MADHU GUPTA AND OTHERS vs STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER

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High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No: 542 of 2026
Reserved on: 20.07.2026
Date of Decision: 29.07.2026
Madhu Gupta & Ors. ..Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Petitioner : M/s Virbahadur Verma & Aditya
Singh Thakur, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed a present petition against the
order dated on 01.03.2025 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge-I, Solan vide which the order dated 29.01.2018
passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Solan
(learned Trial Court) was set aside. ( The parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant Nand Lal, accused Vinod Gupta
and Smt. Madhu Gupta are partners of the firm Tee & Tee
Healthcare, Chewa, Tehsil and District Solan. The accused Vinod
Gupta, Madhu Gupta, Naveen Gupta and Sumit Gupta forged the
complainant's signature on the cheque of ₹60,00,000/- issued in
favour of M/s Passim Medichem Agency. The cheque was
honoured and ₹60,00,000/- were deducted from the account of
the firm. The complainant came to know about this fact, and he
reported the matter to the police. The police registered the FIR and
investigated the matter. The specimen and disputed signatures
were sent to the FSL, but the authorship of the disputed signatures
could not be determined. The cheques were sent to CFSL
Chandigarh, and as per the report of the CFSL, the complainant's
signatures matched the disputed signatures. Hence, the police
filed a cancellation report.
3. The complainant filed a protest petition. The learned
Trial Court directed the Investigating Officer to carry out further
investigation. The Investigating Officer conducted further
investigation, but maintained that no offence was made out.
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4. The Learned Trial Court held that the report of CFSL
showed that the complainant's signatures matched the disputed
signatures. There was no reason to disbelieve the correctness of
the report of CFSL Chandigarh. No offence was made out in the
present case. Hence, the cancellation report was accepted, and the
FIR was ordered to be cancelled.
5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Trial Court, the complainant filed a revision which was decided by
the learned Additional Session Judge -I, Solan, District Solan,
(learned Revisional Court). The learned Revisional Court held that
the complainant had filed a protest petition before the Court. The
complainant had a right to lead preliminary evidence in support of
the averments made in the protest petition. The learned Trial
Court had not provided such an opportunity. Hence, the order
passed by the learned Trial Court was set aside, and the matter
was remitted to the learned Trial Court with a direction to allow
the complainant to lead evidence in support of the protest petition
and to treat the protest petition as a complaint.
6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned
Revisional Court, the accused has filed the present petition
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asserting that the learned Revisional Court exceeded the
jurisdiction vested in it. The protest petition was based upon the
report of the FSL, which was superseded by the report of CFSL. The
complainant had filed a false complaint and his signatures tallied
with the disputed signatures. The learned Revisional Court erred
in opening a closed matter without satisfying the necessary
conditions provided in Sections 223 to 226 of Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned
Revisional Court be set aside.
7. I have heard Mr Virbahadur Verma and Aditya Singh,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned
Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.
8. Mr Virbahadur Verma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the report issued by CFSL states that the
complainant’s signatures matched the disputed signatures. The
learned Revisional Court erred in directing the learned Trial Court
to treat the protest petition as a complaint. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the
learned Revisional Court be set aside.
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9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State submitted that the complainant was not
allowed to produce the evidence in support of the protest petition
and the learned Revisional Court had rightly directed the
complainant to produce the evidence before the learned Trial
Court. There is no infirmity with the procedure adopted by the
learned Revisional Court. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
10. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. A perusal of the order of the learned Revisional Court
shows that the learned Revisional Court had directed the learned
Trial Court to treat the protest petition as a complaint and to
proceed thereafter. Therefore, as on today, a protest petition is
pending before the learned Trial Court, which is being ordered to
be treated as a complaint. The accused does not have any right to
appear before the issuance of summons to him. It was laid down
by the full bench of Allahabad High Court in Father Thomas v. State
of U.P. , 2010 SCC OnLine All 2438 : (2011) 72 ACC 564 that the
prospective accused has no right to be heard before issuing
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summons to him and he cannot challenge an order of registration
of FIR. It was observed at page 570
34. From a consideration of the aforesaid authorities, it is
apparent that even when a complaint is filed under section
190(1)(a) and the Court decides to take cognizance and to
adopt the procedure provided for inquiry under sections
200 and 202 Cr. P.C. the accused is only permitted to remain
present during the proceedings, but not to intervene or to
raise his defence, until the order issuing summons is
passed. The right of hearing of a prospective accused at the
pre-cognisance stage, when only a direction for
investigation by the police is issued by the Magistrate under
section 156(3) Cr. P.C., can only be placed at a lower
pedestal. It is only during the course of trial that the
accused has been conferred rights at different stages to
raise his defence. As the authorities show, in the absence of
any statutory right of hearing to the prospective accused at
the pre-cognisance stage, when the direction to investigate
has only been issued by the Magistrate under section
156(3), the accused cannot be conferred with any right of
hearing even under any principle of audi alteram partem .
xxxxx
37. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is abundantly
clear that the prospective accused has no locus standi to
challenge a direction for investigation of a cognizable case
under section 156(3) Cr. P.C. before cognisance or issuance
of process against the accused. The first question is
answered accordingly.
