Tinneihing Khongsai vs THE NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE
- Court
- Manipur High Court
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026
( Ref :- NCB Crime No. 10/NCB/IMP/2025
u/s 8(c), 22(c), 25 and 29 NDPS Act)
Tinneihing Khongsai , aged about 40 years, W/o Letminthang
Khongsai a permanent R/O Sugnu Utangpokpi, P.O. & P.S.
Sugnu, Chandel District, Manipur, presently residing at
Fabricated Relief Camp Sangaikot P.O., P.S. & District
Churachandpur, Manipur.
… Petitioner
-Versus-
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) represented by Superintendent
of Police Zonal Unit, Imphal, Airport Road, Uchekon Changangei,
Imphal West-795140.
… Respondent/ Complainant
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
For the petitioner :: Mr. Serto T. Kom, Advocate
For the respondent :: Mr. W. Darakishwor, Sr. PCCG
Date of judgment & order :: 17-11-2026
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[1] The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ( ‘BNSS’ for short) with a prayer
for quashing the order dated 26-09-2025 passed by the Special
Judge (ND & PS), Chandel in connection with NCB Crime No.
10/NCB/IMP/2025 dated 25-09-2025 u/s 8(c), 22(c), 25 & 29 NDPS
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[2]
Act, 1985, remanding two accused persons to judicial custody and also
praying for releasing one of the accused person, viz., Letminthang
Khongsai, aged about 42 years, S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of
Sugnu, Utangpokpi, Chandel District, Manipur.
[2.1] The brief factual matrix of the present case as disclosed by
the respondent in its affidavit-in-opposition is that acting on a specific
information received from a reliable source about the trafficking and
transportation of suspected illegal drugs of undisclosed quantity of
‘ Methamphetamine/ WY tablets ’ by two persons namely, (i) Mr.
Seimang Kipgen (45 years), S/o Lenkhopao Kipgen, resident of House
No. 08, New Leikot Village, Moreh (ST), Tengnoupal District and (ii) Mr.
Letminthang Khongsai (42 years) (hereafter referred to as “Accused
No. 2”) , S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu, Utangpokpi,
Chandel, Manipur, in a Maruti Gypsy vehicle bearing Registration No.
NL01H3374 and escorted by a black Kenbo bike coming from a
General area Monlghat towards General area Hengsi, the same was
taken down in writing and submitted to immediate superior officer Sh.
Aram Anth, Superintendent, NCB, Imphal by Sh. Prashant Kumar
Yadav, Sub-Inspector at around 1700 hrs. of 24-09-2025.
[2.2] Thereafter, in pursuance of an office order No. 10/NCB/
IMPH/2025 dated 24-09-2025 and on the direction of the
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[3]
Superintendent, NCB, Imphal, a team of NCB, Imphal, comprising of
Sh. Prashant Kumar Yadav, S.I. detailed as Seizing Officer, Sh. Aquib
Ahmad, S.I., Sh. Ankur, Sepoy and Sh. Sanchit Kumar Sahu, Sepoy
leaved Imphal on 24-09-2025 at around 1830 hrs. and proceeded
st
towards 01 Assam Rifles, which is around 118 Km. from NCB,
st
Imphal office and reached the 01 Assam Rifles at around 1245 hrs. of
25-09-2025.
[2.3] A requisition letter to provide necessary assistance for
security purpose and providing 02 witnesses to witness search-sum-
st
seizure process was submitted to the 01 Assam Rifles, Chandel, at
around 0100 hrs. Thereafter, the said NCB team along with a team of
st
01 Assam Rifles, Chandel, led by Sh. RNG Shungwar, Assistant
st
Commandant of 01 Assam Rifles, Chandel, proceeded towards
General Bala point along with two independent witnesses. The said
st
NCB team along with the said 01 Assam Rifles team reached General
Bala Point at around 0230 hrs. of 25-09-2025.
[2.4] Thereafter, the said team conducted a reconnaissance of the
area and set up Naka and mounted surveillances at General Bala point
Aibol Joupi, Sehlon, Chandel. At around 0300 hrs., one black colour
bike Kenbo without a number plate followed by a white colour Maruti
Gypsy vehicle bearing Registration No. NL01H3374 were seen coming
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[4]
from the General area Molngat and moving towards General area
Hengsi side. The NCB team signalled the said vehicle to stop, on which
both the vehicles stopped at general Bala point for verification.
[2.5] There were 01 occupant in the Maruti Gypsy and 01
occupant on the Kenbo bike. The NCB team then introduced
themselves as officials of the NCB, Imphal, to the persons seating in
the Maruti Gypsy vehicle and Kenbo bike and requested them to get
off from the vehicles. Thereafter, both the persons came down from
their respective vehicles and introduced themselves as Mr. Seimang
Kipgen (45 years), S/o Lenkhopao Kipgen, resident of House No. 08
New Leikot Village, Moreh (ST), Tengnoupal District (driving Maruti
Gypsy) and Mr. Letminthang Khongsai (42 years) (Accused No. 2), S/o
Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu Utangpokpi, Chandel, Manipur
(driving Kenbo bike).
[2.6] The team of NCB, Imphal, thereafter disclosed the secret
information received by them and expressed the intention to conduct
search of the bike and Maruti Gypsy and both the said two persons
were willing to cooperate in the search proceeding. On searching the
said vehicles, 03 sacks of white colour were found on the back seat of
the Maruti Gypsy and on cutting them opened 29 packets of black
colour packets wrapped in transparent plastic were found. Thereafter,
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[5]
each black packets was cut opened using a box cutter and a yellow
packet was found and inside the said yellow packet, a blue packet was
found, which contained pink colour tablets and one tablet from each
packet was taken out and crushed and mixed homogenously and
tested with the Drug Detection Kid available with the NCB team, which
gave positive result for presence of ‘ Methamphetamine ’ .
The total weight of all the 29 packets was found to be 67.19
Kg. and both the abovenamed two persons admitted that they were
carrying consignment of illegal Methamphetamine to deliver it in the
illegal market.
[2.7] On having reasonable believe that an offence has been
committed under Section 8(c), 22(c), 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act, 1985
(as amended), the recovered contraband, OPPO Mobile Phones,
Redmi Mobile Phone, Maruti Gypsy vehicle of white colour bearing
Registration No. NLO1H3374, back Kenbo bike without registration
number and other recovered documents were seized by the Seizing
Officer.
[2.8] The search-cum-seizure list was prepared on the spot by
typing on a laptop by the Seizing Officer and completed at about 0630
hrs. of 25-09-2025 without causing any damage to any person or
property and in the presence of two independent witnesses. The
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[6]
content of search-cum-seizure list was read over and explained to the
two accused persons and the two independent witnesses and
thereafter, the signatures of both the accused persons, two
independent witnesses and the Seizing Officer were obtained and the
impression of brass seal NCB IMPHAL 01 was affixed on the last page
of the search-cum-seizure list.
[2.9] Thereafter, notice under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985
was given to both the two accused persons and asked them to appear
st
at 01 Assam Rifles, Chandel, Manipur, at 1400 hrs. Accordingly, both
the two accused persons appeared before the NCB officer for recording
their voluntary statement under Section 67(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985.
In their voluntary statement, both the two accused persons confessed
their involvement in trafficking of the seized Methamphetamine/ WY
Tablets. On the basis of recovery of contraband, the confessional
statements made by the said two accused persons and on the
reasonable believe that an offence had been committed in violation of
the provisions of Section 8(c), which attracts penal provisions under
Section 22(c), 25 and 29 of NDPS Act, 1985, both the said two accused
persons were arrested on 25-09-2025 at 1300 hrs. and 1330 hrs.
[2.10] Thereafter, both the accused persons were taken to the
District Hospital, Chandel, for medical examination and after
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[7]
completion of the legal formalities, the arrested accused persons and
the seized contraband were produced before the Court of Special
Judge (ND & PS) Court, Chandel on 26-09-2025. Thereafter, the
Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, passed the impugned order dated
26-09-2025 remanding both the arrested accused persons to judicial
custody.
[3] The present petition had been filed by the wife of Mr.
Letminthang Khongsai (Accused No. 2) raising many points in assailing
the impugned remand order. Even though many grounds have been
raised in the present petition, Mr. Serto T. Kom, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner pressed only one point in assailing the
impugned remand order and praying for releasing the Accused No. 2
from judicial custody. It has been submitted by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner that the NCB, Imphal, failed to produce the
arrested two accused persons to the nearest Magistrate within 24
hours of their arrest thereby resulting in violation of the Accused
No. 2’s fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the
Constitution of India and as such, the impugned order dated 26-09-
2025 passed by the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, remanding the
said accused persons in judicial custody as well as his detention in
judicial custody are illegal.
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[8]
[4] To buttress his argument, it has been submitted by the
learned counsel that even though in the Arrest Memo dated
25-09-2025 issued in respect of accused No. 2, the NCB recorded the
st
place of arrest as at 01 Assam Rifles, Shelon, Chandel, Manipur, and
the time of arrest as 1330 hrs. (01:30 PM) of 25-09-2025, the actual
time of arrest is at 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025, when the said accused
person was stopped and restrained by the official of the NCB.
According to the learned counsel, the statutory period of 24 hrs. as
provided under Article 22(2) of the Constitution will commence from
0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025 and will expire at 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025. The
learned counsel submitted that as 0300 hrs. is in the early morning, the
Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, would not be on duty at such hour
and that it can reasonably be inferred that the accused was produced
after 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025 thereby resulting in a clear violation of
the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution
of India.
It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that
according to the NCB, the search-cum-seizure process was said to be
completed at 06:30 AM of 25-09-2025 and the accused persons could
have been produced on 25-09-2025, however, they were produced
only on 26-09-2025 after the statutory period of 24 hours. Therefore,
the impugned remand order dated 26-09-2025 and the detention of the
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[9]
Accused No. 2 in judicial custody is ultra vires the mandate of Article
22(2) of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the same are
rendered illegal. The learned counsel, accordingly, prays for quashing
the impugned remand order dated 26-09-2025 and to direct the
respondent to release the Accused No. 2 from judicial custody
forthwith.
[5] The learned counsel pressed into service the following case
laws in support of his contentions:-
(a) (1980) 2 SCC 559 “Niranjan Singh & anr. Vs. Prabhakar
Rajaram Kharote & ors.” wherein it has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-
“7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of
Section 439 CrPC? When he is in duress either because
he is held by the investigating agency or other police or
allied authority or is under the control of the court having
been remanded by judicial order, or having offered
himself to the court's jurisdiction and submitted to its
orders by physical presence. No lexical dexterity nor
precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic
conclusion that he who is under the control of the court
or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power
is in custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is
of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law
has taken control of the person. The equivocatory
quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard
in court that the police have taken a man into informal
custody but not arrested him, have detained him for
interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and
other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of
the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[10]
this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the
accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge
and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.”
(b) 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 3 “Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @
Siddique & anr. Vs. The Assistant Collector of Customs
(P) Bombay & anr.” wherein a learned Single Judge of
Bombay High Court held as under:-
“10. It is thus clear that arrest being a restraint on the
personal liberty, it is complete when such restraint by an
authority, commences. Whether a person is arrested or
not does not depend on the legality of the act. It is
enough if an authority clothed with the power to arrest,
actually imposes the restraint by physical act or words.
Whether a person is arrested depends on whether he
has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he
4
pleases. It stands to reason, therefore, that what label
the Investigating Officer affixes to his act of restraint is
irrelevent. For the same reason, the record of the time of
arrest is not an index to the actual time of arrest, The
arrest commences with the restraint placed on the
liberty of the accused and not with the time of “arrest”
recorded by the Arresting Officers.”
(c) (1994) 3 SCC 440 “Directorate of Enforcement Vs.
Deepak Mahajan & anr.” wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court
held as under:-
“46. The word ‘arrest’ is derived from the French word
‘Arreter’ meaning “to stop or stay” and signifies a
restraint of the person. Lexicologically, the meaning of
the word ‘arrest’ is given in various dictionaries
depending upon the circumstances in which the said
expression is used. One of us, (S. Ratnavel Pandian, J.
as he then was being the Judge of the High Court of
Madras) in Roshan Beevi v. Joint Secretary,
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[11]
Government of T.N. had an occasion to go into the
gamut of the meaning of the word ‘arrest’ with reference
to various textbooks and dictionaries, the New
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Halsbury's Laws of England,
A Dictionary of Law by L.B. Curzon, Black's Law
Dictionary and Words and Phrases. On the basis of the
meaning given in those textbooks and lexicons, it has
been held that:
“[T]he word ‘arrest’ when used in its ordinary
and natural sense, means the apprehension or
restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty.
The question whether the person is under arrest or
not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on
whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty
to go where he pleases. When used in the legal
sense in the procedure connected with criminal
offences, an arrest consists in the taking into
custody of another person under authority
empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or
detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of
preventing the commission of a criminal offence.
The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the
above sense are that there must be an intent to
arrest under the authority, accompanied by a
seizure or detention of the person in the manner
known to law, which is so understood by the person
arrested.”
“48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police
officer and a Magistrate but also under certain
circumstances or given situations to private persons.
Further, when an accused person appears before a
Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the Magistrate is
empowered to take that accused person into custody
and deal with him according to law. Needless to
emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition
precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To
put it differently, the taking of the person into judicial
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[12]
custody is followed after the arrest of the person
concerned by the Magistrate on appearance or
surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note
that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa
and that both the words ‘custody’ and ‘arrest’ are not
synonymous terms. Though ‘custody’ may amount to an
arrest in certain circumstances but not under all
circumstances. If these two terms are interpreted as
synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist
interpretation which if under all circumstances accepted
and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly resulting
in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi.”
“49. While interpreting the expression ‘in custody’ within the
meaning of Section 439 CrPC, Krishna Iyer, J. speaking
for the Bench in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram
Kharote observed that: (SCC p. 563, para 9)
“He can be in custody not merely when the
police arrests him, produces him before a
Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other
custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody
when he surrenders before the court and submits to
its directions.”
(d) 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240 “Directorate of Enforcement
Vs. Subhash Sharma” wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held
as under:-
“6. This argument cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the LOC
was issued at the instance of the appellant-Directorate of
Enforcement. By executing the LOC, the Bureau of
Immigration detained the respondent at IGI Airport from
th
4 March 2022 on behalf of the Appellant. The finding of
fact recorded in paragraph 10 is that undisputedly, the
physical custody of the respondent was taken over by the
appellant from the Bureau of Immigration at 11.00 hours
th th
on 5 March, 2022. Thereafter, at 1.15 hours on 6 March
2022, an arrest memo was prepared by ED at Raipur. He
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[13]
th
was produced before the Court at 3 p.m. on 6 March,
2024. The perusal of the arrest order(Annexure p-1)
shows that the typed order was kept ready. The date and
time of arrest were kept blank which appear to have been
filled in by hand. Admittedly, the respondent was not
produced before the nearest learned Magistrate within 24
th
hours from 11.00 a.m. on 5 March, 2022. Therefore, the
arrest of the respondent is rendered completely illegal as
a result of the violation of clause 2 of Article 22 of the
Constitution of India. Thus, the continuation of the
respondent in custody without producing him before the
nearest Magistrate within the stipulated time of 24 hours
is completely illegal and it infringes fundamental rights
under clause 2 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India.
Therefore, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24
hours in custody. Since there is a violation of Article 22(2)
of the Constitution, even his fundamental right to liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 has been violated.”
“8. Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds
that the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution of India have been violated
while arresting the accused or after arresting him, it is the
duty of the Court dealing with the bail application to
release the accused on bail. The reason is that the arrest
in such cases stands vitiated. It is the duty of every Court
to uphold the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.”
(e) 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6017 “Biswajit Mandal Vs.
Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau” wherein a learned
Single Judge of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held as
under:-
“20. Hence the period of twenty-four hours to produce an
accused before the Magistrate commences not when the
actual time of arrest is recorded by the police, but runs
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[14]
from the time when the accused was effectively detained
or his liberty was curtailed.”
[6] Mr. W. Darakishwor, learned Sr. PCCG appearing on behalf
of the respondent submitted that acting on a specific information
received from a reliable source about the trafficking and transportation
of illegal drugs of undisclosed quantity and after following due
procedure established by law, a team of Narcotics Control Bureau,
st
Imphal, with the assistance of a team of 01 Assam Rifles, Chandel,
along with two independent witnesses conducted a reconnaissance of
the area and set up Naka and mounted surveillances at General Bala
point Aibol Joupi, Shelon, Chandel at around 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025.
At around 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025, the said NCB team stopped the two
accused persons – one riding a white colour Maruti Gypsy vehicle
bearing Registration No. NL01H 3374 and one black colour bike Kenbo
without registration number and conducted search of the bike and the
gypsy vehicle and on searching the said vehicles, a commercial
quantity of contraband drugs, Methamphetamine/ WY Tables having a
total weight of 67.19 Kg. was recovered.
[7] The learned Sr. PCCG submitted that the search and seizure
of the contraband drugs were strictly after following all the procedures
established by law and the Seizing Officer completed the seizure of the
contraband drugs and other articles at about 0630 hrs. of 25-09-2025.
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[15]
It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that notice under
Section 67(c) of the ND & PS Act, 1985 was given to both the two
st
accused persons asking them to appear at the 01 Assam Rifles,
Chandel, Manipur, at 1400 hrs. In compliance with the said notice, both
the two accused persons appeared before the NCB officials for
recording their voluntary statement under Section 67(c) of the NDPS
Act, 1985 and that the said two accused persons confessed their
involvement in trafficking of the seized Methamphetamine/ WY Tablets.
Thereafter, on the basis of recovery of the said contraband drugs, the
confessional statements and on a reasonable believe that an offence
has been committed in violation of the provisions of Section 8(c) of the
NDPS Act, 1985, both the said two accused persons were formally
arrested on 25-09-2025 at 1300 hrs. and 1330 hrs. It has also been
submitted that after completing the medical examination of the said two
accused persons and the legal formalities, both the accused persons
were produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, on
26-09-2025 within a stipulated period of 24 hrs. as provided under
Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India.
[8] The learned Sr. PCCG also submitted that the date, time and
place of arrest of the accused No. 2 is clearly reflected in the Arrest
st
Memo. as 25-09-2025 at 1330 hrs. from 01 Assam Rifles, Shelon,
Chandel, Manipur. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[16]
for the respondent that the commencement of the stipulated period of
24 hrs. as provided under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India
should be counted only from the time and date of formal arrest of the
accused persons as recorded in the Arrest Memo and that the period
taken in effecting search and seizure and completing of the necessary
formalities as provided under the NDPS Act and the rules made
thereunder should be excluded while counting the stipulated period of
24 hrs. The learned Sr. PCCG submitted that as the Accused No. 2
was produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, within
the 24 hrs. period, the present petition is liable to be rejected as being
devoid of merit.
[9] In support of his contentions, the learned Sr. PCCG cited the
following case laws:-
(a) 2026 SCC OnLine Mad 6652 “Kannan Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu, represented by the Inspector of Police, Othakadai
Police Station” wherein a learned Single Judge of the
Hon’ble High Court of Madras held as under:-
“28. The Supreme Court has categorically held that the
procedure contemplated under Sections 42 and 50 of
NDPS Act are imperative in nature and non-compliance of
the same would render the conviction and sentence
unsustainable. Section 42(d) of NDPS Act points out that
a Law Enforcing Agency is empowered to detain and
search and if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he
has reason to believe to have committed any offence
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[17]
punishable under this Act. Section 50 lays down an
elaborate procedure for conducting personal search. The
accused persons should be given two options that either
they may get searched before a gazetted officer or before
the Magistrate.”
“29. Section 50(2) points out that if the accused persons
request to search themselves through a gazetted officer
or the Magistrate, the accused persons have to be
detained till such officer arrives. Therefore, it is clear that
the detention prior to search or at the time of search
cannot be considered to be arrest under NDPS Act. Unless
search is completed and the officer of the Law Enforcing
Agency finds that the accused persons are in possession
of contraband, he cannot arrest them.”
“30. Section 50(3) of NDPS Act points out that in case if the
accused persons choose to get themselves searched
before the gazetted officer or the Magistrate, the
concerned officer, if they see that there is no reasonable
ground for search, the accused persons have to be
forthwith discharged. On the other hand, if the concerned
officer finds that there are reasonable ground for search,
he can direct that search be made.”
“31. For a search to be conducted as per Section 50, unless a
person is detained, personal search cannot be conducted.
Only after completion of the personal search, in case, if
the contraband is found in possession of any person, the
Law Enforcing Officer can proceed to arrest him. In fact,
Section 50(2) clearly points out that till the arrival of
gazetted officer or Magistrate, the person who is believed
to be in possession of contraband, has to be detained.”
“32. Even Section 43(b) (relating to power of search and arrest
in the public place) points out that the detention and
search have to precede the arrest and the arrest can be
made only if any person was found to be in possession of
contraband and such possession appears to unlawful.
Therefore, it is clear that under Section 42(d) and 43(b), the
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[18]
word detention and search are used in contradistinction
with the word arrest.”
“33. The word arrest has not been defined either in BNSS or in
any other statute. Section 43(1) of BNSS only explains how
an arrest can be made. Though detention and arrest
involve placing restriction on the movement of any
person, they are conceptually distinct. While detention is
investigatory in nature based on reasonable suspicion,
arrest is accusatory in nature after confirmation of
commission of offence. Since the provisions under NDPS
Act are imperative in nature, the officers of Law Enforcing
Agency are expected to strictly follow the same before
effecting search, seizure or recovery. Otherwise that may
result in vitiating the conviction and sentence. Therefore,
the said procedure as contemplated under Sections 42, 43
and 50 have to be strictly complied with by the authorities
concerned. Without complying the same, any arrest made
by them, would not be of any help to the prosecution and
the same is likely to result in acquittal.”
“34. These precautionary procedures have been mandated
under the Act only to safeguard the accused persons from
any false cases being foisted as against them. Therefore,
the time taken by the authorities concerned, to fulfil the
statutory mandate, prior to arrest, cannot be included for
calculation of 24 hours custody as contemplated under
Section 58 of BNSS. When the other statutes do not
provide for a distinction between the detention and the
arrest, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner would not be applicable for detention and arrest
under NDPS Act cases.”
“35. In the present case, the Car was intercepted at 5.00 p.m.,
the consent letter was prepared between 5.10 p.m. to 5.40
p.m. and the search was conducted between 5.40 p.m. to
5.50 p.m. and thereafter, arrest memo was prepared
between 5.50 p.m. to 6.20 p.m. The petitioners were
arrested at 6.30 p.m. and there is no unreasonable
detention of the accused persons than what is required for
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[19]
conducting search by following the mandate of Section 42
and Section 50 of NDPS Act. When 24 hours is calculated
from 6.30 p.m. on 9-10-2024, production of accused before
Jurisdictional Magistrate at 5.30 p.m. on 10-10-2024 is well
within 24 hours. Therefore, the impugned remand order of
Jurisdictional Magistrate is perfectly in order and does not
call for any interference.”
(b) 2026 SCC OnLine Ker 13043 “Arun K. Thomas Vs.
Narcotic Control Bureau, represented by the Sub-
Inspector” wherein a learned Single Judge of the Hon’ble
High Court of Kerala held as under:-
“20. Section 42 of the NDPS Act deals with the power of entry,
search of any building, conveyance or place, seizure and
arrest without warrant or authorisation. Of relevance in the
present context is Section 42(d) which says “detain and
search”, and if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom
he has reason to believe to have committed any offence
punishable under the Act. Section 43 deals with the power
of seizure and arrest in a public place. Here also, the
section uses the expression “detain and search any
person”……under the Act, and if such person has any …..,
arrest him and any other person in his company. Thus,
both Sections 42 and 43 preserve a doctrinal distinction
between investigative detention and custodial arrest. It is
significant to note that “detention for the purpose of
search” is distinct and different from the “arrest and
detention in custody” that forms the underpinning of Art.
22(2) of the Constitution. Under the scheme of the NDPS
Act, “detain and search” is only temporary restraint and
does not involve infraction of personal liberty.”
