newly
constituted committee. It is argued that the petitioners cannot be
aggrieved by an order passed in their favour, nor can they rely upon it
to the extent that it suits them while simultaneously assailing it. It is
further contended that the Internal Committee is to be constituted at
the workplace by its Executive Authority, and that there is no
provision empowering the Vice-Chancellor to constitute a
University-level committee for a complaint arising within a college.
14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 2
and 3 submits that the Principal is the Executive Authority of the
College within the meaning of the UGC Regulations and that the
constitution of the Internal Committee is a statutory function vested
in her. It is argued that the new IC was constituted within twelve days
of the Speaking Order, strictly in terms of Regulation 4 of the UGC
Regulations, and that no member of the earlier ICC has been included
therein. It is contended that the Principal is not a respondent to the
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complaint dated 07.07.2025 and that the order dated 26.05.2026
merely records the submissions of the petitioners and does not
contain any finding of this Court. It is further submitted that no role
in the incidents complained of is attributed to respondent no. 4; that
respondent no. 5 has been nominated under Regulation 4(1)(b),
which itself contemplates the nomination of non-teaching employees
by the Executive Authority; that the external member has no
connection with the College or the parties; and that the notice dated
18.08.2026 itself stipulates that the proceedings are strictly
confidential.
15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 14
submits that the repeated litigation instituted by the petitioners has
stalled the fresh inquiry and that a complainant cannot be permitted
to choose the members of the ICC on the basis of vague allegations
of bias. It is, thus, prayed that the petition be dismissed.
16. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
petitioners as well as the respondents, and has perused the material
placed on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
17. In the present case, the issues that arise for consideration are:
( i ) whether the Speaking Order dated 16.07.2026 suffers from any
infirmity warranting interference by this Court; (ii) whether the
constitution of the new IC by the Principal of the College stands
vitiated on account of bias; and ( iii ) whether the composition of the
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new IC, or any of the other grievances raised, warrants interference
by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
18. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that Section 4 of the PoSH
Act mandates that every employer of a workplace shall constitute an
Internal Committee, the members whereof are to be nominated by the
employer. In higher educational institutions, Regulation 4(1) of the
UGC Regulations requires every Executive Authority to constitute an
Internal Complaints Committee comprising a woman Presiding
Officer, two faculty members, two non-teaching employees, and one
member from amongst non-governmental organisations or a person
familiar with the issues relating to sexual harassment, all nominated
by the Executive Authority. The autonomy of such a Committee is
secured by Regulation 4(3), which reads as under:
“(3) Persons in senior administrative positions in the HEI, such
as Vice-Chancellor, Pro Vice-Chancellors, Rectors, Registrar,
Deans, Heads of Departments, etc., shall not be members of
ICCs in order to ensure autonomy of their functioning.”

19. It is the own case of the petitioners that the Principal is the
„Executive Authority‟ of the College under Regulation 2(g) of the
UGC Regulations, in whom the power to nominate the members of
the Internal Committee is statutorily vested . The statute, thus,
designates the Internal Committee of the workplace as the forum
which „ shall ‟ inquire into complaints of sexual harassment, within a
time-bound framework, the inquiry being required to be completed
within ninety days under Section 11(4) of the PoSH Act. In Prof.
Rasal Singh v. University of Delhi: W.P.(C) 14760/2025 , decided on
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24.04.2026, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has observed as
under:
“45. ...The PoSH Act specifically creates a self-contained
mechanism for redressal of such complaints through the
Internal Complaints Committee/Local Committee. Once the
legislature has expressly designated the ICC/Local Committee
as the authority which shall inquire into such complaints, the
constitution of any parallel or pre-ICC fact-finding body would
be outside the statutory scheme.”

