South Delhi Municipal Corporation vs Housing And Urban Development Corporation Ltd.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Judgment reserved on: 7 September 2026
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Judgment pronounced on: 19 November 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010166732019
+ W.P.(C) 3320/2019 & CM APPL. 15283/2019
SOUTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Madhu Tewatia and Mr. Adhirath
Singh, Advocates.
versus
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawanjit Singh Bindra, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Abhishek
Aggarwal and Ms. Neha Narang,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL
JUDGMENT
AMIT BANSAL, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs:
“I. A writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
in the nature thereof setting aside the Order dated 10.08.2018 passed by
the Hon'ble Municipal Taxation Tribunal in House Tax Appeals bearing
Nos HTA NO. 188/ MTT/ 2013 & HTA NO. 49 - 57/ MTT/ 2015, the same
being illegal and contrary to the provisions of the DMC Act 1957 AND
the Statutory Bye Laws 2004 AND
II. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, as this Hon'ble Court
may deem fit and proper in the facts of the present case AND Orders
calling for the records pertaining to the present case.”
2. Brief facts necessary for deciding the present petition are as follows:
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2.1. The respondent/HUDCO is the owner of Flat Nos.205-216 and 241-
246 situated at Asian Games Village, Siri Fort Road, New Delhi (hereinafter
‘subject flats’).
2.2. Flat Nos.241 to 246 were being used for residential accommodation
of senior officers of HUDCO and officials of the Ministry of Urban
Development, while Flat Nos.205 to 216 were being used as transit hostel
accommodation for trainees, officials of municipal bodies, borrowing
agencies, training institutes, researchers, consultants and participants in
training programmes.
2.3. Whilst filing the self-assessment property tax returns (hereinafter
‘PTRs’) from the assessment year 2004-05 onwards, the
respondent/HUDCO classified the subject flats under Bye-Law 9(a) of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation (Property Taxes) Bye-Laws, 2004 (hereinafter
‘2004 Bye-Laws’) pertaining to “residential buildings”, and accordingly
applied Use Factor-1 (“UF-1”) as per Annexure-H to the Self Assessment
Property Tax Form, applicable to self-occupied residences, and deposited
property tax at the rate of 25%.
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2.4. On 19 November, 2012, the petitioner/MCD issued a show cause
notice to the respondent/HUDCO alleging that the property tax was not
calculated by applying Use Factor-4 (“UF-4”) and called upon HUDCO to
furnish revised PTRs taking into account the UF-4 instead of UF-1 and to
submit the difference of tax along with interest @ 1% per month from 2004-
05, till the date of issuance of the letter.
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2.5. The respondent/HUDCO responded to the aforesaid notice on 14
December 2012, informing that the UF-1 has been applied while computing
the property tax since the flats bearing no.241 to 246 are exclusively
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residential flats and other flats bearing no.205 to 216 are used as a transit
hostel for the officials of the HUDCO coming from different regional offices
located throughout the country.
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2.6. Thereafter, the petitioner/MCD issued a notice dated 2 July, 2013
under Section 123D of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
(hereinafter ‘DMC Act’) alleging that the self-assessment PTRs for the
period 2004-05 to 2012-13 had been filed by applying UF-1 instead of UF-4
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and proposing reassessment with effect from 1 April, 2004.
2.7. Pursuant thereto, the respondent/HUDCO appeared before the
Assessing Authority. The Assessing Authority passed the Assessment Order
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dated 2 September, 2013, holding that the flats were being allotted at
differential rates and consequently treated their use as commercial, applying
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UF-4 and determining the annual value at Rs.52,97,443/- with effect from 1
April, 2004.
2.8. A demand of Rs.71,98,231/- was thereafter raised by the
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petitioner/MCD on 16 September, 2013 for the differential property tax.
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2.9. The Assessment Order dated 2 September 2013 as well as the
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consequential demand dated 16 September 2013 was challenged by the
respondent/HUDCO before the Municipal Tax Tribunal (hereinafter ‘MTT’)
in ten (10) appeals, bearing HTA No.188/MTT/2013 and HTA No.49-
57/MTT/2015, under Section 169 of the DMC Act.
