Suresh Bhargava & Ors. vs Laxman Sharma
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~78
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 05.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010539772026
+ RC.REV. 425/2026, CM APPL. 77729/2026 (Stay), CM APPL.
77730/2026 (Ex.), CM APPL. 77731/2026 (Ex. From filing
complete trial court record) & CM APPL. 77732/2026 (Delay
of 2 days in Re-filing the petition)
SURESH BHARGAVA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal,
Advocate.
versus
LAXMAN SHARMA .....Respondent
Through: Nemo.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“ DRC Act ”] and seeks to impugn the
Order dated 27.04.2026 [“ Impugned Order ” ] passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi [“ learned ARC ”]. By way of the Impugned Order,
the learned ARC has dismissed the Application seeking leave to
defend preferred by the Petitioners herein and proceeded to pass
an eviction order as against them .
2. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners confines
his challenge to the Impugned Order to the following grounds:
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a. Firstly, learned counsel for the Petitioner would contend
that the learned ARC has failed to appreciate that the
Respondent had, in the past, purchased and subsequently
sold other properties which were equally suitable for the
purpose of carrying on the business for which the
eviction petition had been instituted on the ground of
bona fide requirement. In support of this contention, he
would place reliance upon the sale deeds dated
09.04.2010 and 03.06.2010, and submit that the said
documents demonstrate that the Respondent had acquired
ownership of the aforesaid properties. He would further
contend that, even if the entirety of the premises acquired
under the said sale deeds was not available to the
Respondent, at least a portion thereof ought to have been
considered as available accommodation for meeting the
alleged business requirement.
b. Secondly, he would submit that the Petitioners herein had
also pleaded that the premises were not required by the
Respondent herein for the bona fide requirement of
starting a business, as the Respondent was engaged in the
real estate development business and the said factum has
been erroneously considered by the learned ARC.
3. It is apposite to note that no further arguments were advanced
by the learned counsel for the Petitioners and it is on the basis of the
aforementioned challenges that this Court shall proceed to adjudicate
the present lis.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
4. This Court has heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of
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the Petitioners at length, and, with his able assistance, perused the
relevant documents as well as the Impugned Order.
5. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
6. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
1
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
2 3
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
7. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
4
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
5
Grover .
8. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
4
2024:DHC:9322
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High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
9. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
10. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
5
2025:DHC:11285
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arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
11. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined. In
this backdrop, it would be apposite for this Court to extract the
relevant portion of the Impugned Order, which reads as under:
“17) Next, it is contended that the petitioner has concealed the fact
that the petitioner had purchased roof of the second floor of
property bearing no. 3277, Gali Raja Wali, Peepal Mahadev, Hauz.
Qazi, Delhi-110006 and thereafter after raising construction over
the said floor sold portion of third, fourth and fifth floor over the
said property prior to the filing of present eviction petition. Hence,
it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not bonafide.
Perusal of record however shows that the present eviction petition
has been filed in the year 2023, whereas the said portions on the
third, fourth and fifth floor on the property bearing no. 3277, Gali
Raja Wali, Pecpal Mahadev, Hauz Qazi, Delhi-110006 were sold
in the year 2010. It is trite to state that time is not static and with
lapse of time, new needs may emerge which were not exist earlier.
Petitioner has already stated in his petition that he requires the
demised premises for setting up business of selling hardware goods
and tools. Furthermore, in the case of Shyam Sunder Ahuja Vs.
Sushil Kumar, 2017 SCC Online Del 10624, the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi has held that the fact that the landlord has sold some
property or let out some property is not a ground to deny the order
of the eviction to the landlord. The relevant extract is reproduced
here under: -
16. Not only so, the petitioner/tenant also did not state that
there was no change in the requirement of the
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respondent/landlord since then. Merely taking a plea that
the respondent/landlord has in the past sold some property
or let out some property has in Narender Kumar Shah
Proprietor Jay Bharat Steels Vs. Malti Narang 2014 SCC
Online Del 3839 and Anil Kumar Bogania Vs. Shiv Rani
2014 SCC Online Del 6645 been held to be not a ground
for denying order of eviction to landlord on the ground of
self-requirement of premises.
18) Further, reference is made to the decision of the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi in the case of Mohinder Singh Vs. Satish Chander
Sik- ka RC Rev. 35/2023 dated 08.10.2025, in which the following
was held:-
"14. Further, the sale of certain premises by the landlord
before filing of the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e)
of the DRC Act are irrelevant and immaterial as they
cannot be a determining factor for his need of the subject
premises of present. Once again, sale/purchase/lease of
other properties by the landlord are not an impediment for
a landlord to file eviction proceedings under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. In any event the tenant had
merely made bald and vague assertions with no
substantiation, which in view of the settled position of law
in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and
Deena Nath v. Poora Pooro Lat were insignificant and
inconsequential.
19) Hence, I find that the petitioner has been able to establish his
bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises.
ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
20) With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is
contended by the respondent that the petitioner has concocted the
various alternative accommodations. However, it is a well settled
proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the
property should be available to the petitioner landlord to rule out
the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with
the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property.
In MM Quasim vs/ Manohaal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex
Court has that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to
choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has some
other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to
negative the landlord's claim if the vacant premises were not
suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. In the
light of the said principles, I proceed to consider the contentions of
the respondent.
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21) In the present matter, however, no particulars of any purported
alternative accommodation have been pleaded by the respondent. It
is trite to state that the burden is upon the tenant to show that other
alternative suitable accommodation is available with landlord and
how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement
Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC
Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under:
“18 Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting
the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the
landlord, though at the time of requirement having
alternate premises, having not used the same and instead
having commercially exploited the same, the tenant must
plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right/title
of the landlord to the same: (c) that the said premises were
vacant and available for use at the time of pleaded
requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the
landlord has deprived himself thereof Le, by sale or letting
and support the said pleas with material on the basis
whereof such pleas will be proved”
22) It is also contended that petitioner has alternative
accommodations in the form off shops on third, fourth and fifth
floors, 3277, Gali Raja Wali, Peepal Mahadev, Hauz Qazi. Delhi-
110006. However, it is pertinent to note that nothing has been
brought on record to even prima facie show that the said premises
are lying vacant.
Therefore, it is not the case whereby the said shops are lying vacant
and available as alterative accommodations. Besides, it is a well
settled law that the shop on the ground floor is much more suitable
than a shop on the upper floors from the perspective of both the
buyer and seller. In this regard it is pertinent to note the judgement
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen
Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, is to be noted where it was held
that it is not for the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to
the first floor or any higher floor as it is well known that shops and
businesses are usually conducted on the ground floor, because the
customers can reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court
cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his
business and that is for the landlord himself to decide. Thus, a
ground floor premises is more suitable for commercial purpose
than the premises on upper floor as it has more footfall of the
customers. Therefore, the shop on the upper floors cannot be
considered as a suitable alternative accommodation. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in case of Dilip Singh Kapoor & Ors Vs. Neeraj Khanna &
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Anr, RC.REV. 66/2017, decided on 31.08.2022. Furthermore, the
landlord being the best judge of his own requirement is the best
person to decide as to which premises, he has to choose for
conducting his business and a tenant cannot force the landlord to
conduct his business from the basement or upper floor. It has been
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rahabhar
Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendera Kumar Tandon 72 (1998)
DLT 629 that the landlord is not disentitled from seeking recovery
of the possession of a ground floor merely on the pica that he is
also in possession of the first and second floors, so long as the
court is satisfied with respect to the Bonafide requirement of the
landlord for the tenanted premises. Similarly, in the present matter,
the tenant cannot dictate to the landlord to run his business from
the first floor when it is settled law that the premises on the ground
floor are much more suitable for commercial needs.
23) The Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have
repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the
landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the
landlord is to be best utilised by him. The landlord is the absolute
owner of his property and is the best person to decide which
property is to be utilized in what way The respondent cannot
dictate as to how the landlord is to utilise his property. The
landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific
requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not with
in the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord
regard ing the nature or quality of their chosen stage of the
tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing
any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or
commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court in case of Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors.
RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Therefore, the said contention
also does not amount to any triable issue as it is for the landlord to
decide which premises are suitable and not for the court to sit in
armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available
property of landlord is bast utilized by him.
24) Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any triable
issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as well.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the
Petitioners and upon a perusal of the reasoning adopted by the learned
ARC in the Impugned Order, this Court finds that neither of the
grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners warrants interference in the
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exercise of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
13. The first contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners pertains
to the alleged availability of alternative accommodation with the
Respondent, on the basis of the sale deeds dated 09.04.2010 and
03.06.2010. The submission essentially is that, since the Respondent
had acquired certain properties and subsequently sold portions thereof,
the said properties ought to have been taken into consideration while
examining the bona fide requirement pleaded in the eviction petition.
14. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the learned ARC has
duly taken cognizance of the aforesaid contention and has specifically
dealt with the same in the Impugned Order. The learned ARC has
noticed that the portions of the property bearing No. 3277, Gali Raja
Wali, Peepal Mahadev, Hauz Qazi, Delhi, had been sold in the year
2010, whereas the eviction petition itself came to be instituted in the
year 2023. The learned ARC has, therefore, rightly observed that the
mere fact that the Respondent had sold certain portions of the
aforesaid property more than a decade prior to the institution of the
eviction proceedings would not, by itself, be sufficient to discredit the
bona fide requirement subsequently pleaded by him. The requirement
of a landlord is not static and may undergo a change with the passage
of time. Consequently, a transaction undertaken in the past cannot, in
the absence of any other supporting material, be treated as conclusive
evidence that the requirement pleaded at a subsequent point in time is
not bona fide .
15. Further, insofar as the contention regarding the availability of a
portion of the property acquired under the aforesaid sale deeds is
concerned, this Court finds that the Petitioners have not been able to
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demonstrate that any such portion was lying vacant and was available
to the Respondent for commencing the business in question at the time
of institution of the eviction petition. It is well settled that a mere
assertion regarding the existence of alternative accommodation would
not, by itself, give rise to a triable issue. The tenant is required to
furnish the necessary particulars concerning such accommodation,
establish its availability and demonstrate its suitability for the specific
requirement pleaded by the landlord.
16. In the present case, the learned ARC has specifically noticed
that the Petitioners had failed to place any material on record, even at
a prima facie level, to establish that the shops situated on the third,
fourth and fifth floors of the aforesaid property were lying vacant and
available for the Respondent's use. In the absence of any material
establishing their availability, the mere reference to the earlier sale
transactions cannot be elevated to the status of a triable issue
warranting grant of leave to defend.
17. Even otherwise, the question of suitability of the alleged
alternative accommodation cannot be examined in isolation from the
nature of the business which the landlord proposes to commence. The
learned ARC has taken note of the fact that the premises sought to be
recovered by the Respondent are situated on the ground floor, whereas
the alleged alternative accommodation relied upon by the Petitioners
comprises premises situated on the upper floors. The distinction
assumes relevance, particularly when the requirement pleaded is for
commencing a commercial activity involving the sale of hardware
goods and tools. The accessibility of a commercial establishment and
the convenience of prospective customers are relevant considerations
while examining the suitability of the premises for the proposed
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business.
18. It is trite that it is not for the Court to dictate to a landlord that
he should shift his business to the first floor or any other upper floor,
particularly when the premises situated on the ground floor are more
convenient and accessible to customers. The learned ARC has also
rendered a finding that the premises situated on the upper floors could
not be treated as suitable alternative accommodation so as to defeat
the Respondent's claim.
19. This Court finds no infirmity in the aforesaid approach. The
Petitioners cannot insist that the Respondent should commence his
proposed business from premises situated on the upper floors, merely
because such premises may have been acquired by him at an earlier
point in time. The question is not merely whether some other property
had, at some stage, been owned by the Respondent, but whether any
reasonably suitable accommodation was available to him for meeting
the requirement pleaded in the eviction petition. The learned ARC has
examined this aspect and returned a finding that the Petitioners had
failed to establish either the availability or the suitability of the alleged
alternative accommodation. Such a finding, being founded upon the
material available on record and the settled principles governing the
grant of leave to defend, does not warrant interference in revisional
jurisdiction.
20. The second contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners is
that the Respondent is engaged in the business of real estate
development and, therefore, the requirement pleaded by him for
commencing a business involving the sale of hardware goods and
tools could not be regarded as bona fide . This Court is unable to
accept the aforesaid submission. Merely because a landlord is engaged
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in one line of business, the same does not preclude him from intending
to commence another business or diversify his existing commercial
activities. There is no legal impediment to a landlord seeking
possession of his tenanted premises for the purpose of commencing a
business different from the one in which he may presently be engaged.
21. The mere fact that the Respondent is engaged in the real estate
development business does not, by itself, negate his stated intention of
commencing a business dealing in hardware goods and tools. What is
required to be examined is whether the requirement pleaded is genuine
and whether the material placed on record discloses any circumstance
which would render such requirement wholly implausible or lacking
in bona fides . The Petitioners have not been able to point out any
material which would demonstrate that the Respondent's stated
intention is merely a pretence or that the eviction petition has been
instituted for an oblique purpose. The mere existence of an ongoing
business activity cannot be construed as a circumstance which, by
itself, gives rise to a triable issue regarding the bona fide requirement
of the landlord.
22. It is also relevant to reiterate that, at the stage of consideration
of an application seeking leave to defend, the tenant is required to
disclose such facts as would, if ultimately established, disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. The mere raising of
assertions, without the necessary factual foundation or supporting
material, would not suffice. In the present case, the Petitioners have
sought to rely upon past sale transactions and the Respondent's
existing business activity to dispute the bona fide requirement.
However, neither circumstance, independently or collectively,
establishes the availability of reasonably suitable alternative
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accommodation or otherwise renders the requirement pleaded by the
Respondent doubtful.
23. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the learned
ARC has duly considered the material contentions raised by the
Petitioners, examined the issue of alternative accommodation in the
light of the applicable legal principles and returned findings which are
supported by the material available on record. The Petitioners have
not been able to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, manifest
illegality, material irregularity or perversity in the approach adopted
by the learned ARC. In effect, the challenge sought to be raised is
directed towards inviting this Court to undertake a fresh appreciation
of the material on record and substitute its own view for that of the
learned ARC, which would amount to exercising appellate
jurisdiction, an exercise impermissible within the confines of the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in
the grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioners. The
Impugned Order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting
interference in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
Accordingly, the present Petition is dismissed.
25. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
NOVEMBER 5, 2026 /pd DJ/va
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