ACTIONCOR CONSULTANTS PRIVATE LIMITED vs ALYOTECH SAS

Court
Karnataka High Court

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 6 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL

COM.S NO.6 OF 2022

BETWEEN:

ACTIONCOR CONSULTANTS PRIVATE LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT 41,
POORVI MARG, VASANTH VIHAR, NEW DELHI,
REPRESENTED BY MR.K.K.MORADIAN, DIRECTOR.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SHREYAS JAYASIMHA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

ALYOTECH SAS
HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL OFFICE AT 8,
RUE VOLNEY-75002, PARIS, FRANCE.

…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. ACHAL ANAND V.J., ADVOCATE)

THIS COMMERCIAL SUIT/PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 34 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT,
1996, (A) CALL FOR THE RECORDS ON THE FILE OF THE
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY THE PARTIES IN
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE SHARE PURCHASE
AGREEMENT DATED 15 DECEMBER 2010 IN THE MATTER OF
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN AND; (B) SET ASIDE THE AWARD DATED 25 APRIL
2017 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A ABOVE FOR THE REASONS
AND GROUNDS STATED ABOVE AND ETC.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
18.08.2026 FOR ORDER COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL



















Digitally
signed by
SAROJA
HANGARAKI
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad
Bench

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


CAV ORDER

1. This Commercial Suit/Petition is filed under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act, 1996') by the claimant-petitioner
herein, aggrieved by the award dated 25.04.2017 passed
by the sole Arbitrator, in terms of which the claim made by
the petitioner as well as the counterclaim made by the
respondent herein have been dismissed.

2. Brief facts of the case are:

2.1 That the petitioner, a company registered under the
Companies Act, 1956, with its office at New Delhi, is
engaged in the business of providing consultancy services
to companies in the areas of design, engineering,
information technology products and energy infrastructure.
One K.K.Moradian (KKM), an expert in recognizing areas of
synergy and in implementing outsourcing work, is the
Director responsible for the management of the petitioner
company.

2.2 The respondent is a company incorporated under the laws
of France engaged in the business of providing high-

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

technology consulting to companies engaged in the
telecom, aerospace, defence, auto, retail, rail, health,
banking, insurance, energy and nuclear sectors. It has its
business establishments in France, Canada, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Lebanon and Morocco.

2.3 In the year 2008, the respondent was intending to expand
its business in India. That after prolong discussions,
deliberation on the investment, attainable growth and
mutual obligations, including requirement of Indian
investment, between KKM to Mr.Carlos Bedran, the then
chairman of the respondent company, a consulting
agreement dated 31.03.2009 was entered into between
one Univerve, KKM's consultancy firm, and the respondent.
In terms of the said agreement, Univerve was appointed
as the respondent's consultant. Univerve was to render its
expertise in corporate financial advisory services and
provide collaborative contracts that would eventually lead
to an investment in the respondent company.

2.4 A Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) and a strategic plan
were shared. According to the strategic plan, the

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respondent projected its growth from a 110-million-euro
entity to a 464-million-euro entity in 3 years.

2.5 KKM informed Mr.Bedran of a company known as
Winfoware Technologies Ltd. (WTL), with a strong profile in
the telecommunications sector that also had 30% of the
respondent's business, was a good prospect for a potential
investment in India, which after deliberations agreed to be
a target company.

2.6 Once WTL had been finalized as a target company,
discussions and negotiations began with the promoters of
WTL for investment by the respondent and the petitioner
around November 2009. At that time when WTL was
identified as a target company, two simulation models
were prepared in order to assess the potential business
prospects. The model assumed that there would be Euro
2,600,000 worth of work sent by the respondent to WTL in
the first year and Euro 5,500,000 worth of work in the
second year. The minimum amount of work valued in
Euros that was required to make the project successful
was Euro 1,500,000 in the first year and Euro 3,000,000 in
the second year. Both the models also included Euro

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

225,000 for the training of WTL employees for High Value
Projects, which was to be budgeted and provided by the
respondent. The said simulation models constituted a
reasonable expectation that the petitioner had at the time
of investment of funds in WTL. KKM had sent a summary
of the skill set to the employees of WTL and to Mr. Bedran,
as he had shown interest in the respondent partnering with
WTL, in order to gain approval of the same.

2.7 Mr.Bedran had suggested KKM to be the chairman of WTL.
The respondent, and the petitioner jointly invested EUR
700,000 for the purchase of shares and the infusion of
funds into the company to acquire jointly approximately
70% of WTL’s shares. Thus, the investment in WTL was
valued at approximately Euro 1,000,000, including a future
infusion of capital in WTL of over Euro 400,000. Due to the
respondent's unwillingness to invest more than Euro
200,000, the petitioner was persuaded, based on the
respondent's representation that he would be bought out
at a higher value at a later date, to invest an amount of
Euro
300,000. While the promoter of WTL, Mr. Srikumar
Narayan, and Mr. Shantakumar Varambally were willing to
keep a 30% shareholding that was valued at

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approximately Euro 300,000, there was a shortfall of
approximately Euro 200,000, and in order to plug this
shortfall of funds, Kaynes Technology India Pvt. Ltd. was
brought in as an investor in WTL. Kaynes was selected
because it had experience in manufacturing electronic
systems for a few French companies and therefore would
have been in a better position to contribute to WTL's
growth.

2.8 The aforesaid discussions and negotiations culminated in
execution of a Share Purchase Agreement and
Shareholders Agreement in Paris on 15.12.2010. The said
agreements were entered into between the petitioner, the
respondent, the promoters of WTL and representatives of
Kaynes. Share Purchase Agreement and Shareholders'
Agreement dated 15.12.2010 provided the shareholding
patterns. Clause 5.5 of the Shareholders' Agreement gives
the respondent the exclusive right to purchase 31% of the
petitioner's shareholdings, thereby taking its own
shareholding in WTL to 51%. This option to have its share
holding purchased by the respondent was granted
exclusively to the petitioner. Thus indicating the intention
of both the petitioner and the respondent that the

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respondent would be investing in WTL as a fully functional
subsidiary. Considering the requirement of finding a
suitable target company, Univerve was given a success fee
of EURO 25,000, which also indicates the respondent's
intention to use KKM's services to find an Indian
subsidiary.

2.9 A press release was issued subsequent to execution of the
Shareholders’ Agreement and Share Purchase Agreement
by the respondent and the petitioner, along with a video
message from Mr. Bedran to the employees of WTL, which
assured them of the respondent’s long-term interest in
India.

2.10 Subsequent to the execution of Share Holders Agreement
and the Share Purchase Agreement, there has been a
complete breach by the respondent of its obligations under
the Share Holders Agreement. Respondent made no efforts
to contact any of its clients in France or Canada for
offshore work. No sales meeting was held. Respondent
failed to introduce any of the employees of WTL to its
clients for the purpose of securing offshore work,
especially in telecom, banking and retail, which constitute

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60% of the business of the respondent and required no
training. The breaches committed by the respondent are
as under:

(a) Respondent had conveyed that it would contact
only three clients, namely Airbus, Thales, and
Safran, all of whom were carrying on business in
only one field, aerospace, and only in France, and
that too without any employee of WTL present.
The aerospace sector constituted only 18% of the
respondent's sales. No attempts were made by
the respondent in telecom, banking, insurance,
retail, energy and nuclear, naval, rail, public
administration, and health, etc.

(b) No efforts were made in Canada or any other
country to outsource the work to WTL in India. No
efforts were made to contact customers who could
have offloaded high-volume work to WTL in India.

(c) Respondent failed to make any serious efforts in
the main sector where WTL had the requisite
skills, i.e., the telecom sector. No representatives
from WTL were invited or included in any
meetings or discussions with any clients in
Canada or France, where major banking and
telecom operations existed, that could have
resulted in outsourced or any other work for WTL.

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This amounted to a breach of Article 3.4 of the
Shareholders' Agreement.

(d) Respondent failed to pursue any project with WTL
in India. It refused to train even a single
employee of WTL. WTL was unable to benefit from
the respondent's name, reputation, skills, and
experience and therefore, without training and
experience, WTL was unable to pursue high-value
projects in India independently.

(e) No meetings were held in India, and no work
was done with the respondent for procuring jobs or
projects either for itself or for WTL, which
amounted to a breach of Article 3.3 of the
Shareholders' Agreement.

(f) Respondent, still being a shareholder of WTL,
separated out the Canadian operation in April 2013
during the lock-in period, which constituted 40% of
the respondent's business focused on the telecom
and banking sectors. WTL was not informed of this
and only became aware of the sale/separation in
November 2013. Petitioner became aware of the
sale of Alyotech Group in 2013 with the hope that
the new buyer would focus on offshore work and
further create and exploit synergies with WTL.
Petitioner was never told that the respondent
would consider the sale of its business in a
piecemeal manner. Petitioner was not aware that

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the subsidiaries of the respondent were to be sold
in isolation and in breach of the shareholders'
agreement.

(g) Respondent altogether failed to explain and
clarify the reason for not extending exclusivity
under clause 12.4 of the Shareholders' Agreement
to the new buyers/purchasers.