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2.10. Vide order dated 10 August 2018, MTT allowed the appeals and
quashed the Assessment Order and demands by holding that UF-1 was
applicable.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present writ petition has been filed.
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4. Notice in the present petition was issued vide order dated 2 April
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2019, on which date the operation of the impugned order was stayed.
5. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent/HUDCO, it
is stated as under:
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5.1. The Assessment Order dated 2 September 2013 and demand notice
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dated 16 September 2013 issued by the petitioner are wrong and arbitrary
as not being in accordance with the usage of property in question. The
petitioner wrongly applied the UF-4 (being business purpose) as the basis of
assessment instead of UF-1 (being public purpose).
5.2. The respondent/HUDCO got the taxable covered area calculated and
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certified on 12 July 2004 from an architect registered and empanelled with
the petitioner/MCD. Further, the respondent/HUDCO has been regularly
filing the property tax returns, which were duly accepted by the
petitioner/MCD since 2004 without any objection or demur.
5.3. The petitioner/MCD is not justified in reopening the assessment after
a lapse of almost 8 years. Under Section 123B (10) of the DMC Act, MCD
is not vested with the power to make a demand or change the rateable value
beyond 12 months of the year to which the self-assessment relates. The
action, if any, has to be taken by the authorities within a reasonable period
of time.
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5.4. The demand notice dated 16 September 2013 was received by the
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respondent/HUDCO on 19 September 2013. The petitioner/MCD first
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issued a notice under Section 154 of the DMC Act on 7 October 2013 and,
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after a span of only a week, issued a warrant of distress dated 14 October
2013 for the differential amount of Rs.71,98,231. In terms of Section 156 of
the DMC Act, the petitioner/MCD could have initiated the action only after
the expiry of the statutory period of 30 days from the service of notice,
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which expired on 19 October 2013.
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6. The matter was heard on 11 August 2026 and on 7 September
2026, after which the judgment was reserved.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
7. The respondent/HUDCO concealed the correct facts in the self-
assessment PTRs for the assessment years 2004-2005 onwards, thereby
leading to wrong application of Use Factor by the assessee. The subject flats
were being used as guest houses/boarding and lodging houses by the
respondent/HUDCO, i.e. for commercial use. The flats clearly fall under the
ambit of “business buildings” as defined under Bye-Law 9(b) of the 2004
Bye-Laws and therefore UF-4 is applicable. A lodging house has been held
to be a commercial/non-residential building by the Supreme Court in
1
NDMC v. Sohanlal .
8. MTT misread Bye-Law 9 of the 2004 Bye-Laws. A “residential
building” specifically excludes premises used for lodging, guest house, hotel
or similar purposes, whereas “business building” specifically includes
lodges and guest houses.
9. MTT could not have introduced a requirement of commercial or
profit-making activity into the statutory definition.
10. The charging of different amounts from occupants, including persons
not in Government service, clearly demonstrated the nature of the use and
justified UF-4. The taxing provisions are required to be construed strictly
and equitable considerations cannot be employed to alter the statutory
classification.
1
2000 (2) SCC 494.
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11. Whether the use of a guest house is commercial does not depend upon
whether the activity is undertaken with an intention to earn profit. The use of
the subject flats as guest houses/transit accommodation would attract UF-4
and it is immaterial that HUDCO may have charged only nominal amounts
from the occupants or may not have earned any profit. Reliance is placed on
2
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Mafatlal Industries.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
12. The subject flats are exclusively used for residential purposes, and the
nominal fee charged does not even cover the maintenance. Where a small
fee is charged which is insufficient for the upkeep will not be an essential
factor for determining the purpose of building. Reliance is placed on
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Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India in Council .
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13. The Assessment Order dated 2 September 2013 is barred by
limitation under Section 123B (10) of the DMC Act. The petitioner could
not have reopened the self-assessments dating back to 2004 after an
unexplained lapse of several years. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a
Division Bench of this Court in Springdales School v. North Delhi
4
Municipal Corporation , and the subsequent decision in Seth Pokharmal
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Educational Society v. MCD .
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14. The notice dated 2 July, 2013 merely alleged that UF-1 had been
wrongly applied instead of UF-4 and proposed reassessment with effect
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from 1 April, 2004. It did not allege any wilful suppression of information
by HUDCO, much less disclose the material or circumstances constituting
2
(1996) 8 SCC 27.
