Amritpal Singh vs Competent Authority Under Ndps Act & Anr.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on:11.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on:01.07.2026
+ W.P.(CRL) 1747/2025
AMRITPAL SINGH .....Petitioner
versus
COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER
NDPS ACT & ANR. ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. Viraj R. Datar, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Harish Chand & Mr. Anant Chittoria, Advs.
For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Tiwari, CGSC with Ms. Ayushi
Srivastava, Mr. Ayush Tanwar, Mr. Arpan
Narwal & Mr. Kushagra Malik, Advs. for
NIA
CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
1. Through the present petition, the petitioner has assailed the
freezing order no. 02/2023 dated 08.11.2023 (hereafter ‘ impugned
freezing order ’), which was confirmed by the competent authority by
order dated 07.12.2023 (hereafter ‘ impugned confirmation order ’),
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and also the order dated 05.11.2024 (hereafter ‘ impugned order ’),
whereby the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissed the petitioner’s
challenge against confirmation order. Consequently, the petitioner
seeks release of his property in his favour.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the present case
are as follows:
2.1. On 30.07.2022, the National Investigation Agency (‘ NIA ’)
registered a case, being, RC-35/2022/NIA/DLI, for offences under
Sections 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘ IPC ’), under Sections
17, 18 & 22A of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
(‘ UAPA ’) and under Sections 23/8(c) of the Narcotics Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘ NDPS Act ’) (the provisions of
NDPS Act are stated to be added subsequently). Allegedly, during
routine check-up, suspicious materials were detected by Customs,
which led to recovery and seizure of 102.136 kg and 0.648 kg of
heroin on 24.04.2022 and 26.04.2022 respectively. The contraband
had allegedly been concealed in a consignment of 17,000 kg of
liquorice roots imported under the cover of lawful business. It was
suspected that multiple individuals and companies were involved in
laundering the proceeds of drug trade and the proceeds were likely to
be used for committing terrorist acts or preparatory acts for
commission of terrorist acts in India.
2.2. During investigation, it was found that a major part of the funds
derived from the sale of narcotic drugs were deposited in the bank
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account of ‘QSA Fashion’ (owned by one of the main accused–
Shahid Ahmed) via the bank account of ‘Sandhu Tour and Travel’,
which was owned by the petitioner, who was a Punjab based Hawala
Operator. Investigation also revealed that funds were transferred from
the bank account of ‘Sandhu Tour and Travel’ to the bank account of
the accused Razi Haider Zaidi (alleged receiver of the consignment).
Certain funds were allegedly also transferred by the petitioner and his
wife to an associate of the accused Shahid and Razi. It is the case of
the prosecution that proceeds of drug sales amounting to ₹10,00,000/-
had been transferred by the petitioner in the bank accounts of the other
accused persons.
2.3. On 20.10.2022, searches were conducted by NIA at the
premises of the petitioner at Tarn Taran, Punjab, during which, cash
amounting to ₹1,34,12,000/- was seized from his residential and
official premises. Allegedly, on being examined by NIA, the petitioner
could not furnish any plausible explanation regarding the seized cash.
2.4. Thereafter, on 08.11.2023, the impugned freezing order was
passed under Section 68F (1) read with Section 68E of the NDPS Act
as it was believed that the cash had been acquired illegally by the
petitioner and the same was to be channelled by the petitioner to
various drug peddlers and anti-national elements.
2.5. On 07.12.2023, the impugned freezing order was confirmed by
the Competent Authority by way of impugned confirmation order after
hearing the petitioner in terms of Section 68F (2) of the NDPS Act.
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After going through the investigation as well as the documents on
record, the Competent Authority affirmed that it was satisfied that the
seized cash fell under the ambit of “illegally acquired properties” and
the same was likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in a
matter which will lead to frustration of proceedings under Chapter VA
of the NDPA Act ( Forfeiture of illegally acquired property ), which
warranted confirmation of the impugned freezing order. A copy of the
impugned confirmation order was received by the petitioner on
11.12.2023.