“20(a) The Supreme Court in Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat (2024
SCC OnLine SC 520) has held that the statutory provisions
conferring authorities with the power to search and seize
are a mere temporary interference with the right of the
accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[20]
restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions
themselves and such a power cannot be considered as a
violation of any fundamental rights of the person
concerned. Consistent with the jurisprudence that a search
and seizure procedure does not violate any fundamental
rights, the restraint on a person in the event of a search
under the circumstances indicated in the Act is therefore
not an infraction of any fundamental right.”
“20(b) In the context of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, the arrest
contemplated therein is triggered on the satisfaction or on
the threshold of “reason to believe” and not on the mere
finding of the contraband. In the context of Section 43(b) of
the NDPS Act i.e. the search in a public place, it is triggered
on the finding itself failing which the threshold does not
reach. In either case, it is to be noticed that the detention
for the purpose of search following the statutory procedure
does not amount to detention in custody following an
arrest or effective detention.”
“20(c) Whether the search and seizure procedure has been
deliberately or unduly delayed and whether such delay
would have consequences is another matter. However, as
a general proposition, the arrest and consequently the
twenty-four hour rule for the purpose of Art. 22(2)
commences only from the completion of the “search and
seizure” that may lead to the arrest and detention in
custody of the person. This is so because there is no
element of detention in custody in the context of Art. 22(2)
amid a search and seizure and it is only when the arrest
and detention in custody occurs that the twenty-four hour
rule gets attracted. The constitutional reckoning of time
begins only from arrest, not from antecedent detention
during search or enquiry.”
“21. Rule 3 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
(Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 (for
short, NDPS Disposal Rules) prescribes the procedure for
classification, weighing, packaging and numbering of
seized narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[21]
controlled substances. Sub-rule (4) mandates that these
processes shall be carried out in the presence of the
search witnesses and the person from whose possession
the contraband was recovered, with a specific recital to
that effect in the panchnama drawn at the place of seizure.
Sub-rule (5) further requires that a detailed inventory of the
packages, containers, conveyances and other seized
articles be prepared and appended to the panchnama.”
“21(a) The statutory scheme thus accords due sanctity to the
disposal process, which was earlier regulated only by
executive Standing Orders. The Rule integrates the acts of
classification, weighing, packaging and numbering into
the seizure procedure itself, thereby making them part of
the continuum of search and seizure. In consequence, the
time consumed in implementing these safeguards is
statutorily absorbed into the investigative stage. Such
restraint or detention during seizure does not ipso facto
amount to arrest. Accordingly, the period taken for
compliance with Rule 3— being incidental to seizure and
essential for evidentiary integrity— stands outside the
ambit of the twenty-four hour mandate under Article 22 of
the Constitution. The constitutional reckoning of time
commences only upon formal arrest, not during
antecedent detention necessitated by statutory
procedures of seizure and inventory.”
“22. Section 50 of the NDPS Act deals with conditions under
which a search of a person shall be conducted. It ordains
that when an empowered officer proposes to search the
person of a suspect, such individual must be apprised of
the right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a
Magistrate. In effectuating this statutory mandate, the
officer may necessarily detain the suspect until the choice
is exercised and the search duly conducted. Such
detention, however, is investigative in character. It is a
procedural restraint designed to secure compliance with
the statutory safeguard, and does not ipso facto amount to
arrest. Arrest occurs only when liberty is formally curtailed
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[22]
after incriminating material is found and custody is
imposed. It is only at that stage that the constitutional and
statutory guarantees of production before a Magistrate
within twenty-four hours under Article 22(2) of the
Constitution and Section 58 of BNSS (57 of CrPC) are
attracted.”
“25. Taken together, these provisions delineate a graduated
spectrum of interaction between enforcement authorities
and individuals“ranging from mere enquiry or information
gathering to examination upon summons and finally formal
arrest followed by detention. Each stage is hedged by
statutory procedure, constitutional safeguards, and the
principle of proportionality, thereby ensuring that any
restraint upon personal liberty is justified, documented,
and effected strictly in accordance with the “procedure
established by law” under Article 21. The distinction
between investigative detention for purposes of enquiry
and custodial arrest is critical: the former permits
temporary restraint under statutory authority, while the
latter alone attracts the full panoply of custodial
safeguards, including the commencement of the twenty-
four hour reckoning for production before a Magistrate.
These statutory schemes underscore the legislature's
careful balance between investigational necessity and the
protection of fundamental rights. Compliance with
prescribed procedure is the very essence of Article 21; any
restraint imposed dehors statutory authority or without
adherence to procedural safeguards degenerates into
illegal detention.”
Findings and Conclusions
“26. The upshot of the above discussion is that though the
statutory and constitutional period of twenty-four hours to
produce an accused before a Magistrate commences from
the time the accused was effectively detained or his liberty
was curtailed, without the sanction of law, as held in
Biswajit Mandal (supra), it cannot be said to invariably
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[23]
begin from the moment a person is detained in all cases.
Pre-arrest detention is permissible where explicitly
authorised by statute-such as under Sections 179(1) and
35(3) of BNSS (160(1) and 41-A of CrPC), Sections 67, 42,
43 and 50 of the NDPS Act, Rule 3 of the NDPS Disposal
Rules, Section 50 of the PMLA, or Sections 107 and 108 of
the Customs Act-which provide a clear procedural
framework for enquiry or limited restraint of liberty. In such
cases, the reckoning of the twenty-four hours begins only
upon formal arrest. In all other circumstances, any
deprivation of liberty prior to arrest must be treated as part
of the detention period, and the statutory timeline for
judicial oversight is triggered at that point. This
understanding, evolved through judicial precedents,
ensures uniform compliance with procedural safeguards,
prevents arbitrary delay, and upholds the constitutional
protection of personal liberty, while permitting
investigatory authorities to act within the bounds of law
where specific statutory provisions allow pre-arrest
detention for enquiry. It preserves the equilibrium between
the necessity of effective investigation and the prohibition
against arbitrary or wanton restraint of liberty. Whether a
person has been subjected to illegal detention prior to the
formal recording of arrest is a matter to be carefully
assessed in the light of the circumstances disclosed in
each case.”
[10] The learned Sr. PCCG further submitted that the principle of
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court at para. 7 of Niranjan Singh
( supra ) has been considered and explained by a Full Bench of the
Hon’ble High Court of Madras in the case of “Roshan Beevi & ors.
Vs. Joint Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & ors.”
reported in 1983 SCC OnLine Mad 163 and that the explanation given
by the Full Bench is applicable in the present case. The relevant
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[24]
paragraphs relied on by the learned Sr. PCCG of Roshan Beevi are
reproduced hereunder:-
“21. In support of his proposition, Mr. Rangavajjula would draw
the attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar, AIR 1980 SC 785 : (1980
Cri LJ 426), wherein S. 439, Cr. P.C. came up for
consideration. In that case, the Supreme Court posed a
question for consideration and answered the same as
follows:
“When is a person in costody within the meaning of
S. 439, Cr. P.C.? When he is in duress either because he
is held by the investigating agency or other police or
allied authority or is under the control of the Court, having
been remanded by judicial order or having offered himself
to the Court's jurisdiction and submitted to its order by
physical presence. No lexical dexerity or precedential
profession is needed to come to the realistic conclusion
that he who is under the control of the Court or in the
physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in
custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is of
elastic semantics and its core meaning is that the law has
taken control of the person. Equivocatory quibblings and
the hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in Court that
the police have taken a man into informal custody but not
arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but
not taken him into formal custody and the other like
terminological dubieties (sic) are unfair evasions of the
straight-forwardness of the law. We need not dilate on
this shady facet here because we are satisfied, that the
accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge
and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose. Custody in
the context of S. 439 (we are not, be it noted, dealing with
anticipatory bail under S. 438) is physical control or at
least physical presence of the accused in Court with
submission to the jurisdiction and order of the Court. He
can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him,
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[25]
produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to
judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial
custody when he surrenders before the Court and
submits to its directions.”
“22. In order to fully understand the above view expressed by the
Supreme Court, let us have a cursory glance of Section 439,
Cr. P.C. (which corresponds to S. 498 of the old Code). The
unfettered discretionary power of the High Court and the
Court of Session under Sec. 439 of the Code in granting bail
can be exercised only on the satisfaction of two conditions:
Firstly, the person who moves for bail must be a person
accused of an offence, bailable or non-bailable, and secondly
he must be in custody. The Supreme Court in Niranjan
Singh's case (AIR 1980 SC 785) : (1980 Cri LJ 426), on being
satisfied that the first condition has been fulfilled, gave the
meaning of the term ‘in custody’ while considering the
fulfilment of the second condition. Be it noted that in the said
case their Lordships did not express the view that the mere
taking of a person into custody by an authority empowered to
arrest, or the mere presence of the accused is enough to
constitute the arrest of the accused, but only emphasized that
the physical control or at least physical appearance of the
accused in Court should be coupled with the submission to
the jurisdiction and orders of the Court. In other words, the
person who is accused of an offence should submit himself
to the jurisdiction or orders of the authority empowered to
arrest.”
“23. Coming to the Customs Act, a person who appears before any
officer of Customs on being required for an enquiry in
connection with the smuggling of any goods, under Section
107 of the Customs Act, or a person who attends before any
gazetted officer of Customs on summons in connection with
an enquiry relating to the smuggling of any goods, under S.
108 of the said Act, is not a person accused of an offence at
that stage. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Rangavajjula that
since the person so required or summoned under the above
said provisions comes under the custody of the Customs
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[26]
Officials, he must be deemed to have been arrested in the
light of the interpretation by the Supreme Court of the term ‘in
custody’ occurring in S. 439 of the Code in Niranjan's case
(1980 Cr LJ 426), cannot be accepted. In fact, their Lordships
themselves have pointed out in that judgment that there is a
shady facet in the expression of the term in ‘custody’. Hence,
this decision cannot be availed of by the learned counsel in
support of his contention that the mere taking of a person into
custody would amount to arrest.”
[11] After a careful examination of all the materials available on
record and after a careful consideration of the rival submission made
by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this court is of the
considered view that only one issue needs to be considered and
decided in the present case. The issue is from which point of time, the
period of 24 hours as stipulated under Article 22(2) of the Constitution
will commence? In my humble opinion, this issue is no longer
res-integra .
In a recent judgment dated 05-11-2026 passed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Sri Sujit Das & ors. Vs. Union
of India, 2026 INSC 1195”, this issue has been considered elaborately
and held as under:-`
“69. In the circumstances, we would like to summarize our
conclusions as under:
(i) the 24 hours timeline as mandated under clause (2) of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India would commence
from the date and time of detention of the person detained
when his liberty stands curtailed and not from the time of
his formal arrest;
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[27]
(ii) in the event, such detention continues beyond 24 hours
before the person is produced before a magistrate, he
shall be forthwith released from custody;
(iii) while computing the 24 hours deadline, no other time
period is permitted to be excluded therefrom except the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to
the court of the magistrate;
(iv) the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman
Pattnayak, Madras High Court in Kannan and Kerala High
Court in Arun K. Thomas do not lay down the correct law
qua interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the
Constitution of India;
(v) the detaining authority should keep in mind not only the
24 hours deadline mandated by clause (2) of Article 22 of
the Constitution but also ensure that such detention
should not extend beyond a reasonable period within the
24 hours period considering the circumstances of the
case in terms of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);
(vi) at the time of production, the magistrate is duty bound to
record the actual date and time of detention of the person
produced before him when his liberty stood curtailed and
examine whether the 24 hours deadline has been
complied with or not from the time of such detention. If
there is breach of the 24 hours deadline, the concerned
person shall be released forthwith from detention;
(vii) the magistrate shall also examine at the time of
production whether the production of the person
produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours,
has exceeded the period which can be construed to be
reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is
satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer
period that what is reasonable, he may decline remand;
(viii) in so far the present case is concerned, for the reasons
cited in paragraphs 65, 66 and 67 above, the detention of
the appellants was not only in breach of clause (2) of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India but was for a period
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[28]
beyond what can be construed to be a reasonable period
considering all the circumstances of the case which was
in contravention of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);
(ix) consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment and
order of the High Court dated 24.04.2026 and direct that
the appellants shall be produced before the jurisdictional
Special Court within a maximum period of 7 days from
today whereafter they shall be released on bail on such
terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate.”
[12] At para 69(iv) of Sri Sujit Das ( supra ), the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman
Pattanayak , Madras High Court in Kannan and Kerala High Court
in Arun K. Thomas, which have been relied on by the Sr. PCCG on
behalf of the respondent, do not lay down the correct law qua
interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India.
[13] Keeping in view the ratio decidendi and in the light of the
decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sri Sujit Das (supra) , this court proceeded to consider the present
case. In the present case, it is an admitted fact and on record that the
two accused persons were stopped and detained by the team of NCB
at 0300 hrs. of 25-09-2025 and the search-cum-seizure of the
contraband drugs and other articles were completed at about 0630 hrs.
of 25-09-2026. It is also an undisputed fact and on record that the two
accused persons were produced before the Special Judge (ND & PS),
Chandel, on 26-09-2025. In the present case, considering these
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[29]
undisputed facts, this court has no hesitation to arrive at a conclusion
that the 24 hrs. period as stipulated under Article 22(2) of the
Constitution of India shall commence on and from 0300 hrs. of
25-09-2025, when the said two accused persons were stopped and
detained by the NCB team.
[14] Even though neither the petitioner nor the respondent
have stated the exact time of the production of the said accused
persons before the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, this court
can reasonably arrived at a conclusion that the accused persons
were produced before the said court only after 0300 hrs. of 26-09-2025
as it will be unreasonable to presume that the said Special Judge would
be on duty at such an early hour. It will be also reasonable to arrive
at a conclusion that the NCB team must have produced the said
two accused persons after 10:00 AM of 26-09-2025, i.e., during court
hours.
[15] In view of the above, the reasonable conclusion is that the
said two accused persons were produced before the court beyond the
period of 24 hours as mandated under Article 22 thereby resulting in
violation of the fundamental rights of the said two accused persons as
guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, this
court is of the considered view that the impugned remand order dated
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-
[30]
26-09-2025 and the detention of the Accused No. 2 in judicial custody
is rendered illegal. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26-09-2025
passed by the Special Judge (ND & PS), Chandel, is hereby quashed
and set aside. Consequently, the respondent is hereby directed to
produce the Accused No. 2, viz., Letminthang Khongsai, aged
about 42 years, S/o Jamsei Khongsai, resident of Sugnu,
Utangpokpi, Chandel District, Manipur, before the Special Judge
(ND & PS), Chandel, within a maximum period of seven days from
today whereafter he shall be released on bail on such terms and
conditions as may be deemed appropriate.
With the aforesaid directions, the present petition is hereby
disposed of.
JUDGE
FR/ NFR
Devananda
Cril. Petn. No. 17 of 2026 Contd,,,/-