12. A fortiori , the accused does not have a right to challenge
the proceedings when the Magistrate is only recording the
statements of the witnesses. Therefore, the present petition is not
maintainable.
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13. A heavy reliance was placed upon the report of CFSL to
submit that there was no forgery and the complainant’s
signatures matched the disputed signatures. This submission will
not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P ., (1996) 4 SCC 596: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 792 that the report of a handwriting expert is opinion
evidence and requires corroboration from independent sources. It
was observed at page 614:
28. Thus, the evidence of PW 3 is not definite and cannot be
said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant
with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is a
rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not
generally consider it as offering ‘conclusive’ proof and
therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking
independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal
v. State of Punjab [(1977) 2 SCC 210: 1977 SCC (Cri) 313: AIR
1977 SC 1091 ], while dealing with the evidence of a
handwriting expert, this Court opined: (SCC pp. 213-14,
para 7)
“… We think it would be extremely hazardous to
condemn the appellant merely on the strength of
opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well
settled that expert opinion must always be received with
great caution and perhaps none so with more caution
than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a
profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is
unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion
without substantial corroboration. This rule has been
universally acted upon, and it has almost become a rule
of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra v. State
of U.P. [AIR 1957 SC 381: 1957 Cri LJ 559 ] that it is unsafe to
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treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for
conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by
other items of internal and external evidence. This Court
again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa
[AIR 1963 SC 1728: 1963 BLJR 226 ] that expert evidence of
handwriting can never be conclusive because it is, after
all, opinion evidence, and this view was reiterated in
Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee [AIR
1964 SC 529] where it was pointed out by this Court that
expert's evidence as to handwriting being opinion
evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive
evidence and before acting on such evidence, it would be
desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by
clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This
Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary
value of expert opinion in regard to handwriting in
Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. [AIR 1967 SC 1326 : (1967) 2
Andh LT 38 ] and it uttered a note of caution pointing out
that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the
evidence of a handwriting expert and before acting upon
such evidence, the court must always try to see whether
it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or
circumstantial.”
14. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padum
Kumar v. State of U.P. , (2020) 3 SCC 35 , that the report of the
handwriting expert can be relied upon if corroborated by other
evidence. It was observed: -
14. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
that, without independent and reliable corroboration, the
opinion of the handwriting experts cannot be relied upon to
base the conviction. In support of his contention, the
learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon S.
Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P.,
(1996) 4 SCC 596: 1996 SCC (Cri) 792] , wherein the Supreme
Court held as under: (SCC pp. 614-15, para 28)
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“ 28 . Thus, the evidence of PW 3 is not definite and
cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect
the appellant with the disputed letters. The evidence
of an expert is a rather weak type of evidence, and the
courts do not generally consider it as offering
“conclusive” proof and therefore safe to rely upon the
same without seeking independent and reliable
corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab
[Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210:
1977 SCC (Cri) 313], while dealing with the evidence of
a handwriting expert, this Court opined: (SCC pp. 213-
14, para 7)
‘ 7 . … we think it would be extremely hazardous to
condemn the appellant merely on the strength of
opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now
well settled that expert opinion must always be
received with great caution, and perhaps none so
with more caution than the opinion of a
handwriting expert. There is a profusion of
precedential authority that holds that it is unsafe to
base a conviction solely on expert opinion without
substantial corroboration. This rule has been
universally acted upon, and it has almost become a
rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra
v. State of U.P. [Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., AIR 1957
SC 381: 1957 Cri LJ 559] that it is unsafe to treat
expert handwriting opinion as a sufficient basis for
conviction, but it may be relied upon when
supported by other items of internal and external
evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari
Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa [Ishwari Prasad Misra v.
Mohd. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728] that expert evidence of
handwriting can never be conclusive because it is,
after all, opinion evidence, and this view was
reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar
Banerjee [ Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar
Banerjee , AIR 1964 SC 529] where it was pointed out
by this Court that an expert's evidence as to
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handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if
ever, take the place of substantive evidence and
before acting on such evidence, it would be desirable
to consider whether it is corroborated either by
clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
This Court had again occasion to consider the
evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to
handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of M.P.
