Vinod Kumar vs State Of Punjab And Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
125
CWP-28905-2026
Date of Decision : 07.09.2026
Vinod Kumar …..Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Aditya Dassaur, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Rohit Ahuja, D.A.G., Punjab.
Mr. Gian Chand Garg, Advocate for respondent No.3.

NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking
issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to grant the
pay scale/grade pay of Junior Assistant to the petitioner w.e.f.
01.04.2018 instead of 12.11.2021 with all consequential arrears, interest
and retiral benefits.
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are that
the petitioner was initially appointed as a Clerk in the Municipal
Council, Rahon, District Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar, Punjab w.e.f.
29.11.1996. Under the Punjab Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, as
clarified by the Finance Department, Punjab, vide letter dated
10.12.1999 and further amended, vide Punjab Civil Services (Revised
Pay) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2000 (Annexure P-1) (for short ‘2000
Rules’), the cadre of Clerk was to be bifurcated into two categories,
namely Clerk and Junior Assistant, in the ratio of 50:50 w.e.f.
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CWP-28905-2026 2
01.01.1996, subject to the clarification that fractional counts of 0.5 or
above were to be ignored, and only complete/whole counts, i.e., 2 out of
every 5 posts or 3 out of every 7 posts, were to be placed in the higher
scale of Junior Assistant, strictly on the basis of seniority. As per the
official record maintained by respondent No.3 for the year 2018-19
(Annexure P-2), there were a total of 9 sanctioned posts in the cadre of
Clerks, out of which 5 posts stood filled and 04 posts were lying vacant.
Applying the ratio of 2 out of 5/3 out of 7 to the aforesaid 9 posts, at
least 4 out of the 9 Clerks, including the petitioner who is at Sr. No.4 in
the seniority list, were entitled to and required to be granted the scale of
Junior Assistant w.e.f. 01.04.2018, strictly on the basis of their seniority
position in the cadre as on that date. However, respondent No.3, vide its
proceedings dated 12.11.2021 (Item No.42) (Annexure P-3) granted the
said scale to the petitioner and other similarly situated Clerks w.e.f.
12.11.2021 only, i.e., the date on which the petitioner completed 25
years of service, rather than from 01.04.2018, i.e., the date on which the
vacancy-based entitlement had already crystallized in the petitioner’s
favour. Thereafter, the petitioner took voluntary retirement from service
on 30.11.2024. When the petitioner came to know that he was entitled to
the scale of Junior Assistant w.e.f. 01.04.2018 instead of 12.11.2021, he
submitted a representation dated 21.01.2026 (Anexure-9) before
respondent No.3. However, no action has been taken on the same.
Hence, the instant petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the year
2018-19, there were 9 sanctioned posts of Clerk in respondent No.3 and
as per 2000 Rules (Annexure P-1), the petitioner, being at Sr. No.4 in
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CWP-28905-2026 3
the seniority list, is entitled for grant of scale of Junior Assistant w.e.f.
01.04.2018 on the basis of seniority and vacancy position. However,
respondent No.3, vide its proceedings dated 12.11.2021 (Item No.42)
(Annexure P-3), erroneously proceeded on the premise that completion of
25 years of qualifying service was the criterion for grant of the scale of
Junior Assistant, and granted the said scale to the petitioner w.e.f.
12.11.2021 only, i.e. the date on which the petitioner completed 25 years
of service. He further submits that the said act of respondent No.3 is
causing grave financial loss to the petitioner. Therefore, the instant petition
may be allowed and the petitioner may be granted the scale of Junior
Assistant w.e.f. 01.04.2018 instead of 12.11.2021, with all consequential
benefits.
4. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel and learned counsel for respondent No.3 have put in appearance
and vehemently opposed relief claimed in the instant petition on the
ground that on three earlier occasions, the petitioner had approached this
Court by filing CWP Nos.10017, 19628 & 30024 of 2025 for releasing his
pensionary benefits and for grant of interest on the delayed payments of
his pensionary benefits and he could have agitated the relief sought in the
instant petition at that time, but he failed to do so. They further submits
that the cause of action in favour of the petitioner arose in the year 2018,
whereas he has approached this Court only in the year 2026, i.e., after an
inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 08 years and that too after
retirement. Therefore, the instant petition may be dismissed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
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CWP-28905-2026 4
6. The present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two
counts i.e. (i) constructive res judicata and (ii) delay and laches.
(i) CONSTRUCTIVE RES JUDICATA
7. Earlier, the petitioner had approached this Court by filing
writ petition bearing CWP No.10017 of 2025 (Vinod Kumar Vs. State of
Punjab and another) seeking issuance of directions to the respondents
to release his pensionary benefits. The said writ petition was listed for
hearing on 07.04.2025 (Annexure P-5) and on the said date the counsel
for the respondents in the said writ petition made a statement that in
case the legal notice dated 01.03.2025 has been received in the office of
the concerned authorities and the same is still pending consideration
with the authorities concerned, the same will be decided by the
competent authority within a period of 08 weeks from the date of receipt
of certified copy of the order by passing an appropriate speaking order
and in case, after the decision any relief is to be extended to the
petitioner, the same will be extended, otherwise due reasons will be
mentioned in the speaking order to be passed for not accepting the claim
of the petitioner for his information and necessary action. On the basis
of the said statement made by learned counsel for the respondents, the
said writ petition was disposed of as having not been pressed.
Thereafter, the petitioner again approached this Court by filing CWP
No.19628 of 2025 (Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and others)
seeking issuance of directions to the respondents to release the interest
on the amount of delayed payment of his retiral benefits. The said writ
petition was disposed of by this Court, vide order dated 16.07.2025
(Annexure P-6) with a direction to respondent No.2 to consider and
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CWP-28905-2026 5
decide the legal notice dated 04.06.2025, within a period of two months
from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order, in accordance
rd
with law. Thereafter, the petitioner filed 3 writ petition bearing CWP
No.30024 of 2025 (Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and others) for
quashing the impugned order dated 15.09.2025, whereby the claim of
the petitioner regarding interest was rejected and for issuance of
directions to the respondents to release the interest @ 18% per annum
amounting to Rs.1,74,474/- for delayed payment of retiral dues of the
petitioner. The said writ petition was disposed of by this Court, vide
order dated 20.04.2026, with a direction to the respondents/competent
authority to compute and release interest on the delayed payment of
retiral dues to the petitioner @ 6% per annum. It was further directed
that the interest shall be calculated from the expiry of a period of two
months from the date of retirement of the petitioner till the date of
actual disbursement.
8. Since the relief claimed by the petitioner in the present writ
petition (benefit of pay scale/grade pay of Junior Assistant w.e.f.
01.04.2018 instead of 12.11.2021) was available to him at the time
when he filed the aforesaid three writ petitions, therefore, the petitioner
cannot be permitted to agitate the said issue in the present proceedings.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case M. Nagabhushana
versus State of Karnataka and others : 2011 (3) SCC 408 has explained
the doctrine/principles of res judicata qua its applicability to the writ
petitions and after considering the various judgments, has held that “the
principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in explanation IV to
Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, are also applicable to the writ
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CWP-28905-2026 6
petitions” . The relevant paras of the said judgment explaining the
doctrine/principles of res judicata, read as under:-
“xx xx xx xx xx
14. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal
application as it is based on two age old principles,
namely, `interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means
that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation and the other principle is `nemo debet his
ve ari, si constet curiae quod sit pro un aet eademn cause'
meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a
litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the
same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all
civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a
judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent
jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive
determination of the questions litigated and should for ever
set the controversy at rest.
15. That principle of finality of litigation is based on
high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a
principle great oppression might result under the colour
and pretence of law in as much as there will be no end of
litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in
infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and
actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his
right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved to
prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that
the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine but a
fundamental principle which sustains the Rule of Law in
ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to
promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to
prevent abuse in the matter of accessing Court for
agitating on issues which have become final between the
parties.
xx xx xx xx xx
30. In the premises aforesaid, it is clear that the attempt
by the appellant to re-agitate the same issues which were
considered by this Court and were rejected expressly in the
previous judgment in All India Manufacturers Organisation
(supra), is a clear instance of an abuse of process of this
Court apart from the fact that such issues are barred by
principles of Res Judicata or Constructive Res Judicata
and principles analogous thereto.
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CWP-28905-2026 7
xx xx xx xx xx”
(ii) DELAY AND LACHES
10. The grievance of the petitioner is that in the year 2018-19,
there were 9 sanctioned posts in the cadre of Clerks in respondent No.3
and as per 2000 Rules (Annexure P-1), the petitioner, being at Sr. No.4 in
the seniority list, is entitled for grant of scale of Junior Assistant w.e.f.
01.04.2018 on the basis of seniority and vacancy position. However,
respondent No.3, vide its proceedings dated 12.11.2021 (Item No.42)
(Annexure P-3) granted the said scale to the petitioner w.e.f. 12.11.2021
only, i.e. the date on which the petitioner completed 25 years of service.
11. The cause of action in favour of the petitioner arose in the
year 2018, whereas he has approached this Court in the year 2026, i.e.,
after a lapse of period of more than 08 years. Even the petitioner had
submitted his first representation to the respondents for claiming the
aforesaid benefit on 21.01.2026 (Annexure P-9), which was also after a
lapse of more than 07 years from the date when the cause of action first
arose, and, significantly, after he had taken voluntary retirement from
service on 30.11.2024.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24 , while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
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CWP-28905-2026 8
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with
the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is
involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769) . Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969
Supreme Court 329) , Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy."
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation
with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union
of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no relief can
be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself
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CWP-28905-2026 9
a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
13. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346 ,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
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CWP-28905-2026 10
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278 , observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at
the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322] ”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538 , it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
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CWP-28905-2026 11
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios……...............
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
14. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687 , while rejecting the claim of
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others .
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
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CWP-28905-2026 12
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions additionald by counsel is
that similarly situated employees had approached this
Court and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chairman , U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464 . In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347 , it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is concerned, that
has been settled by this court. Therefore, there is no
quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other persons who
were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge
their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ
petitions after the judgment of this court in
Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik,
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CWP-28905-2026 13
2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300 . Whether
they are entitled to same relief or not? Therefore, a
serious question that arises for consideration is
whether the employees who did not wake up to
challenge their retirement and accepted the same,
collected their post-retirement benefits, can such
persons be given the relief in the light of the
subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has been
examined by this court in a series of decisions and
laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be
heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years' salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
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CWP-28905-2026 14
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314 . In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
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CWP-28905-2026 15
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664 . Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar's case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502 . In M.R. Gupta's case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees .
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam's case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches .
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.09.11 09:51
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authenticity of this document

CWP-28905-2026 16
13. Ordered accordingly.”
15 . Subsequently, a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation of India and others Vs. Shree Lal Meena : (2019) 4 SCC
479 , considering the principle of delay and laches, opined as under:-
“36. We may also find that the appellant remained silent
for years together and that this Court, taking a particular
view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India
Assurance Company Limited, (2011)12 SCC 197 would not
entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of
the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the matter for
almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement
of the judgment.
37. Thus, the endeavour of the appellant, to approach
this Court seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be rejected, and the appeal
is dismissed.”
16. In the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court
after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 08 years from
the date when the cause of action first arose i.e. 01.04.2018. Even when
the scale of Junior Assistant was granted to the petitioner on 12.11.2021,
he did not raise any grievance in respect thereof and failed to agitate his
claim at the relevant point of time. Instead, he approached the
respondents for grant of the pay scale/grade pay of Junior Assistant
w.e.f. 01.04.2018 only by submitting a representation dated 21.01.2026
(Annexure P-9), i.e., after a lapse of more than seven years from the
date when the cause of action first arose i.e. 01.04.2018. Moreover, the
petitioner took voluntary retirement from service on 30.11.2024 and,
having thus ceased to be in service, cannot now seek grant of the pay
scale of Junior Assistant w.e.f. 01.04.2018. Such belated invocation of
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.09.11 09:51
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authenticity of this document

CWP-28905-2026 17
the writ jurisdiction, without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for
the prolonged silence, defeats the very object of equitable relief and
disentitles the petitioner from any discretionary relief under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
17. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed
with costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with High Court Lawyers
Welfare Fund within a period of two months from today failing which,
the Deputy Commissioner, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Nagar, is directed to
recover the same as arrears of land revenue.
07.09.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Kothiyal JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
VINOD KOTHIYAL
2026.09.11 09:51
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this document