(h) When nearly 40% of the Canadian business was
sold, the exclusivity that the petitioner had for the
country was not transferred to the new company.
Thus, petitioner lost the potential of over 50% of
the business that would have come from Canadian
operations, which were heavily concentrated in
banking and telecommunications and involved
English-speaking clients.

(i) Neither any brand nor any trademark of the
respondent was ever licensed to WTL. There was
no agreement for licensing the intellectual property
of the respondent, which amounted to a breach of
Article 3.5 of the shareholders' agreement.

(j) Respondent failed and neglected to submit its
nomination to be represented on the board of
directors of WTL, which amounted to a breach of
Clauses 6, 7 and 8 of the shareholders' agreement.
Respondent never attended any Annual General
Meeting of WTL nor any WTL Board of Directors
meeting held in India, nor did it appoint any proxy

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to attend these meetings. There ought to have
been 3 nominees out of 5 for the 51% share held
jointly by the petitioner and the respondent. As the
respondent did not appoint its nominee, the
petitioner did not have control over the board and
was thus ineffective as non-executive Chairman.

(k) Contrary to the understanding before the
shareholders' agreement was executed, the
respondent was to depute someone for three
months upon execution of the agreement. No one
was sent for the said duration. Thus, no work from
India was effectuated.

3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid acts and omissions of the
respondent, and in an attempt to resolve the dispute and
differences amicably, the petitioner addressed a letter
dated 26.08.2013 to the Chairman of the respondent.
Respondent unreasonably denied and dismissed the issue
raised by the petitioner and did not come forward to
address the concerns of the petitioner. The petitioner was
therefore compelled to initiate arbitration pursuant to
Clause 14 read with Annexure-B of the shareholders'
agreement on 12.12.2013. Respondent accepted the
notice for arbitration through a reply dated 23.12.2013.
Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator was appointed to

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adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties in which
the petitioner had sought the following reliefs:
a. to pay a sum of Euros 300,000 to the claimant along with
interest at the rate of 15% per annum from 15.12.2010 till
the date of actual payment by the respondent;
b. pay a sum of Euros 75,000 as compensation to the
claimant for loss of opportunity to earn dividends from
Winfoware Technologies Private Limited;
c. pay a sum of Euros 300,000 to the claimant as
compensation for giving up exclusivity of its relationship
with the Respondent in the Canadian operations and the
telecom sector;
d. pay a sum of Euros 600,000 to the claimant as
compensation for 300 man-days of time spent by Mr. K. K.
Moradian's, time spent on behalf of the claimant for making
efforts to ensure that WTL becomes a successful and
commercial venture, efforts to mitigate the losses suffered
by WTL and for opportunity lost on the amount invested by
the Claimant in WTL;
e. pay some of Euros 22,000 as reimbursement of expenses
incurred by claimant in working for the profitability of WTL.
f. pay costs of the proceedings to the petitioner;
g. pay interest of 15% per annum on the above mentioned
claims from 15.12.2010 till the date of actual payment
responded.

4. The respondent had also sought a counterclaim as under:
a. pay a sum of Euros 300,000 to the respondent as
claimed in para 10A of the respondent's statement of
defence;
b. pay a sum of Euros 260,78 to the respondent as claimed
in para 10B of the respondent's statement of defence;
c. pay a sum of Euros 548,292 at the rate of interest 15%
per annum to the respondent as claimed in para 10C of the
respondent's statement of defence;

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4.1 The aforesaid claim petition and the counterclaim have
been dismissed by the Sole Arbitrator by the impugned
Award dated 25.04.2017, being aggrieved by which the
petitioner is before this Court.
SUBMISSIONS:-

5. Sri.Shreyas Jayasimha, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner reiterating the averments and grounds urged in
the petition and additional grounds urged by way of
amendment (in terms of I.A.1/2022 filed under Order VI
Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure), and, taking this Court
extensively through the records the parties submitted;

5.1 That the award passed is in violation of agreed arbitral
procedure. There was a delay in passing the award, which
warrants setting aside. Firstly, the parties had agreed that
the entire duration of the proceedings shall not exceed six
months from the date of reference and that the parties
would strictly adhere to this timeline. Secondly, the
arbitrator was required to deliver the award within 30 days
of the conclusion of the proceedings. In the instant case,
the statement of claim, the statement of defence, and the
counterclaim were submitted in the year 2014. The award
was rendered three years later, i.e., on 25.04.2017, which

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is in violation of the arbitration procedure agreed upon by
the parties and in violation of Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the
Act, 1996. No reasons are assigned by the Tribunal for
deviation from the agreed arbitral procedure.

5.2 The award violates the mandatory obligation to give
reasons. The decision was not based on the legal basis
required by the agreement between the parties. It denied
the petitioner its right to have its evidence mindfully
considered, given that Section 31(3)(a) of the Act, 1996,
provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall state the reasons
upon which it is based unless the parties have agreed that
no reasons are required to be given. The parties have not
agreed at any stage that no reasons were to be given in
the award. As such, the Arbitral Tribunal was under an
unqualified and mandatory statutory obligation to set out
the reasons for every finding made. Thus, the arbitral
award fails on multiple accounts. The right to a full
opportunity to present one's case requires mindful
consideration of the evidence and submissions put forth. A
Tribunal that receives evidence but fails to consider it, and
receives submissions but declines to address them, fails to
provide an opportunity to present the case.

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5.3 The award conflicts with the fundamental policy of Indian
law. The impugned award did not take notice of the
judgments produced before the arbitrator, including Jai
Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, reported in
(2006) 7 SCC 756, and Rhodia International Holdings
Limited & Anr v. Huntsman International, reported in
[2007] EWCA Civ 62 , which have held that the best-effort
clause places a party in a more onerous position than the
reasonable-efforts clause. The decision of the Apex Court
forming a part of the fundamental policy of Indian law has
been neglected by the Arbitral Tribunal, which has applied
a standard of reasonableness and adequacy without
applying the best-efforts clause. The Tribunal has failed to
appreciate that in terms of clause 3.3, the respondent was
required to contribute by way of providing its name,
reputation, training, skill and expertise and making
available skilled manpower to India on a specific billable
basis for project assignment.

5.4 That, in terms of clause 3.4, it was required to make best
efforts to refer and outsource the subcontract jobs and
assignments for the company. Clause 3.4 has not been
appreciated by the Arbitral Tribunal. Firstly, the Tribunal

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was required to see whether the respondent had
exhausted all the avenues to refer its existing clients to
WTL. Secondly, it was required to see whether it had
exhausted all avenues in trying to outsource subcontract
jobs and assignments to retailers from the existing clients.
Thirdly, it was required to see whether, in case projects
were won or even otherwise, in the respondent's opinion,
training was necessary; whether the respondent made any
efforts to ensure that WTL was in a viable position,
manpower-wise, to execute potential offshore work.

5.5 The Arbitrator failed to consider that the respondent neither
took any initiative with respect to acquiring projects for
WTL nor provided any on-the-job training to any WTL
employees. No efforts were made by the respondent to
outsource work to India from its existing clients. No efforts
were made to obtain orders from telecom, banking, retail,
and other sources. No efforts were made to send the
respondent's personnel to India to meet the customers.

5.6 The Arbitrator erred in holding that the obligation to train
the Indian consultant in France was at the discretion of the
respondent. The impugned award failed to acknowledge

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the intent of the parties when they entered into the
shareholders' agreement, i.e., KKM to facilitate the
respondent's operations in India. The respondent received
the benefits of establishing its presence in India without
deploying its own resources. The respondent made no
efforts to bring business to the petitioner.

5.7 The Arbitrator has not properly applied the provisions of
Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Once a breach
is established, Section 73 entitles the aggrieved party to
compensation for all the losses and damages that naturally
arise from the breach. Entitlement to compensation arises
independently of Section 73 of the Contract Act. The
respondent acknowledged and benefited from KKM's work
and paid a success fee of EUR 25,000 for finding a suitable
target company, which established the respondent's intent
to use and pay for KKM's services. Yet the respondent
refused to compensate for the greater time and effort
expended after the Shareholders' Agreement was
executed. The impugned award contravenes the
fundamental policy of Indian law and is in conflict with the
most basic notions of justice.

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5.8 Complete failure to address the breach of Articles 3.5, 6.2,
7, 8, and 5.3, providing for a breach in the sale of the
Canadian operation. The sale of the Canadian operation
was without any information being provided to the
petitioner. The purpose of Article 5.3 was to ensure that all
parties remained committed to the joint ventures during
the given period of the commercial model. Article 12.4 of
the Shareholders' Agreement required the respondent, in
the event of a change of control, to ensure that the
acquiring party assumed all the obligations of the
respondent under the Shareholders' Agreement, including
the exclusivity obligations under Clauses 4.1 and 4.2,
which have been breached.

5.9 The arbitral award wrongly found that there was no privity
of contract between the petitioner, WTL, and Alyotech
Canada, which finding materially contradicts the express
terms of Article 1.2 of shareholders' agreement. The
respondent also sold its telecom business without
extending the exclusive obligation to the new buyer. This
was a separate breach from the sale of the Canadian
operation. The Arbitral Tribunal has not determined this
issue.