[Fakhruddin v. State of M.P., AIR 1967 SC 1326: 1967
Cri LJ 1197] and it uttered a note of caution pointing
out that it would be risky to found a conviction
solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert and
before acting upon such evidence, the court must
always try to see whether it is corroborated by other
evidence, direct or circumstantial.’”
15. Of course, it is not safe to base the conviction solely on
the evidence of the handwriting expert. As held by the
Supreme Court in Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab [Magan
Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210: 1977 SCC (Cri)
313 ] that: (SCC p. 213, para 7)
“ 7 . … expert opinion must always be received with
great caution … it is unsafe to base a conviction solely
on expert opinion without substantial corroboration.
This rule has been universally acted upon, and it has
almost become a rule of law.”
16. It is fairly well settled that before acting upon the
opinion of the handwriting expert, prudence requires that
the court must see that such evidence is corroborated by
other evidence, either direct or circumstantial evidence. In
Murari Lal v. State of M.P. [Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1
SCC 704: 1980 SCC (Cri) 330] , the Supreme Court held as
under: (SCC pp. 708-09, paras 4 and 6)
“ 4. … True, it has occasionally been said on very high
authority that it would be hazardous to base a
conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting
expert. But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any
expert, handwriting expert or any other kind of
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expert, is not because experts, in general, are
unreliable witnesses — the quality of credibility or
incredibility being one which an expert shares with all
other witnesses — but because all human judgment is
fallible and an expert may go wrong because of some
defect of observation, some error of premises or
honest mistake of conclusion. The more developed
and the more perfect a science, the less the chance of
an incorrect opinion and the converse if the science is
less developed and imperfect. The science of the
identification of fingerprints has attained near
perfection, and the risk of an incorrect opinion is
practically non-existent. On the other hand, the
science of handwriting identification is not nearly so
perfect, and the risk is, therefore, higher. But that is a
far cry from doubting the opinion of a handwriting
expert as an invariable rule and insisting upon
substantial corroboration in every case, howsoever
the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons.
It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with
an initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort
of witness. His opinion has to be tested by the
acceptability of the reasons given by him. An expert
deposes and not decides. His duty “is to furnish the
Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing
the accuracy of his conclusion, so as to enable the
Judge to form his own independent judgment by the
application of these criteria to the facts proved in
evidence [ Vide Lord President Cooper in Davis v.
Edinburgh Magistrate, 1953 SC 34 quoted by Professor
Cross in his evidence].
5 . *
6 . Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of
the Evidence Act, and where the Court has to form an
opinion upon a point as to identity of handwriting,
the opinion of a person “specially skilled” in
questions as to identity of handwriting is expressly
made a relevant fact. … So, corroboration may not
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invariably be insisted upon before acting on the
opinion of a handwriting expert, and there need be no
initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a particular case,
a court may require corroboration of a varying degree.
There can be no hard-and-fast rule, but nothing will
justify the rejection of the opinion of an expert
supported by unchallenged reasons on the sole
ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of a
court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting
expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the
reasons for the opinion, consider all other relevant
evidence and finally decide to accept or reject it.”
15. A similar view was taken in Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v.
Baddam Pratapa Reddy , (2019) 14 SCC 220 , wherein it was
observed: -
10. By now, it is well settled that the court must be cautious
while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of
evidence and not substantive in nature. It is also settled that
it may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the
court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in
the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as
to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it. In this
respect, reference may be made to a long line of precedents
that includes Ram Chandra v. State of U.P. [Ram Chandra v.
State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 381: 1957 Cri LJ 559], Shashi Kumar
Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee [Shashi Kumar Banerjee v.
Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529], Magan Bihari Lal
v. State of Punjab [Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977)
2 SCC 210: 1977 SCC (Cri) 313] and S. Gopal Reddy v. State of
A.P. [S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 4 SCC 596: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 792]
11. We may particularly refer to the decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee
[Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964
SC 529], where it was observed that the evidence of a
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handwriting expert can rarely be given precedence over
substantive evidence. In the said case, the court chose to
disregard the testimony of the handwriting expert as to the
disputed signature of the testator of a will, finding such
evidence to be inconclusive. The court instead relied on the
clear testimony of the two attesting witnesses as well as the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.