2.6. The petitioner assailed the impugned confirmation order before
the learned Appellate Tribunal. Although the exact date of filing of the
appeal is not on record, the impugned order passed by the learned
Tribunal reflects that the appeal was accompanied by an application
for condonation of delay of 250 days. Reliance was placed by the
learned Tribunal on Section 68-O (1) of the NDPS Act, which
essentially provides that an appeal is to be preferred within 45 days,
and that the Tribunal can entertain an appeal up to sixty days if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented from preferring an appeal in
time. Noting that the appeal was filed belatedly, the Tribunal rejected
the petitioner’s appeal after noting that it had no power to condone the
delay of even a single day after sixty days from the date of service of
the confirmation order.
2.7. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed W.P. (C) 4349/2025,
which was withdrawn with liberty to file afresh after incorporating
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fresh pleadings. Pursuant to the same, the petitioner has filed the
present petition.
3. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that
although the seizure was effected on 22.10.2022, the freezing order
was passed one year thereafter. He submitted that as per the proviso to
Section 68F of the NDPS Act, any agency or officer freezing/seizing
any property under Section 68F of the NDPS Act is not vested with
any authority or discretion to sit over it beyond 48 hours without
informing the competent authority. He submitted that retention of
recovered cash was unsustainable and placed reliance on the cases of
Arvind Goyal CA v. Union of India and others : 2023 SCC OnLine
Del 765 and Best Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent, CGST,
Delhi West and others : 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5874 .
4. He refuted that the seizure could not have been effected under
Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘ CrPC ’)
because specific power is available under the special law/ NDPS Act
which leaves no scope for resorting to general law.
5. He submitted that the impugned orders are thus liable to be
quashed and set aside for non-compliance with the mandatory
provision of Section 68F of the NDPS Act since the competent
authority was not informed about the seizure within 48 hours.
Reliance was placed on the judgments in Jatinder Kaur Chilotra v.
Intelligence Officer :2024 SCC OnLine Bom 682 (Bombay High
Court), M/s. Ownpath Learning Private Limited v. State by
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Intelligence Officer : 2024 KHC 614 (Karnataka High Court) and
Anupama Sahoo v. State of Punjab and Others : 2023 : PHHC :
135761 (Punjab and Haryana High Court).
6. He further submitted that even on merits, the freezing order is
not sustainable. He submitted that the petitioner owns several
businesses which include transactions in cash and the petitioner had no
knowledge that the money being transferred through him was for any
illegal activities as alleged by the prosecution.
7. He submitted that the petitioner was arrested soon after the
impugned freezing order was confirmed by the competent authority
and he was unable to prefer the statutory appeal in time as he is not
legally educated and he was not aware of the limitation period. He
also stressed that the petitioner is a resident of Punjab and delay was
caused due to lack of proper guidance.
8. Per contra , the learned Central Government Standing Counsel
contested that the present petition is not maintainable as the petitioner
is seeking to bypass and revive his statutory remedy. He submitted
that it has been rightly appreciated in the impugned order that the
petitioner’s right to statutory appeal was extinguished by virtue of
lapse of time. He placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in
Omaxe Buildhome Limited v. Union of India and Another : 2019
SCC OnLine Del 7344 and Shri Joni @ Jona and Ors v. Union of
India through Ministry of Finance and ors : W.P. (C) 9284/2024 to
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buttress his argument that statutory limitation cannot be subjugated by
this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. He further submitted that the investigative chronology in the
present case evidences strict adherence to the statutory architecture
and timelines, including from an investigation initially proceeding
under the UAPA to consequential action under the NDPS Act. He
submitted that seizure of the cash was effected under Section 102 of
the CrPC as property suspected to be connected with the commission
of offences under investigation. He pointed out that the first
chargesheet was filed on 16.12.2022, and it was only on the NDPS
nexus being unearthed through detailed further investigation and upon
formation of reasons to believe that the recovered amount constituted
as illegally acquired property that the said amount was frozen by way
of the impugned freezing order.
