Yamuna Expressway Industrial Dev. Authority Thru. Authorized Representative Sh. Gajendra Singh vs Akriti Garg

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
RERA APPEAL No. - 95 of 2026
Yamuna Expressway Industrial Dev. Authority
Thru. Authorized Representative Sh. Gajendra
Singh .....Appellant(s)
Versus
Akriti Garg
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Prashant Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) :
Court No. - 17
HON'BLE KARUNESH SINGH PAWAR, J.
1. Heard Mr. Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by
Mr. Prashant Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr.
Avinash Singh Vishen, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against the order dated
27.05.2026 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Appellate Tribunal,
Lucknow in Appeal No. 259 of 2025, whereby the application seeking
condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated
02.11.2022 passed by the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory Authority,
Gautam Budh Nagar, was rejected and consequently the appeal itself
stood dismissed.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that
the delay in filing the appeal was neither deliberate nor intentional,
but occurred due to unavoidable circumstances and the prolonged
administrative process involved in obtaining approvals at various
levels within the appellant-authority. It is contended that sufficient
cause for condonation of delay had been demonstrated and that the
respondent had not opposed the application.
4. It is further submitted that the Tribunal adopted an unduly technical
approach in rejecting the application instead of adopting a liberal and
justice-oriented approach and affording an opportunity to the
appellant to have the appeal decided on merits.

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5. Learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the submissions
made by learned counsel for the appellant.
6. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material available on record, the
principal question which arises for consideration is whether the
appellant has furnished a satisfactory and bona fide explanation
constituting sufficient cause for the substantial delay in preferring the
appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal.
7. The record of the Tribunal indicates that the order of the
Regulatory Authority was uploaded on the portal on 23.11.2022 and
the period of limitation for filing the appeal expired on 23.01.2023.
However, the appeal came to be filed on 07.01.2025 along with an
application seeking condonation of delay.
8. A perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay indicates
that the dates and events have been explained in a casual and
general manner. Even where certain dates have been mentioned, the
intervening periods have not been satisfactorily accounted for. In
paragraph 4, it has been stated that in the first week of December
2022, the file was sent to the Officer In-charge (ALO), who forwarded
it to the Property Department. However, no specific date of such
movement has been disclosed. A similar general explanation has
also been furnished in paragraph 5.
9. In paragraph 6, the movement of the file to different authorities for
approval has been stated without specifying the dates or the duration
for which the file remained pending at each stage. Similarly, in
paragraphs 7 and 8, after referring to December 2022, the next dates
mentioned are May 2023 and August 2023, without furnishing any
satisfactory explanation for the intervening period.
10. In paragraph 9, it has been stated that approval was sought from
the Property Department, without disclosing the specific date on
which such approval was sought. Paragraph 10 states that the file
was handed over to the present counsel for drafting in the last week
of October 2023. Here again, the intervening period has not been
satisfactorily explained.
11. In paragraph 11, reference has been made to festivals without
specifying the dates of such festivals or the actual period during
which the concerned department remained closed. Similar general

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3
explanations have been furnished in paragraphs 13 to 17, without
disclosing the specific dates or satisfactorily accounting for the
periods of inactivity.
12. In paragraph 19, it has been stated that the relevant documents
could not be traced in October 2024. The application, however, jumps
from January 2024 directly to October 2024, without furnishing any
explanation whatsoever for the intervening period of about eight
months. The subsequent paragraphs, up to paragraph 23, also do not
satisfactorily account for the delay, ultimately stating that the appeal
was filed on 07.01.2025.
13. Thus, the application does not disclose a continuous, coherent or
satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Tribunal has also
examined this aspect in paragraph 9 of the impugned order, wherein
it has observed as follows:
the approach of the appellant-promoter in movement of
"
the file is casual, flimsy and whimsical and no plausible
reasons, whatsoever, has been given to condone the
delay in institution of the appeal. The delay is solely
attributable to the lethargic approach of the officials of the
applicant organization. To condone the delay in given
facts would tantamount to misuse of the process of law."

