Mukkera Venkata Ratnam vs Vantasala China Venkateswarlu

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 810

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(C) No(s)…..@Diary No. 21610 of 2022)

MUKKERA VENKATA RATNAM & ORS …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

VANTASALA CHINA VENKATESWARLU & ORS.
… RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Delay Condoned.
2. Leave Granted.
1
3. Under challenge is the judgment and order passed by the
st
High Court for the State of Telangana on 1 February 2022 by a
2
learned Single Judge, setting aside the judgment in First Appeal
st
dated 1 December 2008 by the Principal Senior Civil Judge,
Kothagudem, allowing the appeal suit and thereby overturning the
3 th
judgment and decree dated 29 October 2003, which dismissed
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2026.08.06
18:40:56 IST
Reason:

1
In SA No. 1225 of 2009
2
AS No. 9 of 2004
3
In OS No. 307 of 1999
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the plaintiffs (present appellants’) suit for partition and separate
possession.
4. All the parties to the dispute are members of the family of a
4
common ancestor, namely Mukkera Muthaiah who died in 1979.
Plaintiffs 1-5 are his grandsons (sons of Hanumanthaiah); plaintiff
No. 6 is their mother; defendant no. 1 is the younger son;
defendant no. 2 is the eldest daughter; defendant no. 4 is his
youngest daughter of MM. Defendant No. 3 is defendant no.2’s
husband. A family chart is placed hereinbelow for ease of
understanding:
ORIGINAL P/Fs AND D/Fs IN TRIAL COURT :

[MM] (karta)
(died in 1979)




D 2 (D 4 )
S 2 (D 1 ) D 1 (D 2 ) ---H (D 3 )
*
[S 1 ]---W (P 6 )



P 1 P 2 P
P 3 P 4 5

*
S 1 = Mukkera Hanumanthaiah (Predeceased MM)

th
Plaintiffs set the law in motion on 6 July 1998 by filing a civil suit
after they apparently learnt about the extent of land holdings of
MM. The defendants resisted the same by filing written statements.
The issues as framed by the Civil Court and their corresponding
findings are represented below in this table:

4
MM
2

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ISSUES FINDING
1. Whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to partition of the suit
scheduled property?


The court determined that the partition of
property among the co-sharers of Mukera
Muthaiah occurred during his and Mukkera
Hanumanthaiah’s lifetime, with each branch
having distinct possession since 1975-76 and
separately paying land revenue.
Consequently, there being no question of a
joint family property, the plaintiffs were not
rd
entitled to claim 1/3 share of the property.
Answered against the plaintiffs.
2. Whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to perpetual
injunction, restraining the
defendants from alienating the
suit schedule property?
Since the co-sharers of Mukerra Muthaiah
family are enjoying the suit schedule
property separately and the parties to the
suit are in peaceful possession and enjoyment
of their respective properties. Hence, the
plaintiffs cannot claim the relief of
permanent injunction.
3. Whether after the death of
late Mukkera Muthaiah
partitioned joint family
properties had taken place and
the properties fell to the share
of each branch?
Partition occurred during the lifetime of
Mukkera Muthaiah and Mukkera
Hanumanthaiah, not after their death as
pleaded by defendant no. 1.
4. Whether Sy. No.250 to an
extent of Ac.4.20 gts was sold
to one S.Narayana and
K.Laxmaiah by plaintiffs 1 to 5
and they inturn sold the same
to a Tribal by name Bhukya
Arja?
Admissions of PWs-1 and 2 indirectly support
the conclusion that Mukkera
Hanumanthaiah did sell the land to
Laxmaiah and Narayana.
5. Whether Ac.2-30 gts,
Sy.No.178/A in seethampeta
which is part of Item No.1 of
suit schedule property fell to
the share of defendant No.1 in
the said partition?
Evidence establish that this land was
allocated to defendant no. 1 in the
partition .
6. Whether late Muthaiah
grand-father of plaintiffs in his
life time gave Item Nos. 1, Ac.
1-10gts of land to respondent
No. 2 towards her “Pasupu
Kumkuma”?
Though there was no registered settlement
deed, one acre in Sy.No.163 was allotted to
defendant No.2 in the partition in recognition
of the services she rendered to Mukkera
Muthaiah in his old age. Answered in favour
of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs.
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7. Whether this Hon’ble Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain
the present suit?
Since both parties were non-tribals and no
tribal interest was involved, Section 9 CPC
vested it with jurisdiction.
8. Whether the suit is
undervalued?
The valuation and fee paid were found to be
proper.
9. Whether the suit is barred
by limitation?
Suit barred by limitation as plaintiff no. 1,
manager of the family, was 42 years old as on
the date of filing of the suit, whereas under
Article 110 of the Limitation Act the
plaintiffs should have filed the suit after
plaintiff no. 1 attaining majority.
10. To what relief? Suit barred by limitation, thus dismissed.