3
AIR 1914 PC 20.
4
238 (2017) DLT 487 (DB).
5
2018 SCC OnLine Del 7958.
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such suppression.
15. The respondent/HUDCO had been filing returns since 2004 on the
basis of the certificate issued by an architect registered with the petitioner
itself and had, throughout, disclosed the nature of the property and paid
property tax on the basis of UF-1. Consequently, there was neither
concealment nor wilful suppression.
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16. The petitioner/MCD issued the warrant of distress on 14 October
2013, before expiry of the statutory 30-day period as given in Section 156 of
the DMC Act.
ANALYSIS
17. I have heard the submissions made by counsel for the parties and
carefully perused the record.
18. On the basis of the submissions made by the parties, the following
two (2) issues arise for consideration in the present writ petition:
(i) Whether the petitioner/MCD is justified in applying Use Factor-4 (for
business purpose) in respect of the subject flats in terms of the Assessment
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Order passed on 2 September, 2023. Consequently, whether the demand
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notice issued by MCD dated 16 September, 2013 is legally tenable.
(ii) Whether the petitioner/MCD was justified in reopening the
assessment after 8 years in terms of Section 123D of the DMC Act.
ISSUE (i)
19. It is an undisputed position that the respondent, HUDCO, is a public
sector undertaking (PSU), fully owned by the Government of India. The
respondent owns 18 Flats bearing nos.205 to 216 and 241 to 246 at Asian
Games Village, Siri Fort Road, New Delhi (subject flats).
20. As per the respondent/HUDCO, Flat Nos. 241 to 246 are being used
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exclusively for residential purposes of senior officers of the respondent,
whereas Flat Nos.205 to 216 are being used as a ‘transit hostel for officials
of the respondent and other government officers.’ It is contended on behalf
of the respondent that none of these flats is being used for any commercial
purpose or to derive any profit.
21. Per contra , it is the stand of the petitioner/MCD that the subject flats
are being let out to individuals not in service with any government agency
and accordingly, differential charges are being levied from such persons.
Therefore, all the aforesaid flats are to be subjected to property tax by
applying UF-4.
22. To appreciate the rival contentions, it may be useful to refer to the
relevant provisions with regard to categorisation of the use factor under the
2004 Bye-Laws.
“ 9. Definitions of use-wise categories of buildings.
-For the purposes of clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 116 A, the
use-wise
(a) “residential building” shall mean any building used for dwelling
purposes by a family/families/individual but excludes any premises for
commercial use including lodging, guest house, hotel or similar
purposes:
(b) “business building” shall mean any building or part thereof used for
transaction of business or for keeping of accounts and records or for
similar other purposes, and such buildings shall include
(i) …
(ii) …
(iii) one and two star hotels, restaurants, lodges and guest houses ”
[Emphasis supplied.]
23. The definition of “business building”, as defined above in Bye-Law 9,
came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Bar
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6
Council of India v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation . The Division
Bench held that non-profit entities and statutory bodies which perform
public duty and statutory functions must be assessed as a public utility
attracting UF-1. Accordingly, it was held that the Bar Council of India,
which is a statutory professional body constituted under the Advocates Act
and performs statutory functions, cannot have its office building taken as a
commercial building and levied with UF-4.
24. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in South Delhi Municipal
7
Corporation v. Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education was
also seized of a similar issue in respect of property owned by the respondent
therein, which was categorised under UF-4. Aggrieved by the assessment,
the respondent filed an appeal before the MTT, which was allowed by the
impugned order. The aforesaid order of the MTT was challenged by MCD
before this Court. The Court, while dismissing the writ petition, held that a
building which is primarily used for residential purposes and is not involved
in any commercial activity would be covered under the definition of
“residential building” under Bye-Law 9 and therefore, UF-1 would be
applicable. The relevant findings from the said judgment are set out below:
“ 13. A perusal of the definition of a residential building under the
applicable bye-laws reveals that it encompasses any structure used for
dwelling purposes by families or individuals, while explicitly excluding
premises utilized for commercial purposes, such as lodges, guest houses,
or hotels.
14. The essence of the exclusion is based on commercial activity. It falls
within the domain of reasonable classification to demarcate residential
use and commercial use separately for the purpose of assessment.
