Antara Majumdar vs Vimla Choudhary & Ors

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Judgment reserved on: 25 September, 2026
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Judgment pronounced on: 29 October, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010022752018
+ RFA 810/2019 & CM APPL. 40358/2019, CM APPL. 41751/2023,
CM APPL. 32535/2024
ANTARA MAJUMDAR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. B.K. Mishra, Advocate with
Mr. Tarun Majumdar.
versus
VIMLA CHOUDHARY & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vijay Datt Gahtari and
Mr. Zeeshan Khan, Advocates for
R-1, R-2 and R-4
Mr. Akhil Gupta, Advocate for R-6
and R-7
Ms. Nidhi Mohan Parashar and
Mr. Madhav Binzani, Amicus Curiae
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL
JUDGMENT
AMIT BANSAL, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed under Section 96 of the Code of
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Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) against the order dated 27 February, 2018
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and the judgment and decree dated 8 May, 2018 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts (‘Trial Court’) in CS No. 18346/2016 titled
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‘ Vimla Chaudhary & Ors . v. Gopal Krishan & Ors .’ (‘impugned
judgment’).
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2. By way of the order dated 27 February, 2018, the Trial Court closed
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the evidence of the defendants. By way of the impugned judgment dated 8
May, 2018, the Trial Court made absolute and final the preliminary decrees
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dated 9 February, 2011 (‘first preliminary decree’) and 7 April, 2018
(‘second preliminary decree’), whereunder the plaintiffs no. 1 to 4
(respondents no. 1 to 4) and the defendants no. 1 to 3 (respondents no. 5 to
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7) were each held entitled to a 1/7 share in the property bearing no. A-132,
Pocket-I, Paschim Puri, Delhi (‘suit property’).
3. The appellant before this Court was the defendant no.4 before the
Trial Court. The respondents no.1 to 4 before this Court were the plaintiffs
no. 1 to 4 before the Trial Court. The respondent no. 5, 6 and 7 were the
defendants no. 1, 3 and 2 respectively.
4. The case set up by the respondents no. 1 to 4 (plaintiffs) before the
Trial Court was as under.
5. The respondents no.1 to 7 are the descendants of Late Sh. Sukh Dayal
Sharma and Late Smt. Kaushlya Devi.
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6. The suit property was purchased on 7 October, 1978 in the name of
Late Smt. Kaushlya Devi, from one Sh. Suja Lal on the basis of the
following documents:
i. Registered Special Power of Attorney in favour of Late Sh. Sukh
Dayal (Exh. PW3/15),
ii. Registered General Power of Attorney in favour of Late
Sh. Sukh Dayal (Exh. PW3/16),
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iii. Registered will in favour of Late Smt. Kaushlya Devi (Exh.
PW3/18),
iv. Registered receipts in favour of Late Smt. Kaushlya Devi (Exh.
PW3/17).
7. The funds for the purchase of the property, as well as the construction
raised upon the suit property were partly arranged by the respondent no.1
(plaintiff no.1).
8. Sh. Sukh Dayal Sharma expired in the year 1996 and Smt. Kaushlya
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Devi expired on 13 March, 2004, both intestate.
9. After the demise of Smt. Kaushlya Devi, a family arrangement/mutual
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agreement dated 25 March, 2004 came to be executed between the
respondent no.1 (plaintiff no.1) and the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1),
which recorded that the cost of construction of the suit property had been
borne by the respondent no.1 (plaintiff no.1) to the tune of Rs. 2,85,000/-,
which was to be reimbursed to her by the other legal heirs in proportion to
their respective shares, and that the suit property would thereafter be equally
divided amongst all the legal heirs of Late Sh. Sukh Dayal Sharma and Late
Smt. Kaushlya Devi.
P ROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE T RIAL C OURT
10. Apprehending the alienation of the suit property by the respondent
no.5 (defendant no.1), the respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) instituted a suit
seeking partition of the suit property, possession of the suit property and the
refund of amounts spent by the respondent no.1 (plaintiff no.1) towards the
construction of the suit property.
11. The respondents no. 5 to 7 (defendants no. 1 to 3) filed a joint written
statement contesting the suit, inter alia , on the ground that the respondent
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no.5 (defendant no.1) was the owner of the suit property and the
construction thereupon, by way of a sale by Late Sh. Sukh Dayal in his
favour.
12. In response, a replication was filed on behalf of the respondents no.1
to 4 (plaintiffs), denying the assertions in the written statement.
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13. By way of order dated 1 September, 2005 under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Trial Court restrained the respondent no.5
(defendant no.1) from alienating or transferring the suit property. The said
interim order was extended from time to time, and remained in operation
thereafter.
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14. Vide order dated 21 February, 2006, the Trial Court framed the
following issues:
“(i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the partition of the suit
property? If so, at what share? OPP.
(ii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession, where
partition is allowed? OPP.
(iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any amount, if
partition not effected? OPP.
(iv) Relief.”
15. The respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) examined four witnesses and
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concluded their evidence on 28 April, 2007.
16. The respondents no.6 and 7 (defendants no.3 and 2) examined one
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witness and concluded their evidence on 16 March, 2009.
17. During the pendency of the suit proceedings, a joint application was
filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC by the respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs)
and the respondents no. 6 and 7 (defendants no. 3 and 2), i.e., by all the
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parties except the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1), wherein the respondents
no. 6 and 7(defendants no. 3 and 2) admitted that all the parties had a right
in the suit property and prayed that the same be partitioned into seven equal
shares. They further stated that they had no objection to paying their
respective share of the expenses incurred by the respondent no. 1 (plaintiff
no.1).
18. In view of the above compromise arrived at between the respondents
no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) and the respondent no. 6 and 7 (defendants no.2 and 3),
the Trial Court issued directions to the respondent no. 5 to appear in person.
However, the respondent no.5 (defendant no. 1) did not enter appearance in
person nor did he lead any evidence. Accordingly, the matter was listed for
orders, with liberty to the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1) to make final
arguments, if any.
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19. Vide the first preliminary decree dated 9 February, 2011, the Trial
Court directed the respondents no. 5 to 7 (defendants no.1 to 3) to pay a sum
of Rs. 42,857/- each to the respondent no.1 (plaintiff no.1) towards their
respective 1/7th share in the cost of construction. A preliminary decree of
partition was also passed holding that the respondents no. 1 to 7 (plaintiffs
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no.1 to 4 and defendants no. 1 to 3) were each entitled to a 1/7 share in the
suit property. The Trial Court also observed that the respondent no.5
(defendant no.1) had not made out a case for declaration as the absolute and
sole owner of the suit property, inasmuch as no evidence was led by him,
despite contesting the suit on the ground that he was the actual owner of the
suit property by way of sale of the suit property in his favour by his father.
20. After the passing of the first preliminary decree, the parties attempted
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a settlement. A joint relinquishment/release deed dated 3 August, 2011 and
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a compromise deed-cum-Memorandum of Understanding dated 5 August,
2011 were placed on the record of the Trial Court as Exh.C-1 and Exh.C-2.
However, the respondent no. 5 (defendant no.1) did not appear before the
Trial Court to have his statement recorded, on account of which a court
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notice was issued to him on 18 August, 2011.
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21. A Conveyance Deed came to be executed and registered on 11 May,
2012 by the Delhi Development Authority in favour of the respondent no. 5
(defendant no.1), whereby the leasehold rights in the suit property were
converted into freehold rights in his name.
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22. Subsequently, on 22 May, 2012, the respondent no.5 (defendant
no.1) executed a registered sale deed in favour of the appellant (defendant
no.4) in respect of the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 13,40,000/-.
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23. On 13 August, 2012, the appellant (defendant no.4) entered
appearance before the Trial Court and informed the Court that she had
purchased the suit property from the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1).
24. In 2014, the appellant (defendant no.4) filed an application seeking
impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 CPC, which
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was allowed vide order dated 21 September, 2015. On the same date, it was
brought to the notice of the Trial Court that several proceedings relating to
the suit property were pending in different courts. The Trial Court observed
that it would be appropriate that the suits be clubbed for the purpose of trial
before the same court, for which counsel for the parties sought time to move
an appropriate application before this Court. Three Transfer Petitions came
to be filed before this Court in relation to the proceedings concerning the
suit property.
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25. On 28 November, 2017, the Trial Court observed that the transfer
proceedings had failed and put up the matter for final arguments.
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26. Vide order dated 5 February, 2018, the Trial Court framed the
following additional issue:
“ Whether defendant no. 4 is bonafide purchaser? OPD4 ”
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27. By the impugned order dated 27 February, 2018, the Trial Court
recorded that none had appeared on behalf of the appellant (defendant no.4)
and accordingly forfeited the right of the defendants, particularly of the
appellant (defendant no.4), to lead evidence. Recording the submission of
counsel for the respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) that the said parties did not
wish to lead evidence, the plaintiffs’ evidence was also closed.
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28. Vide the second preliminary decree dated 7 April, 2018, the Trial
Court decreed the suit in terms of the first preliminary decree. The additional
issue framed, as reproduced in Para 26 hereinabove, was decided against the
appellant (defendant no.4) on the ground that the appellant (defendant no.4)
did not lead any evidence and had failed to prove that she was a bona fide
purchaser of the suit property.
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29. By way of the impugned judgment and decree dated 8 May, 2018,
the Trial Court made absolute and final the first and second preliminary
decrees. The Trial Court noted that the suit property was incapable of
division by metes and bounds on account of the nature of the structure, and
that only the proceeds thereof could be distributed amongst the shareholders.
A joint statement of the parties present was recorded separately to that
effect.
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P ROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE T HIS C OURT
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30. Aggrieved by the order dated 27 February, 2018 and the impugned
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judgment and decree dated 8 May, 2018, the appellant (defendant no.4)
preferred the present appeal.
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31. Notice in the present appeal was issued vide order dated 19
September, 2019 on which date this Court directed that status quo qua the
title of the subject property shall be maintained. The said interim order has
been extended from time to time and continues to be in force.
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32. On 30 July, 2026, this Court appointed Ms. Nidhi Mohan Parashar,
Advocate as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.
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33. On 25 September, 2026, submissions of the parties concluded, a note
of submissions on behalf of the Amicus Curiae was taken on record and the
judgment was reserved.
34. To be noted, during the pendency of the appeal, the respondent no. 3
(plaintiff no.3) and the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1) have expired,
however the appellant did not take any steps to bring their LRs on record.
S UBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE A PPELLANT
35. Mr. B.K. Mishra, counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
(defendant no.4) submits that the impugned order and decree are based on
conjectures and surmises.
36. The appellant (defendant no.4) was never afforded a real and effective
opportunity to lead evidence on the issue of her being a bona fide purchaser,
and the said issue was never considered on merits.
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37. The non-appearance of the appellant (defendant no.4) on 27
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February, 2018 and 7 April, 2018 was bona fide and attributable to the
wrong noting of the date of hearing.
38. The Trial Court forfeited the right of the appellant (defendant no.4) to
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lead evidence on 27 February, 2018 without issuing any notice to her.
Hence, the impugned order is in breach of the principles of natural justice.
39. The Trial Court ought to have appreciated that a Transfer Petition was
pending before this Court, and awaited the outcome of the same before
proceeding to decree the suit. The respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) misled
the Trial Court by not disclosing the pendency of the Transfer Petition
before this Court.
UBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ESPONDENTS
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40. Mr. Vijay Datt Gahtori, counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents no. 1, 2 and 4 (plaintiffs) submits that the purchase of the suit
property by the appellant (defendant no.4) is squarely hit by the doctrine of
lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (‘TPA’).
The suit property was the subject matter of a pending partition suit, wherein
an interim order restraining the defendant no. 1 from disposing of the suit
property had been passed. Hence, the sale effected by the defendant no.1 in
favour of the appellant was in the teeth of the said interim order and the
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preliminary decree dated 9 February, 2011.
41. The appellant (defendant no.4) purchased the suit property in
collusion with the respondent no.5 (defendant no. 1), with full knowledge
that the same was the subject matter of a pending suit, evidenced by the
nominal consideration of Rs. 13,40,000/- paid.
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42. In any case, the first preliminary decree dated 9 February, 2011
remains unchallenged and has attained finality. The appellant (defendant
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no.4) entered appearance before the Trial Court on 13 August, 2012 and
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was impleaded on 21 September, 2015. However, no application was made
for the setting aside of the first preliminary decree. Reliance in this regard is
placed upon Venkata Reddy & Ors. v . Pethi Reddy , AIR 1963 SC 992 .
43. The Trial Court adjourned the suit on multiple occasions, however,
none appeared for the appellant (defendant no.4) on various dates.
44. The submission of the appellant (defendant no.4) with respect to the
pendency of the Transfer Petitions is misconceived, inasmuch as the
respondents had raised no objection to the clubbing of the suits. TR.P.(C.)
64/2016 was dismissed on 1st September, 2017 and TR.P.(C.) 170/2017 was
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rejected on 3rd November, 2017, both prior to the impugned order dated 27
February, 2018.
45. Without prejudice to the above submissions, the present appeal is
liable to be dismissed on account of the fact that despite multiple orders
providing opportunity for the same, no application has been filed by the
appellant to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased
respondent no.3 (plaintiff no.3) and the respondent no.5 (defendant no. 1).
Consequently, the appeal stands abated qua the said respondents.
46. Mr. Akhil Gupta, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents no.
6 and 7 (defendants no. 3 and 2), adopts the submissions made on behalf of
the respondents no. 1,2 and 4 (plaintiffs no.1,2 and 4).
UBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE MICUS URIAE
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47. Ms. Nidhi Mohan Parashar, Amicus Curiae, submits that while the
appellant (defendant no.4) has been proceeded ex-parte in the impugned
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judgment and decree, the appellant has to make out ‘sufficient cause’ for
non-appearance. In terms of G.P. Shrivastava v. R.K Raizada & Ors , (2000)
3 SCC 54, discretion may be exercised in favour of a party that approached
the courts immediately. In this regard, the Amicus Curiae highlights the
conduct of the appellant (defendant no.4) before this Court, including inter
alia the delay of 40 days in refiling of the appeal, the repeated adjournments
sought by the appellant (defendant no.4), and the failure of the appellant
(defendant no.4) to implead the LRs of the deceased respondent no. 3
(plaintiff no.3) and the deceased respondent no.5 (defendant no.1).
48. She further submits that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the
decree, even when the subsequent purchaser may be a bona fide purchaser
without notice of the decree. Reference in this regard may be made to
Shingara Singh v . Daljit Singh and Anr , 2024 INSC 770 and Balwant
Singh v . Buta Ram and Ors , 2009 SCC Online P&H 6642. In the present
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case, the conveyance deed dated 22 May, 2012, was executed in favour of
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the appellant (defendant no.4) after the first preliminary decree dated 9
February, 2011, was passed, which has not been challenged in the present
appeal.
A NALYSIS AND F INDINGS
49. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record of the
appeal.
50. It is the case of the appellant (defendant no.4) that a registered sale
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deed was executed in her favour on 22 May, 2012 by the respondent no.5
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(defendant no.1) for a sum of Rs.13,40,000/-. Immediately thereafter, on 13
August, 2012, the appellant (defendant no.4) entered appearance in the suit
before the Trial Court claiming that she was a purchaser of the suit property.
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The statement of the appellant (defendant no.4) and the respondent no.5
(defendant no.1) to this effect was also recorded before the Trial Court.
51. Subsequently, the appellant (defendant no.4) filed an application
under Order I Rule 10 CPC, seeking impleadment as a party in the suit,
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which was allowed by the Trial Court on 21 September, 2015. The
appellant (defendant no.4) informed the Court that she had filed another suit
for injunction relating to the suit property, which was pending before the
Civil Court.
52. On various dates thereafter, the respondent no.5 (defendant no.1) and
the appellant (defendant no.4) sought time for the transfer of the cases to one
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court. However, vide order dated 28 November, 2017, the Trial Court
recorded that the transfer of the cases to one court had failed and therefore,
the matter was put for final arguments. Pertinently, this order was passed in
the presence of the advocate of the appellant (defendant no.4). Thereafter,
the matter was put up for hearing on various dates, however, the appellant
(defendant no.4) failed to appear on the said dates.
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53. In the order passed on 5 February, 2018, the Trial Court noted that
the appellant (defendant no.4) had filed her written statement and framed an
additional issue, i.e., “ Whether defendant no.4 is a bonafide purchaser?
OPD4. ”.
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54. On 27 February, 2018, Trial Court closed the right of the appellant
(defendant no.4) to lead evidence due to non-appearance and put the matter
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for final arguments on 7 April, 2018. On 7 April, 2018, the Trial Court
passed a preliminary decree to the effect that the plaintiffs and the
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defendants no.1 to 3 (respondents no.1 to 7 herein) shall be entitled to 1/7
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share in the suit property. It was also recorded that the appellant (defendant
no.4) had failed to prove that she is a bona fide purchaser.
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55. Ultimately, on 8 May, 2018, the Trial Court passed the final decree.
Once again, there was no appearance on behalf of the appellant (defendant
no.4).
56. It is well settled that an ex-parte decree cannot be set aside unless
sufficient cause is shown by the relevant party for the said non-appearance.
Reference in this regard may be made to G.P. Shrivastava v. R.K Raizada &
Ors , (2000) 3 SCC 54. The relevant extract from the said judgment is set out
below:
“Under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC an ex parte decree passed against a
defendant can be set aside upon satisfaction of the Court that either the
summons were not duly served upon the defendant or he was prevented
by any "sufficient cause" from appearing when the suit was called on
for hearing. Unless "sufficient cause" is shown for non-appearance
of the defendant in the case on the date of hearing, the court has no
power to set aside an ex parte decree . The words "was prevented by
any sufficient cause from appearing" must be liberally construed to
enable the court to do complete justice between the parties particularly
when no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party…
….. In a case where the defendant approaches the court immediately
and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally
exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not mala fide or
intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be
compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits .”
(emphasis supplied)
57. The appellant (defendant no.4) failed to provide sufficient cause for
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her non-appearance on various dates with effect from 9 January, 2018. i.e.,
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9 January, 2018, 29 January, 2018, 5 February, 2018, 27 February,
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2018, 7 April, 2018 and 8 May, 2018. It is a matter of record that the
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appellant (defendant no.4) did not file an application under Order 9 Rule 13
CPC for setting aside of the ex-parte decree.
58. A perusal of the proceedings before the Trial Court, as summarized
above, shows that ample opportunity was given by the Trial Court to the
appellant to get the other suits transferred and consolidated with the present
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suit. It was on 28 November, 2017 that the Trial Court noted that the
consolidation and transfer has failed.
59. Pertinently, the Transfer Petitions, TR.P.(C) 64/2016 and TR.P.(C)
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were dismissed vide orders dated 1 September, 2017 and 3 November,
2017 respectively, prior to the second preliminary decree which was passed
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on 7 April, 2018. Insofar as the third Transfer Petition, i.e., TR.P.(C.)
6/2018 is concerned, the pendency of the same was not brought to the
attention of the Trial Court by the appellant (defendant no.4), as she stopped
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appearing before the Trial Court. In fact, this Court, vide order dated 20
April, 2018 in TR.P.(C.) 6/2018, noted that the appellant had neither filed
the process fee nor taken steps to serve the respondents therein.
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Subsequently, the said petition was dismissed as infructuous on 22 May
2018 in view of the impugned judgment and decree.
60. In these circumstances, this Court does not find any merit in the
submission of the appellant (defendant no.4) that the Trial Court should
have awaited the outcome of the Transfer Petition before proceeding to
decree the present suit.
61. It is a settled proposition of law that a transferee pendente lite is
bound by the decree already passed. Once, it is established that a sale is
executed during the pendency of a suit, doctrine of lis pendens in terms of
Section 52 TPA would apply and it would not matter if the purchaser is a
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bona fide purchaser or not. Reference in this regard may be made to
Shingara Singh v . Daljit Singh and Anr , 2024 INSC 770 and Balwant
Singh v . Buta Ram and Ors , 2009 SCC Online P&H 6642.
62. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in Shingara Singh v .
Daljit Singh and Anr , 2024 INSC 770 are set out below:
“ 14. In a recent judgment of this Court in Chander Bhan (D) through Lr.
Sher Singh vs. Mukhtiar Singh & Ors. it is observed, “once it has been held
that the transactions executed by the respondents are illegal due to the
doctrine of lis pendens the defence of the respondents 1 – 2 that they are
bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and thus, entitled to
protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is liable to
be rejected.”
15. In the case in hand also, it is an admitted position that the suit was filed
on 24.12.1992 and the sale deed was executed on 08.01.1993 by defendant
no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2/appellant during pendency of the suit. The
doctrine of lis pendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 applies to a transaction during pendency of the suit. The
Trial Court found execution of agreement to be proved and directed for
refund of the amount of Rs. 40,000/- by defendant no. 1 to the
plaintiff/appellant with further finding on issue no. 5 that the agreement was
not a result of fraud and collusion. The defendant did not prefer any cross-
appeal or cross objections against the said partial decree and allowed the
finding to become final. The plaintiff was non-suited only on the ground that
defendant no. 2 had no notice of the agreement and is a bona fide
purchaser. However, once sale agreement is proved and the subsequent sale
was during pendency of the suit hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the High
Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the
Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and passing a decree for “specific
performance” .”
63. Admittedly, in the present case, the preliminary decree in the suit had
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already been passed on 9 February, 2011 and the sale deed in favour of the
appellant was executed after the said date. Therefore, the doctrine of lis
pendens would apply and title in favour of the appellant would be
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subservient to the preliminary decree, which declared the share of each of
the respondents no.1 to 4 (plaintiffs) and the respondents no. 5 to 7
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(defendants no.1 to 3) as 1/7 each.
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64. Despite becoming a party in the present suit on 21 September, 2015,
the appellant (defendant no.4) has not challenged the preliminary decree
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dated 9 February, 2011, nor has she challenged the second preliminary
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decree dated 7 April, 2018..
65. The Supreme Court in Venkata Reddy & Ors. v . Pethi Reddy , 1962
SCC OnLine SC 320 has held that a preliminary decree passed in a partition
suit is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it
are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. The relevant observations from
the said judgment are set out below:
“…A decision is said to be final when, so far as the court rendering it is
concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or
amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which
would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be
modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review
application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed,
whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative
decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned,
be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the
making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree — the
decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the
finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its
being executable . The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of
certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such
cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final
decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also
has a finality attached to it . It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party
aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is
precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be
Signature Not Verified
RFA 810/2019 Page 16 of 17
Signed By:AARZOO
Signing Date:29.10.2026
12:28:37

preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates
that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as
embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree …”
(emphasis supplied)
66. In view of the discussion above, the appellant (defendant no.4) has
th
failed to make out a case for interference with the impugned order dated 27
th
February, 2018 and the impugned judgment and decree dated 8 May, 2018.
67. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
68. Pending applications stand disposed of.
AMIT BANSAL
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 29, 2026
Vivek/-
Signature Not Verified
RFA 810/2019 Page 17 of 17
Signed By:AARZOO
Signing Date:29.10.2026
12:28:37