(emphasis supplied)

5. Against the dismissal of the civil suit, plaintiffs filed an
appeal, in which, two points for consideration were framed by the
Court and answered respectively in the following manner,

decreeing the same in favour of the plaintiffs:

ISSUES FINDING
1) Whether suit properties
are joint family properties?

Documents relied on by the trial court to infer
partition were held to be uncertified and
unreliable Held that properties are joint
family properties. Relying on a High Court
judgment held that Civil Court has
jurisdiction to entertain dispute
connected to the properties situated in
scheduled areas .
2) Whether judgment and
decree of the trial court
from any irregularity
illegality?
The court held that the trial court came to
a wrong conclusion that partition was
already effected , thus liable to be set aside.

(emphasis supplied)

6. Aggrieved thereby, the defendants filed a second appeal
before the High Court. The sole point on which the finding of the
First Appellate Court was overturned was the judgment of this
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5
Court in Nagarjuna Gramin Bank v. Medi Narayana, which, as
per the Court, had observed that from 1972 onwards, the
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, illegal and void.

7.
With that background, this appeal asks us to decide whether
the dispute inter partes was within the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court in the state of Andhra Pradesh, currently Telangana.


8.
We have heard Mr. Amit Pai, learned counsel for the
appellant, and Mr. Vikas Bansal, learned counsel as amicus curiae .
Devina Sehgal, learned AOR, was heard for the State of Telangana.

9. The first question which we must address is whether the
judgment in Nagarjuna supra is a binding precedent or not?
9.1 In Read and others v. The Bishop Of Lincoln
6
Respondent . , the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
observed that:
“Whilst fully sensible of the weight to be attached to
such decisions, their Lordships are at the same time
bound to examine the reasons upon which the
decisions rest, and to give effect to their own view of
the law.”

9.2 The majority of a three-judge Bench in Abdul Kayoom
7
v. CIT , speaking through Hidayatullah J., as he then was,
observed:
“21. … Each case depends on its own facts, and a close
similarity between one case and another is not enough,
because even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid

5
CA 5037-5038 of 2004
6
[1892] A.C. 644
7
1961 SCC OnLine SC 244
5

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the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo)
[(1960) 3 SCR N 681] by matching the colour of one case
against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on
which side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance
to another case is not at all decisive. What is decisive is
the nature of the business, the nature of the
expenditure, the nature of the right acquired, and their
relation inter se, and this is the only key to resolve the
issue in the light of the general principles, which are
followed in such cases.”
[ See also : V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51]

8
9.3 State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn . , held
as under:
113. In order to determine this aspect, one of the well-
established tests is “the Inversion Test” propounded
inter alia by Eugene Wambaugh, a Professor at The
Harvard Law School, who published a classic text book
called The Study of Cases [ Eugene Wambaugh, The
Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1892).] in
the year 1892. This textbook propounded inter alia what
is known as the “Wambaugh Test” or “the Inversion
Test” as the means of judicial interpretation. “the
Inversion Test” is used to identify the ratio decidendi in
any judgment. The central idea, in the words of
Professor Wambaugh, is as under:
“In order to make the test, let him first frame
carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let
him then insert in the proposition a word
reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire
whether, if the court had conceived this new
proposition to be good, and had it in mind, the
decision could have been the same. If the answer
be affirmative, then, however excellent the
original proposition may be, the case is not a
precedent for that proposition, but if the answer
be negative the case is a precedent for the
original proposition and possibly for other
propositions also. [ Eugene Wambaugh, The
Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1892) at p. 17.] ”
114. In order to test whether a particular proposition of
law is to be treated as the ratio decidendi of the case,

8
(2018) 6 SCC 21

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the proposition is to be inversed i.e. to remove from the
text of the judgment as if it did not exist. If the
conclusion of the case would still have been the same
even without examining the proposition, then it cannot
be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. This test
has been followed to imply that the ratio decidendi is
what is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case.
“In order that an opinion may have the weight of a
precedent”, according to John Chipman Grey [ Another
distinguished jurist who served as a Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School.] , “it must be an opinion, the
formation of which, is necessary for the decision of a
particular case”.

9.4 A coordinate Bench succinctly captured the principle in
Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree
9
Thakurji Educational Society , in the following words with
reference to earlier judgments:
“7. In Jayant Verma [ Jayant Verma v. Union of India ,
(2018) 4 SCC 743 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 207] , this Court
has referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Dalbir
Singh v. State of Punjab [ Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab ,
(1979) 3 SCC 745 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 848] to state that it
is not the findings of material facts, direct and
inferential, but the statements of the principles of law
applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts,
which is the vital element in the decision and operates
as a precedent. Even the conclusion does not operate as
a precedent, albeit operates as res judicata. Thus, it is
not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment
that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's
decision binding as a legal precedent is the principle
upon which the case is decided and, for this reason, it
is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the
obiter dicta.”

9.5 In the light of the pronouncements referred to supra,
let us consider the holding in Nagarjuna supra. Here itself
it be noted that the reason why Mr. Pai submits that this is
not a binding precedent is because the conclusion was not

9
(2023) 16 SCC 458
7

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based upon a legal analysis of the provisions of the Andhra
10
Pradesh Civil Courts Act 1972 and instead was on the
basis of the decision taken by the high-powered committee
of the State. The relevant paras thereof are as follows:
“ 7. The high-powered committee headed by the Chief
Minister of the State and comprising of the Minister for
Tribal Welfare; Minister for Law; Chief Secretary to
Government; Principal Secretary to Government,
Tribal Welfare; Principal Secretary to Government,
Social Welfare; Principal Secretary to Government
Home; Secretary to Government, Law and Justice;
Secretary to Government, Legal Affairs; Member of
Legislative Assembly, Rampachodavaram;
Commissioner, Tribal Welfare and Lawyer and
President, Girijana Yuvajana Samkshema Sangam,
R.C. Varam met on 24-7-2012 and, after extensive
deliberations and having regard to the relevant facts
and circumstances, decided to accept one of the
alternatives suggested by Mr R. Venkataramani,
learned Senior Counsel, namely, retention of the
existing system as obtaining in the Scheduled Areas in
complete substitution of the Civil Courts Act.
8. Mr R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel for
the State of Andhra Pradesh, submits that the decision
taken by the high-powered committee is in accord and
conformity with the Notification issued on 30-10-1972
effective from 1-11-1972 declaring that the 1972 Act
does not apply to the Scheduled Areas of the State. ”

(emphasis supplied)
9.6 In order to appreciate these observations, it is also
necessary to, in toto, quote the previous order passed in
11
Nagarjuna Grammena Bank v. Medi Narayana , which
reads as follows:
“1. These appeals have been filed by the decree-
holders. In the midst of hearing of these appeals, a
peculiar problem has been brought to our notice by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties that under
the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (hereinafter

10
1972 Act
11
(2013) 11 SCC 367
8

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for short “Act 19 of 1972”) a notification has been
issued by the Governor in exercise of powers under
sub-section (3) of Section 1 of Act 19 of 1972 by which
the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has come into force
in the whole State of Andhra Pradesh except in the
Scheduled Areas of the State.
2. It is contended by Mr P.S. Narasimha, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant(s) that even before
coming into force of the Act, the Civil Courts had been
established in the Scheduled Areas and they have been
functioning since 1950. The appellant(s) decree-
holders obtained a decree from the Civil Court in the
Scheduled Areas, however, since the operation of Act
19 of 1972 is excluded from the Scheduled Areas of the
State, they are unable to execute the decree. The High
Court, in its impugned judgment [ Meda
Narayana v. Nagarjuna Grameena Bank , CRP No. 2888
of 1998, order dated 27-6-2000 (AP)] , held that as the
Act itself is not applicable in the Scheduled Areas, the
decree passed by the Civil Court is null and void and
inexecutable. It has been brought to our notice that
now many non-Scheduled people are residing in the
Scheduled Areas of the State including owners of
commercial and business houses. That apart, many
banks have been established including the appellant
Banks, who are non-Scheduled people and they are
being deprived of resolution of the disputes through
the Civil Courts. Even in those cases which have been
decided by the Civil Courts, the decrees could not be
executed because the Civil Courts Act is not applicable
and the decree passed by the Civil Courts in the
Scheduled Areas has been declared null and void.
These are the contentions over which we have given
our serious consideration.
3. A dispute may arise between the people of the
Scheduled Areas and non-Scheduled Areas in which
case, in our view, the people of the non-Scheduled
Areas cannot be subjected to the methodology and the
procedure adopted while resolving the dispute between
the people of the Scheduled Areas. In our view,
therefore, a mechanism has to be evolved in a case
where the dispute involved is between the people of the
Scheduled Areas and non-Scheduled Areas. One way
of resolving this problem is by either issuing a
notification or by an amendment in the Act to the
extent that the Civil Courts Act shall be extended to the
Scheduled Areas of the State except where the dispute
involved is between the people of the Scheduled and
non-Scheduled Areas.
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4. While saying this we also took note of the
observation made by the High Court. The High Court,
while allowing the petition, also took note of the
submission of the counsel for the appellant that it is
necessary to confer the jurisdiction over the Scheduled
Areas on the Civil Courts also. The High Court
observed that it is for the State Government to take
expeditious steps as early as possible to issue a
notification extending the provisions of the Civil Courts
Act even with retrospective effect in the Scheduled
Areas for peace and good governance and for the
speedy disposal of the civil cases in the Scheduled
Areas. A copy of the High Court order was also directed
to be endorsed to the Home Department, Government
of Andhra Pradesh. It is unfortunate that no steps
appear to have been taken pursuant to such
observation.
5. In this view of the matter, we are now of the view
that the matter requires serious consideration of the
State Government at the earliest in terms of our
suggestions as noted above. Mr H.S. Gururaja Rao,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State prays
for three months' time for taking necessary steps in the
matter and issuing appropriate notification in this
regard.
6. List these matters after three months. The Registry
shall send a copy of this order to the Registrar General
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court who shall coordinate
with the State Government for doing the needful.”
(emphasis supplied)

9.7 It appears that the situation presented in this case was
contemplated by this Court in para 3 of the order immediately
above. The suggestion put forward by the Court was either an
amendment or a notification addressing the scenario. It is
thereafter, that the order relied on by the High Court in the
impugned judgment came to be passed. The stand of the State
after the meeting of the committee was clear, that the 1972
Act does not and would not apply to the scheduled areas and
such a view had been carried forward to the present case also.
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However, to us, there appears to be merit in the submission
of Mr. Pai. This is for the reason that if Nagarjuna supra is
to be held to be deciding a point of law, it is obviously requisite
that the provision, the intent, the objective thereof be
discussed in light of the judgments extracted in Para 8.1 to
8.4 supra . This was clearly absent. It was rather a case of a
judicial deference to the executive/legislature, because the
question involved is ordinarily within that domain i.e.,
extending or taking away jurisdiction of a particular court. It
was not a case of either adjudicating or returning a positive
finding on a proposition of law.

10. Having concluded thus, we must now consider whether the
Civil Court was correct in adjudicating the suit for partition and
separate possession, when the undisputed position is that though
the land subject matter of dispute fell within Scheduled Areas
without any fetters, but the parties are non-tribals?

11. In 1874, the Government enacted Act no XIV of 1874 being
the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. The interpretation clause
thereof reads as under:
“Interpretation clause.-
In this Act the term "Scheduled Districts" means the
territories mentioned in the first schedule hereto
annexed; and, from the date fixed in the resolution
next hereinafter mentioned, it shall also include any
other territory to which the Secretary of State for India,
by resolution in Council, may declare the provisions of
the thirty-third of Victoria, Chapter III, Section 1, to be
applicable. ”

11

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Section 6 thereof, permits the appointment of officers and
regulation of procedures. It reads as under:
“ 6. The Local Government may from time to time-
(a) appoint officers to administer civil and criminal
justice, and to superintend the settlement and
collection of the public revenue and all matters relating
to rent, and otherwise to conduct the administration
within the Scheduled Districts,
(b) regulate the procedure of the officers so
appointed; but not so as to restrict the operation of any
enactment for the time being in force in any of the said
Districts,
(c) direct by what authority any jurisdiction,
powers, or duties incident to the operation of any
enactment for the time being in force in such District
shall be exercised or performed.
”


It is under this power that the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules 1924
were promulgated. The objects and reasons clause thereof, is as
under:

“Under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act 1874,
the Governor is pleased to make the following rules
12
for the administration of the Agency tracts of the
State of Andhra Pradesh and the regulation of the
procedure of the officers appointed to administer
them . ”


These Rules were promulgated in connection with the
adjudication of civil disputes and provided for a detailed
exposition on the powers and procedures to be exercised by the
Courts functioning in ‘ agency tracts ’. Discussion with respect to
other provisions will not be of aid to the present dispute.


12
Defined in the Agency Tracts Interest and Land Transfer Act, 1917 as follows: 2(a)
"Agency tracts" means the scheduled districts as defined in Acts XIV and XV of 1874 and
included within the districts of Ganjam, Vizagapatam and Godavari.
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HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION TO THE TRIBALS
AND TRIBAL AREAS

12. The history of this legislation, its enactment and subsequent
judicial developments have been noted by K. Ramaswamy J. in
13
Samatha v. State of A.P . :
“Legislative intervention — Enforcement ineffectiveness
14. The Ganjam and Vizagapatnam Act of 1839 declared the
Agency areas of the Madras Presidency, comprising parts of
Southern Orissa and seven present Andhra Pradesh districts
for special administration. In 1874, the Scheduled Districts
Act XIV (Central Act) was passed. Thereunder, Scheduled
Districts were defined to mean the territories mentioned in
the First Schedule and parts thereof; they also include any
other territory to which the Secretary of State for India by
resolution in council, may declare. Subsequently, the Act
was extended to the Taluk of the then Bhadrachalam in East
Godavari District which is now a part of Khamman District
together with the districts covered under the 1839 Act. The
Provincial Government issued rules prescribing the
procedure to be followed by the officers appointed thereunder
to administer Agency tracts. Later on, the Agency Tracts and
Land Transfer Act 1 of 1917 came to be passed. Thereunder,
to mitigate the hardships of the tribals from the wiles of
moneylenders and other migrants from plain areas, provision
was made so that rate of interest would not exceed 24% per
annum and compound interest would not be charged nor any
collateral advantage would be taken by the moneylenders.
The total interest allowed or decreed should not exceed the
principal amount. The “Scheduled Districts” defined in the
1874 Act were reconfirmed in the 1917 Act. Section 4 thereof
prohibited transfer of land in the Agency tracts which read
as under:

“4. Transfer of immovable property by a member
of a hill tribe.—(1) Notwithstanding any rule of
law or enactment to the contrary, any transfer of
immovable property situated within the Agency
tracts by a member of a hill tribe shall be
absolutely null and void unless made in favour
of another member of a hill tribe, or with the
previous consent in writing of the Agent or of any
other prescribed officer.