However, the identification of use, residential or commercial, must be
6
2018 SCC OnLine Del 13616.
7
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5835.
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based on a sound criterion. In the present case, the transit
accommodation cannot be deemed to serve a commercial purpose solely
due to the nominal charges of Rs. 75 to Rs. 250 per day for
accommodation. The character of the usage is not altered merely by the
imposition of these minimal tariffs. It is evident that the ICFRE does not
generate any revenue from the transit accommodation. The bye-laws
explicitly delineate that use factor-1 applies to a range of property uses,
including residential purposes, government or government-aided schools
and colleges, public religious institutions, educational institutions
recognized by government bodies, medical institutions, and similar
entities. Conversely, use factor-4 is designated for properties associated
with business activities, such as self-occupied commercial spaces,
hazardous buildings, restaurants, hotels up to 2 stars, lodges, guest
houses, banquet halls, and mercantile shops. For the sake of clarity, the
table illustrating the nature of usage of property along with the
corresponding use factors as reflected in the Self Assessment Property
Tax form is reproduced hereunder as:—
“H. USE FACTOR
Factor ID Use of Property Use Factor
1. Residential 1
Business – Self
2. 4
Occupied/Tenanted
Industrial – Self
3. 3
Occupied/Tenanted
Govt/Govt aided
4. 1
Schools/Colleges
Hotels – 3 Stars and
5.
10
above.
6. Towers 10
7. Hoardings 10
8. Public Purpose 1
9. Public Utility 2
10. Religious Institution 1
Telecommunication
11.
2
Tower
12. Business – Vacant 2
13. Industrial – Vacant 2
14. Hazardous Building 4
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Factor ID Use of Property Use Factor
Workshops and Auto
15.
3
Repair Garages
16. Restaurant 4
17. Hotels – upto 2 stars 4
18. Lodges 4
19. Guest Houses 4
20. Banquet Halls 4
Recreation purpose -
Theatres, Movie Halls,
Assembly Halls,
21.
Baratghars,
Museums, Exhibition
3
Halls, Auditorium,
Swimming Pool etc.
Mercantile – Shops,
Warehouses, STD
Booths, Wholesale
Traders, Transporters,
22.
4
Cold Storage, etc.
Sports Purpose -
Gymnasium, Dance
Halls, Club Rooms,
23.
Health and Sports
Club, Bowling Alleys,
3
Stadium, Recreation
Piers etc.
24. Colleges – Govt 1
Colleges – UGC
25.
1
Recognised
26. Colleges – Trust 2
Educational
Institutions – Fees
27.
1
upto Rs. 600 per
month
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Factor ID Use of Property Use Factor
Educational
Institutions – Fees
upto Rs. 601 to Rs.
28.
2
1200 per month
Educational
Institutions – Fees
above Rs. 1200 per
29.
3
month
Educational
30. 1
Institutions – Govt.
31. University 1
32.
Medical Institution -
33.
1
Govt.
Medical Institution -
34.
Others (including
2
nursing homes)
Medical Education
35.
1
Institution – Govt.
Medical Education
36.
1
Institution – 1
Medical Education
Institution – 2
(approved by tech.
37.
2
body)
Medical Education
38.
3
Institution – 3
Schools – Govt./Govt
39.
1
Aided.
Schools – Fees upto
40.
1
Rs. 600 per month
Schools – Fees upto
41.
Rs. 601 to Rs. 1200
2
per month
Schools – Fees above
42.
3
Rs. 1200 per month
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Factor ID Use of Property Use Factor
Relevant
43. Vacant Land – In Use
use factor
44. Vacant Land – No Use 1
15. The juxtaposition of the sweep of use factor-1 and use factor-4
indicates a distinct demarcation. On one hand, use factor-1 is applied to
the premises which do not generate income and are solely established
either for public purposes, such as residential buildings, government
institutions, charitable organizations etc. On the other hand, use
factor-4 is applicable to premises intended for profit generation and
commercial purposes, including businesses, hotels, lodges, guest
houses, and similar commercial entities. This clear distinction indicates
the unique and non-overlapping purposes sought to be served by each
use factor.
[Emphasis supplied.]