20. At the same time, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Aureliano
Fernandes v. State of Goa : (2024) 1 SCC 632 has cautioned that “ An
improperly constituted ICC/LC/IC, would be an impediment in
conducting an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment at the
workplace ”. The question before this Court, therefore, is whether the
new IC, constituted under the aforesaid statutory scheme, suffers
from any such infirmity as would warrant its dissolution.
21. To appreciate the rival contentions, this Court notes that vide
order dated 18.05.2026 passed in W.P.(C) 1793/2026 , the
Predecessor Bench had only issued a direction to the Vice-Chancellor
of the University to decide the appeal of the petitioners
independently, leaving all rights and contentions of the petitioners
open. The order dated 26.05.2026 passed subsequently only modified
the submission of the petitioners recorded in the previous order dated
18.05.2026; and thus, as against the paragraph 1 of order dated
18.05.2026 recording “ The petitioner has made various submissions
and has stated that the entire inquiry is vitiated on many accounts,
more particularly, since the allegations are against the Chairman of
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the governing body. ”, the order dated 26.05.2026 modified the said
paragraph 1 to read as “ The petitioner has made various submissions
and has stated that the entire inquiry is vitiated on many accounts,
more particularly, since the allegations are against the Governing
Body and ICC. ”
22. In fact, in their application seeking the aforesaid modification,
the petitioners had themselves categorically stated that they were “ not
seeking any review, reconsideration or alteration of the substantive
directions ” and that the application was “ confined only to seeking
modification of the factual recording of the submissions advanced by
the Petitioners ”. The recording that „ the allegations are against the
Governing Body and ICC ‟ is, thus, only a recital of the case of the
petitioners, and cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be read as a
finding of this Court that the Governing Body or the Principal of the
College was biased.
23. It is further to be noted that the appeal dated 22.12.2025 filed
by the petitioners herein, which the Vice-Chancellor of the University
was directed by this Court to decide, had sought the setting aside of
the report of the earlier ICC and a fresh inquiry by a newly
constituted, impartial and unbiased Internal Committee. Even in
W.P.(C) 1793/2026, the petitioners had prayed for the constitution of
a fresh Internal Committee “strictly in accordance with Section 4” of
the PoSH Act, excluding respondent no. 14, and for a de novo
inquiry. In the opinion of this Court, the impugned Speaking Order
has granted precisely the reliefs sought by the petitioners, inasmuch
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as the report of the earlier ICC has been set aside, a fresh inquiry has
been directed, and the new IC is required to be constituted strictly in
accordance with the UGC Regulations, excluding any person
connected with the subject matter of the complaint. In these
circumstances, this Court finds no ground to hold that the petitioners
can legitimately claim any grievance against the relief granted by the
impugned Speaking Order.
24. The contention of the petitioners that the impugned Speaking
Order was passed without affording them a hearing also does not
merit acceptance. It is material to note that the Vice-Chancellor
considered the written appeal dated 22.12.2025 preferred by the
petitioners, as well as their subsequent representations, which have
been specifically noticed in the impugned order. The Speaking Order
also addresses the core of their grievance by setting aside the report
of the earlier ICC and directing a fresh inquiry by a newly constituted
Internal Committee, in accordance with the applicable statutory
framework. Further, it is also material to note that the order dated
18.05.2026 passed by this Court directed the Vice-Chancellor to
decide the appeal independently but did not specifically require that
the petitioners be afforded a personal hearing.
25. While the observance of the principles of natural justice must
be assessed in the facts and circumstances of each case, the mere
absence of a personal hearing does not, by itself, establish that the
decision-making process stands vitiated. The petitioners must
demonstrate that the procedure adopted resulted in prejudice to them.
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In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan , (2000) 7 SCC
529 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court approved the principle that
“ ….There must have been some real prejudice to the complainant;
there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural
justice… ”.
26. In the present case, the petitioners have not demonstrated any
such prejudice arising from the absence of a personal hearing before
the Vice-Chancellor. Their written appeal and subsequent
representations were considered, and the decision substantially
accords with the reliefs sought by them. It is also pertinent to note
that the petitioners themselves seek to rely upon paragraphs 13.3.3 to
13.3.5 of the impugned Speaking Order as the standard against which
the constitution of the new IC is to be tested, even while challenging
the said order itself, which further reinforces the need to examine
their grievance in light of the actual directions issued in the said
order, and the prejudice, if any, resulting from the procedure adopted.
In these circumstances, and in the absence of any demonstrated
prejudice attributable to the absence of a personal hearing, this Court
finds no ground to interfere with the impugned Speaking Order on
this count.
27. The argument that the Vice-Chancellor ought to have decided
the appeal on merits, rather than directing a fresh inquiry, is also
misconceived, since in the opinion of this Court, once the appellate
authority found that the earlier inquiry stood vitiated on account of
the participation of a member named in the events complained of, and
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the absence of a validly nominated external member, the inquiry
stood rendered unsustainable at its very foundation. In such
circumstances, the only course consistent with the PoSH Act was to
direct a fresh inquiry by a properly constituted Internal Committee.
The Vice-Chancellor could not have assumed to himself the fact-
finding function which the statute vests in the Internal Committee,
since such a course would have resulted in precisely the kind of
parallel mechanism which this Court in Prof. Rasal Singh ( supra )
has held to be outside the statutory scheme. The analogy sought to be
drawn with an appeal from an order of a High Court being decided by
another Bench of the same Court is unmerited, since the appeal of the
petitioners has been decided by the Vice-Chancellor himself, and it is
only the fresh inquiry which is to be conducted by the statutory body
of first instance.
28. For the same reason, the prayer for constitution of a committee
at the level of the University cannot also be granted. The petitioners
as well as respondent nos. 10 to 14 are employees of the College,
which is their workplace, and neither the PoSH Act nor the UGC
Regulations contemplate any Committee to be constituted by the
Vice-Chancellor of the University for a complaint arising within a
college. This Court also takes note of the fact that a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Rashi v. Union of India : W.P.(C) 3396/2019 ,
decided on 04.12.2020, had observed that “ In cases where persons
who have been at the helm of affairs are themselves the Respondents
in a complaint, the ICC cannot be one of their choice or of persons
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who have worked under them ”. However, such principle has no
application to the present case, since the Principal of the College
herein is not a respondent to the complaint dated 07.07.2025, and the
persons complained against are members of the faculty who exercise
no administrative control over the members of the new IC.
29. Insofar as the argument of the petitioners that the Principal,
against whom bias is alleged, could not have constituted the new IC,
is concerned, this Court is of the view that it is well-settled that mere
apprehension of bias is not enough. In G.N. Nayak v. Goa
University: (2002) 2 SCC 712 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held
as under:
“34. It is not every kind of bias which in law is taken to
vitiate an act. It must be a prejudice which is not founded
on reason, and actuated by self interest whether pecuniary
or personal. Because of this element of personal interest, bias
is also seen as an extension of the principle of natural justice
that no man should be a judge in his own cause...”
(Emphasis added)