13
(1997) 8 SCC 191
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(2) Where a transfer of property is made in
contravention of sub-section (1), the Agent or
any other prescribed officer may, on application
by anyone interested, decree ejectment against
any person in possession of the property
claiming under the transfer and may restore it to
the transferor or his heirs.
(3) Subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed an appeal against a decree or order
under sub-section (2) if made by the Agent shall
lie to the Governor General-in-Council and if
made by any other officer shall lie to the
Assistant Agent or to the Agent as may be
prescribed.”

15. The Montague and Chelmsford Report, 1918 briefly
touched the administration of tribal areas and political
reform and excluded them from the reformed Provincial
Governments. The Government of India Act, 1919 divided the
area into two parts — “wholly excluded and partially
excluded areas for reform”. The former were small and the
latter were given joint responsibility of the Governor and the
Governor General-in-Council. The Montague Chelmsford
Report of 1918 suggested that the backward areas where
primitive tribes live should be excluded from proposed
political reform and administration was entrusted to the
Governors of the Provinces.

16. Pursuant to Simon Commission Report, the Government
of India Act, 1935 dealt with excluded and partially excluded
areas as per 1936 Order issued under Section 91 of the
Government of India Act, 1935. Simon Report is worth
extracting here and reads thus:

“There were two dangers to which subjection to
normal laws would have specially exposed these
peoples, and both arose out of the fact that they
were primitive people, simple, unsophisticated
and frequently improvident. There was a risk of
their agricultural land passing to the more
civilized section of the population, and the
occupation of the tribals was for the most part
agricultural: and, secondly, they were likely to
get into the ‘wiles of the moneylenders’. The
primary aim of government policy then was to
protect them from these two dangers and
preserve their tribal customs; and this was
achieved by prescribing special procedures
applicable to these backward areas.”
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17. Therein also, “Scheduled Districts” defined in 1874 Act
were treated as excluded and partially excluded areas. The
administration thereof was exclusively vested in the
Governor of the Province under Section 92 of the Government
of India Act, 1935 and sub-sections (1) and (2) which are
relevant for our purpose read as under:

“92. (1) The executive authority of a Province
extends to excluded and partially excluded areas
therein, but, notwithstanding anything in this
Act, no Act of the Federal legislature or of the
Provincial legislature shall apply to an excluded
area or a partially excluded area, unless the
Governor by public notification so directs; and
the Governor in giving such a direction with
respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall
in its application to the area, or to any special
part thereof, have effect subject to such
exceptions or modifications as he thinks fit.
(2) The Governor may make regulations for the
peace and good government of any area in a
Province which is for the time being an excluded
area, or a partially excluded area, and any
regulations so made may repeal or amend any
Act of the Federal legislature or of the Provincial
legislature or any existing Indian law, which is
for the time being applicable to the area in
question.
Regulations made under this sub-section shall
be submitted forthwith to the Governor General
and until assented to by him in his discretion
shall have no effect, and the provisions of this
Part of this Act with respect to the power of His
Majesty to disallow Acts shall apply in relation to
any such regulations assented to by the
Governor General as they apply in relation to
Acts of a Provincial legislature assented to by
him.”

18. The Government of India (Adoption of Indian Laws)
Order, 1937 repealed 1874 Act and brought excluded and
partially excluded areas directly under the governance of the
Governor under Section 92 of the Government of India Act,
1935. Thus they became Scheduled Areas by virtue of the
Scheduled Areas (Part ‘A’ States) Order, 1950 issued by the
President of India. After the advent of the Constitution, Fifth
and Sixth Schedules were engrafted as part of the scheme of
the Constitution by the founding fathers. Fifth Schedule
empowers the President of India who thereunder issued
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Scheduled Areas (Part ‘A’ States) Order, 1950 declaring
specified areas therein to be Scheduled Areas within the
States specified in Part ‘A’ of the First Schedule to the
Constitution of India. Therein also East Godavari, West
Godavari and Visakhapatnam Agencies (Vizianagaram and
Srikakulam Districts are part of it) were declared to be
Scheduled Areas in Madras Province. Equally, by Scheduled
Areas (Part ‘B’ States) Order, 1950 which became effective
from 7-12-1950, the President exercised the power declaring
certain specified areas as Scheduled Areas in Part ‘B’ States
including the State of Hyderabad (Adilabad, Karimnagar,
Nizamabad, Warangal, Khammam, Mahaboobnagar
Districts).
19. It would, thus, be clear that right from the inception of
colonial administration, the Agency areas were treated
distinctly from other areas. Tribals were protected from
exploitation; their rights and title to enjoy the lands in their
occupation and their autonomy, culture and ecology were
preserved; infiltration of the non-tribals into tribal areas was
prohibited. Sugalis, i.e., Khanabadosh, non-tribals, by
migration became in due course, tribals. Even those migrant
non-tribals were prohibited to purchase the lands in Agency
areas from the tribals except with the prior sanction of the
officer appointed by the Government in that behalf. However,
with the connivance and fabrication of revenue records, non-
tribals got hold of the lands and exploited the tribals. ”