10. He submitted that even if the initial order suffered from any
infirmity or procedural defect, as the same was confirmed by the
competent authority after perusal of the material, no benefit can be
given to the petitioner, especially since the petitioner has been unable
to provide any satisfactory explanation to explain the legitimate
sources of the funds.
ANALYSIS
11. At the outset, due to the vehement opposition of the respondents
to the maintainability of the present petition, it is imperative to take
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note of the scope of interference under writ jurisdiction, especially
when the statutory framework provides for a structured appellate
mechanism.
12. It is well-settled that this Court has to be circumspect in
exercising its discretionary writ jurisdiction and existence of an
alternative efficacious remedy in the statute is a factor to be
considered in the matter of granting writs. Although alternative
remedy is not an absolute bar, ordinarily, if a litigant has any such
available remedy, refusal to entertain the petition is the rule and writ
jurisdiction is not to be exercised as a tool to circumvent statutory
remedies [Ref. CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. : (1985) 1 SCC 260 ,
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa : (1983) 2 SCC 433 ,
etc]. Certain exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy are where the
challenge is for enforcement of any fundamental rights; or if there has
been a violation of principles of natural justice; or if the proceedings
are wholly without jurisdiction; or if the vires of a legislation has been
challenged. In the case of Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. :
(2021) 6 SCC 771 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has aptly underlined the
position of law in this regard as under:
“ 27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs
can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental
rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High
Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.
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27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a)
the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b)
there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c)
the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d)
the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court
of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an
appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be
entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by
law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes
the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort
must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking
the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution.
This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High
Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition.
However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the
nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.
28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court
in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad [Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad,
(2003) 5 SCC 399] , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal
Khodidas Barot [Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas
Barot, (1974) 2 SCC 706] and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of
India [Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 632] among
other decisions.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Pertinently, the present case is one where the petitioner has
invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court after his statutory appeal
was dismissed on the ground of delay in terms of Section 68-O of the
NDPS Act. Before the matter can be appraised on merits, the issue of
delay on part of the petitioner in preferring the appeal before Tribunal
as well as in approaching this Court after the impugned order was
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passed has to be countenanced. As the impugned order is helmed in
interpretation of Section 68-O of the NDPS Act, at this juncture, it is
appropriate to take note of the relevant portion of the aforesaid
provision, which reads as under:
“ 68-O. Appeals.—(1) Any officer referred to in sub-section (1) of
section 68E or any person aggrieved by an order of the competent
authority made under section 68F, section 68-I, sub-section (1) of
section 68K or section 68L, may, within forty-five days from the
date on which the order is served on him, prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an
appeal after the said period of forty-five days, but not after sixty
days , from the date aforesaid if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time .”
The same clearly provides that the statutory appeal is to be
preferred within forty-five days, and the Tribunal cannot entertain the
same after sixty days. The additional leverage of fifteen days is also
contingent on the litigant’s ability to demonstrate sufficient cause for
the delay to the Tribunal’s satisfaction. The petitioner had admittedly
preferred the statutory appeal with a delay of around 250 days, which
led the learned Tribunal to dismiss the appeal as it had no power to
condone the delay after sixty days.
14. The decision of the Tribunal is in tandem with the observations
of the Coordinate Benches of this Court in the cases of Omaxe
Buildhome Limited v. Union of India and Another ( supra ) and Shri
Joni @ Jona and Ors v. Union of India through Ministry of Finance
and ors ( supra ), where it has been consistently held that the Tribunal
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does not have the power to condone delay beyond 60 days. It was
further held that an appeal is a creature of a statute, and the delay
cannot be condoned by this Court exercising power under Article 226
of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the decision in Omaxe
Buildhome Limited v. Union of India and Another ( supra ) is as
under:
“ 8 … An appeal under Sub-section (1) of Section 68-O of the NDPS
Act can be filed only within a period of 45 days from the date on
which the order is served. However, the Appellate Tribunal can
entertain an appeal even beyond the said period of 45 days if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from
filing the said appeal. However, this power is not available to
entertain an appeal beyond a period of 60 days.
xxx
10 … First of all, the contention that the petitioner has any inherent
right to file an appeal against the order of the Competent
Authority, is flawed. It is well settled that an appeal is a creature of
statute and there is no inherent right of appeal.
11. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh : AIR
1954 SC 520 , the Supreme Court had held that “It is well known
that an appeal is a creature of statute and there can be no inherent
right of appeal from any judgment or determination unless an
appeal is expressly provided for by the law itself.”
xxx
15. Plainly, if the right of appeal is a creature of statute, it would
be open for the legislature to curtail the said right as well.
Therefore, there is no infirmity in the legislature providing a
limited right of appeal. The Parliament has provided a right of
appeal against an order of the Competent Authority, albeit,
subject to the condition that the same be preferred within the
specified period… .Thus, a person aggrieved by an order of the
Competent Authority has no right to an appeal if the same is not
preferred within the prescribed period.
16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur. : (2008) 3 SCC 70 , the Supreme Court had
considered the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act,
1944 which also limited the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
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Appeals to condone the delay in filing an appeal, beyond a period
of 30 days. The Court upheld the view that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the said period of 30 days….
17. The aforesaid decision was referred in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited v. Gujarat Energy Transmission
Corporation Limited : (2017) 5 SCC 42 . The Supreme Court
considered the question whether the Supreme Court could condone
the delay in filing the appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity
Act, 2003, beyond the period as specified therein…
18. The Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions including
in Singh Enterprises (supra) and held that the delay beyond the
specified period could not be condoned . It is important to note that
the Supreme Court also rejected the contention that recourse to
Article 142 of the Constitution of India was available for
condoning such delay which was beyond the stipulated period….
xxx
23. In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. The State of
West Bengal : AIR 1962 SC 1044 , the Supreme Court held as
under:
“Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High
Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned
therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear
that persons other than those claiming fundamental right
can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder.
The Article in terms does not describe the classes of
persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in
the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief
asked for must be one to enforce a legal right.”
24. Clearly, if the petitioner has no statutory right to file an appeal,
the question of issuing directions under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to provide the same, contrary to the statue,
would not arise.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. A similar view was echoed by another Coordinate Bench in the
case of Shri Joni @ Jona and Ors v. Union of India through
Ministry of Finance and ors ( supra ) as well.
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16. Further, it is trite law that once a litigant disables themselves
from availing the statutory remedy by missing the prescribed
limitation, the same cannot be urged as a ground to invoke the writ
jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard, reference may be drawn to the
following portion of the decision in Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of
India & Ors. : 2025 INSC 1337 :
“12. That apart, the majority view in a previous Constitution
Bench in A. V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v.
Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [ AIR 1961 SC 1506 ] reads thus:
“14. ..., we must express our dissent from the reasoning by
which the learned Judges of the High Court held that the
writ petitioner was absolved from the normal obligation to
exhaust his statutory remedies before invoking the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution. If a petitioner has disabled himself from
availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault
in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot
certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the
Court dealing with his petition under Article 226 to
exercise its discretion in his favour. Indeed, the second
passage extracted from the judgment of the learned C.J. in
Mohammed Nooh case with its reference to the right to
appeal being lost ‘through no fault of his own’ emphasizes
this aspect of the Rule.”
(emphasis ours)
In essence, this Court was of the opinion that once a petitioner has
due to his own fault disabled himself from availing a statutory
remedy, the discretionary remedy under Article 226 may not be
available.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Although the petitioner has sought to argue that he had no
knowledge about the prescribed period of limitation and that he had no
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proper guidance, perusal of the impugned confirmation order belies
the said assertion as the same explicitly provides that any person
aggrieved by the said order can prefer an appeal within 45 days from
the date on which the order is served on him. Bald claims of lack of
proper guidance are also not sufficient for justifying the delay. Merely
because the petitioner was under arrest or because his residence was in
Punjab, the same does not rid him of his obligation to pursue his
remedies in time. Even otherwise, as noted above, the writ Court
cannot function as a parallel forum for reviving statutory remedies,
which have lapsed due to delay on part of the litigant. Undisputedly,
an appeal is the creation of a statute and interfering in such cases
would frustrate the legislative intent behind providing for a limited
right to appeal to ensure finality and orderly administration.
Limitation cannot be construed as a mere technicality in the present
circumstances and considering that the statutory remedy has lapsed
due to inaction on part of the petitioner, he cannot seek resurrection of
such a remedy through writ jurisdiction.
18. It is also imperative to note that the petitioner has also
approached this Court belatedly. No action was taken by the petitioner
for an year against the seizure between October, 2022 (when seizure
was effected) and November, 2023 (when the formal proceedings
under Chapter VA of the NDPS Act were commenced). The petitioner
did not agitate this aspect of delay in the freezing and confirmation
proceedings either. Further, although the impugned order was passed
on 05.11.2024, the present petition was only filed in May, 2025 after
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around six months. Although there is no prescribed period of
limitation for preferring a writ petition, however, the same does not
mean that a litigant is relieved of their onus to avail their remedies
with a reasonable period of time. This Court is duty bound to consider
the aspect of delay and laches on part of the litigant and a litigant
should approach the Court at the earliest [Ref. Tridip Kumar Dingal
v. State of W.B. : (2009) 1 SCC 768 ]. No cogent explanation is given
for the delay in this case, which further dissuades this Court from
exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction.
19. While the petitioner’s right to property is involved in the
present dispute, constitutional remedies cannot be used to defeat
legislative schemes, especially when the petitioner has been indolent
in pursuing his remedies.
20. Insofar as the merits of the case are concerned, it is the case of
the petitioner that the continued retention of the seized cash was ipso
facto bad in law as the seizure was not effected within the contours of
the statutory framework provided under the NDPS Act. It is argued
that the retention of the recovered cash was without authority of law as
no freezing order came to be passed until an year after the recovery.
21. Undoubtedly, indefinite retention of seized property is
impermissible in terms of Section 68F of the NDPS Act which
mandates notifying the competent authority within 48 hours to enable
timely oversight. The provision also necessitates formation of ‘ reason
to believe ’ by the concerned officer that that property in question is
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illegally acquired and that the same is likely to be concealed,
transferred or dealt with in a manner which may frustrate the
proceedings under Chapter VA.
22. Be that as it may, in the instant case, it is maintained on behalf
of the respondents that the recovery was effected under Section 102 of
the CrPC, which empowers police officers to seize property which
may be found under circumstances that create suspicion of the
commission of any offence. Such seizure is to be forthwith reported to
the Magistrate having jurisdiction, however, no supporting material to
this effect has been placed on record.
23. While it is contested on behalf of the petitioner that there is no
question of resorting to the general law when power is available under
the special enactment, the respondents have also emphasized that the
seizure was in context of investigation under UAPA framework (as the
case is said to be initially registered under UAPA) and the proceedings
under NDPS Act were carried out afterwards on emergence of
incriminating material under NDPS Act.
24. As the chargesheets have not been filed before this Court, it
remains unclear as to exactly when the prosecution came to suspect
that the seized cash was obtained from proceeds of drug trade, and
when the provisions of NDPS Act were invoked against the petitioner.
Even so, prima facie , there is no reason to disbelieve the said assertion
made on behalf of the respondents in arguments as well as in their
reply, which is supported by an affidavit.
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25. Reference is made to the observations in Arvind Goyal CA v.
Union of India and others ( supra )and Best Crop Science Pvt. Ltd. v.
Superintendent, CGST, Delhi West and others ( supra ) to stress that
passing of freezing order after a period of one year is unsustainable.
The said cases pertained to recovery under the GST framework and
they do not further the case of the petitioner. In the former, the Court
had rejected the argument by the investigating agency that the
recovered property had merely been resumed and not seized on
finding that there was no provision which could support such action.
In the latter, the Division Bench was dealing with a case where
an order of prohibition was passed against the petitioner therein
restricting it from dealing with certain goods, which were
subsequently seized. There was some delay in passing the show cause
notice, which is to be passed within six months from date of seizure.
