DALEEP KUMAR BHAT vs STATE TH.V.O.J
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case No: CRA No. 5/2017
Reserved on : 01.10.2026
Pronounced on : 05.11.2026
Uploaded on: 06.11.2026
Daleep Kumar Bhat
….Petitioner(s)….
Through: Mr. P.N.Raina, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. J.A.Hamal, Advocate
v/s
State of J&K …..Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Raman Sharma, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Saliqa Sheikh, Advocate
Ms. Jagmeet Kour, Advocate
Mr. Kartikay Sharma, Advocate
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal is directed against judgment dated
18.02.2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, Anti-
Corruption, Jammu (hereinafter referred to as the “trial
court”), whereby the appellant has been convicted for
offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the
Jammu & Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter
referred to as the “P.C. Act”) and Section 161 RPC. By the
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impugned judgment, the appellant has been sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years and to
pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- in respect of each of the offences.
In default of payment of fine, the appellant has been
sentenced to undergo further imprisonment for a period of
three months for each offence. Both the sentences have been
directed to run concurrently.
2. As per the prosecution case, on 14.06.2010, the complainant,
PW Parmanand, lodged a written complaint before the
Vigilance Organization, Jammu, alleging therein that he had
applied for and obtained sanction of loan for an amount of
Rs. 1.00 lakh from Jammu Rural Bank (J&K Grameen Bank),
Pargwal, and had received the first instalment to the tune of
Rs. 35,000/-. It was further alleged that, for release of the
second instalment of Rs. 65,000/-, the appellant-accused, who
was posted at the relevant time as Manager of Jammu Rural
Bank, Pargwal, demanded Rs. 7,000/- as illegal gratification
from him. It was further stated in the complaint that, after
persuasion, the appellant agreed to release the loan instalment
if an amount of Rs.5,000/- was paid to him as illegal
gratification and that, in this regard, the appellant approached
the complainant thrice at his shop. It was further stated that
the complainant had arranged an amount of Rs. 5,000/- to be
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paid to the appellant-accused. He further stated in his
complaint that, on 14.06.2010, the appellant-Manager would
come to his shop to collect the bribe money. The complainant
sought action against the appellant-accused .
3. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 17/2010 for
offences punishable under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section
5(2) of the P.C. Act and Section 161 RPC came to be
registered at Police Station, Vigilance Organization, Jammu,
and investigation of the case was conducted. The trap team
comprising officers/officials of the Vigilance Organization,
Jammu, was constituted for laying a trap against the
appellant-accused. The services of two independent
witnesses, namely, PW-4 Sanjeev Gupta, Assistant Engineer,
PWD R&B Division-II, Jammu, and PW-5 Madan Singh,
Assistant Engineer, PWD R&B Division-II, Jammu, were
also requisitioned, and they were associated with the trap
proceedings. The complainant is stated to have produced Rs.
5,000/-, comprising six currency notes of Rs. 500/-
denomination each and 20 currency notes of Rs. 100/-
denomination each, before the members of the trap team.
4. After conducting the pre-trap demonstration, the complainant,
along with other members of the trap team, proceeded to
Main Bazaar, Pargwal. On reaching there, the complainant
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opened his shop, whereas PW Madan Singh, the shadow
witness, kept on watching from a nearby shoe shop. The other
members of the trap team took their respective positions in
the vicinity of the complainant’s shop. At about 1605 hours,
the appellant reached the shop of the complainant, who
offered him a cold drink. After taking the cold drink, the
appellant sat in front of the counter of the shop and demanded
bribe money from the complainant, who handed over the
bribe amount of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant, whereafter the
shadow witness gave the pre-fixed signal to the members of
the trap team, who gathered outside shop of the complainant.
5. The trap laying officer, PW H.K. Nazar, introduced himself
to the appellant, who tried to throw away the accepted bribe
money from the right back pocket of the pant worn by him.
However, he was caught hold of by the members of the trap
team by his wrists. The local police was also called to the
spot, as a large number of people had gathered outside the
shop of the complainant. A solution of sodium carbonate was
prepared, and the appellant was made to wash his hands in
the said solution, which turned pink. Similarly, the right-side
back pocket of the pant worn by the appellant was also
washed with a solution of sodium carbonate, its colour also
turned pink. These solutions were put in bottles, and the same
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were sealed on the spot. Thereafter, the appellant was
arrested, and during his personal search, the bribe money of
Rs. 5,000/- was recovered from back pocket of the pant worn
by him. In addition to this, a wallet containing Rs. 550/, a
PAN card and an Aadhaar card were also recovered. Besides
this, a Nokia mobile set containing an Airtel SIM was
recovered from his belt. Two long keys of Godrej make, one
key of a Hero Honda motorcycle, and a golden-coloured
Timex wristwatch were also recovered. It has been submitted
that, during recovery of the bribe money from the right back
pocket of the pant worn by the appellant, he pushed the
independent witness, PW Madan Singh, and the recovered
notes fell on the floor from the hands of PW Madan Singh. It
is also stated that the appellant tried to clean his hands and he
poured some drinking water on the right back pocket of his
pant, from where the bribe money was recovered, he became
arrogant and vulgar and tried his best to destroy the evidence
on the spot.
6. The Investigating Agency seized the file relating to the
complainant’s loan case and prepared the post-trap memo and
other documents on the spot. The statement of the
complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded, and the
statements of other witnesses conversant with the facts of the
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case were also recorded. After investigation of the case, the
offences punishable under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section
5(2) of the P.C.Act and Section 161 RPC were found
established against the appellant, and the challan was laid
before the Court .
7. Vide order dated 12.07.2011, the learned trial court framed
charges for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section
5(2) of the P.C. Act and Section 161 RPC against the
appellant, who denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
Accordingly, the prosecution was directed to lead evidence in
support of the charges. In order to prove the charges, the
prosecution, besides examining the complainant, PW
Parmanand, and the shadow witness, PW Madan Singh, also
examined the independent witness, PW Sanjeev Gupta, and
members of the trap team, namely, PW H.K. Nazar, Dy. SP,
PW Mohd. Aslam, Inspector, PW Deepak Tufchi, Inspector,
PW Narinder Kumar, SGCT, and PW Neeraj Sharma,
Constable. The prosecution also examined PW Bhushan Lal,
Pawan Abrol, Assistant Scientific Officer, FSL, Jammu,
Harnam Singh, Clerk, J&K Grameen Bank, Pargwal, PW
Raja Abdul Latief, Chairman, J&K Grameen Bank, was also
examined as witness by the prosecution for proving the
sanction order.
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8. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the
incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution
evidence were put to the appellant-accused for seeking his
explanation. Accordingly, his statement under Section 342 of
J&K Cr.P.C. was recorded on 31.05.2016. The appellant
stated in his defence that, after the release of the first
instalment of the loan amount of Rs. 35,000/-, the
complainant started making demands for the release of the
balance loan amount, but he was told that unless he installed
the machinery and produced the purchase bills, which were to
be verified by the appellant in his capacity as Manager, the
balance amount cannot be released in his favour. He further
stated that, in the month of June 2010, the complainant came
to the branch of the Bank and demanded release of the
balance loan amount, to which the appellant-accused
responded by saying that he had cheated the Khadi Board as
well as the Bank, as he had not utilized the first instalment of
the loan amount for installation of the machinery. On this, the
complainant got annoyed, and on 14.06.2010, when he was
working in the Bank, the complainant came to him and asked
him to verify installation of the machinery. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the shop of the complainant, but he could not
see any machinery installed there. The complainant offered to
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settle the matter, but when he refused, when he was leaving
the shop, the complainant tried to thrust some money into the
pocket of his pant. The appellant plucked the complainant’s
hand with his hand, and in the process the amount fell down
on the ground. In the meantime, two officials of the Vigilance
Organization came there and caught hold of him by his
hands. Other members of the Vigilance Team also reached
there. The appellant denied that PW-Madan Singh had
conducted the search of his pocket and recovered the bribe
money. The appellant claimed that the currency notes were
collected from the ground and that he had been falsely
implicated. He further claimed that the entire proceedings
took place inside the Police Post, Pargwal, and not on the spot.
9. The appellant entered his defence and examined DWs
Rajinder Singh Manhas, Nishi Kant and Ganesh Dass as
witnesses in his defence. After completion of the defence
evidence, the case was set down for final arguments.
10. The learned trial court, vide impugned judgment dated
18.02.2017, after analysing the evidence on record, came to
the conclusion that the prosecution had successfully proved
that the trap was genuinely laid on the basis of the written
complaint lodged by the complainant, who was compelled
by the appellant to pay bribe. It has been further observed by
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the learned trial court that the complainant had no axe to
grind against the appellant and that his testimony clearly
showed that the appellant had demanded and accepted the
bribe money, which fact was corroborated by the statements
of other witnesses. The learned trial court, after recording
the finding that the bribe money, demanded and accepted by
the appellant, was recovered from his possession, concluded
that presumption under Section 4 of the P.C. Act is to be
drawn that the appellant had accepted the said money as
illegal gratification. The learned trial court also found that
the defence put forth by the appellant was not acceptable.
On the basis of these findings, the learned trial court
recorded the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence
against the appellant, which is under challenge in the present
appeal.
11. The appellant has challenged the impugned judgment on the
grounds that the learned trial court has not appreciated the
evidence on record in its right perspective. It has been
contended that, in the present case, the prosecution has not
established the essential ingredients of demand, acceptance
and recovery of illegal gratification. It has been further
stated that there is sufficient material on record to show that
the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the trial
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court has expressed misplaced sympathy towards the
complainant by observing that he is a villager dealing with
agricultural activities. It has been contended that the shadow
witness, PW Madan Singh, has not supported the
prosecution case and has turned hostile; therefore, no
conviction could have been recorded against the appellant on
the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of the
complainant. It has been further contended that the very
genesis of the complaint lodged by PW Parmanand is false
because he had not installed the machinery in his shop,
which was pre-condition for release of second instalment of
loan and when the appellant refused to release the
instalment, he lodged a false complaint against him with a
view to pressurize him to release the loan amount.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned judgment, the grounds of appeal, the evidence on
record and the record of the trial court.
13. The charge against the appellant-accused, which was the
subject matter of the trial, is that he, in his capacity as
Manager of the Jammu Rural Bank (J&K Grameen Bank),
demanded illegal gratification from the complainant, PW
Parmanand, for release of second instalment of the loan that
had been sanctioned in his favour. It is the case of the
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prosecution that, when the trap was laid on 14.06.2010, the
appellant demanded and accepted tainted currency notes
amounting to Rs. 5,000/-, which were later on recovered
from the right back pocket of his pant.
14. The first contention raised by learned Senior counsel
appearing for the appellant is that, in the present case, the
officer who has accorded sanction for prosecution of the
appellant, has not applied his mind to the relevant material.
It has been submitted that PW Raja Abdul Latief, Chairman,
J&K Grameen Bank, has, in his cross-examination, admitted
that the seized loan file of the complainant was not
forwarded to him, meaning thereby that he was not aware of
the terms and conditions of the loan sanctioned in favour of
PW Parmanand. It has been contended that, in the absence of
knowledge about the terms and conditions of the loan
sanctioned in favour of PW Parmanand, it was not possible
for PW Raja Abdul Latief to accord sanction for
prosecution. This, according to learned Senior counsel,
exhibits non-application of mind on the part of the
sanctioning authority; therefore, the sanction order itself is
vitiated.
15. In the above context, it is to be noted that an order of
sanction can be proved by the sanctioning authority either by
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producing the original sanction order, which itself contains
the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of
satisfaction, or by adducing evidence to show that the facts
were placed before the sanctioning authority and the
satisfaction arrived at by it. In the present case, the
prosecution has placed on record the original sanction order
dated 03.03.2011. The said sanction order has been
approved by PW Raja Abdul Latief, who has admitted its
contents and identified his signatures. It is true that, during
his cross-examination, the said witness has deposed that the
loan file was not forwarded to him, but he has clearly stated
that the terms and conditions on which the loan was granted
to the complainant, the amount of subsidy, and the scheme
under which it was granted, etc., were examined by him.
Merely because the seized loan file was not forwarded to the
sanctioning authority, it cannot be stated that there has been
non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning
authority, particularly when the witness has clearly stated
that he examined the terms and conditions of the sanction
and recorded his satisfaction in the sanction order before
according sanction for prosecution against the appellant.
16. The order granting sanction for prosecution against the
appellant, which is on record, is a detailed order running into
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sixteen paragraphs, which clearly reflects the application of
mind by the sanctioning authority. Therefore, the contention
of learned senior counsel for the appellant in this regard is
misconceived.
17. The next question raised by learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant, on which much emphasis has been laid by
him, is that, the complainant had not completed the
formalities for the release of the second instalment of the
loan, as such, there was no occasion for the appellant to
release any further amount of the loan in his favour. Thus,
the complaint lodged by PW Parmanand is based upon
falsehood. It is being contended that, because the appellant
refused to release the second instalment of the loan on
account of non-fulfilment of formalities by the complainant,
this gave the complainant a reason to lodge a complaint
against him. It is contended that the respondent investigating
agency and the members of the trap team did not conduct
any verification before registering the FIR and proceeding to
lay a trap against the appellant. Learned Senior counsel,
while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 (10)
SCC 489, has contended that it was incumbent upon the
Trap Laying Officer to get independent verification of the
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alleged demand conducted, as the said fact assumes
prominence in ascertaining whether or not the complainant
bore a grudge against the appellant .
18. The issue whether the complainant was actually entitled to
get the second instalment of the loan released in his favour
and whether or not he had completed the requisite
formalities for release of the second instalment of the loan in
his favour may not be of much relevance to the present case.
The fact of the matter remains that the loan was sanctioned
in favour of PW Parmanand and the first instalment of the
loan amount had already been released in his favour. He was
awaiting the release of the subsequent instalments of the
loan. The appellant was in a position and he had the
authority to release the second instalment in his favour.
Whether the complainant had actually completed the
formalities in this regard is not of much relevance when the
facts on record clearly show that the appellant-accused, in
his capacity as a public servant, was in a position to confer a
benefit upon the complainant and, therefore, was in a
position to extract illegal gratification from him. It is not
only the doing of a legal act by illegal means that would fall
within the purview of misuse of official position, but doing
an illegal act with a view to confer a benefit upon a person
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would also amount to misuse of official position. Therefore,
even if the appellant-accused had demanded bribe money
from PW Parmanand for release of the second instalment of
the loan amount, despite the fact that the complainant had
not completed the requisite formalities, the demand made by
the appellant would fall within the purview of misuse of his
official position, thereby attracting the provisions of Section
5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the P.C. Act and Section
161 RPC .
19. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has laid
emphasis on the contention that, in the present case, the
demand for illegal gratification by the appellant from the
complainant at the time of the trap proceedings has not been
established. It has been contended that the shadow witness,
PW Madan Singh, has categorically stated that neither did he
see the exchange of bribe money nor did he hear the
conversation between the appellant and PW Parmanand. He
has further contended that the other prosecution witnesses,
who were present on the spot at the time of the alleged
transaction of bribe money between the complainant and the
appellant, neither witnessed the transaction nor did they
overhear the conversation between the two .
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20. According to learned Senior counsel, in the absence of
corroboration, the statement of the complainant with regard
to demand and acceptance of tainted money by the accused
during the trap proceedings cannot be relied upon. It has
been contended that the complainant in a trap case has to be
treated as an accomplice and his uncorroborated testimony
cannot be relied upon .
21. It has further been contended that, in the present case, there
is evidence on record to show that the tainted money was
recovered from the ground and not from the pocket of the
appellant-accused. Therefore, the defence of the appellant
that the complainant attempted to thrust the money into the
back pocket of his pant, stands established. On this basis, it
has been contended that the essential ingredients of demand
and acceptance of tainted money by the appellant during the
trap proceedings have not been established, and even the
recovery of tainted money from the possession of the
appellant-accused is highly doubtful .
22. Before dealing with the aforesaid contentions of learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant, it would be
necessary to survey the legal position as to whether a
conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of
the complainant in a trap case. In the present case, PW
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Madan Singh, the shadow witness, has turned hostile by
stating that he has neither witnessed the transaction
involving the exchange of bribe money between the
appellant and the complainant nor did he overhear the
conversation between the two. Thus, we are left with the
statement of the complainant so far as direct evidence on
aforesaid aspect is concerned.
23. The Supreme Court has, in the case of Prakash Chand vs.
State Delhi Administration, (1979) 3 SCC 90, while
dealing with the issue as to whether conviction can be based
on uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness, held that a
trap witness may perhaps be considered as a person
interested in the success of trap and that may entitle a Court
to view his evidence as that of an interested witness. The
Court further held that where the circumstances justify it, a
Court may refuse to act upon the uncorroborated testimony
of a trap witness but on the other hand, a court may well be
justified in acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of a
trap witness if the court is satisfied from the facts and
circumstances of the case that the witness is a witness of
truth.
24. In M. O. Shamsudhin vs. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC
351, the Supreme Court has, while dealing with the
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argument that statement of a bribe giver being in the nature
of an accomplice cannot be relied upon without
corroboration, explained the legal position on the issue in the
following manner:
11. Since this is an argument which is
frequently put forward in all cases of bribery,
we would like to examine the scope, nature
and extent of corroboration that is necessary
in such cases. The word ‘accomplice’ is not
defined in the Evidence Act. However, it is
accepted that the word is used in its ordinary
sense which means and signifies a guilty
partner or associate in a crime. Illustration
(b) to Section 114 in a way cautions the court
to bear in mind the presumption that an
accomplice is not worthy of credit unless he is
corroborated in material particulars. Section
133 of the Act, however, declares that an
accomplice shall be a competent witness
against an accused person and a conviction is
not illegal merely because it proceeds on the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
The relation between Section 133 which is a
rule of law and Illustration (b) to Section 114
which is a rule of prudence has been the
subject of comment in a large number of
decisions. However, it has emerged that a
conviction based on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice is not illegal
though an accomplice may be unworthy of
credit for several reasons. Reading Section
133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the
Evidence Act together, the courts in India
have held that while it is not illegal to act
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
accomplice the rule of prudence so
universally followed has to amount to rule of
law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of
an accomplice unless it is corroborated in
material aspects so as to implicate the
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accused. The reasons for requiring
corroboration of the testimony of an
accomplice are that an accomplice is likely to
swear falsely in order to shift the guilt from
himself and that he is an immoral person
being a participator in the crime who may not
have any regard to any sanction of the oath
and in the case of an approver, on his own
admission, he is a criminal who gives
evidence under a promise of pardon and
supports the prosecution with the hope of
getting his own freedom.
12. Now confining ourselves to the case of
bribery it is generally accepted that the
person offering a bribe to a public officer is in
the nature of an accomplice in the offence of
accepting illegal gratification but the nature
of corroboration required in such a case
should not be subjected to the same rigorous
tests which are generally applied to a case of
an approver. Though bribe-givers are
generally treated to be in the nature of
accomplices but among them there are
various types and gradations. In cases under
the Prevention of Corruption Act the
complainant is the person who gives the bribe
in a technical and legal sense because in
every trap case wherever the complaint is
filed there must be a person who has to give
money to the accused which in fact is the
bribe money which is demanded and without
such a giving the trap cannot succeed. When
there is such a demand by the public servant
from a person who is unwilling, and if to do
public good approaches the authorities and
lodges a complaint, then in order that the trap
succeeds he has to give the money. There
could be another type of bribe-giver who is
always willing to give money in order to get
his work done and having got the work done
he may send a complaint. Here he is
a particeps criminis in respect of the crime
committed and thus is an accomplice. Thus,
there are grades and grades of accomplices
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and therefore a distinction could as well be
drawn between cases where a person offers a
bribe to achieve his own purpose and where
one is forced to offer bribe under a threat of
loss or harm that is to say under coercion. A
person who falls in this category and who
becomes a party for laying a trap stands on a
different footing because he is only a victim of
threat or coercion to which he was subjected
to. Where such witnesses fall under the
category of ‘accomplices’ by reason of their
being bribe-givers, in the first instance, the
court has to consider the degree of complicity
and then look for corroboration if necessary
as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature
of corroboration that may be needed in a case
may vary having regard to the facts and
circumstances.
13. The word ‘corroboration’ means not mere
evidence tending to confirm other evidence.
In DPP v. Hester , Lord Morris said:
“The purpose of corroboration is not to
give validity or credence to evidence
which is deficient or suspect or
incredible but only to confirm and
support that which as evidence is
sufficient and satisfactory and credible;
and corroborative evidence will only fill
its role if it itself is completely
credible….”
In DPP v. Kilbourne , it was observed thus:
“There is nothing technical in the idea
of corroboration. When in the ordinary
affairs of life one is doubtful whether or
not to believe a particular statement one
naturally looks to see whether it fits in
with other statements or circumstances
relating to the particular matter; the
better it fits in the more one is inclined
to believe it. The doubted statement is
corroborated to a greater or lesser
extent by the other statements or
circumstances with which it fits in.”
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14. In R. v. Baskerville , which is a leading
case on this aspect, Lord Reading said:
“There is no doubt that the
uncorroborated evidence of an
accomplice is admissible in law.… But it
has long been a rule of practice at
common law for the judge to warn the
jury of the danger of convicting a
prisoner on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice or
accomplices, and, in the discretion of
the judge, to advise them not to convict
upon such evidence; but the judge
should point out to the jury that it is
within their legal province to convict
upon such unconfirmed evidence…. This
rule of practice has become virtually
equivalent to a rule of law, and since the
Court of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907,
came into operation this Court has held
that, in the absence of such a warning
by the judge, the conviction must be
quashed…. If after the proper caution by
the judge the jury nevertheless convicts
the prisoner, this Court will not quash
the conviction merely upon the ground
that the testimony of the accomplice was
uncorroborated.”
15. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, Bose,
J., after referring to the rule laid down
in Baskerville case with regard to the
admissibility of the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice, held thus:
“That, in my opinion, is exactly the law
in India so far as accomplices are
concerned and it is certainly not any
higher in the case of sexual offences.
The only clarification necessary for
purposes of this country is where this
class of offence is sometimes tried by a
judge without the aid of a jury. In these
cases it is necessary that the judge
should give some indication in his
judgment that he has had this rule of
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caution in mind and should proceed to
give reasons for considering it
unnecessary to require corroboration on
the facts of the particular case before
him and show why he considers it safe
to convict without corroboration in that
particular case.”
Justice Bose in the same judgment further
observed thus:
“I turn next to the nature and extent of
the corroboration required when it is
not considered safe to dispense with it.
Here, again, the rules are lucidly
expounded by Lord Reading
in Baskerville case at pages 664 to 669.
It would be impossible, indeed it would
be dangerous, to formulate the kind of
evidence which should, or would, be
regarded as corroboration. Its nature
and extent must necessarily vary with
circumstances of each case and also
according to the particular
circumstances of the offence charged.
But to this extent the rules are clear.
First, it is not necessary that there
should be independent confirmation of every
material circumstance in the sense that the
independent evidence in the case, apart from
the testimony of the complainant or the
accomplice, should in itself be sufficient to
sustain conviction. As Lord Reading says —
‘Indeed, if it were required that the
accomplice should be confirmed in
every detail of the crime, his
evidence would not be essential to
the case, it would be merely
confirmatory of other and
independent testimony.’
All that is required is that there must be
‘some additional evidence rendering it
probable that the story of the accomplice (or
complainant) is true and that it is reasonably
safe to act upon it’.
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Secondly, the independent evidence must
not only make it safe to believe that the crime
was committed but must in some way
reasonably connect or tend to connect the
accused with it by confirming in some
material particular the testimony of the
accomplice or complainant that the accused
committed the crime. This does not mean that
the corroboration as to identity must extend to
all the circumstances necessary to identify the
accused with the offence. Again, all that is
necessary is that there should be independent
evidence which will make it reasonably safe
to believe the witness's story that the accused
was the one, or among those, who committed
the offence. The reason for this part of the
rule is that —
‘a man who has been guilty of a
crime himself will always be able to
relate the facts of the case, and if the
confirmation be only on the truth of that
history, without identifying the persons,
that is really no corroboration at all….
It would not at all tend to show that the
party accused participated in it.’
Thirdly, the corroboration must come
from independent sources and thus ordinarily
the testimony of one accomplice would not be
sufficient to corroborate that of another. But
of course the circumstances may be such as to
make it safe to dispense with the necessity of
corroboration and in those special
circumstances a conviction so based would
not be illegal. I say this because it was
contended that the mother in this case was not
an independent source.
Fourthly, the corroboration need not be
direct evidence that the accused committed
the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely
circumstantial evidence of his connection with
the crime. Were it otherwise, ‘many crimes
which are usually committed between
accomplices in secret, such as incest, offences
CRA No.5/2017 Page 23 of 47
with females’ (or unnatural offences) ‘could
never be brought to justice’. ”
16. We shall now refer to some of the
judgments wherein the rule of corroboration
has been considered in respect of the bribery
cases. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of
Vindhya Pradesh there are observations to
the effect that the evidence of the trap
witnesses cannot be taken on its face value
thereby indicating that their evidence cannot
be relied upon without independent
corroboration. In State of Bihar v. Basawan
Singh a Bench of five Judges considered this
“corroboration requirement” and after
referring to the observations made in Rao
Shiv Bahadur Singh case explained them in
the following manner:
“If the witnesses are not
accomplices, what then is their
position? In Shiv Bahadur Singh case
(A) it was observed, with regard to
Nagindas and Pannalal, that they were
partisan witnesses who were out to
entrap the appellant in that case, and it
was further observed: ‘A perusal of the
evidence … leaves in the mind the
impression that they were not witnesses
whose evidence could be taken as its
face value.’ We have taken the
observations quoted above from a full
report of the decision, as the authorised
report does not contain the discussion
with regard to evidence. It is thus clear
that the decision did not lay down any
universal or inflexible rule of rejection
even with regard to the evidence of
witnesses who may be called partisan or
interested witnesses. It is plain and
obvious that no such rule can be laid
down; for the value of the testimony of a
witness depends on diverse factors, such
as, the character of the witness, to what
extent and in what manner he is
interested, how he has fared in cross-
CRA No.5/2017 Page 24 of 47
examination etc. There is no doubt that
the testimony of partisan or interested
witnesses must be scrutinised with care
and there may be cases, as in Shiv
Bahadur Singh case (A), where the
Court will as a matter of prudence look
for independent corroboration. It is
wrong, however, to deduce from that
decision any universal or inflexible rule
that the evidence of the witnesses of the
raiding party must be discarded, unless
independent corroboration is
available.”
This Court in the above case concluded thus:
“The correct rule is this: if any of
the witnesses are accomplices who
are particeps criminis in respect of the
actual crime charged, their evidence
must be treated as the evidence of
accomplices is treated; if they are not
accomplices but are partisan
or interested witnesses, who are
concerned in the success of the trap,
their evidence must be tested in the same
way as other interested evidence is
tested by the application of diverse
considerations which must vary from
case to case, and in proper case, the
Court may even look for independent
corroboration before convicting the
accused person.”
It was further concluded thus:
“As was observed by Lord
Reading in Baskerville (C) even in
respect of the evidence of an
accomplice, all that is required is that
there must be ‘some additional evidence
rendering it probable that the story of
the accomplice is true and that it is
reasonably safe to act upon it’.
In Rameshwar at p. 385 (B), to which
we have referred in an earlier
paragraph, the nature and extent of
CRA No.5/2017 Page 25 of 47
corroboration required, when it is not
considered safe to dispense with it, have
been clearly explained and it is merely
necessary to reiterate that
corroboration need not be direct
evidence that the accused committed the
crime; it is sufficient even though it is
merely circumstantial evidence of his
connection with the crime.”
17. In a later case namely Major E.G.
Barsay v. State of Bombay it was held by this
Court that though a trap witness is not an
approver he is certainly an interested witness
in that he is interested to see that the trap laid
by him succeeds and he could at the most be
equated with the partisan witnesses which
needs corroboration. Relying on the ratio laid
down in Basawan Singh case a Bench of three
Judges in Bhanuprasad Hariprasad
Dave v. State of Gujarat held thus:
“Now coming back to the
contention that the appellants could not
have been convicted solely on the basis
of the evidence of Ramanlal and the
police witnesses, we are of opinion that
it is an untenable contention. The utmost
that can be said against Ramanlal, the
Dy SP, Erulker and Santramji is that
they are partisan witnesses as they were
interested in the success of the trap laid
by them. It cannot be said — and it was
not said — that they were accomplices.
Therefore, the law does not require that
their evidence should be corroborated
before being accepted as sufficient to
found a conviction. This position is
placed beyond controversy by the
decision of this Court in State of
Bihar v. Basawan Singh wherein this
Court laid down, overruling the decision
in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of
Vindhya Pradesh that where the
witnesses are not accomplices but are
merely partisan or interested witnesses
CRA No.5/2017 Page 26 of 47
who are concerned in the success of the
trap, their evidence must be tested in the
same way as any other interested
evidence is tested and in a proper case,
the court may look for independent
corroboration before convicting the
accused person. We are unable to agree
that any different rule was laid down
in E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay. It
must be remembered that the decision
in Basawan Singh case was given by a
Bench of five Judges and that decision
was binding on the Bench that
decided Barsay case . Some of the
observations in Barsay case no doubt
support the contention of the appellants.
But those observations must be confined
to the peculiar facts of that case. It is
now well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court that while in the case of
evidence of an accomplice, no
conviction can be based on his evidence
unless it is corroborated in material
particulars but as regards the evidence
of a partisan witness it is open to a
court to convict an accused person
solely on the basis of that evidence, if it
is satisfied that that evidence is reliable.
But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration. In the instant case, the
trial court and the High Court have fully
accepted the evidence of Ramanlal, the
Dy SP, Erulker and Santramji. That
being so, it was open to them to convict
the appellants solely on the basis of
their evidence. That apart, their
evidence is substantially corroborated
by the evidence of Dahyabhai, Sanghvi
and Sendhalal. In the case of partisan
witnesses, the corroboration that may be
looked for is corroboration in a general
way and not material corroboration as
in the case of the evidence of
accomplices.”
CRA No.5/2017 Page 27 of 47
18. In Dalpat Singh v. State of Rajasthan ,
this Court after referring to Basawan Singh
case observed thus:
“We are unable to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17
and other prosecution witnesses to
whose evidence we shall presently refer,
should be considered as accomplices
and therefore their evidence is required
to be corroborated in material
particulars before being accepted. On
the proved facts, even those who gave
illegal gratification to the appellants
cannot be considered as accomplices as
the same was extorted from them.
Though PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be
considered as interested witnesses as
regards their evidence relating to trap,
as a matter of law, it is not correct to
say that their evidence cannot be
accepted without corroboration.
See State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh .”
19. In Maha Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) this
Court held thus: (SCC p. 652, paras 33 and
34)
“This also leads to the question
whether all witnesses, who are called
upon to assist detection of a bribery
case by laying a trap, should be
considered unreliable as accomplices or
at any rate partisan witnesses. There is
no rule of law that even if a witness is
otherwise reliable and independent, his
association in a pre-arranged raid
about which he had become acquainted
makes him an accomplice or a partisan
witness. In absence of anything to
warrant a contrary conclusion,
conviction is not untenable merely
because it is based on the testimony of
such a witness.
CRA No.5/2017 Page 28 of 47
We are also not prepared to dub
every witness of a raiding party to be an
accomplice per se or even as an
interested witness in total absence of
materials justifying such an inference.
While PW 4 will be a highly partisan
witness in this case in his own interest to
oblige the police, nothing was shown
against PW 3. PW 7, the Inspector,
cannot be considered as an absolutely
partisan witness because he is a police
officer who took immediate action on
the complaint. Nothing unusual is
suggested against him. We have no
hesitation in accepting the testimony of
PWs 3 and 7 on their own. They do
corroborate the complainant.”
20. In Hazari Lal v. State (Delhi Admn.) ,
Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench
while repelling the contention that the
evidence of trap witness namely the police
officer should not be accepted unless
corroborated observed thus: (SCC p. 395,
para 9)
“We, however, wish to say that the
evidence of PW 8 is entirely trustworthy
and there is no need to seek any
corroboration. We are not prepared to
accept the submission of Shri Frank
Anthony that he is the very police officer
who laid the trap should be sufficient for
us to insist upon corroboration. We do
wish to say that there is no rule of
prudence which has crystallized into a
rule of law, nor indeed any rule of
prudence, which requires that the
evidence of such officers should be
treated on the same footing as evidence
of accomplices and there should be
insistence on corroboration. In the facts
and circumstances of a particular case a
court may be disinclined to act upon the
evidence of such an officer without
corroboration, but, equally, in the facts
CRA No.5/2017 Page 29 of 47
and circumstances of another case the
Court may unhesitatingly accept the
evidence of such an officer. It is all a
matter of appreciation of evidence and
on such matters there can be no hard
and fast rule, nor can there be any
precedential guidance. We are forced to
say this because of late we have come
across several judgments of Courts of
Session and sometimes even of High
Courts where reference is made to
decisions of this Court on matters of
appreciation of evidence and decisions
of pure question of fact.”
21. From the above resume of various
decisions, the following principles are
deducible. Section 133 of the Evidence Act
lays down that an accomplice is a competent
witness against an accused person. The
conviction based on such evidence is not
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
However, there is a rider in Illustration (b) to
Section 114 of the Act which provides that the
court may presume that the accomplice is
unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated
in material particulars. This presumption is in
the nature of a precautionary provision
incorporating the rule of prudence which is
ingrained in the appreciation of accomplice's
evidence. Therefore, the courts should be
guarded before accepting the accomplice's
evidence and look for corroborating evidence.
The discretion of the court upon which the
rule of corroboration rests must be exercised
in a sound and reasonable manner. Normally
the courts may not act on an uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice but whether in a
particular case it has to be accepted without
corroboration or not would depend on an
overall consideration of the accomplice's
evidence and the facts and circumstances.
However, if on being so satisfied the court
considers that the sole testimony of the
CRA No.5/2017 Page 30 of 47
accomplice is safe to be acted upon, the
conviction can be based thereon. Even if
corroboration as a matter of prudence is
needed it is not for curing any defect in the
testimony of the accomplice or to give validity
to it but it is only in the nature of supporting
evidence making the other evidence more
probable to enable the court to satisfy itself to
act upon it.
22. Now coming to the witnesses in trap
cases, as held in Basawan Singh case by a
Bench of five Judges, if any of the witnesses
are accomplices who are particeps criminis in
respect of the actual crime charge, their
evidence must be treated as the evidence of
accomplices is treated; if they are not
accomplices in that sense but are only
partisan or interested witnesses who are
concerned in the success of the trap, their
evidence must be tested in the same way as
other interested evidence is tested which may
vary from case to case and the corroboration
in the case of such interested witnesses can be
in a general way and not as one required in
material particulars as in the case of an
approver. Therefore, in seeking corroboration
for the evidence of trap witnesses a distinction
has to be drawn where participation of an
individual in a crime is not voluntary but is
the result of pressure. In such a case the
element of mens rea to commit the crime is
not apparent and (sic) cannot strictly be
classified as an accomplice and at any rate he
cannot be treated as being on the same
footing. Where a bribe has already been
demanded from a man and if without giving
the bribe he goes to the police or magistrate
and brings them to witness the payment it will
be a legitimate trap and in such cases at the
most he can be treated as an interested
witness and whether corroboration is
necessary or not will be within the discretion
of the court depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. However, as a
CRA No.5/2017 Page 31 of 47
rule of prudence, the court has to scrutinise
the evidence of such interested witnesses
carefully.
23. Now coming to the nature of
corroborating evidence that is required, it is
well-settled that the corroborating evidence
can be even by way of circumstantial
evidence. No general rule can be laid down
with respect to quantum of evidence
corroborating the testimony of a trap witness
which again would depend upon its own facts
and circumstances like the nature of the
crime, the character of trap witness etc. and
other general requirements necessary to
sustain the conviction in that case. The court
should weigh the evidence and then see
whether corroboration is necessary.
Therefore, as a rule of law, it cannot be laid
down that the evidence of every complainant
in a bribery case should be corroborated in
all material particulars and otherwise it
cannot be acted upon. Whether corroboration
is necessary and if so to what extent and what
should be its nature depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. In a case of
bribe, the person who pays the bribe and
those who act as intermediaries are the only
persons who can ordinarily be expected to
give evidence about the bribe and it is not
possible to get absolutely independent
evidence about the payment of bribe.
However, it is cautioned that the evidence of a
bribe-giver has to be scrutinised very
carefully and it is for the court to consider
and appreciate the evidence in a proper
manner and decide the question whether a
conviction can be based upon it or not in
those given circumstances.”
25. The aforesaid ratio has been followed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar Gupta vs. State of MP,
(1995) 5 SCC 320.
CRA No.5/2017 Page 32 of 47
26. In yet another decision in the case of Meena Vs. State of
Maharashtra 2000(5) SCC 21 , the Supreme Court has held
as under:-
“The corroboration essential in a case like this for
what actually transpired at the time of the alleged
occurrence and acceptance of bribe is very much
wanting in this case. Even the other panch witness, PW
5 categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of
Police, PW 6 arrived, the appellant gave the same
version that PW 1 tried to force into her hands the
currency note which she turned down by pushing it
away, and his evidence also does not lend credibility to
the case of the prosecution. The contradictory version
of PW 1 of the very incident when earlier examined in
departmental proceedings renders his testimony in this
case untrustworthy. PW 3, the Head Copyist, seems to
be the brain behind all this and that PW 1 as well as
Jagdish Bokade appear to be working as a group in this
affair and despite the blunt denial by PW 3, his
closeness to PW 1 and Jagdish Bokade stands well
substantiated. All these relevant aspects of the case
seem to have been completely overlooked by the courts
below."
We do not find any substance in the submission of
Mr. Rai. The word accomplice has not been defined
under the Evidence Act and therefore presumed to have
been used in the ordinary sense. A person concerned in
the commission of crime, a partner in crime and
associate in guilt is an accomplice. He takes part in the
crime and is privy to the criminal intent. In our opinion
a witness forced to pay on promise of doing or
forbearing to do any official act by a public servant, is
not a partner in crime and associate in guilt and
therefore cannot be said to be accomplice. It has long
been rule of practice, which has become equivalent to
rule of law, that the evidence of an accomplice is
admissible but to be acted upon, ordinarily requires
corroboration. Contractor who gave bribe, therefore,
cannot be said to an accomplice as the same was
extorted from him. Reference in this connection can be
CRA No.5/2017 Page 33 of 47
made to a decision of this Court in the case of Dalpat
Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan, (AIR 1969 SC
17), in which it has been held as follows:
"We are unable to accept the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants that PWs 1, 2, 3, 4
and 17 and other prosecution witnesses to whose
evidence we shall presently refer, should be considered
as accomplices and therefore their evidence is required
to be corroborated in material particulars before being
accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave
illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be
considered as accomplices as the same was extorted
from them. Though PWs 1, 2, 4 and 17 can be
considered as interested witnesses as regards their
evidence relating to trap, as a matter of law, it is not
correct to say that their evidence cannot be accepted
without corroboration, see State of Bihar v. Basawan
Singh 1959 SCR 195 : (AIR 1958 SC 500) (underlining
ours).
27. In C.M. Sharma Vs State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 608 , the
Supreme Court has explained that the categories of cases in
which corroboration of evidence of witnesses is required in
the following manner:-
“ 12 . Further corroboration of evidence of a witness is
required when his evidence is not wholly reliable. On
appreciation of evidence, witnesses can be broadly
categorized in three categories viz., unreliable, partly
reliable and wholly reliable. In case of a partly reliable
witness, the court seeks corroboration in material
particulars from other evidence. However in a case in
which a witness is wholly reliable, no corroboration is
necessary. Seeking corroboration in all circumstance of
the evidence of a witness forced to give bribe may lead
to absurd result. Bribe is not taken in public view and,
therefore, there may not be any person who could see
the giving and taking of bribe. As in the present case, a
shadow witness did accompany the contractor but the
appellant did not allow him to be present in the
chamber. Acceptance of this submission in abstract will
CRA No.5/2017 Page 34 of 47
encourage the bribe taker to receive illegal gratification
in privacy and then insist for corroboration in case of
prosecution. Law cannot countenance such situation. In
our opinion it is not necessary that the evidence of a
reliable witness is necessarily to be corroborated by
another witness. Not only this corroboration of the
evidence of a witness can be found from the other
materials on record. Here in the present case there does
not seem any reason to reject the evidence of the
contractor PW.1, M. Venka Reddy. His evidence is
further corroborated by the evidence of the shadow-
witness PW.2, G.T. Kumar. The shadow-witness has
stated in his evidence that when he entered in the
chamber, appellant was asked by the Inspector as to
whether he had received any amount from the
contractor, he denied and then removed the currency
notes 14 from his trouser's pocket and threw the same.
He had further stated that sodium carbonate test was
conducted in which the solution turned pink when the
appellant's fingers and the right side trouser's pocket
were rinsed. From the aforesaid one can safely infer
that the evidence of the contractor is corroborated in
material particulars by the shadow-witness.
28. Recently, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
the case of Neeraj Dutta vs. State (Govt. of N.C.T of
Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, while answering the question as to
whether in the absence of direct or primary evidence of
demand of illegal gratification, is it not permissible to draw
an inferential deduction of culpability/ guilt of a public
servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)( d ) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution,
surveyed the legal precedents on the issue laid down by the
CRA No.5/2017 Page 35 of 47
Supreme Court in previous past and summarized the legal
position in the following manner:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in
issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in
order to establish the guilt of the accused
public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the
accused, the prosecution has to first prove the
demand of illegal gratification and the
subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This
fact in issue can be proved either by direct
evidence which can be in the nature of oral
evidence or documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof
of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification can also be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct
oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely,
the demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by the public servant, the
following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-
giver without there being any demand
from the public servant and the latter
simply accepts the offer and receives the
illegal gratification, it is a case of
acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In
such a case, there need not be a prior
demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public
servant makes a demand and the bribe-
giver accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case
of obtainment. In the case of obtainment,
the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is
CRA No.5/2017 Page 36 of 47
an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and
(ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the
offer by the bribe-giver and the demand
by the public servant respectively have to
be proved by the prosecution as a fact in
issue. In other words, mere acceptance or
receipt of an illegal gratification without
anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the
Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act,
in order to bring home the offence, there
must be an offer which emanates from the
bribe-giver which is accepted by the
public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the
public servant when accepted by the
bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment
made which is received by the public
servant, would be an offence of
obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act.
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an
illegal gratification may be made by a court of
law by way of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence and
not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the
material on record, the court has the discretion
to raise a presumption of fact while
considering whether the fact of demand has
been proved by the prosecution or not. Of
course, a presumption of fact is subject to
rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of
rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”,
or has died or is unavailable to let in his
evidence during trial, demand of illegal
gratification can be proved by letting in the
evidence of any other witness who can again let
in evidence, either orally or by documentary
evidence or the prosecution can prove the case
CRA No.5/2017 Page 37 of 47
by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not
abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal
of the accused public servant.
(g) Inso far as Section 7 of the Act is
concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue,
Section 20 mandates the court to raise a
presumption that the illegal gratification was
for the purpose of a motive or reward as
mentioned in the said Section. The said
presumption has to be raised by the court as a
legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of
course, the said presumption is also subject to
rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law
under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from
presumption of fact referred to above in sub-
para 88.5(e), above, as the former is a
mandatory presumption while the latter is
discretionary in nature.
29. From the foregoing analysis of the legal position on the
subject, it emerges that there is no abstract rule that
uncorroborated testimony of a bribe giver should not be
accepted. It is also clear that a bribe giver can be termed as a
partisan witness who is interested in the success of trap and
his statement has to be analysed and scrutinized in the same
manner in which the statement of any other partisan witness
is to be analysed and scrutinized before placing reliance upon
it. It is further beyond any cavil that corroboration to the
statement of a complainant can be by way of direct evidence
or by way of circumstantial evidence and it is not necessary
that corroboration to his statement has to be by direct
CRA No.5/2017 Page 38 of 47
evidence only. The quantum of evidence corroborating the
testimony of a trap witness would depend upon its own facts
and circumstances which would include nature of the crime
and the character of the trap witness. The Court, on the basis
of the facts and circumstances of each case, will have to
weigh the evidence and see whether corroboration is
necessary.
30. In the face of the aforesaid legal position, let us now advert
to the facts of the present case.
31. If we have a look at the statement of PW Parmanand on the
aspect of the transaction involving the bribe money at the
time of the trap proceedings, he has stated that the appellant
came to his shop at about 4 p.m. and he got cold drink for
him. While the appellant was sipping cold drink, he asked
him whether he had arranged the money. Thereafter, he
demanded the money and told him that he has to pay it. The
complainant further stated that he took the tainted amount
and handed it over to the appellant, who, after counting the
same, put it in the right-side back pocket of his pant.
Thereafter, PW Madan Singh gave the pre-fixed signal to the
other members of the trap team. Later on, however, he stated
that the tainted money was recovered from the left-side
CRA No.5/2017 Page 39 of 47
pocket of the appellant. He further stated that PW Madan
Singh conducted the search of the appellant’s pocket and,
when he took out the tainted money from the appellant’s
pocket, the appellant tucked the currency notes with his
hand, as a result of which two currency notes fell down on
ground, whereafter PW Madan Singh picked them. In his
cross-examination, he denied that he had thrust the money
into the appellant’s pocket under the directions of PW
Deepak Tufchi, Inspector. He also denied the suggestion that
the currency notes were recovered from the ground and not
from the possession of the appellant.
32. So far as the shadow witness is concerned, initially, he
supported the prosecution case, but then he stated that the
appellant was offered cold drink by PW Parmanand,
whereafter he handed over the bribe money to the appellant
because the appellant had demanded it from him. He further
stated that the appellant kept the bribe money in the right-
side back pocket of his pant, whereafter he passed on the
pre-fixed signal. He, however, stated that the bribe money
was lying on the ground and the same was picked up by PW
Sanjeev Gupta. The witness was declared hostile. During his
cross-examination, he stated that he did not hear the
conversation between the appellant and the complainant. He
CRA No.5/2017 Page 40 of 47
further stated that the currency notes fell down between the
bench and the counter. He further stated that he did not see
the currency notes falling down, but he stated that the
currency notes had fallen down during the search and not
from his hand.
33. So far as the other members of the trap team are concerned,
their consistent statements regarding the transaction
involving the bribe money at the time of the trap
proceedings are that, when PW Madan Singh conducted the
search of the right-side back pocket of the pant worn by the
appellant and when he was taking out the tainted notes from
his pocket, the appellant pushed him, as a result of which the
currency notes fell down on the ground. These notes were
picked up and tallied with the serial numbers noted on the
slip. The independent witness, PW Sanjeev Gupta, has also
deposed on similar lines. However, he has stated that the
appellant turned violent when he was caught and that the
tainted money was recovered from the right-side back
pocket of the pant worn by the appellant.
34. There is consistent evidence on record to show that the
appellant had demanded illegal gratification from PW
Parmanand and he accepted the same during the trap
proceedings. Even the hostile witness, PW Madan Singh,
CRA No.5/2017 Page 41 of 47
has clearly stated that the demand emanated from the
appellant, pursuant to which the tainted money was handed
over by the complainant to the appellant. He has resiled
from his statement made to the investigating agency only to
the extent of the recovery of tainted money from the
possession of the appellant. He stated that he saw the tainted
money falling on the ground, from where it was picked up
by PW Sanjeev Gupta. So far as the transaction involving
the bribe money between the appellant and the complainant
is concerned, he has confirmed the said fact and, to that
extent, he has corroborated the statement of PW Parmanand.
Thus, it cannot be stated that the finding of the learned trial
court, that there was a transaction involving tainted money
in the form of demand and acceptance at the time of the trap
proceedings, is based only on the uncorroborated testimony
of the complainant. In fact, the statement of PW Madan
Singh corroborates the statement of PW Parmanand in its
material particulars except to the extent of recovery of
tainted money. Regarding recovery of tainted money from
the possession of the appellant, the statement of the
complainant is corroborated by all the members of the trap
team.
CRA No.5/2017 Page 42 of 47
35. Even otherwise, the law is well settled that, in reaching a
conclusion, the Court can use the process of inferences to be
drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are
akin to presumptions in law. The law gives absolute
discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact
which it thinks likely to have happened. This discretion is
clearly envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. In the
present case, it has been established that the tainted currency
notes were handed over to PW Parmanand during the trap
proceedings and that these currency notes were recovered
from the back pocket of the pant worn by the appellant upon
his search after the trap proceedings. There is also evidence
on record to show that the hand wash and pant wash of the
appellant turned pink immediately after the trap. From these
proved facts, a presumption can be drawn that the appellant
had willingly received the currency notes. Therefore, the
finding of the learned trial court that the prosecution has
succeeded in proving that the appellant had demanded and
accepted the tainted currency notes, which were recovered
from his possession, on the basis of which the presumption
under Section 4 of the J&K P.C. Act has to follow, appears
to be well-founded.
CRA No.5/2017 Page 43 of 47
36. It has been contended by learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant that there was no occasion for the appellant
to be in the shop of the complainant at the relevant time and
that he had gone there only with a view to verify whether the
complainant had installed the machinery. Therefore, his
defence that the money was thrust by the complainant into
the back pocket of his pant to falsely implicate him appears
to be probable, which is supported by the statements of
defence witnesses who have stated that the appellant was
being falsely implicated and that they had seen the currency
notes lying on the ground at the spot.
37. In the above context, it is to be noted that it is the defence of
the appellant that the complainant had not purchased the
machinery and he had not produced the purchase bills before
him. If the complainant had not produced the purchase bills
before the appellant, there was no occasion for him to visit
the shop of the complainant to verify whether or not the
machinery had been installed. The fact that the appellant
visited the shop of the complainant at the time of the trap
proceedings leads to an inference that he had gone there with
a view to collect the bribe money that he had demanded
from the complainant but unfortunately for him, he was
trapped there. So far as defence witnesses are concerned,
CRA No.5/2017 Page 44 of 47
they have clearly stated in their cross-examination that they
had no knowledge of what had happened in the shop of the
complainant before they reached the spot. According to
them, they reached the spot when the appellant had already
been apprehended by the team of the Vigilance
Organization. Thus, their statements regarding the events
that had taken place prior to the apprehension of the
appellant cannot be relied upon.
38. The contention of the appellant that verification of the
complaint made by PW Parmanand was not conducted by
the trap laying officer and other members of the trap team, is
without any substance. In this regard it is to be noted that all
the members of the trap team including independent
witnesses have categorically stated that the complainant was
questioned about the veracity of the allegations made in the
complaint and he was also questioned so as to ascertain
whether he had any grudge against the appellant.
39. From the forgoing discussion and analysis of the material on
record, it can safely be concluded that the prosecution has
been able to prove all the ingredients of the offence for
which the appellant has been charged. The evidence on
record regarding demand, acceptance and recovery of the
CRA No.5/2017 Page 45 of 47
tainted money is cogent and convincing. Hence there is no
reason to discard the same.
40. For what has been discussed hereinbefore, I do not find any
ground to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment passed
by the learned trial court. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment of conviction is upheld. However, having regard to
the fact that the appellant has undergone trial for about six
years and that the present appeal has remained pending
before this Court for the last nine years, the quantum of
sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant by the
learned trial court deserves to be reduced. Accordingly, the
sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the appellant by the
learned trial court is reduced from two years to one year for
each of the offences.
41. The present appeal against the judgment of conviction is
accordingly dismissed. However, the order of sentence is
modified to the extent that the appellant shall, besides
paying a fine of rupees 10,000/- in each of the offences for
which he has been convicted, undergo simple imprisonment
for one year in each of the offences.
42. The appellant shall surrender before the learned trial court
within a period of one month from today to serve the
sentence. Upon the appellant’s surrender, the learned trial
CRA No.5/2017 Page 46 of 47
court shall send him to jail to serve the balance sentence. In
case the appellant does not surrender before the trial court
within the aforesaid period, coercive measures shall be taken
to secure his presence before the said court. The trial court
record, along with a copy of this judgment, be transmitted to
the learned trial court.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge
Jammu
05.11.2026
Madan Verma-Secy
Whether order is speaking? Yes/No
Whether order is reportable? Yes/No
CRA No.5/2017 Page 47 of 47