ACME Solar Holdings Limited & Anr vs Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Anr
- Court
- Appellate Tribunal For Electricity
Court-1
IN THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
IA NO.62 OF 2026 IN DFR NO.21 OF 2026
Dated: 03.07.2026
Present: Hon’ble Ms. Seema Gupta, Officiating Chairperson
Hon’ble Mr. Virender Bhat, Judicial Member
In the matter of:
1. ACME Solar Holdings Limited
Through its Jasmine P. Singh
Plot No. 152, Sector 44,
Gurugram, Haryana – 122002
Email: [email protected]
2. ACME Sikar Solar Private Limited
Through its Jasmine P. Singh
Plot No. 152, Sector 44,
Gurugram, Haryana – 122002
Email: [email protected] … Appellant(s)
Versus
1. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
Through its Secretary
th th th
6 , 7 & 8 Floors, Tower B,
World Trade Centre, Nauroji Nagar,
New Delhi – 110029
Email: [email protected]
2. Central Transmission Utility of India Limited
Through its Chief General Manager
th th
Floors No. 5 -10 , IRCON International Tower,
Tower 1, Plot No. 16, Institutional Area,
Sector 32, Gurugram, Haryana – 122003
Email: [email protected] … Respondent (s)
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 1 of 22
Counsel for the Appellant(s) : Suparna Srivastava
Aniket Prasoon
Pratiksha Chaturvedi
Aman Sheikh
Vinit Kumar
Shubham Singh
Archita Kashyap
Sarthak Sareen
Tanya Bajaj
Sunanda Chowdhary
Anshika Bhatnagar
Anannya Sinha
for App. 1 & 2
Counsel for the Respondent(s) : Poorva Saigal
Shubham Arya
Pallavi Saigal
Reeha Singh
Kaavya
Shree Dwivedi
Rishabh Saxena
for Res. 2
O R D E R
PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER
1. By way of this application, the appellants have sought condonation
of delay of 368 days delay in filing the instant appeal.
2. Appellant No.1 is a public limited company and the successor in
interest of erstwhile ACME Solar Holdings Limited. Appellant no.2 is a
special purpose vehicle incorporated by appellant no.1 for developing and
commissioning 300MW grid connected solar photovoltaic power project.
3. In pursuance to Request for Selection (RfS) dated 06.05.2021, the
appellant no.1 submitted its bid and was declared successful for
development of the said solar power project.
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4. It appears that there was delay on the part of the appellants in
completion and commissioning of the power project within the stipulated
time. Accordingly, the appellants approached the Commission with
petition no.326/MP/2024 seeking extension of time period for
commissioning of the solar power project by three months with further
nd
direction to 2 respondent CTUIL not to take any coercive action with
regard to the connectivity granted to the appellants for the power project
on 10.05.2022. The petition has been disposed of by the Commission
vide order dated 25.11.2024 which has been impugned in this appeal. The
Commission, while allowing extension of time for the completion of power
project till 21.04.2025 has directed the appellant to pay compensation to
the 2nd respondent CTUIL as condition for retention of the connectivity
granted at Bikaner-II transmission line.
5. Being aggrieved by the direction to pay compensation to CTUIL for
retaining the connectivity, the appellants have approached this Tribunal
by way of the instant appeal. As already noted hereinabove, there is delay
of 368 days in filing the appeal.
6. Before adverting to the rival contentions and submissions of the
parties on the aspect of condonation of delay in filing the appeal, we find
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it necessary to note following events which are very material for a decision
on the application at hand.
7. Subsequent to the passing of the impugned order by the
Commission on 25.11.2024, the appellant filed review petition bearing
no.3/RP/2025 on 01.01.2025 seeking review of the impugned order.
However, the review petition was withdrawn by the appellants on
20.02.2025. Thereafter, the appellants approached the Commission
again by way of petition no.452/MP/2025 seeking extension of further 65
days i.e. till 25.06.2025 for commissioning of the power project. However,
during the pendency of the said petition, CTUIL vide its letter dated
23.04.2025, revoked the connectivity granted to the appellants. When this
fact was brought to the notice of the Commission, the Commission vide
record of proceedings dated 24.04.2025 directed CTUIL to keep
revocation in abeyance and permitted the appellants to proceed with the
commissioning activities. Ultimately, the project was commissioned by
the appellants on 25.06.2025. The said interim order dated 24.04.2025
remained in operation till the issuance of final order dated 12.12.2025 in
the said petition no.452 of 2025.