12.1 When the country attained independence, one of the
multitude of concerns that occupied the constitutional
framers was the protection of tribal people. Some of the
discussion 14 , irrespective of its final conclusion in the
Constituent Assembly in this regard, demonstrating the high
level of concern exhibited by the learned members is
reproduced below:

9.132.101 Jaipal Singh The idea behind this amendment is similar to what I
have already said before and it is that any benefits we
might want to confer on the scheduled tribes should
not be limited or circumscribed by the areas, that they

14
https://www.constitutionofindia.net/debates/05-sep-1949/
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should extend to the entire State or wherever the
scheduled tribes may be.
9.132.105 Jaipal Singh As I have already stated, there are only two principles
involved in my five amendments: first, that the
Scheduled Tribes, all of them, should be benefited by
the provisions of the Fifth Schedule and, secondly,
that the Tribes Advisory Council should be a reality
and not a farce. Let us not give it a big name, without
any powers to do things.
9.132.108 Yudhishthir
…the Scheduled tribes are backward and therefore
deserve the special attention and care of the
Government both in the Centre and the provinces and
I think it is for this reason that some areas are
specified as Scheduled areas and some tribes have
been described as Scheduled tribes…
9.132.131 Shibban Lal
Mishra
... Sir, the existence of the scheduled tribes and the
Scheduled areas are a stigma on our nation just as the
existence of untouchability is a stigma on the Hindu
religion. That these brethren of ours are still in such a
sub-human state of existence is something, for which
we should be ashamed. Of course, all these years this
country was a slave of the British, but still we cannot
be free from blame. I therefore think Sir, that these
scheduled tribes and areas must as soon as possible
become a thing of the past. They must come up to the
level of the rest of the population and must be
developed to the fullest extent. I only want that these
scheduled tribes and scheduled areas should be
developed so quickly that they may become
indistinguishable from the rest of the Indian
population and that this responsibility should be
thrown on the Union Government and on the
Parliament…..
9.132.161 Brajeshwar
Saxena
... What the tribals want is not a Council but a
guarantee by the Constitution that means of
livelihood, free education and free medical facilities
shall be provided for all tribals. This is not an
impossible demand which I am making. I am not
making this demand for all the citizens of this country
but for only twenty five million people. The provinces
being weak in economic resources are not in a position
to shoulder this responsibility. Hence I plead that the
Centre should take command of the tribal areas. The
Government of India has no right to exist if it
cannot undertake to guarantee means of livelihood
and free educational and medical facilities even for
such a small number of people. …
9.132.179 Jadubans
Prasad
The problem, or rather the treatment of the problem of
the tribal people is a very difficult and delicate one,
Sahay
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and hence in dealing with these problems we have got
to see that we should not tie down the hands of those
who want to do good to them. It is true, and we are all,
each one of us, here and outside, determined and
agreed that this problem of the tribals is not of recent
making. Their exploitation, their poverty, their
economic backwardness, their social backwardness,
all the things deserve the special attention not only of
the provincial Governments, but also of the
Central Government. ...

12.2 Part X of the Constitution of India deals with
“Scheduled Tribes and Tribal Areas”. The application of the
Fifth Schedule, which is meant for the administration and
control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes for states
other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, is provided
for in Article 244(1). It vests power with the Governor of the
State having such scheduled areas, within the territory of the
State, to make regulations for the good of the area. The
President may, whenever they desire, seek a report from the
Governor, or the Governor may annually send a report to the
President. It has specifically been provided in the Fifth
Schedule, over and above the general power as referred to
above, the power to restrict transfer of land by or among
members of the scheduled tribes; regulate allotment of land
(both these factors found their place in the Constitution
because the Constituent Assembly debates reveal the sense
of urgency felt by the members to protect the land of the
tribals in the scheduled areas and restricting transfer thereof
to non-tribals ) and the practice of moneylending. What
15
constitutes a scheduled area wherein the government may