30. Further, in ABP (P) Ltd. v. Union of India: (2014) 3 SCC 327 ,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, after referring to Kumaon Mandal
Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant : (2001) 1 SCC 182 , had
observed as under:
“35. It is well-settled that mere apprehension of bias is not
enough and there must be cogent evidence available on
record to come to the conclusion. ...
36. This Court, in State of Punjab vs. V.K. Khanna (2001) 2
SCC 330, has held as follows:
„8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere
apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it
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is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must
and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn
therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is
otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias
administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other
hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension
in administrative action, question of declaring them to
be unsustainable on the basis therefor, would not
arise. ‟”
(Emphasis added)

31. In this regard, it would also be apposite to take note of the
decision of this Court in Somaya Gupta v. Jawaharlal Nehru
University: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10819 , wherein the complainant
had sought reconstitution of the ICC on the ground that it had been
constituted by the Executive Council of the University, which
included the Vice-Chancellor and the Rector, against whom her
complaint was directed. Rejecting such challenge, this Court held as
under:
“8. The petitioner seeks reconstitution of the entire ICC on the
ground of bias. I n order to succeed, the petitioner would
require to establish that there is real likelihood of bias.
Mere apprehension in the petitioner’s mind would be
insufficient for securing such relief.
*
11. In the facts of the present case, it is difficult to accept that
there is any real likelihood of bias against the petitioner. There
is no allegation that any of the members of the ICC have any
pecuniary or personal interest in the matter (except the
Chairperson of the ICC). Indisputably, the Presiding Officer of
the ICC (Chief Proctor, Ms Vibha Tandon) is a witness to the
incident and, therefore, would be disqualified from acting as a
member of the ICC in case of the petitioner. This Court is
informed that she had already recused and would not be
participating in any meeting of the ICC or the inquiry relating
to the petitioner. She is also not a part of the Inquiry
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Committee which has been constituted. There is, thus, no
material on record which would even remotely lead to any
suspicion that the members of the Inquiry Committee so
constituted have any personal interest that would conflict in
their obligation to conduct an inquiry fairly and make a fair
recommendation. The mere fact that the ICC was
constituted by the Executive Council of the University that
included two members were accused, is clearly insufficient
to doubt the integrity or ability of the ICC to render an
unbiased opinion .”
(Emphasis added)

32. Notably, the Special Leave Petition challenging the aforesaid
decision, being SLP (C) No. 26486/2018 , came to be dismissed by
the Supreme Court on 04.02.2020.
33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the challenge of the petitioners has to fail.
The Principal of the College in the present case is not a respondent to
the complaint dated 07.07.2025. The allegations against her pertain to
her administrative decisions, namely, declining the request for recusal
of respondent no. 14, the acceptance of the report by the Governing
Body, and inaction on the representations of the petitioners. The first
two events stand effectively undone by the impugned Speaking Order
passed by the Vice-Chancellor, and the College has, in compliance
thereof, excluded respondent no. 14 as well as every member of the
earlier ICC from the new IC. Dissatisfaction with past administrative
decisions cannot amount to any personal or pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the inquiry, and there is no allegation that the Principal
has any relationship with, or interest in protecting, respondent nos. 10
to 14. Moreover, the role of the Executive Authority under
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Regulation 4 of UGC Regulations is confined to nominating the
members; and the adjudicatory function vests in the Internal
Committee, which functions autonomously. If such grievances were
held sufficient to disqualify the Executive Authority, the Internal
Committee of a workplace could seldom be constituted, and the
statutory scheme would be rendered unworkable. In Somaya Gupta
( supra ), even the participation of persons against whom the
complaint was directed in the body that constituted the ICC was held
insufficient, in itself, to establish bias. The allegations in the present
case, which do not extend to any such participation by the Principal,
therefore, do not furnish a sufficient basis to infer a reasonable
likelihood of bias in the constitution of the new IC.
34. Insofar as the objection of the petitioners to inclusion of
respondent no. 4 in the new IC is concerned, the only averment in the
petition is that she was “present and participated” in the meeting of
the Staff Association held on 03.07.2025. The petition does not
attribute to her any remark, any role in the WhatsApp exchanges, or
any relationship with the parties, nor is it the case of the petitioners
that she has been cited as a witness. The Staff Association is the body
of the teaching staff of the College, and mere attendance at its
meeting cannot render a faculty member a person “ directly or
indirectly connected with, involved in, or interested in the subject
matter of the complaint ” within the meaning of paragraph 13.3.4 of
the impugned Speaking Order. Accepting such a contention would
disqualify every member of the faculty who attended the said
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Signing Date:27.10.2026
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meeting.
35. As regards the objection to inclusion of respondent no. 5 in the
new IC, this Court notes that Regulation 4(1)(b) of the UGC
Regulations itself mandates that two non-teaching employees are to
be nominated to the Committee by the Executive Authority. Clearly,
every non-teaching employee of a college is, in the ordinary course,
under the administrative control of the Principal, and if such
administrative subordination was by itself a disqualification, the
Regulation itself would be rendered nugatory. It is pertinent to note
that the UGC Regulations exclude only persons in senior
administrative positions under Regulation 4(3), and the post of a
Senior Personal Assistant (respondent no. 5) is not one of them. No
other circumstance has been pleaded to suggest that respondent no. 5
has any interest in the outcome of the inquiry.
36. Similarly, the external member in the new IC is a Professor of
Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, who is neither an
employee of the College nor is alleged to have any connection with
the parties. No positive case of disqualification has been pleaded
against her, and the observations in paragraph 13.2 of the impugned
Speaking Order, that an advocate had signed the earlier report as a
„Legal Expert‟ and not as an external member, stands cured by the
nomination of a distinct external member vide order dated 28.07.2026
constituting the new IC.
37. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
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Signing Date:27.10.2026
18:54:48

infirmity either in the impugned Speaking Order dated 16.07.2026 or
in the order dated 28.07.2026 constituting the new IC. The
apprehensions expressed by the petitioners, though earnestly urged,
are not founded on cogent material and do not disclose any real
likelihood of bias.
38. However, considering that the complaint dated 07.07.2025 has
remained pending for more than fifteen months, and the period
stipulated in the impugned Speaking Order has lapsed during the
pendency of the present proceedings, it is directed as under:
(i) The new IC shall proceed with the inquiry into the
complaint dated 07.07.2025 and shall endeavour to conclude
the same within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt
of a copy of this judgment, in terms of Section 11(4) of the
PoSH Act.
(ii) The inquiry shall be conducted in accordance with the
PoSH Act, the Rules framed thereunder and the UGC
Regulations, and in adherence to the principles of natural
justice.
39. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed, alongwith
pending applications, albeit with above directions.
40. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.


DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026/zp
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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:27.10.2026
18:54:48