12. On the other hand, in Murari Lal v. State of M.P. [Murari
Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980 SCC (Cri) 330] , this
Court emphasised that reliance on expert testimony cannot
be precluded merely because it is not corroborated by
independent evidence, though the Court must still approach
such evidence with caution and determine its
creditworthiness after considering all other relevant
evidence. After examining the decisions referred to supra,
the Court was of the opinion that these decisions merely
laid down a rule of caution, and there is no legal rule that
mandates corroboration of the opinion evidence of a
handwriting expert. At the same time, the Court noted that
Section 46 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter “the
Evidence Act”) expressly makes opinion evidence open to
challenge on facts. In Alamgir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Alamgir
v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21: 2003 SCC (Cri) 165] ,
without referring to Section 46 of the Evidence Act, this
Court reiterated the observations in Murari Lal [Murari Lal v.
State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980 SCC (Cri) 330] and
stressed that the court must exercise due care and caution
while determining the creditworthiness of expert evidence.
13. In our considered opinion, the decisions in Murari Lal
[Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980 SCC (Cri)
330 ] and Alamgir [Alamgir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 1
SCC 21: 2003 SCC (Cri) 165] strengthen the proposition that it
is the duty of the court to approach opinion evidence
cautiously while determining its reliability and that the
court may seek independent corroboration of such evidence
as a general rule of prudence. Clearly, these observations in
Murari Lal [Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980
SCC (Cri) 330] and Alamgir [Alamgir v. State (NCT of Delhi),
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(2003) 1 SCC 21: 2003 SCC (Cri) 165] do not go against the
proposition stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee [Shashi Kumar
Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 529] that the
evidence of a handwriting expert should rarely be given
precedence over substantive evidence.
16. Therefore, the reliance could not have been placed on
the report of the handwriting expert alone to conclude that there
was no forgery.
17. In the present case, the informant had filed a protest
petition. It was laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Sushil
Kumar Hazra v. Banka Mahato , 1957 SCC OnLine Cal 196: (1956-57)
61 CWN 624 that the informant has a right to file a protest petition,
and once such a petition is filed, the magistrate is bound to
examine the complainant and witnesses and proceed as per the
law. It was observed at page 627:
7. This order did not in any way involve consideration of the
merits of the case. When the Naraji petition was filed, it was
clearly the duty of the Magistrate to treat it as a complaint,
and to proceed straightaway to the examination of the
complainant under Sec. 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Instead of doing that, the learned Magistrate
directed a judicial enquiry to be held. At this enquiry some
evidence was taken, and a report followed on receipt of
which the Magistrate directed the issue of process against
the petitioners. Clearly this involved infringement of the
mandatory provisions of the law inasmuch as the
Magistrate had failed to examine the complainant on Oath
in accordance with the provisions of section 200 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. This position was realised by the
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previous Magistrate who dealt with this matter and he
accordingly ‘discharged’ the accused from the proceedings
obviously on the ground that they had no legal origin. I do
not think that the Magistrate acted improperly in making
the order of discharge in this case, although technically it
could not be said to be an order under section 253 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure.
18. A similar view was taken in Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre
v. State of Maharashtra , (2004) 7 SCC 768: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1214
wherein it was observed at page 774:
13. When the information is laid with the police, but no
action in that behalf is taken, the complainant is given
power under Section 190 read with Section 200 of the Code
to lay the complaint before the Magistrate having
jurisdiction to take cognisance of the offence and the
Magistrate is required to enquire into the complaint as
provided in Chapter XV of the Code. In case the Magistrate,
after recording evidence, finds a prima facie case, instead of
issuing process to the accused, he is empowered to direct
the police concerned to investigate the offence under
Chapter XII of the Code and to submit a report. If he finds
that the complaint does not disclose any offence to take
further action, he is empowered to dismiss the complaint
under Section 203 of the Code. In case he finds that the
complaint/evidence recorded prima facie discloses an
offence, he is empowered to take cognisance of the offence
and would issue process to the accused. These aspects have
been highlighted by this Court in All India Institute of
Medical Sciences Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India
[(1996) 11 SCC 582: 1997 SCC (Cri) 303 ].
19. In the present case, the learned Trial Court had already
ordered further investigation, but the Investigating Officer
maintained his earlier stand. Therefore, the only option available
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with the learned Trial Court was to treat the protest petition as a
complaint, which it had failed to do. Therefore, the learned
Revisional Court was justified in directing the learned Trial Court
to treat the complaint as a protest petition, and there is no
infirmity in the order passed by the learned Revisional Court.
20. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is
dismissed.
21. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
22. The record of the learned Courts below be returned
with a copy of the judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
th
29 July, 2026
(Nikita)
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