15
Para159 by S. Saghir Ahmad J. in Samatha v. State of A.P., (1997) 8 SCC 191
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exercise such powers is to be decided by the President by way
of a public notification.
12.3 It flows from the above that the protection of tribals
and enablement for them to develop and thrive, has been a
clear and continuous concern. Specifically with respect to
land, which is a vehicle for social status, dignity, economic
empowerment and justice, provisions have been inserted. All
of these aspects have been sought to be secured while keeping
preservation of customs and tribal autonomy at the centre. It
also seeks to integrate them into mainstream society, which
was a pressing concern at the time of independence.
In the 1970s, with the aim of enhancing the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Civil Courts within the state, the legislature
of the state of Andhra Pradesh introduced the 1972 Act, which
came into effect on 1st November 1972 in all areas, except
those notified to be scheduled areas. It is with reference to
this exclusion that it is contended by the learned counsel for
the State as also the amicus curiae that the Civil Courts
established under this Act did not have the jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. Relevant extract of the said Act is:
“1. Short title, extent and commencement:--
(1) This Act may be called the Andhra Pradesh Civil
Courts Act, 1972.
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra
Pradesh.
(3) It shall come into force in such area and on such
date as the Government may, by notification,
appoint, and they may appoint different dates for
different areas and for different provisions of this
1
Act.
1
All the provisions came into force on 1-11-1972 in
the whole of the State of A.P. except in the Scheduled
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Areas of the State. Vide G.O. Ms. No. 1573, dt. 30-
10-1972.

2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,
(a) "Court" means a Civil Court established or
deemed to be established under this Act;…

PART II
Establishment and constitution of courts for the
District of Hyderabad
3. Establishment of a City Civil Court - (1) The
Government may, after consultation with the High
Court, by notification, establish a court to be called
the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try
and dispose of, subject to the provisions of this Act,
all suits and proceedings of a civil nature arising in
the district of Hyderabad.
(2) The City Civil Court existing on the date of the
commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have
been established under sub- section (1).”
(emphasis supplied)

12.4 The 1972 Act concerns the establishment of Civil
Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The legislation was to
consolidate and amend the law relating thereto. Such courts
were defined under Section 2(a) as being a Civil Court.
Section 3 discussed the establishment of such Civil Courts
and provided that all suits and proceedings of a civil nature
shall be under the jurisdiction of these Courts. The 1972
notification of the Governor dated 30-10-1972 excluded the
application thereof to the Scheduled Areas.
12.5 It is undisputed that the land with which the present
suit is concerned falls within such Scheduled Areas. As
already noted, the important intention of a particular area
being notified as a scheduled area is to protect the tribal
population which is in that area. There can be no dispute with
this proposition. These areas have been notified so that there
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isn’t unnecessary imposition of ‘modern’ rules and
regulations, in latent disregard for age-old customs, practices
and rituals that have been practiced for centuries. This is a
testament to the inclusivity of the constitution, making rules
and regulations while still retaining space for communities to
thrive, but still maintain their sense of community.
12.6 The necessary conclusion is that the notification of
Scheduled Areas is specifically directed towards the people of
the Scheduled Tribes living in that area. Merely because the
word ‘area’ has been used, it cannot be said that any and
everything that falls within that geographical area pertains to
scheduled tribes.

13. We have arrived at this view for a very simple reason. When
the object sought to be achieved by agency courts continuing in the
Scheduled Areas is to protect the tribal people, the tribal property,
their customs and practices, what is achieved by subjecting non-
tribal people in that area to such special procedure? There is only
one answer. Nothing. Admittedly, both the parties to this dispute
are non-tribals. Then, what is the rational nexus of asking them to
abide by procedures not intended for them? Rational nexus, as it
is well known, is one of the grounds which is to be considered when
looking at a particular dispute through the lens of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Being a part of the golden triangle of the
Constitution, this article provides for equality before the law and
equal protection of the law. The principle is that all persons subject
to the legislation should be placed on the same pedestal regarding
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privileges and liabilities conferred and imposed by the statute,
respectively, provided that the circumstances governing them are
also the same. On the face of it, Article 14 would be violated since
it is specifically intended for securing the rights of indigenous
communities but is being applied to people not amongst them. It
does not bear nexus to the object, which indubitably was to protect
people from these communities from exploitation by those who are
worldly wise. Since in the present facts, neither of the parties is a
member of the Scheduled Tribe, nor are there any fetters of
succession and partition amongst the co-sharers, it does not
concur with reason to treat them as if they were members of the
tribes solely on account of the land in question. The circumstances
governing them cannot be called ‘ like circumstances’ .

13.1 Patanjali Sastri CJ in State of Madras v. V.G. Row 16 ,
made pertinent observations:
23. It is important in this context to bear in mind that
the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should
be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no
abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness
can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature
of the right alleged to have been infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the
prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into
the judicial verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors
and forming their own conception of what is reasonable,
in all the circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable
that the social philosophy and the scale of values of the
Judges participating in the decision should play an
important part, and the limit to their interference with
legislative judgment in such cases can only be dictated
by their sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the

16
(1952) 1 SCC 410
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sobering reflection that the Constitution is meant not
only for people of their way of thinking but for all, and
that the majority of the elected representatives of the
people have, in authorising the imposition of the
restrictions, considered them to be reasonable.

13.2 A.N. Grover J. for the Constitution Bench in Chitra
Ghosh v. Union of India 17 observed:
“8. As laid down in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R.
Tendolkar [1958 SCC OnLine SC 6 : 1959 SCR 279] ,
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid
reasonable classification. In order to pass the test of
permissible classification two conditions must be
fulfilled—( ) that the classification is founded on
i
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from others left out
of the group and ( ii ) that differentia must have a
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.
…”

13.3 Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud C.J., in the seven-judge Bench
18
known as State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh , in the
context of sub-classification of ‘other backward classes’
observed :

“85. The Constitution permits valid classification if
two conditions are fulfilled. First , there must be an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons
grouped together from others left out of the group.
The phrase “intelligible differentia” means difference
capable of being understood. [ See, State of
W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar , (1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952
SC 75] The difference is capable of being understood
when there is a yardstick to differentiate the class
included and others excluded from the group. [ Anwar
Ali Sarkar case , (1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952 SC 75
(Das, J., SCC para 66)] In the absence of the
yardstick, the differentiation would be without a basis
and hence, unreasonable. The basis of classification
must be deducible from the provisions of the statute;

17
(1969) 2 SCC 228
18
(2025) 1 SCC 1
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surrounding circumstances or matters of common
knowledge. [ Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar ,
1958 SCC OnLine SC 6, para 12 : AIR 1958 SC 538 :
1959 SCR 279] In making the classification, the State
is free to recognise degrees of harm. [ Ram Krishna
Dalmia case , 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Special Courts
Bill, 1978, In re , (1979) 1 SCC 380] Though the
classification need not be mathematical in precision,
there must be some difference between the persons
grouped and the persons left out, and the difference
must be real and pertinent. [ Moorthy Match
Works v. CCE , (1974) 4 SCC 428] The classification is
unreasonable if there is “little or no difference”.
[ Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University , (1989) 2 SCC 145
: 1989 SCC (L&S) 284] Second , the differentia must
have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the law, that is, the basis of classification
must have a nexus with the object of the
classification. [ Indra Sawhney v. Union of India , 1992
Supp (3) SCC 217 (Reddy, J., SCC para 643); State of
Kerala v. N.M. Thomas , (1976) 2 SCC 310 : 1976 SCC
(L&S) 227; Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar ,
1958 SCC OnLine SC 6 : AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR
279; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar , (1954) 2
SCC 791 : (1955) 1 SCR 1045]
…
93. Nakara [ D.S. Nakara v. Union of India , (1983) 1
SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] goes a step further
than Triloki Nath [ State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa ,
(1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] to state that
the scope of sub-classification does not hinge on the
yardstick which is used to integrate groups into a
class but on the issue of whether the class is
homogeneous or integrated for the specific objective
of the law. When a law integrates a class, such as
diploma and degree-holders, it integrates the class for
the purpose of that specific law and not for all
purposes. Thus, a class which is not similarly
situated for the purpose of the law can be further
classified. The test that the Court must follow to
determine the validity of the sub-classification of a
class is as follows:
( a ) Whether the class is “homogeneous” or
“similarly situated” for the purpose of the specific
law;
( b ) If the answer to ( a ) above is in the affirmative,
the class cannot be sub-classified;
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( c ) If the answer to ( a ) above is in the negative, the
class can be sub-classified upon the fulfilment of
the following standard:
( i ) There must be a yardstick (or intelligible
differentia) further classifying the class; and
( ii ) The yardstick must have a rational nexus with
the object of the statute.”
19
See also T.N. Medical Officers Assn. v. Union of India
[ : ,
(Constitution Bench)]

13.4 Considering these judgments and particularly the
observations in VG Row supra it is clear to us that while the
salutary object of protection of scheduled tribe people and
their property is important and deserves to be given due
importance, there is no basis for it there to be a blanket
exclusion of Civil Courts in as much as, it pertains to civil
disputes of succession between exclusively non-tribal parties
although the property is situated within scheduled areas. We
therefore hold that the Civil Court had the requisite
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The High Court
erroneously held the Civil Court not to have jurisdiction
because of the exclusion of the application of the 1972 Act to
the scheduled areas. In our view, the application thereof to
the parties that are not in any way connected to its purpose
would be incorrect use of law.

14. We clarify that the effect of the conclusion shall apply only
to pending cases and those that arise in future. The jurisdiction
of the Civil Courts shall stand restored in so far as civil

19
(2021) 6 SCC 568
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transactions involving exclusively non-tribal parties are
concerned.

15. It is clarified that even if one party to the dispute would be
a tribal residing in the Scheduled Areas, then the Agency Courts
would retain the jurisdiction. In that view of the matter,
‘ Scheduled Areas’, although referring to a specific geographical
area, cannot be taken to mean, in view of the object and intent of
Schedule V to the Constitution, to be applicable to non-tribal
parties. We hold that Nagarjuna supra did not lay down any
proposition of law, much less to be a binding precedent. The
impugned judgment is set aside, and the second appeal is restored
to the file of the High Court to be decided on the merits in a
manner consistent with this judgment. Parties to appear before
the High Court on 24.08.2026. Hearing expedited.

16. The appeal is allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of. No costs.


...……………………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)



....……………………………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
August 06, 2026
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