25. Accordingly, it was held that the respondent in the said case cannot be
said to be engaged in any commercial activity, merely on account of levying
nominal fees for providing residential accommodation to officials who are
staying in the subject flats in the course of their official duties.
26. In the present case, the respondent/HUDCO was asked by the
petitioner/MCD to place an affidavit with regard to use of the subject flats.
Accordingly, an affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent/HUDCO on
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26 April, 2013. The relevant extracts from the said affidavit are set out
below:
“3. It is further affirmed that the Corporation has fixed different slabs for
accommodation in the transit/hostel accommodation taking following
into account.
(ii) Guests of officials, both of HUDCO and Ministry are treated at
par.
(iii) Lastly, guests other than the above categories, also avail transit
facilities and placed in a different slab. ”
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27. Yet another affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent/HUDCO
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on 25 July 2013 clarifying the stand taken by the respondent in its earlier
affidavit.
“ In order to explain the correct situation, a team of Senior Officers of
HUDCO visited the office of Joint Assessor & Collector(GRP), SDMC in
which it was suggested that an Additional Affidavit may be submitted
depicting the position regarding Para-3(iii) of Affidavit (i.e.
guests/officials other than I & ii) submitted on 26.4.13.
Accordingly, it is clarified that guests/officials other than I & ii in Para-3
(iii) of said Affidavit includes official from Municipal
Corporations/Bodies of States, HUDCO’s Borrowing Agencies like
Housing Boards & Development Authorities, Faculties of Training
Institutes, Researchers, Consultants and participants of different
Training Programmes organized by HUDCO. Outsiders are not allowed
in the Hostel/transit accommodation.
It is also clarified that Flat No.241 to 246 are being used for the
residence of HUDCO’s Senior Officers/Ministry’s officials and Flat
No.205 to 246 are being used for Hostel/transit accommodation . ”
[Emphasis supplied.]
28. In the aforesaid additional affidavit, a categorical statement has been
made on behalf of the respondent/HUDCO that outsiders are not allowed in
the hostel/ transit accommodation. The subject flats are only meant for the
stay of personnel for official purposes.
29. Despite the stand taken in the aforesaid affidavits, the impugned
Assessment Order held that the subject flats would be subject to UF-4. To
arrive at this conclusion, reliance is placed on the office orders issued by the
respondent/HUDCO providing for differential room rates for different
categories of officials.
30. MTT carefully analysed the contents of the aforesaid affidavits and
held that the subject flats have been used as transit hostel accommodation
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for employees who visit Delhi from different places on official work. The
findings of the Tribunal in this regard are set out below:
“13. The material on record makes it abundantly clear that the ‘subject
property’ is being used by the appellant towards achieving /realizing its
objectives. Six flats bearing No. 241 to 246 are being exclusively used for
residential purposes of the senior officers of the appellant and/or
officials of the Ministry of Urban Development. The flats bearing No. 205
to 216 are being used for hostel ‘for training’ and include officers
officials from Municipal Corporations/ Bodies of states, appellant’s
borrowing agencies like Housing Board and Development Authorities,
faculties of Training Institutes, Researchers, Consultants and
participants of different training programmes organized by HUDCO.
The fee charged is nominal and the same is evident from the
documents placed on record by the appellant.
14. The Assessing Authority ignored the facts that the ‘sub property’ is
being used by the officers/ officials of the government bodies, training
institutes, etc.
The participants, generally, are the government employees/. Officials
but include persons from private companies and other bodies also. The
faculties include experts from different fields and such experts need not
be government officials only. It is for this reason that there is a slab for
persons/ occupants who are not from Ministries/ government bodies. But,
admittedly, such persons who come from other than government sector
are very few. The Assessing Authority failed to appreciate the true import
of the usage of the ‘subject property’. Merely because there are different
slabs for the persons visiting the property from non-government bodies,
does not imply that any ‘commercial activity’ is being carried on at the
‘subject property’. The conclusion drawn by the Assessing Authority
goes to the extent of absurdity. It is not that the Assessing Authority
would be unaware of the true nature of the usage of the ‘subject
property’. It appears that an incorrect conclusion has been drawn just to
raise revenue for the respondent. On the face of it, the conclusion that
the ‘subject property’ is being put to ‘commercial use’ by the Appellant
for making profit, is patently erroneous and does not survive in the eyes
of law.
15. The record reveals that the appellant charge Rs.100/- per day per
room (single occupancy) and Rs.200/- per day per room (double
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occupancy) from HUDCO officials, Ministry officials of HUPA and other
shareholding Ministries. The appellant charge R.400/- per day per room
(single occupancy) and Rs.600/- per day per room (double occupancy)
for guests of Ministry of HUPA and HUDCO (in connection with
business development/ office work-ex-employees of HUDCO) and for
other categories Rs.1000/- per day per room (single occupancy),
Rs.1500/- per day per room (double occupancy). Other non-government/
private guests houses in the same locality charge much higher tariff
than the tariff being charged by the appellant.
The said affidavits reveal that each of the flats (flats bearing No. 241 to
246) is being used exclusively for residential purpose. The Assessing
Authority has failed to explain/ assign any reason as to how it drew the
inference that the ‘subject property’ is being used for ‘business’. It is
evident that the Assessing Authority has not passed a speaking order.
There has been a total non-application of mind and it is also apparent
that while rejecting the plea of the Appellant, the Assessing Authority
has not considered the purpose for which the property in question has
been constructed and put to use. The appellant’s case is squarely
covered under the term ‘public purpose’ as defined under Bye Law (9)
of the DMC (Property-Taxes) Bye Laws, 2004. ”
[Emphasis supplied.]
31. MTT has correctly recorded that the occupants of the subject flats
would generally be government employees and in some cases, could be
experts who need not be government officials. Therefore, there is a separate
tariff rate for such occupants who are not government officials. MTT also
records that the tariff charges are nominal and much less than other
properties in the neighbourhood. MTT has correctly held that merely
because there are different slab rates for the persons visiting the subject flats
does not imply that the subject flats are being used for commercial purposes
or for making profit.
32. Pertinently, the assessment proceeds only on the basis of the ‘office
order’ issued by the respondent/HUDCO providing differential tariff rates,
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without any data with regard to the actual occupants of the subject flats.
There was no independent material with the petitioner/MCD to show that the
subject flats were rented out for commercial purposes. There is no analysis
also to the fact whether the tariffs mentioned in the office order are
commercial rates when compared to other comparable accommodation
available in the area.
33. The reliance placed by the petitioner/MCD on Mafatlal Industries
(supra) is misplaced. In the said case, Mafatlal Industries maintained guest
houses in Bombay for temporary occupation by their employees and the
controversy before the Supreme Court arose from the classification of such
premises under the tariff prescribed under the Bombay Electricity Duty Act,
1958. The question before the Supreme Court was whether such guest
houses would fall within Category ‘R’, which was specifically applicable to
premises “exclusively used as a private residential premises”, or whether
they would fall under the residuary Category ‘C’. The Supreme Court, on an
interpretation of the expression occurring in the said tariff, held that a
company-maintained guest house, used for transient occupation, could not
be regarded as a private residential premises and that the test of profit-
making was irrelevant.
34. The said judgment arose in the context of the classification of
premises under the tariff provisions of the Bombay Electricity Duty Act,
1958, where the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of the
expression “exclusively used as a private residential premises”. The question
was thus one of statutory classification under an entirely different statutory
scheme.
35. In light of the discussion above, this Court does not find any infirmity
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in the impugned order of the Tribunal setting aside the Assessment Order
and holding that the UF-1 would be applicable to the subject flats.
ISSUE (ii)
36. To adjudicate the said issue, it may be relevant to refer to relevant
provisions of the DMC Act, i.e. Sections 123B (10) and 123D, which are set
out below:
“ 123B. Self-assessment and submission of return
(10) Where no notice is sent by the Commissioner under section 123C
within twelve months after the year to which such self-assessment
relates , such self- assessment shall be regarded as assessment made
under this Act:
Provided that in any case, where there has been wilful suppression of
facts, penalty upto thirty per cent of the tax due may be imposed:
Provided further that the procedure for sending of notice, hearing of
objection and determination of tax and penalties shall be such as may be
specified in the bye-laws.
….
