BAPI@SANTOSH KUMAR BEDANT vs STATE OF ODISHA

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.503 of 2022

CNR No. ODHC010413502022
(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of Criminal
Procedure Code )
Bapi @ Santosh Kumar Bedant Appellant
…….

-Versus-
State of Orissa Respondent
…….

For the Appellant : Mr. Sk. Zafarulla, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr. Sarita Moharana, ASC

CRLA No.504 of 2022
CNR No. ODHC010413602022
(In the matter of an application under Section 374(2) of Criminal
Procedure Code)
Anil @ Biswajit Dalasinghary ……. Appellant

-Versus-
State of Odisha ……. Respondents

For the Appellant : Mr. B.S. Dasparida, Advocate

For the Respondents : Ms. Sarita Moharana, ASC

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 11.08.2026 :: Date of Judgment: 25.08.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The instant appeals arise out of the same cause of
action and, accordingly, are being heard and disposed of analogously.
2. Both the appeals are directed against the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 09.05.2022 passed by the learned Assistant
Sessi
ons Judge (Women’s Court), Jagatsinghpur, in C.T. Case No. 62 of
2018 (Comp.282 of 2018), whereby the appellants have been convicted
for the offences punishable under Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 9 years and
to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each, in default whereof to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 6 months for the offence under
Section 307/34 of the IPC, and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default whereof
to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of 3 months for
the offence under Section 326/34 of the IPC. The learned trial Court has
directed that the substantive sentences shall run consecutively, with the

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sentence imposed under Section 307/34 of the IPC to run first and, upon
its expiration, the sentence imposed under Section 326/34 of the IPC to
follow.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 18.04.2009 at about 7.15
P.M., the victim, (name withheld), daughter of the informant, Smt.
Kabita Roul, was returning from her aunt’s house along with her cousin
brother. When they reached near the telephone exchange situated near
the rented house of the then Ex-Sarpanch of Kanakpur G.P., Sri
Baradaprasana Sahu, the accused persons, namely, Santosh Kumar
Bedanta and another person, allegedly hurled acid at the victim and fled
from the spot on a numberless motorcycle. Hearing the commotion, local
people gathered at the spot and brought the victim to her house. She was
thereafter shifted to the Jagatsinghpur Medical and, subsequently, to
S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, where she was
undergoing treatment in Surgical Ward, Cabin No.3. On 04.05.2009, the
informant lodged a written report at Kanakpur Outpost, on the basis of
which Tirtol P.S. Case No.79 of 2009 was registered under Sections
328/307/326/506/34 of the IPC.

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4. During investigation, the Investigating Officer, Pandav Ch.
Behera, examined the informant and other witnesses, recorded their
statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., visited the spot, prepared
the spot map and issued a medical requisition in favour of the victim to
the Superintendent, S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack.
However, he subsequently submitted a final report stating that the name
and address of the accused persons were false and that the case would be
reopened if any clue was received in future. Thereafter, on 04.09.2017,
the case was reopened on the basis of information received from the
victim pursuant to the order of the learned Court. The investigation was
thereafter taken up by I.O. Balaram Nayak, who revisited the spot,
examined the witnesses, issued a fresh injury requisition in favour of the
victim and arrested the accused persons, namely, Santosh Kumar
Bedanta and Anil Dalsinghray. Upon completion of investigation,
charge-sheet was submitted against them for the offences punishable
under Sections 328/326-A/307/506/34 of the IPC. Subsequently, charges
were framed against them on 06.08.2018, by the learned CJM-cum-ASJ,
Jagatsinghpur for the aforesaid offences U/s.328/326/307/506/34 of IPC.

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The accused persons denied the charges and claimed to be tried. As a
result of which, they were committed to the Court of Sessions for Trial.
5. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined eighteen
witnesses in all. P.W.3, is the victim; P.W.6, Kabita Roul, is the mother
of the victim and also the informant; and P.W.7, Bhaskar Das, cousin
brother of the victim who is also an eyewitness to the occurrence.
P.W.18 is the Investigating Officer, whereas P.W.16, Dr. Srikanta Panda,
is the medical officer who examined the victim. P.Ws.4, 9, 11 and 13 are
the seizure witnesses. The remaining witnesses are post-occurrence
witnesses. The prosecution also relied upon the documentary and
material evidence brought on record. The accused persons, however, did
not adduce any evidence in their defence.
6. The present case involves an allegation of violence against a
woman, and the learned trial Court, in arriving at its conclusion, has
placed considerable reliance upon the evidence of the victim, the
eyewitness, who is stated to be the cousin brother of the victim, and the
other prosecution witnesses. In order to properly appreciate the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court and before examining the impugned