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5.10 The Arbitral Tribunal also has not addressed the specific
agreement which provided that the salespersons and the
respondent would come to India for three months upon
execution of the shareholders' agreement to meet the
potential customers. This issue has remained
unadjudicated.

5.11 The arbitration award also erroneously concluded that
KKM's awareness of the respondent's current limitation
constituted an effective waiver of the respondent's
contractual obligation. Such a finding is contrary to the
evidence on record. The same constitutes a contravention
to fundamental policy of Indian law.

5.12 The respondent has claimed compensation for time spent
by its employees on business development activities. But
there is no finding on whether the expenses were actually
incurred by WTL under the separate MOU. This goes
directly to the question of the respondent's bona fides in
asserting that it made its best efforts. The failure of the
Arbitral Tribunal to examine and resolve this material
factual dispute amounts to a failure of its fundamental

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adjudicatory obligation to determine the issues of fact and
law before the Tribunal.

5.13 The shareholders' agreement is in the nature of a joint
venture. Failure of the Arbitral Tribunal to recognize this
has distorted its entire analysis. Contending as above,
sought for allowing of the petition.

5.14 He relies upon the following judgments:
1. PSA SICAL TERMINALS (P) LTD., V. V.O.
CHIDAMBRANAR PORT TRUST, (2023) 15 SCC 781.
2. SSANGYONG ENGINEERING V. NHAI R(2019) 15 SCC
131
3. SEPCO ELETRIC POWER CONSTRUCTION V. GMR
KAMALANGA ENERGY 2025 INSC 1171.
4. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) VS. JAIN ASSOCIATES AND
ORS., MANU/SC/0752/1994.
5. SIKKIM SUBBA ASSOCIATES V. STATE OF SIKKIM,
(2001) 5 SCC 629.
6. ONGC LTD., V. WESTERN GECO INTERNATIONAL
LTD., (2014) 9 SCC 263.
7. NATWARALAL SHAMALDAS AND CO. VS. MINERALS
AND METALS TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA
MANU/DE/0572/2002.
8. M.D., ARMY WELFARE HOUSING ORGANIZATION VS.
SUMANGALSERVICES PVT., LTD.,
MANU/SC80797/2003.

9. DELHI AIRPORT EXPRESS VS. DMRC (2022) 1 SCC
131.
10. ONGC GARWARE V. SHIPPING CORPORATION (2007)
13 SCC 434.

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11. STATE OF RAJSTHAN VS. PURI CONSTRUCTION
(1994) 6 SCC 485.
12. GAYATRI BALASAMY V. M/S ISG NOVASOFT
TECHNOLOGIES LTD., S.L.P (C) NOS.15336-15337 OF
2021.


6. Per contra, Sri Udaya Holla, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondent, submitted:

6.1 That the relief sought by the petitioner in the claim
petition is without any basis. That the present petition
being one under Section 34, the scope of intervention by
the Courts is very limited. The insistence of the claimant
on re-appreciation of the evidence is not permissible.

6.2 Referring to the Shareholders Agreement dated
15.12.2010 he submitted that the said agreement is
between five different parties, of which the petitioner is
the majority shareholder. He referred to Clause 5.5 of
the Shareholders' Agreement, providing for final
shareholding, and submitted that the petitioner's
consortium holds 31.03% of the shares while the
respondent Alyotech holds only 19.98%. He also referred
to Clause 6.2 of the Shareholders' Agreement, providing
for the management and constitution of the Board of

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Directors, to contend that the entire control and
management of the company was with the petitioner.

6.3 He then referred to paragraph 15 of the claim petition
and submitted that, even according to the claimant, it
was only willing to invest a maximum amount of EUR
300,000, and the respondent was willing to invest a
maximum amount of EUR 200,000. The petitioner, who is
claiming an award for payment of EUR 300,000 along
with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from
15.02.2010, is required to prove the actual investment
made by it. No evidence of any nature whatsoever in this
regard is produced by the petitioner to show that such an
amount was invested. In the absence of any proof of
investment, the very basis of the claim is unjustified.
Therefore, he submits that the very claim petition lodged
by the Petitioner is speculative and imaginative.

6.4 That shareholders' agreement essentially provided for
purchase of shares of a company by name Winfoware
Technologies Ltd., obligations and undertakings, if any,
were only towards and in respect of the said WTL. The
said company has not been made a party to the
arbitration proceedings.

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6.5 He referred to clauses 3.3 and 3.4 of the agreement to
contend that the respondent ad litem was required to
make its best efforts to refer and outsource the
subcontracted jobs and assignments for the company for
its existing clients. An evidence of the efforts so made by
the respondent- Alyotech SAS company has been brought
on record, which has been duly appreciated by the
Arbitrator.

6.6 He referred to clause 4 of the shareholders' agreement
providing for a territory/non-compete provision to submit
that it was WTL company that had been vested with a
right of refusal in the event of Alyotech making over its
projects, providing manpower, etc. Therefore, he
submitted that the presence of Alyotech and the
presence of WTL were essential.

6.7 He referred to the points for determination framed by the
arbitrator and the reasons assigned in the impugned
award to contend that each and every issue that was
raised had been addressed by the Arbitral Tribunal.
Hence sought for dismissal of the petition.

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6.8 He relies upon the following judgments in support of his
submissions:
1. “SANTA SILA DEVI AND ANOTHER VS. DHIRENDRA
NATH SEN AND OTHERS AIR 1963 SC 1677.

2. SATNA STONE AND LIME COMPANY LIMITED MADHYA
PRADESH AND OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA AND
ANOTHER (2008) 14 SCC 785.
3. P.R. SHAH SHARES AND STOCK BROKERS PRIVATE
LIMITED (2012) 1 SCC 594
4. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION VS. WIG
BROTHERS BUILDERS AND ENGINEERS PRIVATE
LIMITED (2010) 13 SCC 377
5. SHARMA AND ASSOCIATES CONTRACTORS PRIVATE
LIMITED VS. PROGRESSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS
LIMITED (2017) 5 SCC 743
6. DYNA TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED VS.
CROMPTON GREAVES LIMITED (2019) 20 SCC 1
7. STATE OF RAJASTHAN VS. PURI CONSTRUCTION CO
LID., AND ANOTHER (1994) 6 SCC 485
8. SHARMA AND ASSOCIATES CONTRACTORS PRIVATE
LIMITED VS. PROGRESSIVE CONTRACTIONS LIMITED
(2017) 5 SCC 743
9. RAVINDRA KUMAR GUPTA AND COMPANY VS. UNION
OF INDIA 2010(1)SCC 409
10. MMTC LIMITED VS. VEDANTA LIMITED 2019 (4) SCC
163
11. RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LIMITED VS. DEWAN
CHAND RAM SARAN 2012 (5) SCC 306
12. NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA VS. ITD
CEMENTATION INDIA LIMITED 2015(14)SCC 21.
13. SWAN GOLD MINING LIMITED VS. HINDUSTAN
COPPER LIMITED 2015(5) SCC 739

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

14. HRD CORPORATION (MARCUS OIL AND CHEMICAL
DIVISION) VS. GAIL (INDIA) LIMITED (FORMERLY AS
AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED) 2018(12) SCC 471
15. ATLANTA LIMITED THROUGH ITS MANAGING
DIRECTOR VS. UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY
CHIEF ENGINEER MILITARY ENGINEERING SERVICE
2022(3) SCC 739
16. DELHI AIRPORT METRO EXPRESS PRIVATE LIMITED
VS. DELHI METRO RAIL CORPORATION LIMITED 2022
(1) SCC 131
17. RELIANCE INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED VS. STATE OF
GOA 2024(1) SCC 479
18. PROJECT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAYS NO.45 E
AND 220 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
VS. M. HAKEEM AND ANOTHER (2021) 9
SCC 1
19. GAYATRI BALASAMY VS. ISG NOVASOFT
TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 986”.


7. Heard and perused the records.
POSITION OF LAW ON THE SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE WITH
THE AWARD UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE ACT, 1996

8. Before adverting to the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties, it is appropriate to refer to
the position of law governing consideration of an
application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

9. In the case of Reliance Infrastructure Limited Vs State
1
of Goa dealing with the scope of challenge to an award

1
(2024) 1 SCC 479

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

under Section 34 and the scope of appeal under Section
37, referring to its earlier judgments on the issue and
summarizing the principles in paragraphs 25 to 31, has
held as under:
The scope of challenge to an arbitral award under
Section 34 and the scope of appeal under Section 37 of
the Act
25. Having regard to the contentions urged and the
issues raised, it shall also be apposite to take note of the
principles enunciated by this Court in some of the relevant
decisions cited by the parties on the scope of challenge to an
arbitral award under Section 34 and the scope of appeal
under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.
26. In MMTC MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC
163, this Court took note of various decisions including that
in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 and exposited
on the limited scope of interference under Section 34 and
further narrower scope of appeal under Section 37 of the
1996 Act, particularly when dealing with the concurrent
findings (of the arbitrator and then of the Court). This Court,
inter alia, held as under : MMTC case, paras 11-14)
“11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is
well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over
the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited
ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award
is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position
clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the
amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian
public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental
policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India,
conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent
illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of
the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover
compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a
judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural
justice, and Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture
Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]
reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has
been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of
India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of
the terms of the contract.
12. It is only if one of these conditions is met that the
Court may interfere with an arbitral award in terms of
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), but such interference does not entail a
review of the merits of the dispute, and is limited to
situations where the findings of the arbitrator are arbitrary,
capricious or perverse, or when the conscience of the Court

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

is shocked, or when the illegality is not trivial but goes to the
root of the matter. An arbitral award may not be interfered
with if the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible view
based on facts.
13. It is relevant to note that after the 2015 Amendment
to Section 34, the above position stands somewhat modified.
Pursuant to the insertion of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2),
the scope of contravention of Indian public policy has been
modified to the extent that it now means fraud or corruption
in the making of the award, violation of Section 75 or
Section 81 of the Act, contravention of the fundamental
policy of Indian law, and conflict with the most basic notions
of justice or morality. Additionally, sub-section (2-A) has
been inserted in Section 34, which provides that in case of
domestic arbitrations, violation of Indian public policy also
includes patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.
The proviso to the same states that an award shall not be
set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application
of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
14. As far as interference with an order made under
Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot
travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In
other words, the Court cannot undertake an independent
assessment of the merits of the award, and must only
ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under
Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.
Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been
confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the Court in
an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely
cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.”
27 . In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131 , this Court has set out the scope of
challenge under Section 34 of the 1996 Act in further details
in the following words:
“37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are
concerned, an additional ground is now available under
sub-section (2-A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015,
to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such
illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which
does not amount to mere erroneous application of the
law. In short, what is not subsumed within “the
fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely, the
contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or
public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor
when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground
of patent illegality.
38. Secondly, it is also made clear that reappreciation
of evidence, which is what an appellate court is
permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground
of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders ,
namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of
India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set
aside an arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders,
however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no
reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of
the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent
illegality on the face of the award.
40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras
42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders, namely, that the
construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an
arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the
contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable
person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not
even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator
wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not
allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This
ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground
added under Section 34(2-A).
41. What is important to note is that a decision which
is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of
Associate Builders, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly
amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an
award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its
decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on
the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding
based on documents taken behind the back of the
parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not
based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore,
would also have to be characterised as perverse.”
28 . The limited scope of challenge under Section 34 of
the Act was once again highlighted by this Court in PSA Sical
Terminals and this Court particularly explained the relevant
tests as under : (SCC paras 40 to 42)
“40. It will thus appear to be a more than settled legal
position, that in an application under Section 34, the Court is
not expected to act as an appellate court and reappreciate
the evidence. The scope of interference would be limited to
grounds provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
The interference would be so warranted when the award is in
violation of “public policy of India”, which has been held to
mean “the fundamental policy of Indian law”. A judicial
intervention on account of interfering on the merits of the
award would not be permissible. However, the principles of
natural justice as contained in Sections 18 and 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Arbitration Act would continue to be the grounds of
challenge of an award. The ground for interference on the
basis that the award is in conflict with justice or morality is
now to be understood as a conflict with the “most basic

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

notions of morality or justice”. It is only such arbitral awards
that shock the conscience of the Court, that can be set aside
on the said ground. An award would be set aside on the
ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award and as such, which goes to the roots of the matter.
However, an illegality with regard to a mere erroneous
application of law would not be a ground for interference.
Equally, reappreciation of evidence would not be permissible
on the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of
the award.
41. A decision which is perverse, though would not be a
ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would
certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face
of the award. However, a finding based on no evidence at all
or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its
decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the
ground of patent illegality.
42. To understand the test of perversity, it will also be
appropriate to refer to paras 31 and 32 from the judgment of
this Court in Associate Builders, which read thus : (SCC pp.
75-76)
‘31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is
perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person would
have arrived at the same is important and requires some
degree of explanation. It is settled law that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two
judgments. In CCE & Sales v. Gopi Nath & Sons:1992 Supp
(2) SCC 312 , it was held : (SCC p. 317, para 7)
“7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding
so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the
finding is rendered infirm in law.” ’ ”
29. In Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. v. DMRC,
(2022) 1 SCC 131, this Court again surveyed the case law
and explained the contours of the Courts' power to review
the arbitral awards. Therein, this Court not only reaffirmed
the principles aforesaid but also highlighted an area of
serious concern while pointing out “a disturbing tendency” of
the Courts in setting aside arbitral awards after dissecting
and reassessing factual aspects. This Court also underscored
the pertinent features and scope of the expression “patent
illegality” while reiterating that the Courts do not sit in
appeal over the arbitral award. The relevant and significant

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

passages of this judgment could be usefully extracted as
under, paras 26, 28-30 & 42)
“26. A cumulative reading of the U NCITRAL Model Law and
Rules, the legislative intent with which the 1996 Act is made,
Section 5 and Section 34 of the 1996 Act would make it clear
that judicial interference with the arbitral awards is limited to
the grounds in Section 34. While deciding applications filed
under Section 34 of the Act, Courts are mandated to strictly
act in accordance with and within the confines of Section 34,
refraining from appreciation or reappreciation of matters of
fact as well as law.
*
28. This Court has in several other judgments interpreted
Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be
shown by Courts while examining the validity of the arbitral
awards. The limited grounds available to Courts for
annulment of arbitral awards are well known to legally
trained minds. However, the difficulty arises in applying the
well-established principles for interference to the facts of
each case that come up before the Courts. There is a
disturbing tendency of Courts setting aside arbitral awards,
after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases
to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention
and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either
perversity or patent illegality, apart from the other grounds
available for annulment of the award. This approach would
lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the
endeavours made to preserve this object, which is minimal
judicial interference with arbitral awards. That apart, several
judicial pronouncements of this Court would become a dead
letter if arbitral awards are set aside by categorising them as
perverse or patently illegal without appreciating the contours
of the said expressions.
29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the
root of the matter. In other words, every error of law
committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the
expression “patent illegality”. Likewise, erroneous application
of law cannot be categorised as patent illegality. In addition,
contravention of law not linked to public policy or public
interest is beyond the scope of the expression “patent
illegality”. What is prohibited is for Courts to reappreciate
evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award, as Courts do
not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible
grounds for interference with a domestic award under
Section 34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when
the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one,
or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which
no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the
arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering
outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to
them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings
would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no
evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence
are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent
illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not
supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling
within the expression “patent illegality”.
30. Section 34(2)(b) refers to the other grounds on
which a court can set aside an arbitral award. If a dispute
which is not capable of settlement by arbitration is the
subject-matter of the award or if the award is in conflict with
public policy of India, the award is liable to be set aside.
Explanation (1), amended by the 2015 Amendment Act,
clarified the expression “public policy of India” and its
connotations for the purposes of reviewing arbitral awards. It
has been made clear that an award would be in conflict with
public policy of India only when it is induced or affected by
fraud or corruption or is in violation of Section 75 or Section
81 of the 1996 Act, if it is in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law or if it is in conflict with the
most basic notions of morality or justice.
*
42. The Division Bench referred to various factors leading
to the termination notice, to conclude that the award shocks
the conscience of the Court. The discussion in SCC OnLine
Del para 103 of the impugned judgment [DMRC v. Delhi
Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6562]
amounts to appreciation or reappreciation of the facts which
is not permissible under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The
Division Bench further held DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro
Express (P) Ltd., that the fact of AMEL being operated
without any adverse event for a period of more than four
years since the date of issuance of the CMRS certificate, was
not given due importance by the Arbitral Tribunal. As the
arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as the
quantity of the evidence, the task of being a Judge on the
evidence before the Tribunal does not fall upon the Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34. [State of
Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd., (1994) 6 SCC 485]
On the basis of the issues submitted by the parties, the
Arbitral Tribunal framed issues for consideration and
answered the said issues. Subsequent events need not be
taken into account.”
(emphasis supplied)

30. In Haryana Tourism Ltd. v. Kandhari Beverages Ltd.,
(2022) 3 SCC, this Court yet again pointed out the limited
scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act;
and disapproved interference by the High Court under
Section 37 of the Act while entering into merits of the claim
in the following words : (SCC p. 240, paras 8-9)


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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

“8. So far as the impugned judgment and order
[Kandhari Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine P&H 3233] passed by the High Court quashing
and setting aside the award and the order passed by the
Additional District Judge under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act are concerned, it is required to be noted that in an
appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the High
Court has entered into the merits of the claim, which is not
permissible in exercise of powers under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act.
9. As per settled position of law laid down by this Court
in a catena of decisions, an award can be set aside only if
the award is against the public policy of India. The award
can be set aside under Sections 34/37 of the Arbitration Act,
if the award is found to be contrary to : (a) fundamental
policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c)
justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. None of the
aforesaid exceptions shall be applicable to the facts of the
case on hand. The High Court has entered into the merits of
the claim and has decided the appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act as if the High Court was deciding the
appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the
learned trial court. Thus, the High Court has exercised the
jurisdiction not vested in it under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act. The impugned judgment and order [Kandhari
Beverages Ltd. v. Haryana Tourism Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine
P&H 3233] passed by the High Court is hence not
sustainable.”
31. As regards the limited scope of interference under
Sections 34/37 of the Act, we may also usefully refer to the
following observations of a three-Judge Bench of this Court
in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P. (2022) 2 SCC (Civ)
401 : (SCC p. 124, paras 15-16)
“15. This Court also accepts as correct, the view
expressed by the appellate court that the learned Single
Judge committed a gross error in reappreciating the findings
returned by the Arbitral Tribunal and taking an entirely
different view in respect of the interpretation of the relevant
clauses of the implementation agreement governing the
parties inasmuch as it was not open to the said court to do
so in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, by
virtually acting as a court of appeal.
16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it
comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court in
examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an
award, is all the more circumscribed.”


