Ram Palat And 4 Others vs State Of Up And 8 Others

Reserved on 30.10.2026
Delivered on 06.11.2026
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - B No. - 4744 of 2026
Ram Palat and 4 others
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of UP and 8 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Dinesh Kumar Pandey
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Neha Sonker, C.S.C., Rameshwar
Prasad Shukla
Court No. - 51
HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.
1. Heard Sri Dinesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the
petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4 and Sri
Madan Mohan, Advocate, holding brief of Ms. Neha Sonker, learned
counsel for respondent nos. 6 to 9. Sri Rameshwar Prasad Shukla,
Advocate, has accepted notice on behalf of respondent no. 5.
2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the judgment
and order dated 06.08.2026 passed by the Board of Revenue, Uttar
Pradesh, Prayagraj, in Second Appeal No. SA/24/2000-2001, the
judgment and order dated 06.11.2000 passed by the Additional
Commissioner, Azamgarh Division, Azamgarh, in Appeal No. 261/A of
1998, and the order dated 23.07.1998 passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, in four
consolidated suits instituted under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari

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Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”).
3. The dispute relates to land comprised in Gata No. 455 Mi,
measuring 0.202 hectare, situated in Village Para, Pargana Mahul, Tehsil
Phoolpur, District Azamgarh.
4. The case set up by the petitioners is that they and their
predecessors have been in possession and cultivation of the disputed
land for a period exceeding fifty years. They claim to belong to the
Scheduled Caste community and to be agricultural labourers. It is their
case that the contesting private respondents were not in actual possession
of the disputed land when the benefit of Section 122-B(4-F) of the Act
was extended to them.
5. The petitioners further allege that the private respondents were not
eligible to receive the benefit of the aforesaid provision. In particular, it
is alleged that respondent Raja Ram was employed as a primary school
teacher at the relevant time, whereas the petitioners were agricultural
labourers dependent upon cultivation. The petitioners also allege that the
other contesting respondents were economically better placed and
possessed other agricultural land. These assertions are disputed matters
and are noticed only as part of the petitioners’ case.
6. According to the petitioners, orders dated 29.01.1991 and
15.03.1991 were passed in proceedings under Section 122-B(4-F) of the
Act in favour of the contesting private respondents. The petitioners
contend that the said orders were passed without the private respondents
being in actual possession of the disputed land.
7. The petitioners state that they moved an application for
restoration/recall of the aforesaid orders on 06.06.1991, which was
rejected on 29.01.1996. They thereafter approached the Additional
Commissioner, Azamgarh Division, by filing revision proceedings. The
said proceedings were dismissed by order dated 05.07.1996.

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8. Subsequently, four suits, being Suit Nos. 352, 353, 354 and 355,
were instituted under Section 229-B of the Act, seeking declaration of
the petitioners’ rights as bhumidhars with non-transferable rights in
respect of the disputed land. The petitioners also sought removal of the
names of the contesting private respondents from the relevant revenue
records, alleging that the entries in their favour were illegal. The four
suits were consolidated and decided by a common order dated
23.07.1998 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer/Up-Ziladhikari,
Phoolpur.
9. The appeal preferred against the said order was dismissed by the
Additional Commissioner, Azamgarh Division, by judgment and order
dated 06.11.2000. The petitioners thereafter preferred Second Appeal
No. SA/24/2000-2001 before the Board of Revenue.
10. The Board of Revenue, by order dated 04.08.2022, formulated
five substantial questions of law for consideration in the second appeal.
The questions, in substance, related to the necessity of instituting a suit
under Section 229-B for obtaining bhumidhari rights under Section 122-
B(4-F), the maintainability and effect of a declaratory suit in the face of
an earlier order granting benefit under Section 122-B(4-F), and the
evidentiary value of rent receipts and irrigation slips relied upon by the
parties.
11. The Board of Revenue, by the impugned judgment dated
06.08.2026, dismissed the second appeal. It held, inter alia, that the
benefit under Section 122-B(4-F) had already been extended to the
contesting respondents by earlier orders; that the petitioners had
challenged those orders in the earlier proceedings but had failed; and that
the revenue court dealing with the subsequent suits under Section 229-B
could not pass an order contrary to the earlier orders granting the benefit
under Section 122-B(4-F).

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12. The Board further held that the earlier proceedings had attained
finality and that the subsequent proceedings could not be used to reopen
the determination made therein. It also considered the petitioners’
challenge to the findings concerning the documentary evidence and held
that the questions relating to rent receipts and irrigation slips did not give
rise to substantial questions of law warranting interference in the second
appeal.
13. The Board had earlier passed an interim order dated 20.02.2021
directing the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the disputed
land. The said interim protection stood vacated upon dismissal of the
second appeal.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the courts below
have committed a manifest error in treating the earlier proceedings under
Section 122-B(4-F) as an absolute bar to adjudication of the petitioners’
independent claim for declaration of bhumidhari rights under Section
229-B of the Act.
15. It is contended that Section 122-B(4-D) expressly provides a
remedy to a person aggrieved by an order passed under Section 122-B to
institute a suit before a court of competent jurisdiction for establishing
the right claimed by him in the property. Section 229-B, according to
learned counsel, provides the appropriate statutory forum for
adjudication of a claim to bhumidhari rights.
16. It is further submitted that the revision proceedings decided on
05.07.1996 were before the Additional Commissioner under Section 333
of the Act and were not proceedings under Section 122-B(4-A) before
the Collector. Consequently, the statutory restriction contemplated by
Section 122-B(4-E) was not attracted. Learned counsel submits that an
order passed under Section 122-B(4-F) is not revisable either under
Section 122-B(4-A) or under Section 333 of the Act.

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17. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the earlier
proceedings under Section 122-B(4-F) were summary proceedings and
could not have conclusively determined the interse rights of rival
claimants asserting competing claims founded upon possession. The
petitioners’ independent claim, therefore, required adjudication in the
suits instituted under Section 229-B.
18. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the contesting private
respondents submits that the benefit of Section 122-B(4-F) of the Act
had already been extended to the private respondents by orders passed in
the year 1991. It is contended that the petitioners challenged the said
orders by moving restoration/recall proceedings and thereafter revision
proceedings, which were dismissed. The orders granting the benefit
under Section 122-B(4-F), therefore, attained finality and could not be
reopened through subsequent suits under Section 229-B.
19. Learned counsel further submits that Section 122-B(4-F) confers a
statutory right of bhumidhari with non-transferable rights upon a person
satisfying the conditions prescribed therein. Once such right has accrued
and has been recognised by the competent authority, a subsequent suit
cannot be maintained merely to secure a contrary declaration. Reliance
has been placed upon Manorey alias Manohar, (2003) 5 SCC 521and
Smt. Ram Piyari and Another v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and Others,
1991 RD 192.
20. I have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and have examined the material placed on record.
Since the controversy arising for consideration principally involves the
interpretation of statutory provisions and the legal effect of the earlier
proceedings, and the learned counsel appearing for the parties have been
heard, the writ petition is being decided finally.
21. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether
the earlier orders passed under Section 122-B(4-F), followed by the

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unsuccessful restoration/recall and revision proceedings, could by
themselves constitute an absolute bar to adjudication of the petitioners’
subsequent suits under Section 229-B, without examining the statutory
remedy available to a person aggrieved by an order passed under Section
122-B.
22. A connected question is whether the Board of Revenue was
justified in treating the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in
Manorey alias Manohar (supra), namely, that an eligible occupant need
not institute a suit for declaration of rights under Section 122-B(4-F), as
sufficient to hold that a rival claimant is precluded from instituting a
declaratory suit under Section 229-B.
23. Section 122-B(4-F), in the version applicable to the relevant
proceedings, carves out an exception in favour of an agricultural
labourer belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe who
satisfies the conditions prescribed therein. Upon fulfilment of those
conditions, the statutory consequences contemplated by the provision
follow, including admission as a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights.
The conditions of eligibility, including the applicable date of occupation
and the prescribed ceiling of landholding, must be examined with
reference to the statutory provision as it stood on the legally relevant
date. No finding on the fulfilment of those conditions by any party is
called for in the present writ petition.
24. The legal effect of Section 122-B(4-F) has been authoritatively
explained by the Supreme Court in Manorey alias Manohar (supra). The
Supreme Court held that the provision does not merely afford protection
against eviction but confers a positive statutory right of bhumidhari with
non-transferable rights upon an occupant who fulfils the prescribed
conditions. The right accrues by operation of the statutory provision and
does not depend upon a separate allotment or formal declaration.

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25. The Supreme Court emphasised that the provision is a beneficial
measure of agrarian reform and that full effect must be given to the
statutory fiction by which an eligible occupant is deemed to have been
admitted as a bhumidhar with non-transferable rights. The statutory
benefit, however, is available only to a person who satisfies the
conditions prescribed by the provision.
26. The principle laid down in Manorey alias Manohar (supra) is
binding and is not in dispute. The question before the Supreme Court,
however, concerned the nature of the right conferred by sub-section (4-
F) and the manner in which an eligible occupant could claim the benefit
of that provision. The Supreme Court was not considering the precise
question whether a person aggrieved by an order passed in favour of
another claimant is precluded from instituting a suit to establish his own
independent right in the property.
27. The expression that an eligible occupant need not institute a suit
for declaration of his rights cannot be read as a prohibition against
institution of a suit by another person who is aggrieved by an order
passed under Section 122-B and seeks to establish his own right in the
property. The absence of necessity to institute a suit for obtaining a
statutory benefit is not the same as an express statutory bar against a suit
by a rival claimant.
28. The question of the revisional jurisdiction against an order passed
under Section 122-B(4-F) came up for consideration before a Division
Bench of this Court in Sushila and Another v. State of U.P. and Others,
(2015) 9 ADJ 589. The Division Bench examined the language of
Section 122-B(4-A) and held that the revisional remedy under that
provision is confined to an order passed by the Assistant Collector under
sub-sections (3) or (4). An order passed under sub-section (4-F) does not
fall within either of those provisions. The Division Bench, therefore,
held that no revision under Section 122-B(4-A) is available against an
order passed under Section 122-B(4-F).

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29. The Division Bench further considered the general revisional
jurisdiction under Section 333. It noticed that Section 122-B(4-C)
operates notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 333 and 333-A.
It held that the general revisional jurisdiction under Section 333 cannot
be invoked against an order passed under Section 122-B(4-F),
particularly when no appeal is provided against such an order under the
statutory scheme.
30. In the present case, the Board of Revenue itself records that the
petitioners had pursued revision proceedings under Section 333 before
the Additional Commissioner, which were dismissed by order dated
05.07.1996. Such proceedings cannot be equated with a revision
preferred before the Collector under Section 122-B(4-A), particularly
when the order under challenge was one passed under sub-section (4-F),
against which no such revision was available in law.
31. The distinction assumes significance in the context of Section
122-B(4-E), which provides that no suit referred to in sub-section (4-D)
shall lie against an order of the Assistant Collector if a revision is
preferred to the Collector under sub-section (4-A). The statutory
restriction is specific. It refers to a revision before the Collector under
sub-section (4-A). A proceeding under Section 333 before the Additional
Commissioner against an order under sub-section (4-F), which is not
revisable under that provision, cannot be treated as a revision under sub-
section (4-A) so as to attract the restriction contained in sub-section (4-
E).
32. It follows that the dismissal of the petitioners’ revision
proceedings on 05.07.1996 cannot, merely by reason of its having been
described as a revision, be treated as a statutory revision under Section
122-B(4-A). The precise legal effect of the order dated 05.07.1996,
including any objection founded upon finality or res judicata, is a matter
which may require examination on the original record. However, the said

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order cannot be treated as attracting the specific statutory bar contained
in Section 122-B(4-E).
33. The statutory scheme of Section 122-B does not end with sub-
section (4-F). Sub-section (4-C) provides for finality of orders passed
under Section 122-B, but expressly makes such finality subject to sub-
sections (4-A) and (4-D). Sub-section (4-D) provides that any person
aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Collector or Collector in respect
of any property under Section 122-B may file a suit in a court of
competent jurisdiction to establish the right claimed by him in such
property.
34. The nature of the suit contemplated by Section 122-B(4-D) has
been explained by this Court in Ishlam v. State of U.P. and Others,
Second Appeal No. 172 of 2021, decided on 02.01.2023. This Court held
that a suit under sub-section (4-D) is not a proceeding for judicial review
or an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Collector in the
summary proceedings. It is an independent suit to establish the right of
the person claiming title to the property. If such right is established upon
trial, it would prevail over the conclusion recorded in the summary
proceedings.
35. The Court in Ishlam (supra) further held that where the right
asserted is bhumidhari, the suit for declaration of such right is
cognizable by the revenue court under Section 229-B read with the
relevant entry in Schedule II to the Act. The competent court in such a
case is the Assistant Collector, First Class, and not the civil court. It is,
however, relevant to clarify that Ishlam arose out of proceedings under
Section 122-B(3), followed by a revision under Section 122-B(4-A). Its
discussion of the nature of the suit under Section 122-B(4-D) and the
forum for adjudication of a claim to bhumidhari rights is relevant here;
the decision is not being treated as one which directly decides the
revisional or other consequences of an order passed under Section 122-
B(4-F).

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36. The aforesaid interpretation is consistent with the statutory
scheme. Section 229-B provides for a declaratory suit by a person
claiming to be a bhumidhar. The jurisdiction of the revenue court to
adjudicate such a claim is expressly recognised by the Act. The remedy
under Section 122-B(4-D), read with Section 229-B, thus enables a
person aggrieved by an order concerning the property under Section
122-B to establish his independent claim to bhumidhari rights before the
competent revenue court.
37. The question of competing claims founded upon possession over
Gaon Sabha land has also been considered by this Court in Nand Lal @
Nand Kumar and Another v. State of U.P. and 5 Others, Writ-C No.
27204 of 2018, decided on 22.11.2018. In that case, rival villagers
asserted rights over land on the basis of possession and the benefit of
Section 122-B(4-F) had been extended to one of the claimants. This
Court noticed that the summary machinery under Section 122-B(4-F) did
not provide a mechanism for conclusively determining which of the
competing private claimants was in actual possession. The parties were
left at liberty to approach the appropriate court under the general law or
the relevant land law for declaration of their rights.
38.
A similar principle was noticed in Barendra and Another v. State
of U.P. and 3 Others, Writ-C No. 29430 of 2018, decided on 11.09.2018.
This Court observed that where two individuals claim possession over
land belonging to a Gaon Sabha, the administrative authorities
exercising powers under Section 122-B(4-F) do not have the machinery
to adjudicate the competing claims of possession between the
individuals. The parties have to seek adjudication before the competent
court under the relevant land law or general law.
39. The judgment in Katwaru v. Additional Commissioner,
Administration and Others, Writ-C No. 9013 of 2003, decided on
21.08.2019, also considered the principles laid down in Manorey alias
Manohar (supra) and Barendra (supra). It recognises the distinction

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between the statutory benefit available to an eligible occupant under
Section 122-B(4-F) and the adjudication of competing claims between
private parties. The decision does not dilute the statutory benefit
conferred by sub-section (4-F), but notices the limits of the summary
machinery where rival claims are asserted.
40. The Board of Revenue has principally relied upon the fact that the
orders passed under Section 122-B(4-F) in the year 1991 were
challenged by the petitioners in restoration/recall proceedings and
subsequent revision proceedings, which were dismissed. It has
proceeded on the premise that the said orders had thereby attained
finality and that the revenue court dealing with the subsequent suits
under Section 229-B could not take any view contrary to them.
41. In doing so, the Board of Revenue has not correctly examined the
effect of the Division Bench decision in Sushila (supra). The Board was
required to consider whether the revision proceedings pursued before the
Additional Commissioner under Section 333 were legally maintainable
against orders passed under Section 122-B(4-F). The statutory scheme,
as interpreted by the Division Bench, does not permit such a revision.
42. The Board was also required to examine the effect of Section 122-
B(4-D), which expressly preserves the remedy of a suit for establishment
of the right claimed in the property. The restriction under Section 122-
B(4-E) is confined to the situation specified therein. The Board could not
treat the mere institution and dismissal of a proceeding under Section
333 as equivalent to a revision under Section 122-B(4-A) before the
Collector.
43. The Board has further relied upon the principle that a subsequent
court cannot pass an order contrary to a judicial order which has attained
finality. The principle of finality of judicial orders is undoubtedly
important. However, its application must be considered in the light of the
express statutory remedy under Section 122-B(4-D) and the law declared

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by this Court regarding the nature of orders passed under Section 122-
B(4-F).
44. The question whether the earlier proceedings operate as res
judicata or issue estoppel cannot be answered merely by noting that the
same land was involved in the earlier proceedings. It requires
examination of the nature of the earlier proceedings, the jurisdiction
exercised by the authority concerned, the issues actually raised and
decided, the parties to those proceedings and the relief claimed in the
subsequent suits.
45. The Board of Revenue has not undertaken that exercise in the light
of the statutory scheme and the binding decision in Sushila (supra).
Instead, it has substantially treated the earlier proceedings as an absolute
bar to the petitioners’ subsequent declaratory claims. Such an approach
does not give effect to the remedy expressly preserved by Section 122-
B(4-D).
46. The Board had formulated substantial questions of law concerning
the maintainability and effect of the declaratory suits. Those questions
required consideration of the distinction between Section 122-B(4-F)
and Section 122-B(4-D), the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under
sub-section (4-A), the exclusion of the general revisional jurisdiction
under Section 333, and the nature of the declaratory remedy under
Section 229-B. The Board has not correctly addressed these statutory
aspects.
47. The Additional Commissioner did refer to certain documents,
including receipts and revenue records, and recorded conclusions
regarding their evidentiary value. This Court is conscious that the
appellate authority did not merely reproduce the conclusion of the trial
court. However, its consideration of the documentary material was
undertaken in the context of the earlier orders under Section 122-B(4-F)
and the view that the petitioners could not secure a declaration contrary

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to those orders. The appellate judgment does not demonstrate a complete
adjudication of the petitioners’ independent claim under Section 229-B
after examining the statutory effect of sub-sections (4-C), (4-D) and (4-
E) in the light of the binding decision in Sushila (supra).
48. The Board also considered the questions relating to rent receipts,
irrigation slips and other documentary material and held that they did not
give rise to substantial questions of law. The appreciation of evidence is
ordinarily within the domain of the courts below and a second appellate
forum cannot interfere merely because another view is possible.
However, where the legal premise on which the claim has been treated as
concluded is itself open to correction, the consequential findings require
reconsideration by the competent court in the proper statutory
framework.
49. The error, therefore, is not that the Board was required to
reappreciate every document or to record a finding regarding the actual
possession of the parties. The error lies in treating the earlier orders
under Section 122-B(4-F) and the subsequent proceedings under Section
333 as an absolute bar, without examining the statutory remedy available
under Section 122-B(4-D) and the legal effect of the binding decision in
Sushila (supra).
50. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the private respondents
upon Manorey alias Manohar (supra) and Smt. Ram Piyari (supra) has
also been considered. The proposition that an eligible occupant acquires
the benefit contemplated by Section 122-B(4-F) upon fulfillment of the
statutory conditions is not in dispute. However, the proposition that such
an occupant need not institute a suit for declaration of the statutory right
cannot be extended to hold that a rival claimant is, in every
circumstance, precluded from invoking the declaratory jurisdiction
available under Section 229-B and the suit remedy contemplated by
Section 122-B(4-D). The reliance placed upon Smt. Ram Piyari (supra)
does not dispense with the necessity of examining the express statutory

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remedy contained in Section 122-B(4-D), in the light of the statutory
scheme and the subsequent binding interpretation in Sushila (supra).
51. It is clarified that this Court is not holding that the petitioners have
acquired bhumidhari rights in the disputed land. The statutory conditions
prescribed under Section 122-B(4-F), if relied upon by any party, are
required to be established in accordance with law. The institution of suits
under Section 229-B does not, by itself, establish the petitioners’
entitlement to the declaration sought.
52. Equally, this Court is not holding that the orders passed in 1991
under Section 122-B(4-F) are void or that the private respondents have
not acquired any right under the said provision. The legal effect of those
orders, in the context of the subsequent suits and the statutory remedy
under Section 122-B(4-D), shall be examined by the competent revenue
court on the basis of the original record.
53. The question whether the earlier proceedings operate as res
judicata or issue estoppel, or whether any other principle of finality
precludes the petitioners from raising a particular claim, is also left open.
The revenue court shall examine the pleadings and orders in the earlier
proceedings, the issues actually decided, the parties thereto and the
jurisdiction exercised by the authorities concerned. No final finding on
that question is being recorded by this Court.
54. The court below shall also examine the actual orders passed in the
proceedings under Section 122-B(4-F), the restoration/recall application
and the revision proceedings decided on 05.07.1996. The nature of the
revision proceedings and the provision under which they were instituted
shall be ascertained from the original record. The court shall bear in
mind the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushila (supra) while
considering their legal effect.
55. No opinion is being expressed by this Court on the actual
possession of the disputed land, the date from which any party has been

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in possession, the nature of cultivation, the caste status or occupation of
any party, the landholding of any party, or the eligibility of any party to
the benefit under Section 122-B(4-F). The allegations concerning the
employment of respondent Raja Ram as a primary school teacher, the
economic status of the contesting respondents and the documentary
material relied upon by either side are all left open.
56. The evidentiary value of the revenue entries, khasra and khatauni,
rent receipts, irrigation slips and other documents relied upon by the
parties shall be assessed by the court below in accordance with law. This
Court has not examined those documents for the purpose of recording
any finding on the merits of the rival claims.
57. The court below shall adjudicate the suits in accordance with the
provisions of Section 229-B read with Section 122-B(4-D) and the other
applicable provisions of the Act. Any objection based upon res judicata,
issue estoppel or any other statutory bar, if properly raised and legally
available, shall be decided by a reasoned order on the basis of the
relevant record. The suits shall not, however, be rejected merely on the
assumption that the existence of an earlier order under Section 122-B(4-
F), or the dismissal of a revision under Section 333, automatically bars
every subsequent declaratory suit.
58. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.
59. The judgment and order dated 06.08.2026 passed by the Board of
Revenue, Uttar Pradesh, Prayagraj, in Second Appeal No. SA/24/2000-
2001, the judgment and order dated 06.11.2000 passed by the Additional
Commissioner, Azamgarh Division, Azamgarh, in Appeal No. 261/A of
1998, and the order dated 23.07.1998 passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, District Azamgarh, are hereby
quashed.
60. The four consolidated suits, being Suit Nos. 352, 353, 354 and
355, are restored to their original numbers and remitted to the court of

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the Sub-Divisional Officer/Up-Ziladhikari, Phoolpur, District Azamgarh,
being the court of competent jurisdiction, for fresh adjudication in
accordance with law.
61. The court below shall proceed to adjudicate the suits under
Section 229-B read with Section 122-B(4-D) of the Act, keeping in view
the observations made hereinabove. It shall afford all parties reasonable
opportunity to lead such evidence as may be permissible in law and shall
decide all issues arising in the suits by a reasoned judgment.
62. The court below shall not treat any observation made in this
judgment as a finding on the merits of the rival claims. All questions of
fact and law, including the legal effect of the earlier orders and
proceedings, are left open for independent determination in accordance
with law.
63. Having regard to the fact that the suits were instituted in the year
1997 and have remained pending for a considerable period, the court
below is requested to make an endeavour to decide the suits
expeditiously, preferably within a period of one year from the date of
production of a certified copy of this judgment, subject to the
cooperation of the parties.
64. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Arun Kumar, J.)
November 06, 2026
Ashok Kr.
Digitally signed by :-
ASHOK KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad