Ajai Pratap Singh And Others vs Additional Commissioner Faizabad And Others

A.F.R.
Reserved on : 30.3.2026
Delivered on :14.5.2026
Neutral Citation No. -
2026:AHC-LKO:34573
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 3000221 of 2003
Ajai Pratap Singh and others
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Additional Commissioner Faizabad and others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : R.s.pandey, Mahendra Kumar
Sharma
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Brijesh Kumar Kuldeep,
Dinesh Kumar Arya, Shiv Ram
Tewari
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Dr. R.S. Pande, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Mahendra Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and
learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondent.
2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have prayed
for the following reliefs :-
"A. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
Certiorari quashing the impugned order dated
26.4.1982 passed by opposite party No.2 contained
in Annexure No.2 and order dated 5.3.1998 passed
by opposite party No.2 contained in Annexure No.1
to the writ petition.
B. Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of
Mandamus commanding the opposite parties to
decide the objection filed by the petitioners on the
basis of will executed in their favour by the
recorded tenure holder Fateh Bahadur Singh.

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C. ...
D. ..."
3. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order
dated 26.04.1982 passed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act as well as the appellate
order dated 05.03.1998 whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioners
has been dismissed and the order of the Prescribed Authority has been
affirmed.
4. The dispute relates to land situated in village Chakwa Gholia,
Pargana Bhinga and village Bechuwa, Pargana Tulsipur, which
admittedly belonged to one Fateh Bahadur Singh son of Naresh Singh,
who was the recorded tenure holder. It is the specific case of the
petitioners that during his lifetime, the said tenure holder executed a
registered Will dated 25.11.1971 in favour of Ajay Pratap Singh, Vishnu
Pratap Singh, Bhanu Pratap Singh and Vijay Pratap Singh, all sons of
Raj Narayan Singh.
5. It has further been stated that Vijay Pratap Singh subsequently
died issueless and the present petitioners, being his brothers, succeeded
to his interest. The petitioners have asserted that the Will executed by the
original tenure holder governed the devolution of rights in the land and
conferred upon them a substantive claim, which was liable to be
considered by the authorities in ceiling proceedings.
6. The record further indicates that Fateh Bahadur Singh died on
22.05.1973 and thereafter the name of Raj Narain Singh was mutated in
the revenue records on the basis of a Lekhpal report and incorporated in
the relevant Khatauni. Subsequently, the Prescribed Authority by order
dated 30.09.1975 declared 26.949 hectares of land as surplus.
7. It is not in dispute that at the time when the ceiling proceedings
were initiated and decided, the petitioners were minors. According to the
petitioners, for this reason no objection could be filed on their behalf at
the relevant time and their independent rights arising out of the Will
remained unrepresented and unadjudicated.

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8. It has been brought on record that the order dated 30.09.1975 was
challenged by Raj Narain Singh in appeal, which was dismissed, and
thereafter a writ petition was filed in the year 1980 wherein an interim
order was granted. It is the case of the petitioners that after attaining
majority, they acquired knowledge of the declaration of surplus land and
immediately thereafter filed objections on 01.11.1980 under Section
11(2) of the Act, though due to inadvertence the provision was
mentioned as Section 13-A.
9. The Prescribed Authority, however, rejected the objections of the
petitioners by order dated 26.04.1982 primarily on the ground of delay
and on the basis of incorrect mention of the provision, without entering
into the merits of the claim set up by the petitioners on the basis of the
Will. The appeal preferred by the petitioners was also dismissed on
05.03.1998 without rectifying the errors committed by the Prescribed
Authority.
10. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit opposing the writ
petition wherein it has been stated that the alleged Will is merely a
photostat copy and does not appear to be registered. It has further been
stated that the petitioners were minors and the proceedings were
conducted against their father, who was their natural guardian, and
therefore no illegality was committed. The respondents have also
contended that there is no evidence to show that the Will was filed
before the Prescribed Authority and that the impugned orders are
justified and legal.
11. The respondents have further raised an objection regarding delay
and laches, contending that the writ petition has been filed after an
inordinate delay and that the land declared surplus has already been
allotted to eligible persons after taking possession in the year 2003, and
therefore no interference is warranted.
12. The petitioners have filed a rejoinder affidavit denying the
assertions made in the counter affidavit and reiterating that the Will
dated 25.11.1971 is a registered document which has not been properly

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considered by the authorities. It has been asserted that the petitioners
were minors at the relevant time and therefore could not effectively
participate in the proceedings and that their objections, filed after
attaining majority, ought to have been considered on merits.
13. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the
impugned order dated 26.04.1982 passed by the Prescribed Authority, as
well as the appellate order dated 05.03.1998, are wholly unsustainable in
law and on facts, inasmuch as the same have been passed without proper
appreciation of the material on record and in violation of settled legal
principles.
14. It is contended that the land in dispute originally belonged to
Fateh Bahadur Singh, the recorded tenure holder, who, during his
lifetime, executed a registered Will dated 25.11.1971, thereby
determining the succession of his holdings. The said Will, being a valid
and operative testamentary instrument, governed the devolution of rights
after his death on 22.05.1973. The authorities under the Ceiling Act
were, therefore, legally bound to take into consideration the effect of the
said Will while determining the surplus land.
15. It is further submitted that the Will conferred independent and
substantive rights upon the beneficiaries, including the petitioners, and
such rights could not have been ignored merely on the basis of
subsequent mutation entries. It is well settled that mutation proceedings
are fiscal in nature and do not confer title; hence, the entry of Raj Narain
Singh in the revenue records could not override the testamentary
disposition made by the original tenure holder.
16. It is further urged that Vijay Pratap Singh, one of the beneficiaries
under the Will, died issueless and his share devolved upon the present
petitioners, being his real brothers. Consequently, the petitioners
acquired a lawful interest in the property, which entitled them to
participate in the ceiling proceedings and to have their holdings
independently assessed.

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17. The petitioners contend that when the ceiling proceedings were
started and decided by the order dated 30.09.1975, they were minors and
could not protect their rights or file objections. Since the case went on
without proper representation of their interests, the proceedings are
invalid, especially because their rights were based on a registered Will.
18. It is submitted that upon attaining majority and acquiring
knowledge of the proceedings, the petitioners promptly filed objections
on 01.11.1980. The mere incorrect mention of the provision as Section
13-A instead of Section 11(2) of the Act is a curable defect and could not
have been made a ground to reject the objections, especially when the
substance of the claim was clearly articulated.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submit that the
Prescribed Authority committed a manifest error in rejecting the
objections solely on the ground of delay, without considering that the
petitioners were minors during the relevant period and that limitation
would not run against them. The approach adopted by the authority is
contrary to the settled principle that procedural technicalities should not
defeat substantive rights.
20. It is also contended that the Prescribed Authority failed to
adjudicate upon the genuineness and legal effect of the Will. The
rejection of the claim without examining the core issue amounts to non-
application of mind and renders the order arbitrary.
21. Further submission is that the appellate authority, while dismissing
the appeal on 05.03.1998, merely affirmed the findings of the Prescribed
Authority without independently evaluating the contentions raised by the
petitioners. The appellate order is vitiated as it merely affirms the earlier
decision in a mechanical manner, without proper application of mind or
any reasoned analysis.
22. The petitioners further submit that the objection raised by the
respondents regarding delay and laches in filing the writ petition is
misconceived. The petitioners were pursuing their remedies before the

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statutory forums, and the cause of action continued as their rights were
never adjudicated on merits.
23. It is lastly submitted that the alleged allotment of surplus land to
third parties cannot override the lawful claim of the petitioners,
especially when the declaration of surplus land itself is under challenge.
Any action taken on the basis of an illegal order cannot be sustained in
law or used to continue an injustice.
24. In support of the submissions advanced, learned counsel for the
petitioners placed reliance upon the following judgments :-
(i) Dirvijai Singh Vs. State of U.P. [1984 LCD 324] .
(ii) Shafir Vs. D.J. Gonda [1985 LCD 290] .
(iii) Abdul Hafiz Khan Vs. D.J. Bahraich [1986 LCD 477] .
(iv) Hari Ram Vs. Special Judge ADJ Faizabad [1989 LCD 85] .
(v) Mehfizul Rahman Vs. State of U.P. and others [1984 LCD 370] .
(vi) Ram Bhajan Vs. C.R.O. [2001 LCD 901] .
(vii) State of U.P. Vs. Kailash Nath [2023 LCD 1170] .
(viii) Anand Kishor Devacharya Vs. State of U.P. and others [2024
(165) RD 582] .
(ix) Mohammad Raza Vs. State of U.P. and others [2024 (165) RD
783] .
(x) Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others [2024 LCD
2281] .
25. In view of the aforesaid submissions and the judgments relied
upon, it is prayed that the impugned orders be set aside.
26. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel submits that the writ
petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed both on the
ground of delay and on merits.
27. It is contended that the ceiling proceedings were conducted strictly
in accordance with law and culminated in the order dated 30.09.1975
declaring 26.949 hectares of land as surplus. The said order attained

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finality after dismissal of the appeal preferred by Raj Narain Singh and
subsequent proceedings, and therefore cannot be reopened at this belated
stage.
28. The respondents submit that the petitioners’ claim is based on an
alleged Will dated 25.11.1971, which has not been proved in accordance
with law. It is specifically stated that the document relied upon is merely
a photostat copy and there is no reliable evidence to establish that the
Will was duly executed or registered.
29. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the alleged Will was ever produced before the
Prescribed Authority during the original proceedings. In the absence of
such material on record, the authority cannot be faulted for not
considering the same.
30. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that the mutation of the
name of Raj Narain Singh in the revenue records after the death of Fateh
Bahadur Singh was carried out in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under law and reflected the actual possession and control over
the land. The ceiling proceedings were, therefore, rightly conducted
against the recorded tenure holder.
31. It is further submitted that the petitioners were minors at the
relevant time and were represented by their father, who was their natural
guardian. The proceedings having been conducted against the guardian
cannot be said to be vitiated, as there was adequate representation of the
family interest.
32. The respondents contend that the objections filed by the
petitioners on 01.11.1980 were highly belated and were rightly rejected
by the Prescribed Authority. The incorrect mention of the statutory
provision further reflects lack of diligence and seriousness on the part of
the petitioners.
33. It is also submitted that the Prescribed Authority was justified in
rejecting the objections without entering into the merits, as the

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proceedings had already attained finality and reopening the same after
several years would defeat the object of the Ceiling Act.
34. The appellate authority, after due consideration, affirmed the order
of the Prescribed Authority, and no illegality or perversity can be
attributed to the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below.
35. After having heard the rival contentions of learned counsel for the
parties, I perused the material on record as well as the law report cited.
36. Relevant paragraphs of the judgments relied upon by petitioners'
counsel are being quoted hereunder :-
Dirvijai Singh (Supra)
"I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
Under the Act the third party has a right to file the
objection u/s 11 (2) of the Act. The petitioner being
a third party could file the objection. Only the
question of delay was required to be considered.
The objection could not be rejected merely because
the matter was contested by the recorded tenure-
holder upto High Court. That will not put to an end
to the right of a third party. The view taken by the
prescribed authority and the District Judge is
manifestly erroneous and cannot be sustained."
Shafir (Supra)
"8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged
that the Prescribed Authority has rejected the
objection filed by the petitioner under Section 10(2)
of the Act merely on the ground that in the ceiling
proceedings the Prescribed Authority cannot
determine the claim of the petitioners who have
claimed sirdari rights over certain plots of the
disputed holding on the ground of adverse
possession for more than the prescribed period of
limitation. It was urged that the Prescribed
Authority has wrongly refused to consider the claim
of the petitioners on merits which should have been
considered and decided on merits according to law

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WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this
Court in the Case ‘Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd.’,
reported in 1967 ALJ 556 and also in Dilbagh
Singh's case reported in 1978 ALJ 717. I find much
substance in the contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioners.
9. In Dilbagh Singh's case (Dilbagh Singh v. State
of U.P.,) it was held by the Division Bench that
Section 11(2) permits a tenure-holder to file
objections. Such tenure-holders may be those who
have been served with a notice and a statement
under Section 10(2). It also includes tenure-holders
who have not been given or served with any such
notice or statement. The construction put by the
Full Bench also embraces persons who claim to be
tenure-holders and who having come to know of the
declaration of their land as surplus land of some
other person wish to challenge that declaration or
notification thereof in the gazette under Section 14.
They are all entitled to file an objection under
Section 11(2) and get an adjudication thereon as
required by Section 12.
10. In this view of the matter I find that the
objection which the petitioners had filed required to
be decided on merits under Section 12. The
petitioners have claimed that they are tenure-
holders of certain plots of the disputed holding
recorded in the name of opposite party No. 4. They
thus claimed that opposite party No. 4 is not tenure-
holder of those plots and the petitioners have
acquired rights by adverse possession having
remained in adverse possession for more than the
prescribed period. Thus those plots could not be
shown in the notice issued to the opposite party No.
4 under Section 10(2) of the Act nor the same could
be treated to be holding of the opposite party No. 4
and declared surplus land in his hands because in
the event petitioners succeed in establishing their

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WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
Sirdari rights and title by adverse possession over
the land in dispute it could not be treated to be part
of the holding of opposite party No. 4. The
Prescribed Authority, therefore, was required to
determine this question on merits as to whether the
plots, which were claimed by the petitioners as their
Sirdari land could be factually and legally
sustained or not. The Prescribed Authority should,
therefore, consider the claim of the petitioners after
giving them full opportunity to lead evidence in
support of their claim. The opposite party No. 4 will
also be given opportunity to contest the claim of the
petitioners. Even in the case which has been
remanded by the learned District Judge for
considering the claim of opposite party No. 4 for
being decided by now on merits, the Prescribed
Authority will consider the objections filed by the
Petitioners on merits in respect of the plots in which
they have claimed rights by adverse possession. The
objection would be treated to be maintainable as
one under Section 11(2) of the Act as held by this
Court in the aforesaid decisions and will be decided
on merits even if the land in which petitioners have
claimed title by adverse possession has been
notified under Section 14(1) of the Act because the
deletion of Section 14(2) will not bar
maintainability of such objection, as held in Ram
Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., [ Writ Petition No.
981 of 1976.] decided on 10-10-1984."
Abdul Hafiz Khan (Supra)
"7. So far as the question regarding maintainability
of objection under Section 11(2) of the Act after the
surplus land had been notified under Section 14(1)
of the Act, is concerned, I find that it stands
concluded by a Full Bench Decisions of this Court
in Baldeo Singh v. State of U.P., [1980 L.L.J. 31.] .
According to the majority view expressed in the said
decision an objection can be entertained under

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Section 11(2) of the Act even after the surplus land
had been notified under Section 14(1) of the Act.
The deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the
Act will not affect the tenability of that objection. In
this view I do not find any merit in the contention of
the learned Standing Counsel that the petitioners
had no right to file objection under Section 11(2) of
the Act. Even if the name of the objectors is not
recorded over the land in dispute as tenure-holder
they could file an objection under Section 11(2) of
the Act as held by the Full Bench of this Court in
Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Civil Judge,
Bijnor [1969 A.L.J. 556.]
8. In the present case the petitioner had filed an
objection on 28th October, 1978 (Annexure-4)
asserting that they are the tenure-holders of the
land which they had received in the aforesaid
decree for partition and that the opposite party No.
4 Nazim Ali Khan is not the tenure-holder of the
land situate in village Kanjarwa and his surplus
land be determined excluding the land of village
Kanjarwa, which belongs to the petitioner. This
objection was filed under Section 13-A of the Act
though in fact it purported to be an objection under
Section 11(2) of the Act and deserved to be treated
as such for deciding it on merits. It is well settled
that wrong mentioning of the section or nor
mentioning a correct section in the objection filed
would not by itself disentitle an objector to
appropriate relief which the Prescribed Authority
could grant to the objector in accordance with the
law. In Ram Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. [1985
L.L.J. 81.] . I had an occasion to consider similar
question, whether an objection filed under sub-
section (3) of Section 14 could or could not be
treated to be one under Section 11(2) of the Act. It
was held in Ram Kumar Singh's case (supra) that
even without formal application for amendment the
Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) should have