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judgment, it would be apposite to revisit and carefully analyse the
evidence of the victim and the eyewitness to the occurrence.
The relevant part of the evidence of the P.W.3 is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:
“2. The occurrence took place on 18th April, 2009 at about 7.15
PM. That day I was returning from my aunt's place sitting on a
cycle with my cousin brother namely, Bhaskar Das. In between
Kanakpur-Haripur road near BSNL Tower, I saw Anil driving a
motorcycle towards us and Santosh Bedanta was sitting on the
pillion.
3. The accused persons came from the front and stopped us and
Santosh Bedanta asked me to marry him and when I refused, he
poured acid from a bottle on my face saying that if you don't marry
me, you cannot marry anyone else. I suffered excruciating pain
and shouted loudly and people came to the spot. Tunga Mallick,
Parikhit Roul and others rushed to me and took me to my house
where my mother caught hold of me and asked me who did it I told
her that Santosh Kumar Bedanta and another came to us and
Santosh poured acid on my face.
4. Pradipta Roul was present at the spot and took me to DHH,
Jagatsinghpur accompanied by my mother and others. I was
referred for treatment to SCB Medical College & Hospital,
Cuttack.
5. To Court: The left ear has been totally destroyed, the scalp and
hair completely destroyed, both eyes damaged with very poor eye
sight in left eye after corneal transplant and facial skin severely
scarred along with neck, chest, shoulders and back.
6. I sustained injury on my head, chest, back, shoulder, hands &
other parts of the body. I had undergone treatment in the SCB
Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack for about eight months.
Thereafter, I was admitted in a private nursing home for the
purpose of physiotherapy. Since. I was completely blind I got
admitted in Sankar Netralaya, Chenai for treatment of my eyes.
Now also, I am undergoing treatment in the said Sankar
Natralaya, Chenai where left side cornea of the eye was

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transplanted as a result I am able to see to some extent and I can

produce the all relevant medical papers in this court, if required.”
The aforesaid testimony of P.W.3 is relevant for the purpose of
appreciating the manner in which the occurrence took place and the
injuries sustained by her. Though she was extensively examined and
cross-examined, she remained consistent on the material particulars of
the occurrence, particularly with regard to the identity of the assailants
and the manner in which the acid was allegedly poured upon her. During
her further examination, she also stated that, “ On account of acid attack
I have sustained 46% burn injury and 86% disability. ”
The evidence of P.W.7, Bhaskar Das, who is stated to have
accompanied the victim at the time of occurrence and to have witnessed
the incident, also assumes significance. His testimony contains a detailed
account of the occurrence and materially corroborates the version of
P.W.3 with regard to the presence of the accused persons at the spot and
the manner in which the occurrence took place. It would, therefore, be
apposite to refer to the relevant portion of his evidence. In his evidence,
he stated thus:

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“1. I know the informant of this case. I also know the victim of this
case. I know both the accused persons who are standing in the
dock. The occurence took place on dated 18.04.2009 at about 7.05-
7.10 P.M near BSNL Tower situated on the way going from
Deulipada village to Saharahat. On that date I along with the
victim had been to the house of our aunt which is situated at
Deulipada village and return at about 7.00 P.M.
2. On that date while we were returning to our house and going
from Saharahat towards Sarala Temple then near BSNL Tower the
accused persons came by one motor cycle and crossed us. At that
time the accused anil was riding that motorcycle and the accused
Santosh was siting behind him. After crossing us both the accused
persons turned their motorcycle and came towards us, and stopped
infront of us. So I got down from my bicycle.
3. Then the accused Santosh came and asked the victim whether
she would marry him or not and also stated that "Tu jadi mora
habu ni tahele kahara hebaku debini". There the accused Santosh
brought out one bottle from his bag and poured acid on the head of
the victim for which the victim cried out loudly and fell down and
was also scratching the ground. I saw that immediately after the
incident the face of the victim became of black colour and all her
hair fell down from her head.
4. After pouring the acid the accused Santosh fled away from the
spot towards Saharahat. At that time about 4-5 persons were there
near Biswambar bridge, who came near to us after hearing the cry
of the victim and then the person namely Parikhit Roul took the
victim to her house by one scooter of one passer-by. ”
7. By relying principally upon the evidence of the prosecutrix
(P.W.3), the eyewitness (P.W.7), the informant (P.W.6) and the other
prosecution witnesses, the learned trial Court proceeded to assess the
prosecution case. The learned trial Court attached considerable
significance to the fact that P.W.3 herself was the injured victim of the
occurrence and had withstood extensive cross-examination without any