14. The principles governing condonation of delay, no doubt, require
the Court to adopt a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach,
rather than an unduly technical or pedantic one. However, such an
approach does not dispense with the requirement of establishing
sufficient cause. The expression "sufficient cause" has to be
considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of each
case, keeping in view the conduct of the applicant and the bona fides
of the explanation furnished.
15. In this regard, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and
Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969 , assumes significance. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reiterating the principles governing
condonation of delay, has observed in paragraphs 261 and 262 that
administrative lethargy and laxity cannot constitute sufficient cause
and that State authorities and instrumentalities cannot be permitted to
take advantage of their own administrative inefficiency. The Court has
emphasised that a litigating State agency is equally bound by the
discipline of limitation and must demonstrate bona fides and vigilance

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throughout the relevant period.
16. The aforesaid decision also reiterates that although a justice-
oriented approach is required, the same cannot be extended to
condone delay on the basis of frivolous, superficial or unsubstantiated
explanations. The explanation must demonstrate that the applicant
acted with reasonable diligence and that the delay occurred despite
genuine efforts to pursue the remedy. The relevant consideration is
not merely the length of delay but the acceptability of the explanation
furnished for the same.
17. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
it is evident that the appellant has sought to explain the delay
primarily on the basis of internal movement of files, administrative
approvals and procedural formalities. However, no specific particulars
have been furnished to explain the prolonged periods during which
the matter remained unattended. The application does not disclose
any bona fide or unavoidable impediment which prevented the
appellant from pursuing its statutory remedy within the prescribed
period. Rather, the explanation reflects administrative inaction and
lack of coordination amongst the officials of the appellant-authority.
The mere fact that the appellant is a statutory Development Authority
or an instrumentality of the State cannot, by itself, constitute sufficient
cause for condonation of delay.
18. The contention that the respondent had not filed any objection to
the application for condonation of delay also does not advance the
appellant's case. The burden to establish sufficient cause rests upon
the applicant seeking condonation, and the absence of an objection
by the opposite party does not dispense with such requirement.
Equally, the contention that the substantive appeal raises important
questions or that the award of interest may have adverse financial
consequences cannot, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation
for the delay, constitute an independent ground for condonation. The
merits of the underlying dispute cannot be used to substitute the
statutory requirement of establishing sufficient cause.
19. The decisions relied upon by learned Senior Counsel, including
Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy and others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 and N.
Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123, lay
down the settled principles favouring a liberal approach in appropriate
cases. However, the said principles do not confer an unfettered

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discretion to condone delay irrespective of the conduct of the
applicant or the adequacy of the explanation. The decision in
Shivamma (supra) also makes it clear that administrative inefficiency,
without a satisfactory demonstration of bona fide efforts and due
diligence, cannot be accepted as sufficient cause. The facts of the
present case, therefore, do not warrant the indulgence sought by the
appellant.
20. It is further significant that the impugned order of the Tribunal has
not adjudicated upon the substantive merits of the original dispute, as
the appeal itself stood dismissed on account of rejection of the
application for condonation of delay. The question before this Court is
not whether the substantive dispute could have been adjudicated on
merits, but whether the Tribunal committed any error of law in
refusing to condone the delay. The appellant has failed to
demonstrate any such error.
21. So far as the contention regarding contradictory orders passed by
the Tribunal in other matters is concerned, no material has been
brought on record to establish that the facts and circumstances of
those cases were identical to the present case or that any binding
legal principle was disregarded while passing the impugned order. A
mere assertion of inconsistency, without demonstrating the factual
and legal identity of the cases, does not furnish a ground for
interference.
22. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 58 of the
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, which provides
for an appeal to the High Court on one or more of the grounds
specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The
jurisdiction of this Court is, therefore, confined to examining whether
the impugned order gives rise to a substantial question of law. No
such question arises in the present appeal, as the Tribunal has
considered the explanation furnished by the appellant and rejected
the application for condonation of delay on grounds supported by the
material available on record.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
learned Appellate Tribunal has rightly rejected the application for
condonation of delay upon due consideration of the explanation
furnished by the appellant. The impugned order does not suffer from
any illegality, perversity or error of law warranting interference by this
Court. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the

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6
present appeal.
24. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed at the admission stage.
November 4, 2026
Madhu
(Karunesh Singh Pawar,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
MADHU KUMARI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench