Gurdial Singh Deol vs Union Of India And Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
*
107
RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 05.11.2026

GURDIAL SINGH DEOL
…Appellant
Versus

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
…Respondents

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL

Present:- Ms. Oshin Swami, Advocate on behalf of
Mr. Puneet Sharma, Advocate for applicant/appellant

Mr. Sunil Kumar Sharma, Advocate (through V.C.)
For respondent-UOI

Mr. Puru Jarewal, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab

*

JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)
CM-639-640-CI-2026
1. The applicant through instant applications under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 is seeking condonation of delay of 7196 days in
filing as well as 440 days in refiling the main appeal.
2. The applicant is seeking condonation of delay on the ground
that his brief was misplaced. The similarly situated landowners filed appeals
which stand dismissed by this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that claim of
applicant is covered by judgment of this Court, however, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that landowners would not be entitled to statutory
benefits and interest for the period of delay.
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)

4. Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development
Authority Vs. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma (Dead) Through
Legal Heir & Anr. , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1599 while adverting to the
inordinate delay in filing the appeals before the High Court has held that
delay may be condoned and enhanced compensation may be granted,
however, the beneficiary/acquiring body cannot be saddled with the liability
of statutory benefits and interest. Relevant extracts of the judgment read as:-
“5.2 Even otherwise as rightly observed by the High Court,
the land owners are not entitled to the compensation at
Rs.297/- per sq.yard considering the decision of this Court in
the case of Nanak (Deceased) through LRS. (supra). Nothing
was pointed out that how the case of the land owners was
comparable with that of the case of Nanak (Deceased) through
LRS. (supra). On the contrary with respect to the acquisition of
the year 1982, this Hon'ble Court determined the compensation
at Rs.149/- per sq.yard in the case of Deo Karan & Ors.(supra).
5.3 However, at the same time the acquiring body and the
beneficiary of acquisition shall not be saddled with the liability
of statutory benefits and the interest which may be available
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period. In
the present case the delay of 22 years can be said to be a
substantial delay. However, as the claimants are held to be
entitled the enhanced amount of compensation, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the High Court can be said to be
justified in condoning the delay. However, at the same time, the
High Court has erred in awarding other statutory benefits and
interest for the delayed period. To saddle with the liability to
pay statutory benefits and interest for the delayed period upon
the beneficiary/acquiring body would be a financial burden
upon the public body and it may increase the project cost which
shall be against the public interests. It cannot be disputed that
the liability towards the statutory benefits and the interest under
the Act, 1984 would be a huge liability considering the interest
at the rate of 15% per annum, solatium, price rise etc.
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
Therefore, while condoning the delay and enhancing the
amount of compensation at par with other land owners, the
High Court ought not to have saddled the liability upon the
appellant to pay statutory benefits and the interest payable
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the delayed period. To
the aforesaid extent the impugned common judgment and order
passed by the High Court is required to be modified and the
present appeals are required to be partly allowed to the
aforesaid extent.”
[Emphasis supplied]


5. The Supreme Court vide judgment dated 23.04.2025 passed in
Suresh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 896 has
reiterated that applications seeking condonation of delay ought to be
considered by adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach. It has been
observed that the discretion vested in the Courts under the law of limitation
should be exercised to advance substantial justice, and that a technical or
pedantic approach should not defeat the adjudication of disputes on their

merits. Relevant extracts of the judgement read as:-
“9. Implementing in letter and spirit, the observations made
as above, i, e., a liberal approach in condonation of delay, we
notice that this Court in quite a few judgments has condoned
substantial delay. We may refer to some of them. In Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana The Court observed that even
though there was long delay in filing the appeals, it was a
case of compulsory acquisition and there had been a
difference in the amount of compensation granted to some
land losers vis-a-vis others. References were also made to
Market Committee Hodal v. Krishan Murari wherein delay of
3240 days arising from the same acquisition has been
condoned. In Huchanagouda v. Assistant Commissioner and
Land Acquisition Officer., this Court, taking into account the
poverty and illiteracy of the land loser, condoned the delay of
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
more than 2000 days. It was observed that equities had to be
balanced by ensuring that the determination of market value
relates back to the preliminary notification - making sure that
there is no prejudice to the acquiring authorities, as also no
undue advantage to the land loser. In other words, the
appellants who approached the Court with delay, would not
be granted interest for such period.
10. In Executive Engineer, Nimna Dudhna Project Selu,
District Parbhani, Maharashtra v. State of Maharashtra, this
Court held that the Body acquiring land cannot be saddled
with the liability of paying interest for the period of delay in
preferring the appeals. The order of the High Court, which
granted interest also for five and half years' delay, was
modified to such an extent that interest shall not be payable
for delay. [See also Ningappa Thotappa Angadi v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer.]
11. In all judgments referred supra, the common thread that
can be observed is that delay is not a reason to deny the land
losers their compensation, which is just, fair and reasonable
for the land they have lost.
12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech Services
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., with reference to Coffee Board,
Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commission of Commercial Tax,
Karnataka that while the State has the power of eminent
domain, the owner of a land can only be divested thereof in
accordance with the procedure established by law after
appropriately compensating them. This is in view of Article
300 A and 31A of the Constitution of India.”


6. The Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Vidhya
Devi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725 while adopting a liberal approach
in condoning the delay in appeals preferred by landowners in land
acquisition matters, has deprecated a hyper-technical approach. It has been
observed that having regard to the beneficial nature of land acquisition
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
jurisprudence and the rights involved the matters ought to be adjudicated on
their merits rather than being rejected on technical ground of delay. The
parameters laid down by the Court are reproduced below: -
“47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this
Court in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2
SCC 569, wherein it was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be
raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if
the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial
discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and
reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It
will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay
arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for
the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction
to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not
defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975)
1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”
[Emphasis supplied]
--- ---
49. Similarly, this Court in its decision in Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, (1969) 1 SCR 808 held that:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would
be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material. But in every case, if an
argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the
delay and the nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course
or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
[Emphasis supplied]

--- ---
51. The decisions of this Court have consistently held that the
right to property is enshrined in the Constitution and requires
that procedural safeguards be followed to ensure fairness
and non-arbitrariness in decision-making especially in cases
of acquisition by the State. Therefore, the delay in
approaching the court, while a significant factor, cannot
override the necessity to address illegalities and protect right
to property enshrined in Article 300A. The court must
balance the need for finality in legal proceedings with the
need to rectify injustice. The right of an individual to
vindicate and protect private property cannot be brushed
away merely on the grounds of delay and laches.”


7. Learned counsel for the appellant on being confronted with the
judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (supra) , Suresh Kumar (supra) and Urban
Improvement Trust (supra) expressed his inability to controvert that in view
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)
of inordinate delay in filing and refiling the main appeal, the appellant is not
entitled to statutory benefits and interest for the delayed period.

8. A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court reveals that liberal approach in case of application of a landowner
seeking condonation of delay in land acquisition matter should be adopted.
The Court has approved condonation of delay of more than 20 years. Cases
of landowners must not be treated at par with other cases. Delay irrespective
of number of years ought to be condoned.

9. In the wake of statement of both sides and afore-cited
judgments, applications for condonation of delay stands allowed and delay
in filing and refiling enclosed appeal is hereby condoned subject to the
condition that appellant shall not be entitled to statutory benefits and interest
for the delayed period i.e. 7196 days in filing and 440 days in refiling the
main appeal.
RFA-278-2025 (O&M)

1. The appellant through instant appeal is seeking setting aside of
award dated 03.12.2001 whereby learned Additional District Judge,
Jalandhar (hereinafter referred to as ‘Reference Court’) has not granted
compensation as claimed by him.

2. Notice of motion.

3. Mr. Puru Jarewal, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab and
Mr. Sunil Kumar Sharma, Advocate who on advance notice appeared and
accept notice on behalf of respondent-State as well as respondent-UOI
respectively.
SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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RFA-278-2025 (O&M)

4. On the request of both sides, the appeal is taken up for
adjudication.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent-UOI submits that issue
involved herein is squarely covered by judgment dated 09.09.2026 passed
by this Court in RFA-754-2024 . Land in question was acquired by the same
notification which was in question in the afore-cited judgment.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner expressed her inability to
controvert applicability of the aforesaid judgment to the instant case.

7. By judgment dated 09.09.2026, this Court has dismissed the
appeals on the ground of delay as well as on merits.

8. In the backdrop, the appeal stands dismissed in terms of
judgment dated 09.09.2026 passed by this Court in RFA-754-2024 .

9. Pending Misc. application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
05.11.2026
SDK

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No

SUDEEPAK KUMAR
2026.11.05 16:53
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