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material contradiction or infirmity being brought out in her testimony.
The learned trial Court also took note of the fact that P.W.3 had
identified the accused persons as the persons responsible for the
occurrence. While dealing with the evidentiary value of the testimony of
an injured witness, the learned trial Court relied upon the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Man Singh and
1 2
others and Bijay Sankar Sindhe v. State of Maharashtra , and
observed that the testimony of an injured witness ordinarily carries
greater evidentiary weight and is not to be discarded lightly in the
absence of compelling reasons.
The learned trial Court further found corroboration to the
testimony of P.W.3 in the evidence of P.W.6, the mother of the victim,
who stated that accused Santosh used to disturb the victim while she was
proceeding to college and had also telephoned her and expressed his
desire to marry her, which proposal had been declined by the victim and
her family members. According to the learned trial Court, this

1
2003 (3) Crimes 380 (SC)
2
2008 (1) Crimes 216 (SC)

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circumstance furnished a possible motive for the occurrence and lent
assurance to the version of P.W.3 regarding the conduct of accused
Santosh immediately preceding the incident.
The learned trial Court also considered the absence of any
suggestion in cross-examination as to why the victim would falsely
implicate the accused persons in an incident of such a serious nature. It
observed that no material had been brought on record to suggest any
reason for P.W.3 to falsely implicate the appellants or to shield the actual
perpetrators of the crime. On the question of the applicability of Section
307 of the IPC, the learned trial Court proceeded on the premise that the
consequence of pouring a large quantity of corrosive substance upon the
head of the victim was such that the accused must be attributed with the
requisite knowledge or intention that such an act was likely to cause
death. On the cumulative assessment of the evidence, the learned trial
Court accordingly concluded that the prosecution had established the
charge under Section 307 of the IPC.

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In a similar manner, upon appreciation of the ocular and medical
evidence, the learned trial Court also held the appellants guilty of the
offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
However, it did not find the prosecution case sufficient to establish the
charges under Sections 328 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
Thus, while recording a finding of guilt in respect of the offences under
Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC, the learned trial Court acquitted the
appellants of the offences under Sections 328/506/34 of the IPC. The
relevant findings recorded by the learned trial Court are extracted
hereunder:
“12. It is well settled that usually in matter of this nature testimony
of the injured is sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution.
P.W.3, the injured withstood searching cross-examination and
identified the accused, who had thrown acid on her on the alleged
date of incident. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the
identical circumstances in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs.
Man Singh and others reported in 2003 (3) crimes 380 (SC) at
paragraph 9 held as under
"evidence of injured witnesses have evidentiary
valued and unless compelling reasons exists their
statement are not discarded lightly."
In the case of Bijay Sankar Sindhe Vrs. State of Maharastra
reported in 2008 (1) crimes 2016 (SC) at paragraph no. 9 it is held
as under
"The evidence of injured person who is examined as
witness lent more evidence because normally he

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would not falsely implicate a person thereby
protecting the actual assailant."
P.W.6 also stated that the accused Santosh used to disturb the
victim on her way to college. The accused also called her over
phone and gave his marriage proposal with victim, to which she
rejected the proposal. It is also to be noted here that, the accused
persons have not even suggested remotely to her as to why she is
implicating them falsely with such a ghastly incident. There is
absolutely no material to hold that she is falsely implicating the
accused persons and for what reason. There is nothing to show
contra that either he had no intention or knowledge. The
consequence of pouring large quantity of corrosive substance on
the head is likely to cause death must be known to him.
So the prosecution has successfully proved the offence U/s. 307 of
IPC against the accused.”
8. It would thus appear from the aforesaid findings that the learned
trial Court principally founded the conviction upon the testimony of the
injured victim, P.W.3, which it found to be trustworthy and consistent,
and upon the corroborative evidence of the other prosecution witnesses.
The learned trial Court also relied upon the evidence regarding the
alleged prior conduct of accused Santosh towards the victim as
furnishing the background and motive for the occurrence. In addition,
the evidence of P.W.7 assumes significance as an eyewitness account
which, if found reliable, provides material corroboration to the version of
P.W.3 regarding the presence of the accused persons and the manner of
occurrence.