In this context, it was observed that it was impermissible for the
proper officer to pass an order of prohibition while considering the
question as to sufficiency of reasons for confiscation of the goods.
Even in this case, as the subsequent confiscation order had already
been passed which was challenged in another writ, the Court refrained
from ordering return of the goods in question.
Unlike the aforesaid cases, in this case, the respondents have
not sought to justify the initial seizure by seeking to stress the
difference between detention of property and seizure or by justifying
subsequent seizure on the strength of initial prohibition. It is not the
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case of the respondents that the initial recovery was not a seizure, but
rather, that the initial seizure was made under Section 102 of the
CrPC.
26. Even if it is to be assumed that the mandate of Section 102 of
the CrPC was not followed properly or that there was infirmity in the
initial seizure, the same has since been followed by the impugned
freezing order and impugned confirmation order where due
opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to contest the seizure by
explaining the sources of the funds. This Court is concerned with the
limited issue of correctness of the decision making process which led
to the said impugned orders and procedural irregularities at the initial
stage, if any, cannot come to the aid of the petitioner as he has slept on
his rights and failed to act with promptitude. It is crucial to note that
the recovery took place way back in October, 2022 and it is pointed
out that despite repeated opportunities, the petitioner has not been able
to explain the source of the recovered funds. Though bald claims have
been made on behalf of the petitioner that the cash can be attributed to
his business transactions, as noted in the impugned confirmation
order, no documentary evidence was adduced to substantiate the said
claim. Regardless, as noted above, when the petitioner has failed to
pursue his statutory remedy in time, there is no cause to interfere with
the freezing of the property in question at this juncture.
27. Although much emphasis has also been laid by the petitioner on
the judgments in Jatinder Kaur Chilotra v. Intelligence Officer
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:47:22
W.P.(CRL) 1747/2025 Page 18 of 20

( supra ), M/s. Ownpath Learning Private Limited v. State by
Intelligence Officer ( supra ) and Anupama Sahoo v. State of Punjab
and Others ( supra ), the said cases are distinguishable from the facts in
the present case.
In Jatinder Kaur Chilotra v. Intelligence Officer ( supra ), the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court was dealing with a case where the
account of the petitioner therein had been frozen in terms of Section
68F of the NDPS Act, which was not confirmed by the competent
authority. In such circumstances, it was noted by the Court that the
power to freeze or seize is regulated by the competent authority, which
has discretion to render a freezing order nugatory by not confirming it.
In M/s. Ownpath Learning Private Limited v. State by
Intelligence Officer ( supra ), the Karnataka High Court was met with
a case where the freezing order was neither duly informed nor
confirmed by the competent authority, which led the Court to order
de-freezing of the account.
In Anupama Sahoo v. State of Punjab and Others ( supra ), the
Punjab and Haryana High Court noted that no freezing order was
passed and the same was consequently not confirmed, due to which,
the communications by which the bank accounts were directed to stop
operations of certain bank accounts were quashed.
Whilst there is no dispute that the procedure in respect of
seizure is to be followed strictly and this Court does not seek to
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(CRL) 1747/2025 Page 19 of 20

legitimise dilution of such standards, the present case relates to
extremely peculiar facts where it is maintained by the investigating
agency that the initial seizure was carried out under the UAPA
framework and NDPS nexus was only crystallised later through
detailed financial investigation, which also led to filing of
supplementary charge sheet in 07.06.2024. Unlike the present case,
the litigants in the aforesaid cases approached the respective Courts
prior to any confirmation proceedings being conducted, and in the
case of M/s. Ownpath Learning Private Limited v. State by
Intelligence Officer ( supra ) and Anupama Sahoo v. State of Punjab
and Others ( supra ), even prior to any freezing order being passed.
Moreover, in these cases, the aggrieved parties were deprived of any
opportunity to contest the respective seizures by refuting that the
property in question was not illegally acquired.
28. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is not inclined to
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner.
29. The present petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
JULY 01, 2026
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:47:22
W.P.(CRL) 1747/2025 Page 20 of 20