KAKALI GUPTA (MONDOL) vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR

CRR 190 OF 2024

MRS. KAKALI GUPTA (MONDOL)
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

For the Petitioner : Ms. Tuhina Parvin
Ms. Piu Roy

For the Opposite Party No.2 : Mr. Rana Mukherjee
Mr. Subhendu Roy Choudhury

For the State : Mr. Ooiseerup Sinha
Mr. P. Karan Singh

Reserved on : 14.10.2026
Pronounced on : 12.11.2026

UDAY KUMAR, J.: –
1. The petitioner, by the present criminal revisional application, brought
under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 438/442 read with Section
528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) assails the
correctness, legality, and propriety of the appellate judgment and order
dated 05.01.2024 passed by the Court of the Learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Bench-I, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal
Appeal No. 179 of 2023. By the said impugned judgment, the Learned

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first Appellate Court allowed the appeal filed by the opposite party no. 2
(mother-in-law) under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the "PWDV Act"),
set aside the trial court’s execution order dated 11.09.2023 and
consequently, order dated 07.08.2023, and substituted the petitioner-
widow’s indefeasible statutory right of residence in her shared
household with a meagre, illusory monthly alternative accommodation
₹
allowance of 2,000/- under Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act.
2. To fully comprehend the canvas of this litigation, a structured
recapitulation of the antecedent facts is indispensable. The petitioner,
Smt. Kakali Gupta (Mondol), was lawfully wedded to Late Amit Gupta
(the sole biological son of Opposite Party No. 2, Smt. Anjana Sarkar) on
05.02.2015. Following her marriage, she entered and took up her abode
at her matrimonial home/shared household situated at Premises No.
67/1A, Dr. Girindra Sekhar Bose Road (Picnic Garden), P.S. Kasba,
Kolkata – 700039. Almost immediately after the marriage, the petitioner
was subjected to severe physical and mental cruelty, harassment, and
torture by her husband and in-laws for additional dowry, alongside the
misappropriation of her stridhan . This compelled her to seek police
protection, resulting in the registration of Girish Park P.S. Case No. 181
dated 07.06.2016 under Sections 498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal
Code. Following investigation, a chargesheet (CS No. 44/17 dated
12.04.2017) was submitted against the mother-in-law, while
proceedings abated against the husband, Amit Gupta, who tragically
expired on 14.09.2016 at Mediview Nursing Home.

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3. Being forcefully driven out of her matrimonial home and left completely
shelter-less, the petitioner took shelter with her aged mother at 36/1A,
Sarkar Lane, Kolkata. On 20.04.2022, she invoked the protective
mechanism of the PWDV Act by filing Misc. Case No. 17 of 2022 before
the 20th Court of the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta,
claiming reliefs under Sections 17, 18, 19, and 23 of the said Act. After
a contested hearing under Section 23 of the PWDV Act, the Learned
Magistrate on 07.08.2023 delivered a well-reasoned interim order,
directing the mother-in-law to permit the petitioner to reside peacefully
in one separate room, alongside the independent use of one separate
kitchen and one separate bathroom at the Kasba property, coupled with
restraint orders against the Opposite Party No. 2 from committing any
act of domestic violence, mental or physical torture etc. upon the
petitioner.
4. The execution history of this case reveals a calculated design by the
opposite parties to frustrate the mandate of the law. When the
petitioner attempted to enter the matrimonial home on 12.08.2023 with
police assistance, she found the premises locked from the inside by
Opposite Party No. 2. When the matter came up before the Trial Court
on 21.08.2023 regarding non-compliance, Opposite Party No. 2
personally appeared and made a solemn submission that she had no
objection to the petitioner residing in the shared household and merely
prayed for 45 days to rearrange accommodation. Relying on this
representation, the magistrate refrained from taking immediate penal
steps and called for a police inspection report of the existing rooms,

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kitchen, bathrooms and other areas of the said premises of the
Opposite Party No. 2. However, it subsequently transpired that behind
the back of the court and during the active pendency of the litigation,
Opposite Party No. 2 had executed a registered Deed of Gift on
19.05.2023 in favour of her niece, Smt. Meena Sur. On 30.08.2023, the
said Opposite Party No. 2 filed an application attempting to set up this
gift deed, claiming she was a mere licensee under her niece with no
authority to admit the daughter-in-law.
5. The Learned Magistrate rightly recognized that the gift deed was
executed during pending proceedings and that its suppression
amounted to an abuse of the judicial process, directing the O/C Kasba
P.S. on 11.09.2023 to enforce the residence order. Aggrieved, the
mother-in-law preferred Criminal Appeal No. 179 of 2023 under Section
29 of the PWDV Act. The Court of the Learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Bench- 1, City Sessions Court, placing reliance on a cursory
police inspection report stating that the first floor contained only two
bedrooms shared by the senior citizen and the donee, and citing
"oceanic hostility," allowed the appeal on 05.01.2024, setting aside the
execution and substituting physical residence with interim alternative
accommodation charges @ ₹ 2,000/- per month under Section 19(1)(f) of
the PWDV Act. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned First Appellate
Court, prompted the filing of the instant revisional application by the
petitioner-widow.
6. During the course of hearing, Ms. Tuhina Parvin, the learned counsel
for the petitioner vehemently contended that the petitioner, as a

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widowed daughter-in-law, possesses an indefeasible statutory right of
residence in her shared household under Sections 17 and 19 of the
PWDV Act, which cannot be defeated by a pendente lite third-party
transfer hit by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It was urged that Opposite Party No. 2
was legally bound by the principle of estoppel (Section 115 of the Indian
Evidence Act) after making an express, unconditional statement before
the trial court on 21.08.2023 that she had no objection to the
petitioner's residence. Ms. Parvin further submitted that the learned
First appellate court committed a grave perversity by substituting a
substantive right of residence with a paltry sum of ₹ 2,000/- per month
on account of alternative accommodation charges, which is illusory and
fails to discharge the statutory mandate.
7. Per contra, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the opposite
party No. 2 argued that the subject property is the self-acquired,
absolute property of the aged mother-in-law, who has executed a valid
registered Deed of Gift dated 19.05.2023 in favour of her niece, Smt.
Meena Sur, thereby creating third-party rights that are currently sub
judice in Title Suit No. 1836 of 2023. It was submitted that police
inspection reports categorically established that there are no vacant
rooms on the first floor to accommodate the petitioner, and since the
mother-in-law is protected by the proviso to Section 19(1), physical
eviction is legally impermissible. Thus, the exercise of discretion by the
appellate court under Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act to award

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₹ 2,000/- per month as alternative accommodation charges was fully
justified and warrants no interference.
8. Upon an exhaustive evaluation of the rival pleadings, oral submissions,
and materials-on-record, the following four core questions crystallize for
determination by this Court:
I. Whether an aggrieved wife's indefeasible statutory right of
residence in a "shared household" under Sections 17 and 19 of
the PWDV Act can be defeated, extinguished, or substituted
with monetary compensation solely on the grounds of a
pendente lite third-party transfer (Gift Deed) and spatial
congestion?
II. Whether Opposite Party No. 2 is legally estopped under
Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act from setting up a third-
party transfer and lack of authority, having expressly
submitted on 21.08.2023 that she had no objection to the
petitioner's residence and sought time to arrange space?
III. Whether an Appellate Court, in an appeal under Section 29 of
the PWDV Act, is legally justified in substituting a substantive
physical residence order [Section 19(1)(a)] with a meagre
monetary allowance of ₹ 2,000/- per month [Section 19(1)(f)]
based on domestic hostility and spatial scarcity?
IV. Whether the impugned appellate order dated 05.01.2024
suffers from patent illegality, perversity, and jurisdictional

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error warranting interference under Section 397/401 read
with Section 482 CrPC?
9. Addressing the first core question, I find that the legal position
regarding a "shared household" is firmly entrenched in Indian
jurisprudence. Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act defines a 'shared
household' as a “household where the person aggrieved lives or at any
stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the
respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted...
irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any
right, title or interest in the shared household”. Section 17(1) of the
PWDV Act explicitly guarantees every woman in a domestic relationship
the right of residence in the shared household, irrespective of any legal
interest therein, while Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act empowers the
court directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared
household or to pay for the same, if the circumstances so require:"
10. The ambit of this definition was authoritatively expounded by a three-
judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the landmark ruling of
Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja , [(2021) 1 SCC 414], wherein at
paragraphs 68 and 69 of the report, the Apex Court held that:
" 68. …..Section 2(s) read with Section 17 and 19 of Act, 2005
grants an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of
residence under the shared household irrespective of her having
any legal interest in the same or not…

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69. …..The definition of shared household as noticed in Section
2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which
belongs to or taken on rent by the husband... In event, the shared
household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in
domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions
mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will
become a shared household .”
11. Furthermore, in the three- Judges’ Bench decision in S. Vanitha v.
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors., [(2021) 15
SCC 730], the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the Parliament
enacted the PWDV Act, 2005 as a special social-welfare legislation to
secure the safety, security, and right to shelter of women, consequently,
a woman's statutory right to reside in a shared household under
Section 17 and seek a residence order under Section 19 of the said Act
cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of securing summary
eviction orders or engineering third-party transfers and encumbrances
to oust her from the matrimonial home.
12. To permit an in-law to execute a gift deed in favour of a niece during the
active pendency of PWDV proceedings and thereby render a destitute
widow homeless would completely subvert the social welfare objectives
of the statute. Such a transfer is fundamentally subservient to the
doctrine of Lis Pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. The appellate court committed a foundational error of law in
allowing a concealed, post-litigation transfer to extinguish a statutory
right.

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13. Coming to the second core question, the conduct of Opposite Party No.
2 before the Trial Court on 21.08.2023 is a matter of incontrovertible
judicial record. Having explicitly stated that she had no objection to the
petitioner residing in the premises and prayed for 45 days to arrange
space thereby inducing the magistrate to withhold immediate penal
action and call for a report, the mother-in-law cannot subsequently
turn around and set up a concealed gift deed to deny access to the
petitioner. Under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now
Section 121 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), the doctrine of
estoppel dictates that a litigant who makes a solemn representation to a
judicial forum to influence its proceedings is strictly bound by it and
cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate.
14. The Learned Sessions Judge has completely glossed over this vital
admission of the Opposite Party No. 2 recorded by the learned Trial
Judge in the order dated 21.08.2023, thereby placing judicial
imprimatur on a clear attempt to mislead the court and abuse the
judicial process.
15. On the third core question concerning the substitution of physical
residence with a monetary allowance under Section 19(1)(f), I must
record my profound disapproval of the first appellate court's reasoning.
Section 19(1)(f) empowers a court to direct a respondent to secure
alternative accommodation or pay for the same if the circumstances so
require . The parameters governing this provision were authoritatively
laid down by a three-judges’ bench of the Supreme Court in Prabha
Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi , [(2022) 8 SCC 90] that the right to reside in a

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shared household is a valuable right of a woman given under Section 17
of the PWDV Act. This right cannot be lightly brushed aside or
substituted with monetary compensation unless the aggrieved woman
herself opts for it, or where exceptional circumstances of structural
impossibility render physical residence completely unviable, coupled
with adequate, equivalent financial provision that genuinely matches
the living standards enjoyed in the shared household.

16. In the decision of Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court clarified that while alternative accommodation or rent can be
directed under Section 19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act "if the circumstances so
require", such substitution is a calibrated balancing measure. Physical
residence in the shared household remains the statutory norm under
Section 17 and cannot be lightly displaced or substituted unless
genuine, exceptional circumstances make co-residence unviable and
equivalent accommodation matching her established standard of living
is secured.
17. Alternative accommodation is designed as a protective shield for an
aggrieved woman where structural impossibility or absolute physical
threat renders joint living unviable—it is not an automatic escape hatch
for a respondent who engineers congestion, conceals alienations, and
manufactures domestic hostility. To hold that "oceanic hostility"
between two women justifies throwing a widow out of her matrimonial
home is to penalize the victim for the aggressor's recalcitrance.
Moreover, quantifying this alternative accommodation at a paltry sum
of ₹ 2,000/- per month in the metropolis of Kolkata is entirely illusory,

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detached from economic reality, and fails miserably to provide the
"same level of alternative accommodation as enjoyed by the respondent"
contemplated by the legislature.
18. Finally, addressing the fourth question touching upon the scope of this
Court's revisional and inherent jurisdictions, I am firmly of the view
that the impugned appellate order suffers from patent illegality,
perversity, and a grave failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in law. The
Hon’ble Apex Court, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Anr. , [(2012)
9 SCC 460] has observed that the revisional or inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court cannot be stifled or restricted on technical grounds
where the order impugned suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or
results in a grave miscarriage of justice. When a court of law acts
arbitrarily, ignores foundational admissions, or misinterprets binding
statutory mandates, the High Court is duty-bound to exercise its
powers under Section 397/401 read with Section 482 CrPC to correct
the jurisdictional error.
19. When an appellate forum ignores binding precedents of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, rewards litigant duplicity and suppressed pendente lite
transfers, and passes an order resulting in a gross miscarriage of
justice, this revisional Court cannot remain a mute spectator. The
cumulative flaws in the impugned judgment necessitate its complete
undoing to restore the sanctity of the law and the protection intended
for victims of domestic violence under the PWDV Act.
20. Balancing the ameliorative object of the PWDV Act, the binding ratio of
Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) and S. Vanitha (supra) , the physical space

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constraints of the subject premises, and the gross inadequacy of the
monetary compensation awarded, this Court concludes that the
impugned appellate order requires modification. While physical
cohabitation in the specific two-rooms on the first floor of Premises No.
67/1A, Dr. Girindra Sekhar Bose Road is practically unviable and
detrimental to the peaceful living of the senior citizen, the substitution
₹
of this right with a meagre sum of 2,000/- per month on account of
alternative accommodation charges is legally unsustainable.
21. Accordingly, upon an exhaustive review of the law, facts, and judicial
precedents, the following orders are passed:
(i) In light of the aforesaid discussions and legal principles,
the instant criminal revisional application CRR No. 190 of
2024 is hereby partly allowed .
(ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 05.01.2024
passed by the Learned Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Bench-I, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in Criminal
Appeal No. 179 of 2023 is hereby modified .

(iii) While the direction for physical cohabitation within the
cramped premises of Premises No. 67/1A, Dr.Girindra
Sekhar Bose Road, Kolkata-39 stands set aside in view of
the physical space constraints and senior citizen equities,
opposite party no. 2 is legally directed under Section
19(1)(f) of the PWDV Act to secure and provide a fully self-
contained, respectable, and equivalent alternative

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accommodation of similar standard within the
immediate locality , bearing obligation for payment of all
regular monthly rentals and maintenance charges thereof.
(iv) In the alternative, if opposite party no. 2 fails, neglects, or
refuses to secure and pay for such equivalent alternative
accommodation, she shall be liable to pay realistic and
commensurate interim maintenance/accommodation
charges of ₹ 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) per month
to the petitioner by the 7th day of each succeeding English
calendar month for which it falls due, effective from the
date of filing of the original application under PWDV Act, to
enable the petitioner to secure independent housing in
Kolkata.
th
(v) The Court of the learned 20 Metropolitan Magistrate,
Calcutta is requested to expedite and conclude the
proceedings in Misc. Case No. 17 of 2022 on its own
merits as expeditiously as possible, uninfluenced by any
observations made herein.

(vi) The Protection Officer, Kolkata, is directed to remain
vigilant regarding the unhindered execution of this order
and file a compliance report before the learned Trial Court.
22. The interim order of stay, if any operating, stands vacated.
23. Pending Connected application(s), if any, are also disposed of
accordingly.

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24. There shall be no order as to costs.
25. Let a copy of this judgment along with the Trial Court Records (T.C.R.)
be transmitted to the learned Trial Court forthwith for necessary
information and compliance.
26. Case diary, be returned to the Learned Counsel for the State.
27. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

(Uday Kumar, J.)