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It is, however, relevant to notice that the learned trial Court was
conscious of the distinction between the charges framed against the
appellants and did not accept the prosecution case in its entirety. While it
found the evidence sufficient to establish the offences under Sections
307/326/34 of the IPC, it extended the benefit of doubt to the appellants
in respect of the offences under Sections 328/506/34 of the IPC. The
conclusion of the learned trial Court was thus based upon its assessment
of the evidence on a charge-wise basis. The ultimate conclusion recorded
by the learned trial Court reads as follows:
“After detail analysis of the prosecution evidence this Court comes
to the conclusion that prosecution has failed to prove the offence
punishable U/s. 328/506/34 IPC against the accused persons but
prosecution has successfully proved the charge U/s. 307/326/34 of
IPC against the accused/UTPs Santosh Bedant and Anil
Dalasinghray beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly the UTPs
Anil Dalasinghray & Santosh Bedanta are acquitted from the
offences punishable U/s. 328/506/34 of IPC as per provision U/s.
235(I) of Cr.P.C. But at the same time this Court hold them guilty for
offence punishable U/s. 307/326/34 of IPC and convict them there
under as per section 235 (2) of Cr.P.C
….”
9. The aforesaid conclusion of the learned trial Court has been
assailed in the present appeals. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 09.05.2022, whereby the appellants have
been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 307/326/34 of

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the IPC and sentenced as stated hereinbefore, the appellants have
preferred the present appeals. The principal question that, therefore,
arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the prosecution,
particularly the testimony of P.W.3, the injured victim, and P.W.7, the
alleged eyewitness to the occurrence, inspires confidence and is
sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellants for the offences
under Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC.
10. Having given anxious consideration to the evidence on record, the
findings recorded by the learned trial Court and the submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellants, this court find no compelling
reason to take a different view of the matter. The evidence of P.W.3, the
injured victim, is of considerable significance. She has given a clear and
consistent account of the occurrence and has specifically attributed the
act of pouring acid upon her head to appellant Santosh. Her testimony
further discloses the circumstances immediately preceding the
occurrence, including the demand made by Santosh that she should
marry him and the threat accompanying such demand. The fact that
P.W.3 herself sustained extensive and serious injuries in the occurrence

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lends substantial assurance to her presence and version. Her evidence has
remained substantially intact despite extensive cross-examination and no
material contradiction or omission has been brought to notice which
would render her testimony unworthy of reliance.
11. The testimony of P.W.3 receives material corroboration from the
evidence of P.W.7, Bhaskar Das, who was admittedly accompanying the
victim at the relevant time. P.W.7 has furnished a direct account of the
occurrence and has specifically stated that the appellants came on a
motorcycle, approached the victim, and that Santosh, after asking the
victim to marry him, took out a bottle from his bag and poured acid upon
her. He has also described the immediate physical condition of the
victim after the occurrence and the conduct of the accused persons in
fleeing from the spot. The presence of P.W.7 at the place of occurrence
is natural, as he was accompanying the victim while returning from their
aunt's house. There is, therefore, no apparent reason to discard his
testimony merely because he happens to be related to the victim.
Relationship by itself is not a ground to reject otherwise cogent and
trustworthy evidence, particularly when the witness is a natural

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eyewitness and his testimony finds substantial corroboration from the
evidence of the injured victim.
12. The evidence of P.W.6, the mother of the victim, also assumes
relevance. Her testimony regarding the conduct of appellant Santosh
towards the victim prior to the occurrence including his alleged proposal
of marriage and the victim's refusal thereof, furnishes a background to
the occurrence. More importantly, the immediate disclosure made by the
injured victim to her mother after she was brought home is consistent
with the prosecution version. Such contemporaneous disclosure assumes
significance in appreciating the credibility of the victim's testimony.
13.
The nature and gravity of the injuries sustained by P.W.3 also
cannot be lost sight of while appreciating the ocular evidence. The
evidence on record indicates that the victim sustained extensive injuries
to her face, scalp, ear, eyes and other parts of her body and underwent
prolonged treatment. Her evidence that her left ear was destroyed, her
facial skin and other parts of the body were severely scarred and that she
suffered serious damage to her eyes presents a compelling account of the

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consequences of the occurrence. The medical evidence and the
subsequent treatment undergone by her lend assurance to the core of the
prosecution case that she was subjected to a serious acid attack. The
injuries are wholly consistent with the manner of occurrence spoken to
by P.W.3 and P.W.7.
14. This Court also find no substance in the submission that the
appellants have been falsely implicated. No plausible reason has been
brought on record as to why P.W.3, who herself suffered such serious
and permanent consequences, would falsely implicate the appellants
while sparing the actual assailants. Equally, no convincing reason has
been suggested for P.W.7, a natural eyewitness to the occurrence, to
falsely support the version of P.W.3. The absence of any credible motive
for false implication assumes significance in the present case. The
learned trial Court has rightly assessed the evidence in its entirety rather
than relying upon any isolated circumstance.
15. The learned trial Court has also rightly distinguished the charges
which stood proved from those which were not established by the

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prosecution. While finding sufficient evidence to sustain the charges
under Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC, the learned trial Court acquitted
the appellants of the charges under Sections 328/506/34 of the IPC. Such
an approach demonstrates that the learned trial Court did not accept the
prosecution case mechanically or in its entirety, but scrutinized the
evidence with reference to the individual charges. The finding of guilt
under Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC is consequently based upon a
cumulative appreciation of the ocular, medical and surrounding
evidence.
16. So far as the offence under Section 307 of the IPC is concerned,
the act attributed to the appellants, particularly the pouring of acid upon
the head and face of the victim, coupled with the nature and extent of the
injuries caused to her, clearly demonstrates the seriousness of the assault.
The manner in which the corrosive substance was used and the part of
the body targeted are circumstances from which the requisite intention or
knowledge can legitimately be inferred. The subsequent consequences
suffered by the victim further reinforce the gravity of the act. The
learned trial Court was, therefore, justified in holding that the

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prosecution had established the charge under Section 307 read with 34 of
the IPC.
The conviction under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the IPC
also warrants no interference. The evidence establishes that the
appellants acted in furtherance of the common intention emerging from
their concerted conduct at the place of occurrence. The presence of
appellant Anil as the person riding the motorcycle, the manner in which
both the accused persons approached the victim together, and their
conduct immediately before and after the occurrence constitute relevant
circumstances for drawing the necessary inference regarding their
participation in the occurrence. The fact that the actual act of pouring
acid is attributed specifically to Santosh does not, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, absolve the other appellant of liability when
the evidence establishes the common participation of both in the
occurrence.
17. Upon an overall assessment of the evidence, it is found that the
learned trial Court has assigned cogent and legally sustainable reasons

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for recording the conviction. The appreciation of evidence by the learned
trial Court does not suffer from any perversity, material misreading of
evidence or disregard of any material circumstance. The findings
recorded are supported by the testimony of the injured victim, the
eyewitness, the informant and the medical and surrounding
circumstances. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any material
infirmity in the reasoning adopted by the learned trial Court warranting
interference by this Court in appellate jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the
appellants beyond reasonable doubt for the offences punishable under
Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC.
18. At this stage, Mr. Zafarulla, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, without entering into the merits of the case, confines his
submissions to the question of sentence. It is submitted that the
appellants have already undergone more than eight years of
incarceration. Learned counsel further contends that the learned trial

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Court erred in directing the substantive sentences imposed under
Sections 307/34 and 326/34 of the IPC to run consecutively, instead of
concurrently, particularly when both the offences arise out of the same
occurrence and form part of the same transaction. According to learned
counsel, directing the sentences to run consecutively has the effect of
subjecting the appellants to successive punishment in respect of offences
arising from the very same transaction, which is impermissible in the
facts and circumstances of the present case. It is, therefore, submitted
that, having regard to the period of custody already undergone by the
appellants and the fact that the offences arise out of the same transaction,
the substantive sentences may be directed to run concurrently. In support
of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a catena of
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19. Learned counsel for the State, Ms. Moharana, on the other hand,
opposes the prayer for making the substantive sentences concurrent and
submits that, having regard to the nature and gravity of the offences and
the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court, no interference is
warranted with the direction that the sentences shall run consecutively.