8. It appears that the temporary connectivity granted to the appellants
was not being fully operationalized and thus, the appellants filed a writ
petition bearing no.13641 of 2025 before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 4 of 22
02.09.2025 seeking issuance of appropriate directions to the relevant
government authorities for the timely operationalization of the
connectivity/GNA granted to the appellants’ power project. It is relevant
to note here that in the status report dated 22.09.2025 filed by CTUIL and
PowerGrid Narela Transmission Limited (PNTL) in the said writ petition it
was acknowledged that Khetri-Narela line was likely to be commissioned
only by December, 2025.
9. PNTL declared commercial operation of Khetri-Narela Transmission
Line on 10.12.2025. Accordingly, connectivity for all the projects
connected to Bikaner-II except the appellants was made effective by
CTUIL on the said dated i.e. 10.12.2025.
10. Thereafter, in pursuance to the final order passed by the
Commission in petition no.452 of 2025 on 12.12.2025, CTUIL restored the
connectivity of the appellants at Bikaner-II and made the GNA for
appellants’ 300MW power project at Bikaner-II effective from 14.12.2025.
Thus, the appellants were allowed to evacuate the entire 300MW power
from the project.
11. Thereafter, the appellants filed the instant appeal on 12.01.2026.
12. We have heard Ms. Suparna Srivastava, learned counsel for the
nd
appellant/applicant and Ms. Poorva Saigal, learned counsel for the 2
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respondent CTUIL. We have also perused the pleadings of the parties on
the aspect of condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants would argue that the issues
arising from the impugned order were linked with the pending proceedings
before the Commission concerning the commissioning of the project,
revocation and restoration of connectivity as well as operationalization of
the associated transmission system and the legal position became crystal
clear only on passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the Commission
in petition no.452 of 2025. It is submitted that the appellants found it
appropriate to wait for the crystallization of the issues and the final
resolution of interconnected proceedings before approaching this Tribunal
by way of the instant appeal, in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings
and inconsistent adjudication.
14. It is argued that the delay in filing the appeal was occasioned due to
circumstances wholly beyond the control of the appellants which included
the delay in commissioning of associated ISTS, revocation of connectivity
by CTUIL during the pendency of the proceedings of petition no.452 of
2025, restricted evacuation granted to the appellants under temporary
GNA and the imminent risk of shutdown of the power project. It is argued
that during this period the appellants were constrained to focus on
safeguarding the commissioning of the project in order to ensure
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 6 of 22
uninterrupted supply of entire 300MW power from the project and
utilization of the connectivity to avoid irreparable financial and operational
harm. It is submitted that delay in filing the appeal was entirely attributable
to the need for due diligence and careful preparation, rather than lack of
bonafide intention or diligence on the part of the appellants. The learned
counsel cited the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC
157 and Isha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649 in support of her submissions.
nd
15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 2 respondent CTUIL would
argue that pendency of parallel unconnected proceedings with separate
cause of action/relief before other fora cannot be made a ground to
suspend or extend the period of limitation for filing of the appeal before
this Tribunal against the impugned order dated 25.11.2024. She
submitted that the conduct of the appellants reflects not only lack of due
diligence but also deliberate tactics to prolong litigation and admitting such
a belated appeal would not only defeat the scheme of limitation but would
also unsettle regulatory certainty and would cause grave prejudice to
CTUIL as well as other connectivity grantees.
16. Citing the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.K.
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (1997) 7 SCC 556 and Chhattisgarh
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SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 5 SCC 23, the
learned counsel submitted that special limitation period prescribed under
Section 111 and 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 are to be strictly adhered
to in order to preserve the legislative intent of expeditious adjudication by
an expert body. According to the learned counsel, the appellants have
failed to demonstrate any legally sustainable explanation constituting
“sufficient cause” for not approaching this Tribunal within the prescribed
period of limitation. Referring to another recent judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, the learned counsel would submit that a
party seeking condonation of delay must explain the failure to file the
appeal within the statutory period of limitation itself and the subsequent
development cannot justify the delay.
17. The learned counsel further argued that the conduct of the
appellants clearly demonstrates that they consciously chose to pursue
unrelated proceedings before other foras rather than invoking the
statutory appellate jurisdiction of this Tribunal within the prescribed period
of limitation. According to her, the sequence of events that took place
subsequent to the passing of impugned order by the Commission reveals
a clear pattern on the part of the appellants to indulge in forum shopping.
She submitted that the appellants have failed to demonstrate any
circumstances which prevented them from approaching this Tribunal
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within the statutory period of 45 days prescribed under Section 111 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 and buttressed her submissions by relying upon
another judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v.
Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104. She also relied upon
Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81
to argue that discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously
and not on sympathetic grounds.
18. Thus, on the basis of these submissions, the learned counsel sought
dismissal of the application.
19. We have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsels
and have gone through the averments made by the appellants in the
nd
application and by the 2 respondent in the reply filed to the application.
We have also perused the judgments cited at bar by the learned counsels.
20. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shivamma case (supra) is relied
nd
upon by both the learned counsels. The learned counsel for the 2
respondent CTUIL has drawn our attention to Paragraph No.23 and 40 of
the judgment which are extracted hereinbelow: -
“23. In Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), this very Bench
had the occasion to examine the meaning of the expression
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 9 of 22
“within such period” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Ajit Singh
Thakur (supra) and Basawaraj (supra), it was held that for
the purpose of Section 5, the party seeking condonation of
delay has to explain why it was unable to institute the
proceedings within the prescribed period of limitation.
Events that occurred after the expiry of the period of
limitation till the date of actual filing of the appeal or
application, as the case may be, would be of no
consequence insofar as condonation is concerned, if it is
unable to explain what came in the way of the party that it
was unable to file it. It reiterated that no event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause, where the party allowed the
limitation to expiry unless it can trace such failure in allowing
the limitation to expire to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. The relevant observations read as under:-
…..
40. As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for
the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an
appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the
stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 10 of 22
explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient
cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed
period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of
limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or
application, as the case may be, or to put it simply,
explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the
date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the
date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by
recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
21. Thus, in view of the legal principle enunciated in the above referred
Paragraphs of the judgment, while citing with approval the earlier
judgments in Ramkumar Choudhary’s case (supra) and Basawaraj
(supra), the delay in filing has to be explained by demonstrating existence
of “sufficient cause” that prevented the appellants from filing the appeal
both within the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period after
the expiry of limitation period up to the actual date of filing. However,
Paragraphs 136 and 137 of the judgment are also material, which have
been referred to by learned counsel for the appellants, and are extracted
hereinbelow: -
“136 When technical considerations of limitation conflict
with the imperative of substantial justice, the latter should
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ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are not designed to
destroy the rights of parties but to prevent inordinate delay
in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of “sufficient
cause” must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing
the cause of justice rather than defeating it. This is why the
courts, while construing applications for condonation of
delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the
sheer arithmetical length of the delay.
137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in
injustice, the Court is dutybound to apply a liberal
interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance technical
requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, and therefore, a
pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the
judicial discretion under Section 5. This decision continues
to be the most frequently cited authority for the proposition
that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than
technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret “sufficient
cause,” they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner
that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the
realities of litigation.”
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22. Thus, while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the
courts are duty bound to give a liberal interpretation to the term “sufficient
cause” in order to balance the technical requirements with the demands
of justice and are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters
justice, fairness and equity, while keeping in mind realities of litigation.
23. In Maniben’s case also, the Supreme Court has advocated liberal
and justice oriented approach in exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and other similar statutes but has cautioned that courts
cannot be oblivious of the fact that a successful litigant has acquired
certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of
time has been consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the
costs. The judgment laid down the principle that if the courts find that
there has been no negligence on the part of the appellant and the cause
shown for delay does not lack bonafides, then it may condone the delay
but on the other hand, if the explanation given by the applicant is found to
be concocted or he has been thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his case,
it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.
24. In Isha Bhattacharjee case, the Apex Court has enunciated
following principles to be kept in mind while deciding an application for
condonation of delay: -
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“i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented,
non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for
condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to
legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be
applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation
of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or
litigant is to be taken note of.
v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should
not affect public justice and cause public mischief because
the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
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IA No.62 of 2028 in DFR 21 of 2026 Page 14 of 22
vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.
viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former
doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may
not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to
its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds
urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be
vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face
such a litigation.
xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
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xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
scrutinized and the approach should be based on the
paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective
reasoning and not on individual perception.
xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing
a collective cause should be given some acceptable
latitude.”
25. Now, coming to the instant case. Vide the impugned order dated
25.11.2024, the Commission allowed the prayer of the appellants for
extension of time for commissioning of the power project up to 21.04.2025
but at the same time directed them to pay compensation to CTUIL as a
condition for retaining the connectivity granted to them at Bikaner-II. As
noted in the impugned order by the Commission, the appellant had given
an undertaking vide affidavit dated 28.10.2024 to the Commission that the
project would be commissioned before 24.04.2025. The appellants even
paid a sum of Rs.9.5 crores to CTUIL as compensation for the period
20.10.2024 to 21.04.2025 as per the impugned order of the Commission
between 06.12.2024 and 04.04.2025 notwithstanding the fact that they
had filed a review petition before the Commission on 02.01.2025 seeking
review of the impugned order. Such conduct of the appellants clearly
indicates their commitment to commission the project by 21.04.2025.
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Despite the fact that the appellants were not satisfied with the impugned
order in so far as it directed to pay compensation to CTUIL for retaining
the connectivity, they appear to have paid the sum of Rs.9.5 Crores to the
CTUIL in order to avoid coercive action and to ensure that the work on the
project proceeds without any impediment. However, for certain reasons,
the appellants were not able to commission the project by 21.04.2025 and
accordingly, they approached the Commission by way of petition no.452
of 2025 seeking extension of further 65 days i.e. till 25.06.2025. During
the proceedings of this petition, the connectivity granted to the appellants
came to be revoked by CTUIL vide letter dated 23.04.2025, which was
subsequently put in abeyance by the Commission vide order dated
24.04.2025 passed in that petition.
26. It further appears that the full connectivity for the appellants power
project was being delayed even after the commissioning of the project on
25.06.2025 and accordingly, the appellants had to approach the Hon'ble
High Court of Delhi vide writ petition no.13641 of 2025 seeking direction
for expeditious operationalization of connectivity/GNA. Concededly, in
the status report dated 22.09.2025 filed by CTUIL and Power Grid Narela
Transmission Limited (PNTL) in the said writ petition, it was acknowledged
that Khetri-Narela line was incomplete and was likely to be commissioned
only by December, 2025. Even after the commissioning of the said Khetri-
Narela line on 10.12.2025, connectivity was not made effective for the
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appellants power project by CTUIL even though the same was made
effective for all other projects connected to Bikaner-II. It is after the
passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the Commission in petition
no.452 of 2025 that the connectivity to the appellants power project was
restored fully by CTUIL at Bikaner-II and GNA was made effective for the
power project of the appellants from 14.12.2025 thereby permitting the
appellants to evacuate the entire 300MW power from the project.
27. The above noted sequence of events would manifestly demonstrate
that the appellants were making all out efforts to commission their power
project and to ensure seamless connectivity for it in order to evacuate the
power generated in the project despite facing various impediments for
which they had to file another petition before the Commission as well as
had to approach the Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition. It cannot
be said that all these proceedings were in no manner, connected to the
issues raised in the instant appeal i.e. extension of commissioning date of
the power project and the retention of the connectivity without payment of
any compensation.
28. Since, the appellants had paid a sum of Rs.9.5 cores to CTUIL as
compensation for the period 20.10.2024 to 21.04.2024 in terms of the
impugned order, they appear to have shifted focus to completion of the
power project and its commissioning within the extended time as allowed
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by the Commission in the impugned order. Meanwhile, connectivity issue
came up as CTUIL firstly revoked the connectivity granted to the
appellants, on 23.04.2025 which was, however, kept in abeyance by the
Commission vide order dated 24.04.2025 passed in subsequent petition
no.452/2025 filed by the appellants. Even thereafter also the appellants
were allowed only partial connectivity and full connectivity was being
delayed on account of non-operationalization of Khetri-Narela
Transmission Line. Full connectivity came to be granted to the appellants
only on 14.12.2025 after passing of final order dated 12.12.2025 by the
Commission in petition no.452/2025. Evidently, the appellants were
embroiled in these issues and thought it prudent to wait for the outcome
of petition no.452/2025 before filing the instant appeal before this Tribunal.
We do not find any malafide or lack of due diligence in this regard on the
part of the appellants. The appellants were justified in delaying the filing
of the instant appeal till the power project was commissioned and full
connectivity was made available to the same. Assuming that the
appellants were unable to complete and commission the power project
within the extended time granted by the Commission or the petition
no.452/2025 was dismissed by the Commission thereby resulting in
revocation of connectivity to the appellants’ power project, in that case,
the appellants may not have been left with any cause or occasion for
assailing the impugned order before this Tribunal. It is only when the
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appellants commissioned the power project and were also successful in
obtaining full connectivity for the same on 14.12.2025 that they turned
their attention to the impugned order and commenced steps for filing the
appeal against the same.
29. When we consider the delay in filing the instant appeal on the part
of the appellants in the light of above referred circumstances, we are
unable to impute any inaction or negligence or lack of bonafides to the
appellants. The entire gamut of facts and circumstances that took place
after the passing of impugned order by the Commission, when scrutinized
in the light of legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
above referred judgments, leads to the only conclusion that the delay in
filing of the appeal on the part of the appellants is not so inordinate or
contumacious or deliberate as to warrant dismissal of the application
under consideration.
30. Further, we may also note that the appellants had preferred a review
petition before the Commission on 02.01.2025 seeking review of the
impugned order, it cannot be said that the appellants did not take any
steps to assail the impugned order within the period of 45 days stipulated
under the Electricity Act, 2003 for filing appeal before this Tribunal.
Probably, the appellants realized that they may not succeed in the review
petition and accordingly withdrew the same on 03.03.2025. Normally, this
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Tribunal, while computing the period of delay in filing the appeal, discounts
the time period spent by the appellant while pursuing the review petition
before the Commission. Therefore, if we take these 60 days, during which
period the review petition was pending disposal before the Commission,
out of consideration for computing the period of delay, the same is
reduced to 308 days only. We may also note that this Tribunal has been
liberal in condoning the delay of upto one year (365 days) in filing the
appeal, albeit, on payment of costs ranging from Rs.20,000/- to
Rs.2,00,000/- in order to do complete justice between the parties.
Reference, in this regard, is made by the learned counsel for the
appellants to order dated 30.01.2026 passed in DFR No.446/2025, order
dated 05.08.2025 passed in DFR No.164/2025, order dated 04.07.2025
passed in DFR No.137/2025, order dated 25.04.2025 passed in DFR
No.68/2025, order dated 06.01.2025 passed in DFR No.502/2024 etc.
31. Considering the above referred circumstances which, according to
the appellants were responsible for delay in filing the instant appeal, it is
nd
difficult to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the 2
respondent CTUIL that the delay was deliberate or there is been any lack
of bonafide on the part of the appellants. Adopting the liberal and
purposive interpretation of the term “sufficient cause” as advocated by the
Apex Court in Shivamma case, we are of the opinion that demands of
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justice would be met in case the delay in filing the appeal is condoned
subject to payment of costs.
32. Therefore, the instant application is hereby allowed and the delay in
filing the appeal is condoned subject to the appellants paying costs of
nd
Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh and fifty thousand only) to 2 respondent
CTUIL within four weeks from today and filing the proof of payment of
costs in the Registry of this Tribunal within two weeks thereafter.
Needless to add here that in case of failure to pay such costs within the
stipulated period or failure to file proof of payment of costs within the
stipulated period, the appeal shall stand dismissed as time barred.
DFR NO.21 OF 2026
33. Let reply be filed by the respondents within six weeks from today.
The appellants shall file rejoinder, if any, within four weeks thereafter.
34. Subject to verification by the Registry of the completion of pleadings,
the appeal be included in the List of Finals of Court-1 .
rd
Pronounced in the open court on this the 3 day of July, 2026.
(Virender Bhat)
Judicial Member
(Seema Gupta)
Officiating Chairperson
✓
REPORTABLE / NON-REPORATBLE
tp
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