123D: Power of Commissioner regarding assessment
…
(c) reopen any assessment even after the period of one year in any case
where it has been detected that there is wilful suppression of
information ; and
(d) in The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (d) impose a penalty
not exceeding thirty per cent. of the difference in tax arising from non-
filing of a return in time, giving wrong information or wilful suppression
of facts. ”
[Emphasis supplied]
37. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions demonstrates that in the normal
course MCD can reopen assessments for a period of 12 months from the
year to which the self-assessment relates. It is only when there is wilful
suppression of information that the MCD can reopen assessments beyond
the period of 12 months.
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38. A Division Bench of this Court in Springdales School (supra)
quashed the show-cause notice seeking to reopen assessment on the ground
that the notice did not provide the basic or essential ingredients provided
under Section 123D of the DMC Act to reopen the assessment. The relevant
observations of the Division Bench are set out below:
“ 15. In the present case, not only is the impugned notice (dated
23.01.2013) silent as to which period it relates to or for which
assessment year the Commissioner proposes to revisit completed
assessments [i.e. completed in respect of 123B(10)] but also is utterly
vague as to how there was any “wilful suppression” practiced by the
assessee. This Court, in K.L. Rathee v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
AIR 1995 Del 226 and Savitri Devi v. MCD 1994 (55) DLT 391, while
considering the pre-amended proviso to Section 126 which contained an
obligation on the part of the Commissioner to indicate reasons for
proposing change in the rateable value, has held that the notice should
be effective.
16. The expression "willful suppression" of information has to
necessarily relate to rateable or conscious omission on the part of the
assessee. In case where the Commissioner proposes to proceed under
Section 123D(b) and (c), as a precondition the notice has to necessarily
specify what is the incorrect information provided as well as the barest
reasons for such opinion and specific grounds for stating "willful
suppression" of information The use of the expression "willful
suppression", in our opinion, raises the bar and discloses a primary
intention to give effective notice as to what is to be answered by the
assessee. It is not mere omission or mistake that attracts issuance of a
notice under Section 123D which confers exceptional and even
draconian powers. The lack of any particulars of the kind enshrined in
either 123D(b) or 1230( c) in the facts itself vitiates the notice. On
similar lines, while interpreting the words "wilful" and "suppression" in
Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1994, the Supreme Court in
Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Chandigarh-I (2007) 10 SCC 337, held:
"10. The expression "suppression" has been used in the proviso to
Section 11A of the Act accompanied by very strong words as 'fraud' or
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'collusion' and, therefore, has to be construed strictly. Mere omission to
give correct information is not suppression of facts unless it was
deliberate to stop the payment of duty. Suppression means failure to
disclose full information with the intent to evade payment of duty. When
the facts are known to both the parties, omission by one party to do
what he might have done would not render it suppression. When the
Revenue invokes the extended period of limitation under Section 11A
the burden is cast upon it to prove suppression of fact. An incorrect
statement cannot be equated with a willful misstatement. The latter
implies making of an incorrect statement with the knowledge that the
statement was not correct."”
[Emphasis supplied.]
39. The aforesaid judgment was followed by a Division Bench of this
Court in Seth Pokharmal Educational Society (supra) wherein it was held
that MCD could not have revised the rateable value retrospectively with
effect from 2004 in the year 2011.
40. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of the
present case, it is an undisputed fact that the respondent/HUDCO has been
filing PTRs from the assessment year 2004-05 onwards, claiming UF-1 and
paying property tax in a timely manner. Clearly, there was no suppression of
information by the assessee, i.e. the respondent/HUDCO.
41. The show cause notice seeking to reopen the assessment was issued
nd
by the petitioner/MCD only on 2 July 2013. MCD did not question or raise
doubts about the property tax returns for a period of more than eight (8)
years. It is noteworthy that the said show cause notice does not allege any
wilful suppression.
42. Accordingly, it is held that the action of the petitioner/MCD in
reopening assessment for the period 2004-05 to 2011-12 is manifestly
arbitrary and illegal.
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43. Resultantly, both the issues are decided in favour of the
respondent/HUDCO and against the petitioner/MCD.
44. In light of the aforesaid discussion, no grounds for interference with
the order passed by the Tribunal are made out in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
45. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
46. Pending application stands disposed of.
AMIT BANSAL
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
Rzu
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