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20. In considering the question as to whether the substantive sentences
imposed upon the appellants should run concurrently or consecutively, it
would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
3
Court in O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala , wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Section 31 of the Cr.P.C.
and the principle governing concurrent sentences, referred to the earlier
4
decisions in V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana , Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
5 6
v. Collector of Customs and Manoj v. State of Haryana . In paragraph
16, the H
on’ble Supreme Court observed as follows:
16. When the prosecution is based on single transaction where it
“
constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently.
Imposing separate sentences, when the acts constituting different
offences form part of the single transaction is not justified. So far as
the benefit available to the accused to have the sentences to run
concurrently of several offences based on single transaction, in V.K.
Bansal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 211 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ)
498 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 282] , in which one of us (T.S. Thakur, J.)
was a member, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 217, para 16)
“16. … we may say that the legal position favours
exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in
cases where the prosecution is based on a single
transaction no matter different complaints in relation
thereto may have been filed as is the position in cases
involving dishonour of cheques issued by the

3
(2015) 2 SCC 501
4
(2013) 7 SCC 211
5
(1988) 4 SCC 183
6
(2014) 2 SCC 153

Page 22 of 30

borrower towards repayment of a loan to the

creditor.””
The H
on’ble Supreme Court further referred to the decision in
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain (supra)
and noticed the principle of the “single
transaction rule” in the following terms:
This Court in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of
“17.
Customs [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4
SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] , recognised the basic rule of
conviction arising out of a single transaction justifying the
concurrent running of the sentences. The following passage in this
regard is relevant to be noted : (SCC p. 187, para 10)
“10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been
the so-called single transaction rule for concurrent
sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two
offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong
to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and
legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule
has no application if the transaction relating to
offences is not the same or the facts constituting the
two offences are quite different.”
In Manoj v. State of Haryana [(2014) 2 SCC 153 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 763] the Bench followed Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
case [ Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs , (1988) 4 SCC
183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] . ”
It is, however, equally necessary to bear in mind the subsequent
clarification made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the same judgment.
While considering the effect of Section 31 of the Cr.P.C., the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed:
“18. While referring the matter to a larger Bench, the Bench
observed that in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain case [Mohd. Akhtar

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Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 921] , Section 31 CrPC was not noticed by this Court. It is to
be pointed out that in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain case [Mohd. Akhtar
Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 921] and Manoj case [(2014) 2 SCC 153 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri)
763] , the appellants who were convicted for different counts of
offences arose out of a single transaction, favouring the exercise of
discretion to the benefit of the accused that the sentences shall run
concurrently. Those decisions are not cases arising out of
conviction at one trial of two or more offences and therefore,
reference to Section 31 CrPC in those cases was not necessitated.
”
The position was ultimately authoritatively sett
led by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in paragraph 21 of the said judgment, which reads as
follows:
Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that Section
“21.
31 CrPC leaves full discretion with the court to order sentences for
two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having
regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. We do not find any reason to hold that
normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and
exception is to make the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the
court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence
may run after the other, in such order as the court may direct. We
also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in Mohd.
Akhtar Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs,
(1988) 4 SCC 183 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and Section 31 CrPC.
”
21.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid observations makes the legal
position clear. The earlier decisions referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court recognise that where multiple offences arise out of a single
transaction, concurrent running of sentences is a permissible and

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legitimate course and that the principle of extending such benefit to the
O.M.
prisoner is well recognised. At the same time, paragraph 21 of
Cherian makes it equally clear that such concurrency is not an inflexible
or automatic consequence of the offences arising from one transaction.
Similar principle was also reiterated in the Judgement of Sunil Kumar v.
7
State of U.P. . Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. vests the Court with discretion
to determine whether the sentences should run concurrently or
consecutively, having regard to the nature of the offences and the
attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, the single-
transaction principle remains a relevant and important consideration, but
it operates as a factor guiding the exercise of judicial discretion rather
than as an absolute mandate. The aforesaid principle has also been
followed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chandra
8
Behera V. State of Orissa wherein, relying upon the aforesaid
principles, the Coordinate Bench exercised its discretion to modify the

7
(2021) 5 SCC 560
8
CRLREV No. 305 of 2026

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direction of consecutive sentencing and directed that the substantive
sentences imposed upon the accused therein shall run concurrently.
22. While exercising such discretion in the matter of sentence, the
Court is also required to bear in mind the broader philosophy of
sentencing. The sentencing process is not confined merely to the punitive
aspect of the offence, but also encompasses the principles of
proportionality, reformation and rehabilitation. In this context, the
Mohd. Giasuddin v. State
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
9
of A.P. , speaking through Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, are apposite. The
ourt observed:
Hon’ble Supreme C
9. Western jurisprudes and sociologists, from their own angle
“
have struck a like note. Sir Samuel Romilly, critical of the brutal
penalties in the then Britain, said in 1817: “The laws of England
are written in blood”. Alfieri has suggested: “society prepares the
crime, the criminal commits it”. George Nicodotis, Director of
Criminological Research Centre, Athens, Greece, maintains that
crime is the result of the lack of the right kind of education. It is
thus plain that crime is a pathological aberration, that the criminal
can ordinarily be redeemed, that the State has to rehabilitate rather
than avenge. The sub-culture that leads to anti-social behaviour has
to be countered not by undue cruelty but by re-culturisation.
Therefore, the focus of interest in penology is the individual, and
the goal is salvaging him for society. The infliction of harsh and
savage punishment is thus a relic of past and regressive times.

9
(1977) 3 SCC 287

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The human today views sentencing as a process of reshaping a
person who has deteriorated into criminality and the modern
community has a primary stake in the rehabilitation of the offender
as a means of social defense. We, therefore, consider a therapeutic,
rather than an “in terrorem” outlook, should prevail in our
Criminal Courts, since brutal incarceration of the person merely
produces laceration of his mind. In the words of George Bernard
Shaw: “If you are to punish a man retributively, you must injure
him. If you are to reform him, you must improve him and, men are
not improved
by injuries.” We may permit ourselves the liberty to
quote from Judge Sir Jeoffrey Streatfield: “If you are going to have
anything to do with the Criminal courts, you should see for yourself
he
the conditions under which prisoners serve their sentences”. In t
same strain a British Buddhist-Christian Judge, speaking to a BBC
reporter underscored the role of compassion:
“ Circuit Judge Christmas Humphreys told the BBC reporter
recently that a Judge looks „at the man in the dock in a
different way, not just a criminal to be punished, but a fellow
human being, another form of life who is also a form of the
same one life as oneself‟. In the context of karuna and
punishment for karma the same Judge said: „The two things
are not incompatible. You do punish him for what he did, but
you bring in a quality of what is sometimes called mercy,
rather than an emotional hate against the man for doing
something harmful. You feel with him, that is what
compassion means‟.”
(The Listener, November 25, 1976, p. 692.)”
10. Incidentally, we may glance at the prison system which leaves
much to be desired in the sense of humanizing and reforming
the man we call criminal.
23.
The aforesaid observations emphasise the reformative dimension
of sentencing and the need to balance the punitive aspect of punishment
with the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the offender. At
the same time, such considerations cannot be viewed in isolation from

Page 27 of 30

the nature and gravity of the offence, the impact upon the victim and the
attendant circumstances of the case. The discretion vested in the Court
under Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. is, therefore, required to be exercised
upon a careful balancing of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances.
24. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the present case
stands on a somewhat distinct footing. The convictions of the appellants
under Sections 307/326/34 of the IPC arise out of the same occurrence
and the same transaction. The offences, though distinct in their legal
ingredients, arise from the very same act and are founded upon
substantially the same set of facts and evidence. At the same time, the
devastating consequences suffered by the victim and the seriousness of
the offence cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, the appellants have
already undergone more than eight years of incarceration. Balancing the
nature and gravity of the offence with the aforesaid mitigating
circumstances, and keeping in view that both the offences arise from a
single transaction, this court is of the considered view that the ends of

Page 28 of 30

justice would be met if the substantive sentences are directed to run
concurrently.
25. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 09.05.2022 passed
by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge (Women’s Court),
Jagatsinghpur, in C.T. Case No. 62 of 2018 (Comp.282 of 2018),
convicting the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections
307/326/34 of the IPC, is hereby upheld. The order of sentence is also
affirmed, however, subject to the following modifications:
(i) the fine imposed for the offence under Section 307/34 of the IPC is
enhanced to Rs.40,000/- each, in default whereof the appellants shall
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year; and
(ii) the fine imposed for the offence under Section 326/34 of the IPC is
enhanced to Rs.10,000/- each, in default whereof the appellants shall
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
(iii) It is further directed that the substantive sentences imposed under
Sections 307/34 and 326/34 of the IPC shall run concurrently instead of
consecutively.

Page 29 of 30

The fine amount so realized shall be disbursed to the victim as
compensation in accordance with Section 357 of the Cr.P.C.
26. Accordingly, the CRLAs are dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
th
Dated the 25 August, 2026/ Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 31-Aug-2026 19:37:23

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