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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:

10. Present controversy with regard to the validity or
otherwise of the award passed by the learned Arbitrator
has to be adverted to with reference to the aforesaid
enunciation of law by the Apex Court. Viewed as such, the
grounds urged and submissions made on behalf of the
petitioner and respondent would give rise to the following
points for consideration:
(i) Whether the impugned award is in breach of the
arbitration procedure agreed upon by the parties and,
therefore, in violation of the provisions of Section
34(2)(a)(v) of the Act, 1996?
(ii) Whether the impugned award is required to be set aside
on the ground of delay in delivering the same?
(iii)Whether the impugned award is in conflict with the
fundamental policy of Indian law, and whether it has
taken note of the judgment in the case of Jai Narain
Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf, reported in (2006) 7
SCC 756, and Rhodia International Holdings Limited & Anr
v. Huntsman International, reported in [2007] EWCA Civ
62, on the aspect of “best efforts” ?
(iv)Whether the impugned award suffers from lack of
reasoning and mindful consideration of the petitioner's
case, thereby violating the provisions of Section 31(3)(a)
of the Act, 1996?
(v)What order?

Regarding Point No. (i):

(i) Whether the impugned award is in breach of the
arbitration procedure agreed upon by the parties
and, therefore, in violation of the provisions of
Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the Act, 1996?

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


11. Annexure-B to the shareholders' agreement sets down the
procedure for resolution of the dispute. Perusal of the
impugned award at paragraph 13 indicates that the
learned Arbitrator has taken note of Clause 7 of the
arbitration procedure at Annexure-B, which provided that
the arbitration was “an only documents proceeding”.
Learned Arbitrator has also taken note of Clause 8 of the
said agreement, providing for a procedure whereby, if the
parties require, the Arbitrator may hear the witnesses. It is
further noted that the petitioner had requested to lead oral
evidence and also to submit oral arguments, which request
was granted. Similarly, the respondent was also given
liberty in respect of its defence as well as a counterclaim.

12. It is necessary in this regard to note that two witnesses
have been examined on behalf of the claimant as CW1 and
CW2, and 39 documents have been exhibited. Similarly,
two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the
respondent as RW1 and RW2, and 66 documents have
been exhibited. The parties have also filed a compilation of
the documents and detailed written submissions.

13. Therefore, although the procedure provided under Clause 7
of the arbitration procedure set out in Annexure-B to the

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

shareholders' agreement was “an only documents
proceeding”, at the request of the parties the learned
Arbitrator has indeed provided full opportunity for leading
oral evidence and also for submitting oral arguments.

14. Thus, the parties have fully participated in the entire
arbitration process and have been provided with full and
equal opportunity to present their respective cases. None
of the parties has raised questions regarding alleged
deviation from the agreed arbitration procedure.
Therefore, the contention that the impugned award is in
violation of the provisions of Section 34(2)(a)(ii) and (v) of
the Act, 1996 cannot be accepted.

Point No.(i) is answered accordingly.
Regarding Point No.(ii):-
(ii) Whether the impugned award is required to be
set aside on the ground of delay in delivering the
same?

15. Another ground raised by the petitioner concerns the delay
in the learned Arbitrator passing the award. It is contended
that the Claim Statement, Defence Statement and
Counterclaim were submitted in 2014 and the award was
to be rendered within six months, whereas the impugned

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

award was delivered on 25.04.2017, that is, after three
years; therefore, there is violation of Section 34(2)(a)(v)
of the Act, 1996. This contention is contrary to records
made available by the Petitioner in this matter, as noted
hereunder.

16. The memo dated 05.06.2024 filed by the petitioner along
with the documents enclosed therewith reveals that the
written submissions were filed by the petitioner and the
respondent on 15.10.2014 and 16.10.2014, respectively.
th

17. Minutes of the meeting of the arbitration held on 30
October 2014, found at Part 4 of the document
compilation, reveal that upon the application dated
01.10.2014 filed by the Petitioner for an order requiring
the Respondent to place on record the documents
mentioned in the schedule to said application, for the
purpose of finding out whether the Respondent did make
its best efforts as required under the agreement, fresh
th th
hearing dates were fixed on 24 and 25 February 2015
th th
for the submissions of the Claimant and 5 and 9 March
2015 for the submission of the Respondent.

18. The Memo dated 31.07.2024 filed by the Petitioner, along
with the depositions of the witnesses, indicates that the

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief of CW1 and CW2
were filed on 04.08.2015 and elaborate cross-examination
of the said witnesses was conducted during August and on
th rd
29 , 30th September and 23 November 2015. Similarly,
affidavits evidence of RW1 and RW2 were filed on
27.08.2015 and elaborate cross-examination of the said
rd
witnesses was conducted on 23 November 2015 and 18th
January 2016. The impugned award was passed on
25.04.2017.

19. Apex Court in the case of Lancor Holdings limited v.
2
Prem kumar Menon , while answering the question as to
“what is the effect of undue and unexplained delay in the
pronouncement of an arbitral award upon its validity?” ,
has at paragraph 87.1.1 after surveying all the precedents
on the point, held as under:
“87.1.1. Delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by
itself, is not sufficient to set aside that award. However, each
such case would have to be examined on its own individual
facts to ascertain whether that delay had an adverse impact
on the final decision of the Arbitral Tribunal, whereby that
award would stand vitiated due to the lapses committed by
the Arbitral Tribunal owing to such delay. It is only when the
effect of the undue delay in the delivery of an arbitral award
is explicit and adversely reflects on the findings therein, such
delay and, more so, if it remains unexplained, can be
construed to result in the award being in conflict with the
public policy of India, thereby attracting Section 34(2)(b)(ii)

2
(2026) 4 SCC 392

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

of the 1996 Act or Section 34(2-A) thereof, as it may also be
vitiated by patent illegality. Further, it would not be
necessary for an aggrieved party to invoke the remedy
under Section 14(2) of the 1996 Act as a condition precedent
to lay a challenge to that delayed and tainted award under
Section 34 thereof.”


20. In the instant case, apart from filing a claim and
counterclaim, affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief, and
conducting elaborate cross-examinations of the witnesses,
the parties have filed detailed written arguments with
citations. Delay, if any, in the considered view of this
Court, and also for the reasons assigned while answering
points (iii) and (iv) infra, has not had any effect on the
delivery of the arbitral award. It is not the case that the
award has been passed based on frail human memory,
making it impossible for the learned Arbitrator to have
total recall of the oral evidence, as pointed out in the
aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court. Therefore, this
Court is not persuaded to accept the contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner on this count, requiring
setting aside of the award on the ground of delay.
Point No.(ii) is answered accordingly.
Regarding Point No.(iii):-
(iii) Whether the impugned award is in conflict
with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

whether it has taken note of the judgment in
the case of Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa
Devi Saraf, reported in (2006) 7 SCC 756, and
Rhodia International Holdings Limited & Anr v.
Huntsman International, reported in [2007]
EWCA Civ 62 on the aspect of “best efforts” ?

21. The question what constitutes “fundamental policy of
Indian Law”, has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the
case of ONGC Vs WESTERN GECO INTERNATIONAL
3
LTD, wherein at paragraphs 35, 38, 39, and 40, it has
been held as under:
35 . What then would constitute the “fundamental policy
of Indian law” is the question. The decision in ONGC [ONGC
Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705] does not
elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression must, in our
opinion, include all such fundamental principles as providing
a basis for administration of justice and enforcement of law
in this country. Without meaning to exhaustively enumerate
the purport of the expression “fundamental policy of Indian
law”, we may refer to three distinct and fundamental juristic
principles that must necessarily be understood as a part and
parcel of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The first and
foremost is the principle that in every determination whether
by a court or other authority that affects the rights of a
citizen or leads to any civil consequences, the court or
authority concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal
parlance called a “judicial approach” in the matter. The duty
to adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of
the power exercised by the court or the authority does not
have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the fora
concerned. What must be remembered is that the
importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-
judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the
court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that affect
the rights or obligations of the parties before them shows
fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an arbitrary,
capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial approach ensures
that the authority acts bona fide and deals with the subject
in a fair, reasonable and objective manner and that its
decision is not actuated by any extraneous consideration.

3

(2014) 9 SCC 263

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

Judicial approach in that sense acts as a check against flaws
and faults that can render the decision of a court, tribunal or
authority vulnerable to challenge.
38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the
policy of Indian law is the principle that a court and so also a
quasi-judicial authority must, while determining the rights
and obligations of parties before it, do so in accordance with
the principles of natural justice. Besides the celebrated audi
alteram partem rule one of the facets of the principles of
natural justice is that the court/authority deciding the matter
must apply its mind to the attendant facts and circumstances
while taking a view one way or the other. Non-application of
mind is a defect that is fatal to any adjudication. Application
of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind and
disclosure of mind is best done by recording reasons in
support of the decision which the court or authority is taking.
The requirement that an adjudicatory authority must apply
its mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental
policy of Indian law.
39. No less important is the principle now recognised as
a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that a
decision which is perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same will not be sustained
in a court of law. Perversity or irrationality of decisions is
tested on the touchstone of Wednesbury principle
[Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., (1948) 1 KB of reasonableness. Decisions that fall
short of the standards of reasonableness are open to
challenge in a court of law often in writ jurisdiction of the
superior courts but no less in statutory processes wherever
the same are available.
40. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to attempt
an exhaustive enumeration of what would constitute the
fundamental policy of Indian law nor is it possible to place
the expression in the straitjacket of a definition. What is
important in the context of the case at hand is that if on
facts proved before them the arbitrators fail to draw an
inference which ought to have been drawn or if they have
drawn an inference which is on the face of it, untenable
resulting in miscarriage of justice, the adjudication even
when made by an Arbitral Tribunal that enjoys considerable
latitude and play at the joints in making awards will be open
to challenge and may be cast away or modified depending
upon whether the offending part is or is not severable from
the rest.


22. The entire controversy in the instant case revolves around
the Petitioner's allegation that the respondent did not

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make the “best efforts” to procure clients and outsource
the work to WTL. Learned Arbitrator in this regard has
referred to Clauses 3.3 and 3.4 of the shareholders'
agreement relied upon by both parties to justify their
respective cases, which read as follows:
“ 3.3 ALYOTECH's contribution shall be by way of providing
its name, reputation, training skills and experience, and make
available skilled manpower to India on specific billable basis for
projects and assignments. If necessary for the fulfilment of
these projects, ALYOTECH will provide on-the-job training to
skilled IT professionals from India in different fields of
ALYOTECH's business. Alyotech shall also provide its name
under a Name Licence Agreement as further provided in Article
3.5.
3.4 ALYOTECH will make best efforts to refer and outsource
sub-contracted jobs and assignments for the COMPANY for its
existing clients. In case projects are won, or even otherwise if
ALYOTECH is of the opinion that such training is necessary, a
team of Indian consultants shall be trained in France by
ALYOTECH experts. The gross costs for the training, excluding
the salaries in India, is estimated to be Euro 15 to 20K per
person for a 100 days, and shall be borne by ALYOTECH, and
the salaries in the home country of such personnel shall be
borne by WINFOWARE subject to any bilateral tax or other
treaties in this regard. After the training, these IT professionals
would assist ALYOTECH in offloading large volume low cost work
to India and subject to transfer pricing norms if applicable.”


23. At paragraph No.17 of the impugned award, the learned
Arbitrator has taken note of the aforesaid Clauses 3.3 and
3.4 of the shareholders’ agreement. At paragraph No.18,
the learned Arbitrator has noted that Clause 3.3 requires
the provision of training to IT professionals relating to
projects and assignments and that, since no specific

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

projects or assignments were won by the parties, there
was no question of providing on-the-job training.

24. At paragraph No.19, the learned Arbitrator, referring to the
requirement under Clause 3.4 of the shareholders’
agreement for the respondent to make “best efforts,” has
adverted to the evidence of RW1 and RW2 with regard to
attempts made by them to outsource the work. The
learned Arbitrator has also taken note of the fact that the
said Clause 3.4 gives the respondent discretion to provide
necessary training depending upon the nature of the work.
The learned Arbitrator has also taken note of the evidence
of an unfavourable response from the existing clients to
making an investment in WTL and held that the
respondent’s decision, in furtherance of the discretion
vested in it in terms of Clause 3.4, was not to be found
fault with.

25. At paragraphs 20 and 21, the learned Arbitrator has
adverted to the petitioner's contentions regarding
adequate efforts/best efforts not being made by the
respondent to project WTL as the party selected by the
respondent for subcontracting the jobs and assignments. It
has taken note of the deposition of RW1 with regard to all

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the projects of the respondent requiring French-speaking
personnel, and the portfolio of the respondent’s business
was mainly to provide manpower resources in Canada and
Hyland and, to an extent, in France. The potential clientele
of any project with WTL was to come from France. It has
also appreciated the evidence of the respondent that either
the work obtained was not capable of being subcontracted
to WTL because of the nature of the work or the project
was too small to be subcontracted.

26. As regards existing contract-cum-work not being able to
be outsourced because of lack of familiarity with
French language, the learned Arbitrator has taken note of
the evidence that the contracting party of the respondent
did not want its work to be outsourced.

27. At paragraph 23, the learned Arbitrator has adverted to
the evidence of RW2 with regard to the best efforts made
as contemplated under Clause 3.4 of the shareholders'
agreement to secure the work for WTL. It has taken note
of the fact that immediately after the signing of the
shareholders’ agreement, the investment made by the
respondent in WTL was announced in every possible
forum, representations were made on the new investment

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

both internally to build expertise and externally to
potential customers, and its existing customers were
contacted and informed regarding the potential of WTL.
The respondent trained its staff and had them attend
exhibitions and seminars for business development in
respect of new investments. It has also taken note of the
fact that RW1 was appointed by the respondent as the
person in charge of the relationship between the
respondent, petitioner and WTL. RW1, together with a
team of executives of the respondent company, had begun
to conduct business development and assessment
exercises to solicit clients for WTL.

28. At paragraph 24, the learned Arbitrator has taken note of
press releases of the investment during the years 2011
and 2012, as well as the launch of the website and the
presentations made of the projects.

29. At paragraph 25, the learned Arbitrator has taken note of
the respondent’s participation in the Eurosatory Exhibition
for manufacturers of European defence and recruitment,
where WTL was included in the list of companies
associated with the respondent for offshore work.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


30. At paragraph 26, the learned Arbitrator has taken note of
RW2’s visit to India during October 2011 specifically to
meet WTL and its customers, during which period WTL had
organized only two meetings to meet its customers, which

were poorly organized.

31. At paragraph 27, the learned Arbitrator has taken note of
the decisions cited by the petitioner on the aspect of ‘best
efforts’ in the case of Jai Narain Parasurampurai Vs
4
Pushpa Devi Saraf and the judgment of the High Court
of England and Wales in the case of Rhodia
5
International holdings Vs Huntesman Intl LLC (0) .
The learned Arbitrator has taken note of the scope of the
terms “best efforts”, “best endeavors” and “reasonable
endeavors”.

32. Jai Narain Parasurampurai Vs Pushpa Devi Saraf , the
Apex Court dealing with a case involving performance of
terms of contract in respect of immovable property at
paragraph 90 has held as under:

4

(2006) 7 SCC 756
5
(2007 EWHC 292)

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

"90. In Malhotra v. Choudhury (1978) 3 WLR 825:,
Stephenson, L.J., in the fact situation obtaining therein,
opined:
“But as counsel for the plaintiff pointed out, the question
which the judges were summoned by their Lordships to
answer and which was proposed for their consideration was
‘Whether, upon a contract for the sale of real estate, where
the vendor, without his default (my emphasis), is unable to
make a good title, the purchaser is by law entitled to recover
damages for the loss of his bargain?’ That is the question
which was answered in the judgment of Pollock, B., which
was also the judgment of Kelly, C.B., Keating and Brett, JJ,
and the question as it was stated by both Denman, J. and
Pigott, B. I note this is the way in which the rule is stated in
Williams on Contract of Sale of Land, cited by Megarry, J. in
Wroth v. Tyler [1974 Ch 30:
‘Where the breach of contract is occasioned by the vendor's
inability, without his own fault (my emphasis), to show a
good title, the purchaser is entitled to recover as damages his
deposit, if any, with interest, and his expenses incurred in
connection with the agreement, but not more than nominal
damages for the loss of his bargain.’
It is not necessary to decide how far the words ‘without his
default’ go, if I am right in thinking that inability without
default is what one has to consider as attracting the rule in
Bain v. Fothergill [(1874-80) All ER Rep 83] .
There may be cases in which there has been no lack of
bona fides, yet the rule in Bain v. Fothergill [(1874-80) All ER
Rep 83 : 31 LT 387 (HL)] has been excluded. I would not
however venture to suggest that anything less than lack of
good faith could exclude the rule. But it seems from later
decisions that fraud, in the full sense of that word such as
would found an action for deceit, may not be necessary to
exclude the rule. No doubt Blackett-Ord V-C had in mind that
fraud must be strictly alleged and proved in all ordinary
circumstances. But in my judgment, unwillingness to use best
endeavours to carry out a contractual promise is bad faith,
and for there to be bad faith which takes the case out of this
exceptional rule it is not necessary that there should be either
a deliberate attempt to prevent title being made good or
anything more than the unwillingness which I find it inevitable
to infer in this case. If a man makes a promise and does not
use his best endeavours to keep it, it cannot take much and,
in my judgment, may not need more to make him guilty of
bad faith and to entitle the victim of his bad faith to his full
share of damages to compensate him for what he has lost by
reason of that breach of contract and bad faith.”

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33. In Rhodia International Holdings the observation made
by the High Court of England and Wales at paragraph 33
and 34 reads as under:
“33. I am not convinced that (apart from that decision of
Rougier J) any of the judges in the cases upon which Mr
Beazley relied were directing their minds specifically to the
issue whether "best endeavours" and "reasonable
endeavours" mean the same thing. As a matter of language
and business common sense, untrammelled by authority, one
would surely conclude that they did not. This is because there
may be a number of reasonable courses which could be taken
in a given situation to achieve a particular aim. An obligation
to use reasonable endeavours to achieve the aim probably
only requires a party to take one reasonable course, not all of
them, whereas an obligation to use best endeavours probably
requires a party to take all the reasonable courses he can. In
that context, it may well be that an obligation to use all
reasonable endeavours equates with using best endeavours
and it seems to me that is essentially what Mustill J is saying
in the Overseas Buyers case. One has a similar sense from a
later passage at the end of the judgment of Buckley LJ in IBM
v Rockware Glass at 343, to which Mr Edwards-Stuart QC for
Huntsman drew my attention.
34. That there is a distinction between best endeavours and
reasonable endeavours and that the latter is less stringent
than the former is not only supported by the decision of
Rougier J in UBH but by the decision of Kim Lewison QC (as
he then was) sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, in Jolley v
Carmel Limited [2000] 2 EGLR 154 upon which Mr Edwards-
Stuart relied. At p 159 the judge said:
"Where a contract is conditional upon the grant of some
permission, the courts often imply terms about obtaining it.
There is a spectrum of possible implications. The implication
might be one to use best endeavours to obtain it (see
Fischer v Toumazos [1991] 2 EGLR 204), to use all
reasonable efforts to obtain it (see Hargreaves Transport v
Lynch [1969] 1 WLR 215) or to use reasonable efforts to do
so. The term alleged in this case [to use reasonable efforts]
is at the lowest end of the spectrum."
Mr Beazley sought to suggest that somehow this analysis was
distinguishable because it was concerned with the implication
of a term, but I cannot see any basis for such a distinction. It
seems to me that the judge's analysis is equally applicable to
the construction of the phrase reasonable efforts or
reasonable endeavours whether it is an express or an implied
term of any particular contract.

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34. It is indeed in the light of the aforesaid principles of law
that the learned Arbitrator at paragraph No.28 has
adverted to the question as to whether the respondent had
made best efforts with reference to the terms of the
shareholders' agreement and overall purpose as reflected
in its language. Having adverted to the same, the learned
Arbitrator has concluded that the evidence on record
shows the extent of the efforts made by the respondent
and the cost incurred by the respondent for the project of
WTL as its associate for procurement work that could be
outsourced to WTL.

35. Learned Arbitrator, adverting to the second part of Clause
3.4, has found that training for the Indian consultants in
France was required only when the respondent considered
such training necessary and that no material was produced
to show such training to be necessary. The learned
Arbitrator has thus come to the conclusion that there was
no breach of Clause 3.4 on the part of the respondent.

36. This Court has gone through the depositions of CW.1,
CW.2, RW.1, and RW.2 produced along with the memo
dated 31.07.2024 by the petitioner. In fact, CW.1 has

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

admitted that the candidate selected by WTL was not
proficient in French and did not even have basic knowledge
of French. He also admitted that the respondent had
organized a strategic workshop with all country managers
around June 2012. He also admitted that WTL did not
solicit any business as a result of the presentation made at
the workshop. He also admitted that all the countries
where the respondent had its business were represented at
the meeting. CW.1 was confronted with the documents at
Ex. C-A1 and C-BB and pleaded ignorance about the
questions posed on the said documents. The said witness
has also admitted the press release issued by the
respondent with the link of WTL on their website projecting
WTL to its customers as one of its business entities for a
global delivery services. Witness has pleaded ignorance
about the respondent circulating an internal newspaper to
its employees regarding WTL being an offshore solution for
the respondent group. He has also admitted an e-mail
dated 21.04.2011 issued by one Gonzales calling upon
WTL to send its existing presentation and examples of
projects undertaken by it. In response to a specific
question as to whether any e-mail was sent in response to
the same, the witness pleaded ignorance. These lines of

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

questioning and the response to the same by CW.1
indicate and support the case of the respondent making its
best efforts in furtherance of its obligations in terms of
Clause 3.4 of the shareholders’ agreement.

37. Thus, perusal of the depositions of the said witnesses, who
were subjected to elaborate cross-examination on various
aspects, including the allegation made by the petitioner of
breach of Clause 3.4 by the respondent and the denial of
the same by the respondent’s witnesses, including efforts
made by both sides to procure the work for WTL, reveals
nothing significant that has not been taken note of by the
learned Arbitrator in the aforesaid paragraphs. Nothing to
indicate that there is any lack of judicial approach,
perversity or irrationality in appreciating the contentious
issue by learned Arbitrator.

38. Therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner
that the impugned award fails to distinguish the ratio
between the said two judgments and that such failure
would amount to a failure to take notice of the
fundamental policy of Indian law, warranting a challenge
under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1996 cannot be
countenanced.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


39. Point No.(iii) is answered accordingly.
Regarding point No.(iv):-
(iv) Whether the impugned award suffers from lack of
reasoning and mindful consideration of case of the
petitioner thereby violates provisions of Section
31(3) (a) of the Act, 1996?

40. One of the vehement contentions of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is that the learned Arbitrator has not
given the Petitioner full opportunity to present its case,
and the same would amount to depriving the Petitioner of
an opportunity as provided under Section 18 of the Act,
1996. It is contended that the right to present one's case
is not merely the right to tender documents and cross-
examine witnesses. It includes the right to have one's
evidence, submissions, and arguments mindfully
considered and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal, lest the
right to be heard be meaningless.

41. The learned Arbitrator has framed the following points for
determination of the claim and the counterclaim made by
the parties.
"1. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim of the claimant as alleged in paragraphs 2 to 7 of
the statement of defence?
2. Whether Statement Of Claim is liable to be rejected for
misjoinder/non-joinder of necessary parties?

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

3. Whether claimant has fulfilled his obligation under Recital
A under clause 3.2 and 6.5 of SHA?
4. Whether respondent has fulfilled his obligation under
clause 3.3 and 3.4 of SHA?
5. Whether sale of Alyotech Canada's operations amounts to
breach of the SHA by the Respondent?
6. Whether the Claimant is entitled to reliefs as sought for in
the Statement Of Claim?
7. Whether the Respondent is entitled to a sum of Euros
300,000 from the Claimant towards the loss of reputation
suffered by the Respondent on account of the Claimant?
8. Whether the Respondent is entitled to a sum of Euros
2,60,878 from the Claimant towards compensation for the
time spent by its employees on business development
activities of Winfoware and expenses of trips made to India?
9. Whether the Respondent is entitled to a sum of Euros
5,48,292 from the Claimant as compensation towards
damages suffered by the Respondent due to breach of the
SHA by the Claimant?
10. Whether the Respondent is entitled to payment of
interest at the rate of 15% per annum on its claims in the
counter claim from the date of filing till the date of actual
payment to the Respondent?
11. What order as to costs?
12. What reliefs?

42. The learned Arbitrator has answered points Nos. 1, 3 and 4
in the affirmative, points 2 and 5 to 10 in the negative.

43. While answering the points as above, the learned
Arbitrator has rejected both the claim and the counterclaim
made by the parties. The present application under Section
34 is filed only by the Petitioner, who was a claimant

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

before the Arbitrator. No application is filed by the
respondent questioning the rejection of its counterclaim.
Therefore, scrutiny of the impugned award in the light of
the aforesaid exposition of law on this point is restricted
only to the extent of rejection of the Petitioner’s claim.

44. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in his endeavour to
point out that the reasons assigned by the learned
Arbitrator were inadequate, as, according to him, the
learned Arbitrator had not adverted to the documentary
evidence furnished by the petitioner, copies of which are
produced in this Application in the compilation—Part 1 and
2, referred to the documents at Annexures-C6, C9, C10,
C11, and C17 to C34 extensively, read the contents of the
said documents, and submitted that the impugned award
does not specifically refer to the contents of these
documents and therefore the impugned award suffers from
lack of reasoning, thereby violating Section 31(3)(a) of the
Act, 1996.

45. Document at C6 is spreadsheet purportedly giving
commercial details of the respondent's business strategy in
India. C9 to C10 are the presentation prepared by WTL
and giving its profile and profile of the key people. C11 to

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

16 are email exchanges between petitioner and respondent
during October and November 2009 in relation to
investment in WTL. C17 is the transcription of video
message issued by chairman of the respondent making
promise to the employees of WTL and instilling confidence
in them with regard to investment in WTL. C18 is a press
release, issued by respondent, acknowledging the trust
placed by the Petitioner and other shareholders in the
respondent. C19 is the email correspondence with regard
to proposed training of candidates in France. C20 to C31
are the e-mail correspondence exchanged between the
parties apparently indicating possible business
opportunities for WTL, to which, according to the
petitioner, respondent failed to take any steps to procure
the business projects and missed several opportunities in
India. C32 to 35 are email dated 24.07.2012 issued by
KKM to the respondent about dire situation of WTL due to
lack of any substantial business and projects, as was
originally promised by respondent. That though the
respondent acknowledge the concern by reply email but
did not take any steps to mitigate the situation that WTL
was facing.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


46. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention.
Learned Arbitrator, as noted while answering point No.(iii),
in paragraphs 19 to 28 of the impugned award, has
adverted to the allegation of breach of clause 3.4 of the
shareholders' agreement made by the petitioner with
regard to the respondent's not performing its obligation to
make ‘best efforts’ to refer and outsource the
subcontractor's jobs and assignments in the company for
the existing clients and to provide training to the
employees in India. In this regard, the learned Arbitrator
has referred to evidence of RWs. 1 and 2 with regard to all
the efforts according to them made to obtain the work to
be outsourced to WTL in India. The learned Arbitrator has
also referred to the contents of the affidavit of RW2 and
other materials furnished by the respondent in extenso . It
is only thereafter that the learned Arbitrator has come to
the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to show the
efforts made by the respondent to procure the work for
WTL and declined to accept the contentions of the
petitioner that these efforts were not adequate and fell
short of the obligation cast on the respondent to make the
best effort to secure the work.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


47. Besides, at paragraphs Nos. 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the
impugned order, the learned Arbitrator, while referring to
the respondent’s allegation regarding the petitioner’s
breach of Clauses 3.2 and 6.5 of the shareholders’
agreement, indeed referred to the documents relied upon
by the petitioner being e-mails exchanged between the
parties more particularly from May to October 2011 at Ex.
C-AQ and Ex. C-AS and the evidence of CW.1 regarding
information given by him to the respondent regarding
availability of potential customers. At paragraph 37 it has
referred to extensive cross examination of KKM in respect
of his attempts in procuring the orders for WTL. Therefore
the contention that the learned Arbitrator not adverting to
these documents cannot be accepted.

48. At Paragraphs 39 and 40 of the impugned award the
learned Arbitrator has adverted to grounds urged with
regard to alleged breach of clauses 6.2 and 6.5 of
shareholders agreement providing for constitution of Board
of Directors of WTL. Finding of the learned Arbitrator in
negating the case of the Respondent on this point is now
sought to be urged as by the Petitioner as rendering the
impugned award an internally self-contradictory which

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

purportedly constitutes a contravention of fundamental
policy of Indian Law. Mere negation of case of the
Respondents on this aspect of the matter need not
necessarily result in acceptance of the case of the
Petitioner, which is required to be proved and established
independently.

49. Contention as regards the learned Arbitrator, not adverting
to the provisions of Section 73 of the Contract Act
providing for compensation for loss or damage caused by
breach of contract, is concerned, as pointed out by learned
Senior counsel appearing for the respondent, consideration
of a claim for compensation for loss or damage caused by
a breach of contract would arise if the petitioner
establishes the breach of the terms of the contract; it
should also establish the actual loss suffered by it on
account of the breach committed by the respondent.
Learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent,
pointing out paragraphs 15 and 20 of the claim petition,
submitted that in terms of the agreement entered into
between the parties, the petitioner was required to invest
Euro 300,000 and there has been no evidence of the
petitioner having invested such amount. Therefore, he

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

submitted that, in the absence of the petitioner pointing
out substantial investment had been made and proving a
breach of the terms by the respondent, there was no
question of applying the provisions of Section 73 of the
Contract Act, and the claim in this regard would be
speculative and baseless. There is indeed a considerable
force in this submission made by the learned Senior
counsel for the Respondent. No material is placed in this
regard before the learned Arbitrator for assessment of the
investment and corresponding loss suffered by the
Petitioner.

50. On the question of the sale of the Canadian operation of
the Respondent, the contention is that the learned
Arbitrator has wrongly held there to be no privity of
contract between the petitioner, WTL and Alyotech
Canada. That such finding is contrary to Article 1.2 of the
shareholders’ agreement, which provides for “affiliates” to
be part of the agreement. That the sale of the
respondent’s shares in the Canadian company affected the
petitioner’s right of first refusal under Article 4.1 of the
shareholders’ agreement amounts to a contravention of
the fundamental policy of Indian law.

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022


51. In this regard, it is seen that the learned Arbitrator, at
paragraph 29, apart from opining that there was no privity
of contract between the said entities and that there was no
bar on the respondent from selling the shareholding in its
group company under Clause 4 of the shareholders’
agreement, has also found that Mr. KKM was aware of the
respondent’s attempt to sell its shares in the Canadian
company and that, in March and April 2013, Mr. KKM
forwarded a proposal for the sale of the respondent’s
shares in the said Canadian company and made no
grievance regarding such proposed sale. Therefore, this
contention urged with regard to the breach of Clause 4 of
the shareholder agreement has been negated by the
learned Arbitrator.

52. Clause 4.1 of the shareholders' agreement provides that
WTL shall have the first right of refusal for all projects
done in India by Respondent and manpower recruited in
India for projects in foreign countries. Likewise, the WTL
shall have the right of refusal to Respondent for the
Projects it pursues in France, Canada, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Switzerland, and Morocco, and such refusal

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

shall, at all times, be taken by the unanimous decision of
the Board and communicated to Respondent accordingly.

53. Perusal of said clause indicates the right of refusal
reserved in favour of WTL is in respect of projects being
done by the respondent. The clause does not speak
anything whatsoever with regard to the sale of
shareholdings, as noted by Learned Arbitrator in paragraph
29 of the impugned award. This interpretation cannot be
faulted, as the clause does not specifically prohibit or
create a bar against the sale of the shareholding. Besides,
admittedly, Mr. KKM forwarded a proposal for the sale of
the respondent’s shares in the said Canadian company and
made no grievance regarding such proposed sale,
indicating even his understanding of the said clause. As
held by the Apex Court in the case of Rashtriya ISPAT
6
Nigam Ltd Vs Devan Chand Ram Saran, if the view
taken by the Arbitrator is a possible one, it cannot be
subjected to judicial review, even if the contract is capable
of two interpretations.

54. Appreciation of evidence is the sole domain of the
Arbitrator. As it is a settled principle of law, the Arbitrator

6

(2012) 5 SCC 306

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

is the sole judge of the quality as well as quantity of the
evidence, and the Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
shall not take up the task of being the judge of the
evidence before the Arbitrator, with hardly any scope for
reassessing or re-appreciating the evidence by the Court.
The Court also cannot examine the reasonableness of the
reasons assigned in the award. The Court cannot
substitute its evaluation or conclusion of law or facts to
conclude that the Arbitrator had acted contrary to the
terms of the agreement. { Satna Stone and Lime
Company Limited, Madhya Pradesh and others Vs
7
Union of India and anr , Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Vs WIG Brothers Builders & Engineers
8
Private Ltd., Sharma and Associates Contractors
9
Private Ltd., Vs Progressive Constructions Ltd., ,
10
MMTC Ltd., Vs Vedanta Ltd., }

55. As held by the Apex Court in the case of PSA Sical
Terminals (P) Ltd., Vs V.O. Chidambranar Port
11
Trust, to term an award as perverse, indicating

7

( 2008) 14 SCC 785
8

(2010) 13 SCC 377,
9
(2017) 5 SCC 743
10
(2019) 4 SCC 163
11

(2023) 15 SCC 781

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

illegality, one will have to satisfy the test enumerated in
paragraph 42 of the said judgment, which is,
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.


56. As already noted above, in paragraphs 18 to 28, the
Tribunal has adverted to the depositions of the parties and
the material placed for its consideration; it therefore
cannot be said that the said finding is based on no
evidence at all or without appreciation of the same, or that
the learned Arbitrator has taken into consideration
something that was irrelevant.

57. In the aforesaid circumstances, the findings and conclusion
arrived at by the learned Arbitrator cannot be said to be
opposed to the judicial approach or against the principles
of natural justice, nor are they so perverse and irrational
that no reasonable person would have arrived at such a
conclusion, resulting in miscarriage of justice.

58. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner
that the impugned award suffers from non-appreciation of

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COM.S. NO.6 OF 2022

crucial evidence, non-consideration of oral evidence, and
lack of intrinsic scrutiny of evidence, resulting in the award
being baseless, cannot be countenanced.

59. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
petitioner on the judgments in the cases of Natwarlal
Shamaldas and Co., M.D., Army Welfare Housing
Organization, Delhi Airport Express, ONGC Garware, Puri
Construction, Gayatri Balasamy (Supra) is of no avail in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
Point No.(iv) is answered accordingly.

60. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis, this Court is of the
considered view that the grounds urged by the claimant do
not meet the requirements of law warranting interference
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

61. Accordingly, following:
ORDER
Petition is dismissed.

Sd/-
(M.G.S. KAMAL)
JUDGE

SBN/SH