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WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
proceeded to decided the objection treating it to be
one under Section 11(2) of the Act because wrong
mentioning of section or not mentioning of correct
section in the objection not by itself disentitle the
objector to the appropriate relief which the
Prescribed Authority could grant in accordance
with the law.
9. In Abdul Rahman v. The Prescribed Authority
[1979 A.C.J. 10.] a similar question arose for
consideration before the Division Bench and it was
held.
“Although the application made by the petitioners
purported to be under Section 13-A of the Act it was
substantially an objection under Section 11(2), of
the Act.”
The Prescribed Authority in the aforesaid case was,
therefore, directed to consider the claim of the
petitioners treating the application as an objection
under Section 11(2) of the Act."
Hari Ram (Supra)
"6. The next question then to be considered is as to
whether the objections filed by the petitioners could
be entertained, in view of the orders passed in the
earlier proceedings which were taken against
Chandra Bhan Singh and others. In this connection,
learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
reliance upon two decisions of this Court, one is in
Digvijai Singh v. State of U.P. ( [1984 Lucknow
Civil Divisions, Vol. II, p. 324.] ) in which it has
been held that such objections are to be entertained
despite the fact that earlier matter may have been
fought out between the state and another person.
Another case reported in the same Volume is Rasid
Khan v. State of V.P. ( [1984 Luck. Civil Decisions,
Vol. II, p. 215.] ), where it has been held that such
objections should be treated as objections under

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Sec. 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act.
7. In view of the discussion held above, it is clear
that the petitioners had to be heard and their
objections had to be treated as objections under
Section 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act, specifically when the land was
recorded in the revenue records in their names in
pursuance of an order of mutation passed in their
favour. It will not affect their case if earlier any
order was passed in proceedings between Chandra
Bhan Singh and others and the State. As a matter of
fact, under the first proviso to Rule 8 of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, a
notice should have been issued to the petitioners as
well. The opposite parties have dismissed the
objections and the appeal preferred by the
petitioners erroneously. The matter had to be
considered on merits on the objections filed by the
petitioners."
Mehfizul Rahman (Supra)
"2. Notice under Section 10(2) of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was
issued to opposite party No. 4 father of of the
petitioner, who filed an objection against the same
but as area of 9.753 a.?res of land was declared as
surplus land. The appeal filed by the opposite party
No. 4 was also dismissed and ihe writ petition
against the same was also dismissed on August 7,
1978. On September 26, 1978, the petitioner
alongwith brother and sister, filed ???-jection under
Section 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act on the ground that they were
tenure-holder of few plots vide registered sale-deed
dated September 8, 1967 executed by their father
and they were in its possession. Certified copy oi
the registered sale deed was filed. But ???t was
found that the name of the transferee was not

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mutated in the records. The Prescribed Authority
dismissed the objections filed ??? the petitioner on
the ground that objections were not maintainable as
they were not recorded tenure holder, consequ-entiy
no notice under the Rules was required. Against the
order passed by the Prescribed Authority a number
of appeals were filed. The petitioner also tiled an
appeal. The appeal filed by the petitioner was also
dismissed on the ground that it was highly belated
and the explanation for delay was not acceptable.
The appellate authority found that in the case
before the prescribed authority, against father,
Pairvi was done by the petitioner and on July 8,
1972 and December 28, 1976 he signed the order-
sheet, although on behalf of the petitioner it was
denied that the same bears his signatures. The
Additional District Judge rejected this plea on the
ground that the same was not acceptable and
believable as Fazal Ali could not have forged the
signatures of his son. Even if it could be said that
the son appeared for and on behalf of the father and
signed the order-sheet that could not be taken to
mean that, in fact, the interest of the son was
involved in it and the sun was going to lose the land
over which he was claiming rights on the basis of
the sale-deed. Father was contesting the case and
prayer was for execution of the (sic.) on the ground
that he had already transferred the same for
consideration in the year 1967. Even if the son had
some vague knowledge, that could not be taken to
mean that he had knowledge of the proceedings and
that there was no sufficient cause for not tiling be
objections under Section 11(???) of the UP.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, during
the pendency of these proceedings. The ground on
winch the objections have been dismissed by the
appellate authority are obviously not very relevant
and the order in this behalf is manifestly erroneous
as ramc is not in conformity with the provisions of

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Section 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act. Consequently the writ petition
deserves to be allowed."
Ram Bhajan (Supra)
"It is well settled that the matter of declaration of
the land as surplus is between the State and the
tenure holder and nobody comes in between and
thus once the State has chosen not to take up the
matter to the higher forum, challenging the
judgment of the Prescribed Authority by which
notice for declaration of the land as surplus itself
was withdrawn, no argument can be advanced by
the petitioner raising any finger on this aspect that
the tenure holder might have surplus land if the
matter is examined in further details in the light of
the facts as are being pleaded by him."
State of U.P. Vs. Kailash Nath (Supra)
"20. At the outset, it may be noticed that Sections 37
and 38 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1960 clearly makes provisions of the
CPC applicable by reference. The aforesaid
sections read as under:
“37. Powers of officers and authorities in hearing
and disposal of objections and procedure to be
followed - Any officer or authority holding an
enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act,
shall, insofar as it may be applicable, have all the
powers and privileges of a Civil Court, and follow
the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits
relating to immovable property.
38. Powers of the appellate Court and the
procedure to be followed by it- (1) In hearing and
deciding an appeal under this Act, the appellate
Court shall have all the powers and the privileges
of a Civil Court and follow the procedure for the

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hearing and disposal of appeals laid down in the
Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
(2) Where, under the provisions of this Act, an
appeal has to be heard by the [Commissioner], he
may either hear the appeal himself or transfer it for
hearing to any[Additional Commissioner]
subordinate to him."
21. In view of the aforesaid, it will be relevant to
notice that the Appellate Authority was obliged to
have considered the appeal in the manner as
provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. It will
be appropriate to notice Order 41 Rule 31 CPC
which reads as under:—
“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment- The
judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing
and shall state-
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or
varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled;
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed
and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring
therein.”
22. In this context, since the Appellate Authority is
exercising powers of the First Appellate Court it
was incumbent upon the said court to have
considered the various contentions, the evidence on
record and then gone on to record its conclusion. In
this regard the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Sudarsan Puhan v. Jayanta Ku. Mohanty,
(2018) 10 SCC 552 will be gainful to notice and the
relevant portion reads as under:—
“23. This Court also in various cases reiterated the
aforesaid principle and laid down the powers of the

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Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code while
deciding the first appeal.
24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the
decisions.
25. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
(Deceased) by L.Rs. (2001) 3 SCC 179, this Court
held (at pages 188189) as under:
“15…The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse
or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal
is a valuable right of the parties and unless
restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for
rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The
judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,
reflect its conscious application of mind and record
findings supported by reasons, on all the issues
arising along with the contentions put forth, and
pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate
court……while reversing a finding of fact the
appellate court must come into close quarters with
the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then
assign its own reasons for arriving at a different
finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a
further appeal that the first appellate court had
discharged the duty expected of it”
26. The above view was followed by a three Judge
Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar v.
Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756, wherein it was
reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is
the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues
and the evidence led by the parties before recording
its findings.
27. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10
SCC 243, this Court (at p. 244) stated as under :
(SCC para 3)
“3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as
well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the
right to be heard both on questions of law as also

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on facts and the first appellate court is required to
address itself to all issues and decide the case by
giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in
the present case has not recorded any finding either
on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate
court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with
all the issues and the evidence led by the parties
before recording the finding regarding title.”
28. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC
303, while considering the scope of Section 96 of
the Code, this Court (at pp. 30304) observed as
follows : (SCC para 2)
“2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the
entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.”
29. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy,
(2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the
earlier judgments of this court reiterated the
aforementioned principle with these words:
“3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of
by the appellate court/High Court has been
considered by this Court in various decisions. Order
41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees.
Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the
judgment of the appellate court shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or
varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or
affirm the findings of the trial court. The first
appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless
restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for
rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The
judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,
reflect its conscious application of mind and record

19
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
findings supported by reasons, on all the issues
arising along with the contentions put forth, and
pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate
court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the
duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues
and the evidence led by the parties before recording
its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and
the parties have a right to be heard both on
questions of law and on facts and the judgment in
the first appeal must address itself to all the issues
of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in
support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188,
para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC
756 at p. 758, para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going
through the impugned judgment, we feel that the
High Court has failed to discharge the obligation
placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view,
the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of
the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The
appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory
manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the
regular first appeal shows that it falls short of
considerations which are expected from the court of
first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the
merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the
impugned judgment and decree of the High Court
and remand the regular first appeal to the High
Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with
law.”
30. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by
this Court while reiterating the same principle in
State Bank of India v. Emmsons International Ltd.,
(2011) 12 SCC 174 and Uttar Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation v. Mamta (2016) 4 SCC
172.”

20
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23. From the above, it would be clear, as to how the
First Appellate Court must exercise its jurisdiction.
However, unfortunately from the perusal of the
impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court
dated 27.11.1979 this Court finds that the same is
wanting in many material aspects of meeting with
the reasons of the trial court, assigning its own
reasons and reversing the findings.
25. Now considering the submissions raised by the
respective parties on merits of the controversy, this
Court finds that the findings recorded by the First
Appellate Court that a Will of Smt. Kunta not being
a transfer is not covered under Section 5(6) of the
Ceiling Act and the said view is defended by the
counsel for the respondent by relying upon a
decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
Mulk Nath Singh (supra) wherein the Co-ordinate
Bench has relied upon the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Rathinam @ Kuppamuthu v. L.
S. Mariappan [(2007) 6 SCC 724], while coming to
its conclusion holding that a Will is not a transfer.
26. In this regard, Section 5(6) of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960
and the explanation appended thereto will be
relevant to be noticed and which reads as under:—
“[5. Imposition of Ceiling.-(1) [On and from the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972],
no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the
aggregate through-out Uttar Pradesh, any land in
excess of the ceiling area applicable to him.
[Explanation I.-In determining the ceiling area
applicable to a tenure-holder, all land held by him
in his own right, whether in his own name, or
ostensibly in the name of any other person, shall be
taken into account.]

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Explanation II.-[If on or before January 24, 1971,
any land was held by a person who continues to be
in its actual cultivatory possession and the name of
any other person is entered in the annual register
after the said date] either in addition to or to the
exclusion of the former and whether on the basis of
a deed of transfer or licence or on the basis of a
decree, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed
authority, that the first mentioned person continues
to hold the land and that it is so held by him
ostensibly in the name of the second mentioned
person.]
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1), shall apply to land
held by the following classes of persons namely-
(a) the Central Government, the State Government
or any Local Authority or a Government Company
or a Corporation;
(b) a University;
(c) [an intermediate or degree college imparting
education in agriculture or a post-graduate
college;];
(d) a banking company or a co-operative bank or a
co-operative land development bank;
(e) the Bhoodan Yagna Committee constituted under
the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952.
(3) [Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (4),
(5), (6) and (7)] the ceiling area for purposes of
sub-section (1) shall be-
(a) in the case of a tenure-holder having a family of
not more than five members, 7.30 hectares of
irrigated land (including land held by other
members of his family) plus two additional hectares
of irrigated land or such additional land which
together with the land held by him aggregates to
two hectares, for each of his adult sons, who are
either not themselves tenure-holders or who hold

22
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
less than two hectares of irrigated land, subject to a
maximum of six hectares of such additional land;
(b) in the case of a tenure-holder having family of
more than five members, 7.30 hectares of irrigated
land (including land held by other members of his
family), besides, each of the members exceeding five
and for each of his adult sons who are not
themselves tenure-holders or who hold less than
two hectares of irrigated land, two additional
hectares of irrigated land or such additional land
which together with the land held by such adult son
aggregates to two hectares, subject to a maximum
of six hectares of such additional land;
Explanation.-The expression ‘adult son’ in clauses
(a) and (b) includes an adult son who is dead and
has left surviving behind him minor sons or minor
daughters (other than married daughters) who are
not themselves tenure-holders or who hold land less
than two hectares of irrigated land;
(c) [x x x]
(d) [x x x]
(e) in the case of any other tenure-holder, 7.30
hectares of irrigated land;
Explanation.-Any transfer or partition of land
which is liable to be ignored under sub-sections (6)
and (7) shall be ignored also-
(f) for purposes of determining whether an adult
son of a tenure-holder is himself a tenure-holder
within the meaning of [clause (a) or clause (b)];
(g) for purposes of service of notice under Section
9.
(4) Where any holding is held by a firm or co-
operative society or association of persons (whether
incorporated or not, but not including a public
company), its members (whether called partners,
share-holders or by any other name) shall, for

23
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
purposes of this Act, be deemed to hold that holding
in proportion to their respective shares in that firm,
co-operative society or other society or association
of persons:
[Provided that where a person immediately before
his admission to the firm, co-operative society, or
other society or association of persons, held no land
or an area of land less than the area proportionate
to his aforesaid share then he shall be deemed to
hold no share, or as the case may be, only the lesser
area in that holding, and the entire or the remaining
area of the holding, as the case may be, shall be
deemed to be held by the remaining members in
proportion to their respective shares in the firm, co-
operative society or other society or association of
persons.]
(5) In respect of any holding held by any private
trust,-
(a) where the shares of its beneficiaries in the
income from such trust are known or determinable,
the beneficiaries shall, for purposes of this Act, be
deemed to have the shares in that holding in the
same proportions as their respective shares in the
income from such trust,
(b) in any other case, it shall be governed by
[clause (e)] of subsection (3).
(6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a
tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the
twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for
the transfer would have been declared surplus land
under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply
to-
(a) a transfer in favour of any person (including
Government) referred to in sub-section (2);

24
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(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the
prescribed authority to be in good faith and for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument not being a benami transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder
or other members of his family.
[Explanation I.-For the purposes of this sub-
section, the expression transfer of land made after
the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, includes-
[(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure-holder
made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971
in a suit or proceeding irrespective of whether such
suit or proceeding was pending on or was instituted
after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971];
(b) any admission, acknowledgment, relinquishment
or declaration in favour of a person to the like
effect, made in any other deed or instrument or in
any other manner.
Explanation II.-The burden of proving that a case
falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with
the party claiming its benefit.”
27. From the above, it would indicate that it uses
the terminology to include not mere simplicitor
transfer but other deed or instrument or in any
other manner. Considering this aspect the Apex
Court in (1996) 27 ALR 445 State of U.P. v. Bankey
Singh has held as under:
“….. The only question in this case is : whether the
respondents would get benefit of 1/4th share in the
surplus land declared by the competent authority?
On September 8, 1982, Krishan Pal Singh filed
objection, who claimed land of Khat Nos. 340, 341
and Khata No. 33 of village Nawada and Khata No.
77 of Village Jamla Jot on the basis of a Will
executed by Smt. Gajraji. On that basis, the said
land is required to be excluded from the surplus

25
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
land. The primary authority had rejected the claim
by proceedings dated July 30, 1983 and on appeal
the District Judge allowed the appeal by order
dated November 9, 1983 and excluded 1/4th of the
land held by Gajraji on the basis of the Will dated
September 2, 1978. When it was questioned, the
High Court dismissed Writ Petition No. 1731/84.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
Section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings Act, 1960 (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1961) (for
short, ‘the Act’) in Chapter II imposes ceiling on
land holdings. Certain exemption mentioned in the
Article gets excluded from surplus land. Section 5
postulates that on and from the commencement of
the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land
Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, no tenure-holder
shall be entitled to hold in the aggregate throughout
Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of ceiling area
applicable to him.
Sub-section (6) postulates determination of the
ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder. It
provides that any transfer of land made after the
24th day of January, 1971, which but for the
transfer, would have been declared surplus land
under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account. Explanation-1 provides that for the
purpose of this sub-section the expression transfer
of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January,
1971 includes, among other things, an admission,
acknowledgment, relinquishment or declaration in
favour of a person to the like effect, made in any
other deed or instrument or in any other manner,
shall be construed to be a transfer for the purpose
of sub-section (6).
Admittedly, the Will was executed on February 10,
1978 long after the specified date. By the Will a
devise was made by Gajraji, owner of the land
bequeathing her 1/4th share in favour of her

26
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
brother's grand-son, Krishan Pratap Singh.
Therefore, it must be construed to be a devise “in
any other manner” within the meaning of
Explanation 1(b) of sub-section (6) of the Act. It
shall be ignored for the purpose of determination of
the surplus land. The High Court and the appellate
authority, therefore, were not right in directing to
exclude the said land. The appeal is accordingly
allowed. No costs.”
28. In light of the aforesaid clear authority of the
Apex Court which is in context with the provisions
of the Ceiling Act, this Court finds that the decision
cited by the counsel for the respondent and placing
reliance on the Co-ordinate Bench decision of Mulk
Nath Singh (supra) would be per incuriam for the
reason it does not take note of the decision of the
Apex Court in Bankey Singh (supra). Moreover, the
decision of the Apex Court which has been relied
upon in the case of Mulk Nath Singh (supra) namely
that of S. Rathinam @ Kuppamuthu (supra) is not in
context with the ceiling proceedings rather the said
decision was in context with the general law where
Will was held to be not a case of transfer. However,
in the instant case since the proceedings arise out of
a Special Act where special provisions have been
incorporated and the same has been interpreted by
the Apex Court in the case of Bankey Singh (supra),
accordingly in the humble opinion of this court, the
decision of Bankey Singh (supra) would be a
binding authority and for the aforesaid reason, the
Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the
counsel for the respondent and follow the decision
of Mulk Nath Singh (supra).
29. It will also be relevant to notice that the finding
which has been reversed by the Appellate Court in
respect of the sale deed said to have been executed
by Dinanath in favour of Sundar Lal, the same is
not adequately considered nor supported with

27
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
reasons. Whether the said sale deed was executed
prior to 24.01.1971 or thereafter could only be
proved once the said sale deed was on record. In
absence of the said sale deed merely relying upon
certain entries in the revenue records which do not
establish title and are only for fiscal purposes could
not give rise to a categorical finding and conclusion
that since the name of Sundar Lal was recorded in
the revenue records prior to the said date of
24.01.1971 without clear dates being available as
to when it was entered in the revenue records and
what was the basis and the reason for incorporating
such entries. The findings of the Appellate Court on
the aforesaid point are not supported by any clear
and cogent evidence, hence are unsustainable.
31. How a ceiling area is to be considered while
adjudging a transaction and whether it would be hit
by Section 5 (6) of the Ceiling Act and the manner
in which the Prescribed Authority is to hold an
inquiry in this regard has been considered by the
Apex Court in (1997) 1 SCC 734 State of U.P. v.
Amar Singh, the relevant portion thereof reads as
under:—
“5. Thus, on and from the date the Amendment Act
came into force, namely, 21-1-1971, the tenure-
holder shall not hold, throughout the State of Uttar
Pradesh, any land in the aggregate in excess of
ceiling area applicable to him. Explanation I
adumbrates that in determining ceiling area
applicable to a tenure-holder, all lands held by him
in his own right, whether in his own name or
ostensibly in the name of any other person, shall be
taken into account. In other words, as on the date
the Amendment Act came into force, the land must
be held by the tenure-holder in his own right and
the lands ostensibly in the name of any other person
shall be taken into account. In this case, admittedly,
the alienations came to be made by Kishun Singh in

28
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
favour of his sons and daughters-in-law. Normally,
one would expect that if there is any compelling
legal necessity to alienate the land, one would sell
the land to third parties and that too, as prudent
vendor for valuable consideration not to the sons
and daughters-in-law. The object appears to be, as
rightly pointed out by the District Judge, that the
alienations were made by registered instruments in
favour of his sons and daughters-in-law only to see
that the provisions of the Act are defeated and the
lands do not pass into the hands of strangers. It is
true that the evidence was adduced by the
respondents as regards proof of mutation. Mutation
was effected on the basis that sale deeds came to be
executed in favour of sons and daughters-in-law.
Therefore, the mutation officer was not concerned
at that stage to find out whether the sales were
benami or ostensibly intended to defeat the
provisions of the Act. It is settled law that mutation
entries are only for the purpose of enabling the
State to collect the land revenue from the person in
possession but it does not confer any title to the
land. The title would be derived from an instrument
executed by the owner in favour of an alienee as per
the Stamp Act and registered under the Registration
Act. The alienees being sons and daughters-in-law,
the tenure-holder remained to be the owner and
holder of the land. The sons and daughters-in-law
are only ostensible owners under Explanation I to
Section 5(1) of the Act. It is true that Lekh Pal has
not categorically stated whether the respondents
remained in possession in their own right after the
alienation. It is not in dispute that the father and
sons remained to be members of the joint family and
were cultivating the land. Under these
circumstances, one would normally expect that Lekh
Pal may not be in a position to categorically assert
whether respondents remained in possession in their
own right as owners or were cultivating land on

29
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
their own or on behalf of the coparceners. Under
these circumstances, the findings of the High Court
are illegal. The case falls under Explanation I of
Section 5(1) and the burden is always only on the
respondents to establish that they were not
ostensibly owning the land but remained in their
own right as owners. Accordingly, we hold that
Kishun Singh was the holder of the land. He was a
tenure-holder as on the date and, therefore, ceiling
area has to be computed treating him to be the
owner of the land; besides himself, he had eight
sons who are entitled to the respective additional
ceiling area given to them under the Act. The
authorities are, therefore, directed to compute the
ceiling area accordingly and take possession of the
surplus land.
33. The Apex Court has also considered the
aforesaid aspect in 1995 Supp (1) SCC 204 Nawal
Singh v. State of U.P. and the relevant portion reads
as under:—
2. For a transfer effected after 24-1-1971 to be
valid it must be proved to have been made in good
faith, for adequate consideration, under an
irrevocable instrument, not being a benami
transaction, or for immediate or deferred benefit of
the tenureholder or other members of his family.
Findings have been recorded at one stage or the
other that the sale effected by the appellant was for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument, not being a benami transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenureholder or
other members of his family. These findings have
been recorded in the backdrop that the appellant
had his holdings in two villages i.e. Sihi and
Asawar and that he was residing in Sihi, and had to
manage his land at Asawar at a distance of about
two and a half miles. Additionally he was an old
man of about 65 years of age at the relevant time,

30
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
had no son to look after him and his only daughter
who was married was living elsewhere. In this
situation, the appellant thought proper, as is his
case, to sell the land at village Asawar for a sum of
Rs. 60,000 and he asserts that out of it he
transferred a sum of Rs. 35,000 to his daughter by
way of gift and paid gift tax thereon. These
assertions of the appellant have not been countered
at any stage. His complete version has been
doubted only on the premise that the sale was
effected after the crucial date i.e. 24-1-1971 which
was reflective of absence of good faith.
3. We do not at all appreciate the approach of the
courts below. If this approach is accepted that no
transfer effected after 24-1-1971 can escape, sub-
section (6) of Section 5 would be rendered
meaningless and a dead letter in the statute. The
facts as stated above have been asserted by the
appellant clearly and openly. There is nothing on
these facts to attract a finding that all what he did
was in bad faith. We are satisfied that he has more
than ordinarily proved that the transaction of sale
was effected in good faith and the approach of the
courts below was not in accordance with the spirit
of the statute. We thus set aside the impugned orders
of the High Court as also that of the courts below
and hold that the transaction in question was
entered in good faith and the land covered by it is
not to be reckoned towards computing his holding
for ceiling purposes. The appeal is accordingly
allowed. No costs.
34. The Apex Court again in the case of Brijendra
Singh v. State of U.P. (1981) 1 SCC 597 has
considered the issue and the relevant portion reads
as under:—
14 ….. It will be seen that when sub-section (6) of
Section 5 provides that in determining the ceiling
area and surplus area, any transfer of land which

31
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
but for the transfer would have been declared
surplus land under the Act, shall be ignored, it
proceeds on the presumption that the tenure holders
being aware of the resolution or manifesto adopted
by the ruling All India Congress Party on January
24, 1971, and of the consensus at the Chief
Ministers Conference held in July 1972, to take
measures to lower the ceiling on agricultural
holdings, might make attempts to defraud, defeat
and evade the ceiling law, then in offing, by making
fictitious transfers of land in favour of other
persons. The presumption which underlies the main
provision in Section 5(6) can be displaced, as the
legislature has itself indicated, on proof of the
conditions set out in proviso (b). Although the
strength of the aforesaid presumption and the
nature and quantum required to satisfy the
conditions of proviso (b) may vary according to the
circumstances of the particular case, yet it can be
said as a general proposition that in the case of
transfers made prior to the decision of the Chief
Ministers Conference in July 1972 to lower the
ceiling, the burden under Explanation II on the
tenure holder to establish the facts bringing his case
within clause (b) of the proviso, would be lighter
than the one in the case of a transfer made after the
aforesaid decision in July 1972.
15. In order to bring his case within the purview of
proviso (b), the tenure holder has to show—
(i) that the transfer has been made in ‘good faith’;
(ii) that it is a transfer for adequate consideration;
(iii) that it has been made under an irrevocable
instrument; and
(iv) that it is not a benami transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder
or other members of his family.

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16. There is no dispute in regard to the connotation,
construction and existence of ingredients (ii), (iii)
and (iv) in the instant case. Controversy, however
centres round the true meaning and scope of the
expression “good faith” within the contemplation of
clause (b) of the proviso. In the instant case, the
Appellate Authority appears to have taken the view
— a view which has been upheld by the High Court
— that a transfer cannot be said to have been made
in “good faith” merely because it has been honestly
or genuinely made and satisfies the aforesaid
Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv), unless it is proved
further that it was made for a valid pressing
necessity.
…………
18. The expression “good faith” has not been
defined in the Ceiling Act. The expression has
several shades of meaning. In the popular sense, the
phrase “in good faith” simply means “honestly,
without fraud, collusion, or deceit; really, actually,
without pretence and without intent to assist or act
in furtherance of a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful
scheme”, (see Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn.,
Vol. 18-A, p. 91). Although the meaning of “good
faith” may vary in the context of different statutes,
subjects and situations, honest intent free from taint
of fraud or fraudulent design, is a constant element
of its connotation. Even so, the quality and quantity
of the honesty requisite for constituting “good
faith” is conditioned by the context and object of
the statute in which this term is employed. It is a
cardinal canon of construction that an expression
which has no uniform, precisely fixed meaning,
takes its colour, light and content from the context.
19. The meaning and scope of the expression “good
faith” is therefore, to be considered in the light of
the scheme and purpose of Section 5, in general,
and the context of proviso (b) to sub-section (6), in

33
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
particular. We have already noticed that the primary
object of the Ceiling Act, as adumbrated in the
pivotal provision in Section 5(1) is to prohibit and
disentitle a tenure holder from holding land in the
aggregate in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in excess of
the ceiling area, in his own right, whether in his
own name, or ostensibly in the name of any other
person. The ceiling area and surplus land of a
tenure holder under the Ceiling Act, as already
mentioned, are to be determined as on June 8, 1973
when the U.P. (Amendment) Act 18 of 1973 came
into force. A transfer, therefore, made after January
24, 1971 which is designed to serve as a cloak for
retention of a right or interest of the transferor in
the ostensibly transferred land in excess of the
ceiling area, even on or after June 8, 1973, will be
patently not “in good faith”. But the proviso (b) to
sub-section (6) of Section 5 extends the negative
aspect of the concept “good faith” a little further by
indicating, that even if the transfer is not an
ostensible transfer and the transferor divests
himself of all interest and rights in present in the
transferred land, but reserves some benefit in futuro
for himself or other members of his family, then
also, the transfer will be not in “good faith”. A
transfer solely for the purpose of converting surplus
land into cash without any kind of need (not to be
confused with legal necessity) may also lack good
faith.
20. Broadly speaking, the benefit of clause (b) of the
proviso to subsection (b) is available to a transfer
made in good faith, that is, to a bona fide transfer
whereby the tenure holder genuinely and
irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest in
the land in favour of the transferee, in the ordinary
course of management of his affairs and which is
not a collusive arrangement, or device or
subterfuge to enable the tenure holder to continue
to hold the surplus land or any reserved interest in

34
WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
presenti or in future, therein, (or merely to convert
it into cash), and thus circumvent the ban under
Section 5(1) of the Ceiling Act. In order to be
entitled to the benefit of proviso (a), a transfer made
in good faith, must satisfy the further conditions, (ii)
to (iv), enumerated in the proviso (b). The positive
conditions laid down in proviso (b) are : that the
transfer should be for adequate consideration; that
it should have been made under an irrevocable
instrument. The negative conditions set out in
clause (b) of the proviso are : that it must not be a
benami transaction; that it must not be for
immediate or deferred benefit of the transferring
tenure holder or other members of his family. These
tests or Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) provided in
proviso (b) may not by themselves be conclusive to
hold that the transfer was in “good faith”. For
instance, another important test for judging the
genuineness or otherwise of a sale would be
whether or not cultivatory possession and
enjoyment of the land has passed under the sale to
the vendee. Even so, once it is established by the
transferring tenure holder that the transfer in
question effected in the course of ordinary
management of his affairs, was made for adequate
consideration and he has genuinely, absolutely and
irrevocably divested himself of all right, title and
interest (including cultivatory possession) in the
land in favour of the transferee, the onus under
Explanation II, in the absence of any circumstances
suggestive of collusion, or an intention or design to
defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act, on the tenure
holder to show that the transfer was effected in
“good faith”, will stand discharged, and it will not
be necessary for the tenure holder to prove further
that the transfer was made for an impelling need or
to raise money for meeting a pressing legal
necessity. Although proof of the fact that a transfer
was made for a valid pressing necessity may

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highlight or strengthen the inference in favour of the
genuineness of the transfer, it is not an
indispensable constituent of “good faith”; nor is the
proof of legal necessity requisite, as a matter of law,
to enable a tenure holder to avail of the benefit of
clause (b) of the proviso. It may be remembered that
at the time when such a transfer was made, there
was no legal restriction on his power to alienate the
whole or any part of his holding. In other words, at
the time when such a transfer was made it was not
unlawful, even if it were made without any pressing
necessity. It became unlawful by the subsequent
enactment of a legal fiction introduced in Section
5(6) of the Ceiling Act (U.P. Act 18 of 1973) with
retrospective effect from January 24, 1971. Even so,
under this statutory fiction, a transfer of land made
after January 24, 1971 does not become wholly void
for all purposes; it can be ignored and would not be
taken into account in determining the ceiling area
of the transferring tenure holder for purposes of the
Ceiling Act, and that too, if the following two
conditions are satisfied—
(a) that the land but for the transfer would have
been declared surplus land under the U.P. Act 18 of
1973; and
(b) that the transfer is not of a kind covered by
proviso (6) to Section 5(6) of the Act.
35. This being the position, once a transfer is shown
to be bona fide and further satisfies all the other
positive and negative conditions laid down in the
proviso (b) to Section 5(6), there is no justification
in law to stretch the legal fiction further and to spell
out from the expression “good faith” an additional
requirement of proving pressing necessity for the
transfer before the tenure holder is entitled to the
benefit of the aforesaid proviso (b).
36. In light of what is culled out from the decisions
of the Apex Court noticed above, this Court

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observes that the Appellate Authority must consider
the evidence in a manner aforesaid to find out
whether the transactions are bonafide.
37. Now noticing the aforesaid dictum in Amar
Singh (supra), Nawal Singh (supra) and Brijendra
Singh (supra) and applying the said principles to
the instant case, this Court finds that the Appellate
Court has not adhered to the principles of law
settled and also the manner in which the objections
of the tenure holder and the evidence thereon is to
be considered. Moreover, categorical findings
which have been recorded by the Prescribed
Authority have not been considered by the Appellate
Court in its correct prespective nor any reason has
been incorporated why the conclusion of the
Prescribed Authority were erroneous nor the
findings of the Prescribed Authority have been
reversed."
Anand Kishor Devacharya (Supra)
"13. The Appellate court held that the old Ceiling
Act came into force with effect from 03.01.1961 with
reference year 1958. As proceedings against
Maharaja Pateshwari Prasad Singh and his heir
Maharajaa Dharmendra Pratap Singh had been
instituted under the old Ceiling Act, they will be
governed by the old Ceiling Act.
14. The order dated 27.01.1968 for recording the
name of the appellant's husband, had been passed
by the Consolidation Officer on the basis of a
compromise and this order had been passed 10
years after the reference date. Therefore, the order
dated 27.01.1968 passed by the Consolidation
Officer is liable to be neglected and no relief can be
granted to the appellant on the basis of the
aforesaid order.
19. In view of the provisions contained in Section
19(1) of the Amendment Act, 1972, all the

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WRIC No. - 3000221 of 2003
proceedings initiated under the unamended Act
stood abated on 08.06.1973. The Prescribed
Authority could have initiated fresh proceedings by
issuing a notice under Section 9(2) of the Act.
20. Therefore, the proceedings instituted on the
basis of notice issued to Maharaja Dharmendra
Pratap Singh, stood abated in view of the provisions
contained in Section 19 of the amendment Act.
Fresh proceedings could only be initiated by issuing
a fresh notice under Section 9(2) of the Ceiling Act,
which was not done in the present case.
21. The order passed by the Appellate Authority
stating that the proceedings against Maharaja
Pateshwari Prasad Singh and his heir Maharaja
Dharmendra Pratap Singh had been issued under
the old Ceiling Act (which is a misnomer, as there
was no old Ceiling Act and it was merely the
unamended Ceiling Act, as it was originally
enacted) and that the same proceedings shall be
deemed to be continuing, has been passed in
ignorance of the provisions of Section 19 of the U.P.
Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
(Amendment) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 18 of 1973) and
the same is unsustainable in law.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The
order dated 15.04.2015 passed by Additional
Commissioner (Judicial), Devi Patan Division,
Gonda dismissing Appeal No. 5/43 under Section 13
of the Ceiling Act is quashed. The matter is
remanded to Additional Commissioner (Judicial),
Devi Patan Division, Gonda for being decided
afresh in accordance with the law, keeping in view
the observations made in this judgment."
Mohammad Raza (Supra)
"11. Perusal of the record demonstrates that the
petitioner is claiming right on the basis of sale deed
executed in his favour on 8.10.1971 in respect to the

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khasara no. 53 area 2-17-15 from its recorded
tenure holder Beni Madhav and the name of the
petitioner was ordered to be recorded in case no.
329 passed by the Sub-Divisional Office,
Dumeriyaganj. Entry has been made in the remark
column of the khatauni of 1378-1380 fasli.
Petitioner is claiming that after enforcement of Act
No. 18 of 1973 w.e.f. 8.6.1973, the sale deed
executed on 8.10.1971 in favour of the petitioner is
well protected. The record also demonstrates that
the objection under Section 11(2) of the Ceiling Act
filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the
prescribed authority and the appeal has also been
dismissed holding that transaction of the petitioner
is benami and no reliance can be placed upon the
same as the same has been executed after
24.1.1971. The reasoning given under the impugned
order cannot be sustained as the sale deed has been
executed before 8.6.1973, as such, the same is well
protected.
12. In the instant matter petitioner is claiming right
on the basis of sale deed executed on 8.10.1971 by
recorded owner, which is well before the relevant
dated 8.6.1973 and notice was issued to respondent
nos. 16 to 18 on 14.3.1974 for show cause in C.L.H.
Form- 3A, 3B & 3C, as such, the sale deed executed
on 8.10.1971 cannot be ignored by ceiling
authorities coupled with the fact that name of the
petitioner came in remark coloumn of Khatauni of
1378 fasli to 1380 fasli (1970-71 to 1972-73).
16. So far as the execution of the lease in favour of
respondent nos. 5 to 15 is concerned, the same is
always subject to the right & title of the State.
Since, the Court is holding that the khasara no. 53,
which was purchased by the petitioner by way of
sale deed executed on 8.10.1971 cannot be declared
surplus without notice and opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner, as such, respondent nos. 5 to 15

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cannot claim any right on the basis of lease deed.
No useful purpose will be served by remanding the
matter again before the prescribed authority or the
appellate authority as earlier also the matter has
been remanded by this Court to decide the appeal
afresh. The litigation cannot be kept pending in
Court for unlimited period rather to finalize the
same on the basis of evidence on record as well as
considering the ratio of law laid down by this Court
as quoted above.
17. Considering the entire facts and circumstances
of the case, the impugned order dated 6.3.1982
passed by respondent no. 3 as well as order dated
19.1.2012 passed by respondent no. 2 are liable to
be set aside and the same are hereby set aside. The
impugned order dated 11.12.1974 so far as it relates
to Khasara No. 53 is also set aside and Khasara
No. 53 is excluded from ceiling proceeding.
18. The writ petition stands allowed."
Rajendra Prasad Singh (Supra)
"15. The prescribed authority, without framing the
issues, as directed by the appellate court under
Section 5(6) Explanation, proceeded to decide
without framing the issues. For ready reference
Section 5(6) Explanation proviso to U.P. Imposition
of Ceiling on Land Holding Act, 1960 is being
quoted under :-
"5(6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to
a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the
twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for
the transfer would have been declared surplus land
under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into
account:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply
to :
(a) a transfer in favour of any person (including
Government) referred to in sub-section (2);

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(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the
Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for
adequate consideration and under an irrevocable
instrument not being a benami transaction or for
immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder
or other members of his family."
16. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly
demonstrates that before proceeding to decide the
claim, issue has to be framed in regard to the
possession over the land. On bare perusal of the
impugned order passed by the prescribed authority,
it is crystal clear that no issues whatsoever were
framed nor the petitioners were issued notice to
submit their objection in regard to their claim. The
appellate authority also proceeded to affirm the
order of the prescribed authority without
application of mind.
17. In view of the reasons assigned above, the
impugned orders dated 31.12.1991 and 14.3.1995,
passed by the Chief Revenue Officer, Gonda and
Additional Commissioner Faizabad Division,
Faizabad (Ayodhya) respectively are hereby
quashed. The writ petition succeeds and is
allowed."
37. Upon consideration of the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material brought on
record, this Court finds that the principal grievance raised by the
petitioners is that their independent claim arising out of the registered
Will dated 25.11.1971 executed by the original tenure holder Fateh
Bahadur Singh was never adjudicated upon by the authorities under the
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act and that their
objections were rejected on technical grounds without examining the
substance of their claim.
38. The record demonstrates that Fateh Bahadur Singh admittedly
died on 22.05.1973 and prior thereto is stated to have executed a
registered Will in favour of Ajay Pratap Singh, Vishnu Pratap Singh,

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Bhanu Pratap Singh and Vijay Pratap Singh. The petitioners claim rights
through Vijay Pratap Singh and assert independent rights over the
holding on the basis of the said Will. It further emerges from the record
that when the original ceiling proceedings culminated in the order dated
30.09.1975 declaring surplus land, the petitioners were admittedly
minors. Their case is that after attaining majority and acquiring
knowledge of the proceedings, they promptly approached the authority
by filing objections on 01.11.1980.
39. The Prescribed Authority rejected the objections principally on the
ground that the application mentioned Section 13-A instead of Section
11(2) of the Act and also on the ground of delay. The appellate authority
thereafter mechanically affirmed the order without undertaking any
independent consideration of the issues raised. The approach adopted by
both the authorities, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be
sustained in law.
40. The legal position with regard to the scope and maintainability of
objections under Section 11(2) of the Act is no longer res integra . In
Dirvijai Singh (Supra), this Court categorically held that a third party
claiming independent rights in the land has a right to file objections
under Section 11(2) and such objections cannot be rejected merely
because earlier proceedings had been contested by the recorded tenure
holder up to higher forums. The Court specifically observed that the
right of a third party survives independently and requires adjudication on
merits.
41. Similar principles were reiterated in the case of Shafir (Supra),
wherein it was held that even persons claiming independent tenure-
holder rights, though not originally impleaded in the proceedings, are
entitled to maintain objections under Section 11(2). The Court further
held that such objections are required to be decided on merits after
affording adequate opportunity of evidence to the objector. The ratio of
the aforesaid judgment clearly applies to the facts of the present case, as
the petitioners had asserted an independent claim over the holding on the

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basis of a Will, and such claim could not have been rejected without
proper adjudication.
42. Equally relevant is the judgment in Abdul Hafiz Khan (Supra),
wherein this Court held that even if an objection is filed under a wrong
provision, the authority is under an obligation to treat the same in
accordance with its substance and not reject it on mere technical
description of the statutory provision. The Court specifically held that
wrong mentioning of a section or omission to mention the correct
provision does not dis-entitle an objector from substantive relief. In the
present case, the authorities have adopted an excessively technical
approach in rejecting the petitioners’ objections merely because Section
13-A was mentioned instead of Section 11(2), despite the fact that the
substance of the objection clearly disclosed an independent claim over
the land in dispute.
43. The reasoning adopted by the Prescribed Authority thus stands
directly contrary to the law laid down in Abdul Hafiz Khan (Supra).
Procedural law is intended to advance justice and not to defeat
substantive rights. Once the petitioners had disclosed the basis of their
claim and sought adjudication of their independent rights, the authority
ought to have treated the application as one under Section 11(2) and
decided the same on merits.
44. The plea of delay raised against the petitioners also does not
impress this Court. The petitioners were admittedly minors at the time
when the original ceiling proceedings were initiated and finalized. The
effect of minority and absence of effective representation could not have
been ignored while considering the question of delay.
45. In Mehfizul Rahman (Supra), this Court clearly held that even if
a son had some vague knowledge of proceedings against his father, the
same could not be construed to mean that his independent rights stood
represented or adjudicated. The Court further held that objections filed
subsequently by persons claiming independent rights could not be

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rejected merely on technical grounds of delay. The observations made
therein squarely support the petitioners’ case.
46. Likewise, in Hari Ram (Supra), this Court held that objections by
persons claiming independent rights were required to be heard on merits
notwithstanding earlier proceedings conducted against another person.
The Court further observed that where the objectors’ names were
reflected in revenue records or they otherwise asserted independent
rights, notices ought to have been issued to them and their objections
could not be dismissed summarily.
47. The respondents have attempted to justify the proceedings on the
ground that the petitioners were represented by their father, who was
their natural guardian. However, mere representation by a guardian in
proceedings conducted against another tenure holder cannot
automatically extinguish or adjudicate independent rights claimed by
minors on the basis of a separate legal instrument. The authorities were
under a duty to examine whether the rights asserted through the Will had
any legal effect and whether such claim required independent
adjudication.
48. The impugned orders further reveal complete non-consideration of
the Will relied upon by the petitioners. The authorities have neither
examined the genuineness of the Will nor recorded any finding regarding
its legal effect. The claim has simply been rejected on technical grounds
without any discussion of evidence. Such an approach clearly reflects
non-application of mind.
49. At the same time, this Court cannot ignore the settled legal
position relating to transfers and testamentary dispositions under the
Ceiling Act. In State of U.P. Vs. Kailash Nath (Supra), this Court, after
considering the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P.
Vs. Bankey Singh, Amar Singh, Nawal Singh and Brijendra Singh,
elaborately explained the scope of Section 5(6) of the Act and held that
transactions made after 24.01.1971 are liable to scrutiny to determine

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whether they are bona fide or intended to defeat the provisions of the
Ceiling Act.
50. The Court in Kailash Nath (Supra) further observed that even
though a Will may not constitute a transfer under the general law, for
purposes of ceiling proceedings it may still require examination within
the framework of Section 5(6) and the explanations appended thereto.
The Court further held that the authority must undertake a detailed
inquiry regarding genuineness, bona fides, possession, consideration
where applicable, and surrounding circumstances before recording any
conclusion.
51. Thus, the petitioners cannot claim automatic exclusion of the land
merely on the basis of the alleged Will. However, what is material is that
the authorities were legally bound to examine the said claim on merits in
accordance with the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments.
That exercise has admittedly not been undertaken in the present case.
52. This Court also finds substance in the submission advanced on
behalf of the petitioners that the appellate authority failed to discharge its
statutory obligation while deciding the appeal. The appellate order dated
05.03.1998 merely affirms the order of the Prescribed Authority without
independent analysis of facts, evidence or legal issues.
53. In State of U.P. Vs. Kailash Nath (Supra), relying upon Order
XLI Rule 31 CPC and various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
this Court emphasized that the first appellate authority is required to
independently consider the evidence, submissions and findings recorded
by the original authority and thereafter assign its own reasons. The
appellate order must reflect conscious application of mind and reasoned
adjudication.
54. In the present case, the appellate authority has failed to consider
the effect of minority of the petitioners, the maintainability of objections
under Section 11(2), the effect of incorrect mention of statutory
provision, the legal consequences flowing from the alleged Will, and the
requirement of adjudicating independent rights claimed by third parties.

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The order is thus clearly vitiated for want of proper reasoning and
independent consideration.
55. The objection raised by the respondents regarding allotment of
surplus land to third parties also does not persuade this Court to non-suit
the petitioners at this stage. In Mohammad Raza (Supra), this Court
held that allotments made pursuant to ceiling proceedings remain subject
to the validity of the original declaration of surplus land and cannot
override lawful claims requiring adjudication. Therefore, subsequent
allotments cannot be treated as a complete bar to judicial scrutiny where
foundational illegality is demonstrated.
56. Similarly, in Rajendra Prasad Singh (Supra), this Court
reiterated that failure to frame proper issues, failure to consider
objections and absence of adequate adjudication vitiate ceiling
proceedings. The Court held that mechanical affirmation by the appellate
authority without proper application of mind cannot be sustained.
57. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the objections
preferred by the petitioners disclosed a substantial and legally triable
claim. The authorities below failed to adjudicate the same in accordance
with law and rejected the objections on technical and procedural
grounds. Such an approach has resulted in manifest failure of justice.
The impugned orders therefore cannot be sustained. Consequently, the
writ petition deserves to be allowed.
58. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 26.04.1982 passed by the
Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate order dated 05.03.1998 are
hereby quashed. The matter is remanded to the Prescribed Authority
concerned to reconsider the objections of the petitioners afresh in
accordance with law after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to
all affected parties.
59. While undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Prescribed Authority
shall specifically examine the claim of the petitioners arising out of the
alleged Will dated 25.11.1971, the effect of minority of the petitioners at
the relevant time, the maintainability of objections under Section 11(2),

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and the applicability of Section 5(6) of the Act in light of the principles
laid down in the judgments referred to hereinabove. The authority shall
pass a reasoned and speaking order after considering the evidence and
submissions of the parties independently.
60. The writ petition is accordingly allowed . No order as to costs
(Irshad Ali,J.)
May 14, 2026
Gautam
Digitally signed by :-
GAUTAM TECKCHANDANI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench