Anuj vs Directorate Of Enforcement

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court



CRM-M-37926-2026 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

203-3 CRM-M-37926-2026

Anuj
....Petitioner
V/s

Directorate of Enforcement thr.
Assistant Director Chandigarh
....Respondent

Date of decision: 13.11.2026
Date of Uploading : 16.11.2026

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. P.S. Ahluwalia, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Bhavi Kapur, Advocate and
Mr. Sumit Mor, Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Promila Nain, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Meghna Malik, Central Government Counsel and
Ms. Ritika, LC for the respondent-ED.
*
, J.
SUMEET GOEL
1. The present petition (hereinafter referred to as ‘ petition in
hand’ ) has been filed by the petitioner ––Anuj for grant of regular bail in
ECIR/CDZO-I/02/2024 dated 09.02.2024 registered against the petitioner as
Supplementary Criminal Complaint bearing COMA/25/2025 dated
02.02.2026 by Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter referred to as ‘ ED ’)
under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘PMLA’ ).
2. For the sake of convenience, the relevant factual milieu has
been drawn from the order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the learned Special
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CRM-M-37926-2026 2
Judge, PMLA, Panchkula (whereby regular bail plea of the petitioner was
rejected) which reads thus:
“2. Briefly stated the present case has its genesis in FIR No.266, dated
19.10.2023 registered at PS Mandi, HP by complainant Rajesh Saini on
the allegation of being allured into Forex Trading by accused Ramesh
Chauhan, Rohit, Rajinder Sood, Santosh Kumar and Vineet Kumar in the
guise of QFX Group of Companies whereby he was assured 5% interest
payout on the investment per month. Believing in the same, the
complainant had invested a sum of Rs.12,60,390/- qua which he had been
given post dated cheques which were subsequently found to be blocked.
During further investigation, it was found that seven other FIRs qua the
aforesaid company i.e. QFX Trade Limited had been registered in various
parts of India wherein investors were defrauded by same modus operandi.
Since the aforesaid FIRs constituted scheduled offence under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, thus present ECIR was registered.
3. During investigation by the Directorate of Enforcement, it was found
that QFX Trade Limited and its group companies through its Directors
namely Rajender Kumar Sood, Vineet Kumar, Santosh Kumar and
beneficial owner Navab Ali @ Lavish Chaudhary had orchestrated a
Ponzi style investment fraud under the guise of QFX Trading alluring the
investors to make investment and subsequently defrauding them. In order
to avoid detection, the accused persons repeatedly shifted the investors
across identical looking platforms viz a viz Yorker Capital Markets
Limited (YORKERFX), BOTBRO etc. Further, in order to expand investor
base, the accused persons operated Multi Level Marketing (MLM)
structure, under which the scheme was promoted through social media
websites apps etc. by the agents/investors. Initially for the ponzi scam, the
bank accounts of QFX Group of Companies were used to accept the
investment wherein proceeds of crime amount to the tune of
approximately Rs.200 crores were received. However, subsequently on
expansion of scheme of investment, the accused persons started using
services of payment aggregators for accepting amounts from public and
also to give payouts. During search of payment aggregators, the proceeds
of crime to the tune of Rs.390 crores were frozen. During investigation, it
was also found that the QFX Company had collected Rs.210 crores as
investment out of which payout of Rs.115 crores only was made. It was
also found that the accused persons have floated different companies in
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different names which were associate concerns in order to avoid
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CRM-M-37926-2026 3
detection. The Directors of QFX Company namely Rajinder Kumar,
Vineet and Santosh Kumar have fled abroad. During investigation by the
ED, it was also found that Navab @ Lavish Choudhary is the mastermind
behind the fraud, who is in Dubai and other accused persons had also
fled to Dubai. During investigation, it was also found that the funds in the
guise of QFX Trading were being collected in cash or in benami accounts
and the return was also paid either in cash or in the form of Crypto coin
namely "TLC 2.0 coin" which is yet to be launched. Investors were being
allured to become agents in MLM Scheme. During the scrutiny of bank
accounts of payment aggregators namely M/s Rainet Technology Private
Limited, M/s Kindent Business Solution Private Limited and M/s Mool
Business Solution Private Limtied, it was found that there was no
correlation between the nature of their business and the quantum of
money being credited in their bank accounts under the name
QFX/YFX/BOTBRO etc. The investigation revealed that various agents
and sub-agents were involved to allure more investments and different
associate companies were used to collect and layer the proceeds of crime.
The investigation further revealed that applicant-accused Anuj was
associated with M/s QFX Trade Limited since its inception and was
functioning as a Key Agent therein. He was instrumental in arranging and
managing bank accounts of various payment aggregators through which
investors funds were routed. During search of his residential premises,
material was found showing approximately Rs.390 Crores having been
routed through payment aggregator accounts managed by him which
were frozen. The accused was found to be in direct association with
mastermind Navab @ Lavish Chaudhary. He was also found in
possession of a Land Rover Defender Vehicle which was though
registered in the name of M/s Tofanipay Management Services Private
Limited and was acquired from the tainted funds. Investigation also found
the digital evidence from his device from which crypto wallet seed
phrases were extracted confirming that he was operating the wallets on
the instruction of Navab @ Lavish Chaudhary. The accused was found to
have handled approximately Rs.345.96 Crores in the form of crypto
currency which were proceeds of crime. Investigation also revealed that
the funds from the payment aggregators were transferred to the bank
account of his family members i.e. wife (Rs.30 lakhs) and father (Rs.31
lakhs). During investigation, Directorate of Enforcement after recording
its reasons to arrest the accused, arrested him on 05.12.2025. He was
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CRM-M-37926-2026 4
remanded to the custody of Directorate of Enforcement up to 15.12.2025.
Supplementary Prosecution Complaint was filed on 02.02.2026.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner; led by Mr. Preetinder S.
Ahluwalia, Senior Advocate; has argued that the petitioner has been falsely
implicated into the instant case and his continued incarceration is not
warranted in the factual milieu of the case in hand. Learned senior counsel
has further iterated that the initial FIR was registered on the complaint of an
investor and the petitioner was not named therein. Learned senior counsel
has further pointed out that, except for one FIR No.39 dated 08.11.2024,
registered in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, the petitioner has not been named in
any other FIR(s) with regard to the alleged investment scheme. According
to learned senior counsel, the petitioner has been implicated primarily on the
basis of the material collected by the ED during investigation, the
evidentiary value and correctness of which ought to be tested during the
course of trial. It has been further contended that the allegations regarding
the alleged association of the petitioner with QFX Trade Limited,
management of payment aggregator accounts and handling of crypto
currency, are matters which would require appreciation of evidence during
the course of trial. It has been further contended that the prosecution is
substantially relying upon documentary material, electronic records, bank
transactions and statement(s) recorded during the course of investigation.
According to learned senior counsel, the petitioner has been in custody for a
considerable period, the prosecution complaint has also been filed and the
material relied upon by the ED has been collected and hence no useful
purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody any longer.
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CRM-M-37926-2026 5
3.1. Learned senior counsel has further drawn the attention of the
Court to the fact that the supplementary prosecution complaint was filed on
02.02.2026 and that, despite the passage of considerable time, cognizance
has not yet been taken. Furthermore, considering the volume of
documentary evidence and the number of witnesses cited by the
prosecution, the trial is not likely to conclude in the near future. Moreover,
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offence under Section 4 of the
PMLA is 07 years whereas the petitioner has already suffered incarceration
for almost 01 year and, therefore, the continued incarceration without any
immediate prospect of commencement or conclusion of trial, would
adversely affect the fundamental right of the petitioner to personal liberty
and speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
3.2. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the relevant
bank records, electronic devices, mobile phones and other documentary
material already stands seized by the investigating agency and there is no
material to suggest that the petitioner is likely to abscond, influence any
witness or tamper with the prosecution evidence in any manner in case he is
enlarged on bail.
3.3. Learned senior counsel has further contended that the petitioner
has been in custody for a considerable period of time i.e. since 05.12.2025
and the prosecution complaint cites 49 prosecution witnesses as also 147
relied upon documents running into more than 12,400 pages, the trial is at
cognizance stage and, thus, the prospect of conclusion of trial in near future
is bleak.
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CRM-M-37926-2026 6
On the strength of these grounds, the grant of petition in hand
is entreated for.
4. In oppugnation, learned senior counsel appearing for the ED,
has opposed the petition in hand by arguing that the allegations against the
petitioner are serious in nature and relate to a large-scale organized
investment fraud involving thousands of innocent investors. Learned senior
counsel has further contended that the petitioner was not merely an investor
or an agent but was functioning as a key agent of QFX Trade Limited and
was actively involved in managing the bank accounts of various payment
aggregators through which the funds collected from the public were routed.
Furthermore, the investigation has revealed the routing of approximately
₹
390 crore through the payment-aggregator accounts managed by the
petitioner. It has been further contended that the petitioner was also found to
be in possession of crypto currency wallet-related material and had
₹
allegedly handled crypto currency amounting to approximately 345.96
crore. Learned senior counsel has emphasized that the offence alleged under
the PMLA has serious economic consequences and the petitioner is alleged
to have played an important role in the movement and concealment of the
proceeds of crime. Moreover, the possibility of the petitioner influencing
witnesses or interfering with the prosecution evidence cannot be ruled out at
this stage.
4.1. Learned senior counsel has further urged that the factum of the
petitioner being incarcerated for a period of approximately 01 year in the
ECIR in question vis-à-vis the nature of allegations against him do not, ipso
facto, warrant his release on regular bail.
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CRM-M-37926-2026 7
Thus, dismissal of the petition in hand is canvassed for.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the rival parties and have
gone through the available record of the case.
6. Before proceeding further, it would be opposite to refer herein
to a judgment passed by this Court titled as Varun Puri vs. Directorate of
Enforcement = 2026: PHHC:112452 whereinafter; relying upon
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar reported as (1980) 1
SCC 81 , Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak reported as (1992) 1 SCC
225, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another,
2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494, Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311, V. Senthil Balaji versus The Deputy
Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC Online SC 2626, Manish
Sisodia versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024(12) SCC 660 , Padam
Chand Jain versus Enforcement Directorate, 2025 SCC Online SC 1291,
Kapil Wadhawan versus Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 SCC
Online SC 3038 and Arvind Dham versus Directorate of Enforcement,
2026 SCC Online SC 30; this Court has held thus:
“1. To divest a human being of physical freedom prior to an
adjudication of guilt is an extraordinary, almost desperate concession
made by the social contract to the demands of public order. In a
constitutional order, the temporary deprivation of an individual’s liberty
pending trial is permitted solely as an ephemeral, strictly necessary
safeguard to ensure that justice may take its course. It is a concession
strictly conditioned upon the absolute brevity and necessity of such
restraint. Yet, when judicial custody ceases to be a brief prelude to trial
and degenerates into years of indefinite confinement, the state silently
commits a gravity of wrong that strikes at the very marrow of human
dignity. The antiquity of this limitation finds its genesis in Roman
nd
jurisprudence, where Ulpian, a 2 Century Roman jurist, recorded the
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core precept governing pre-trial/under-trial detention: Carcer ad



CRM-M-37926-2026 8
continendos homines, non ad puniendos haberi debet , i.e. a prison ought
to be used strictly for keeping men, not for punishing them.
Pertinently, pre-trial/under-trial detention is purely preventive
and temporary; it can never be permitted to degenerate into substantive
punishment. When judicial custody stretches across years without the
realistic prospect of an early trial, the prison wall ceases to serve as a
vessel of lawful restraint and assumes the oppressive character of an un-
adjudicated sentence. Indefinite incarceration without the immediate
prospect of trial is, in truth, the judicial equivalent of the infamous Lettres
de Cachet ; it substitutes the arbitrary certainty of the prison wall for the
majesty of a lawful verdict. The intolerance for delayed justice, is
evidenced by the fact that as early as the 13th Century, long before the
contemporary lexicon of human rights was articulated, Clause 40 of
Magna Carta (1215) decreed that realisation of right and justice shall not
be delayed; relevant whereof (translated) reads thus:
“To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”
1.1 Exposing the subtle and insidious danger of such untried
confinement, Sir William Blackstone, in his seminal Commentaries on the
Laws of England (1765–1769, Book 1, Chapter 1) , treated confinement
without swift trial as an existential threat to free society, relevant whereof
reads thus:
“To bereave a man of his life, or by violence to confiscate his
estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and
notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of
tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but confinement of the
person, by secretly sending him to gaol, where his sufferings are
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and
therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.”
Ergo, to hold an individual in endless pre-trial captivity is to treat
their life and time as expendable commodities. It forgets that human
personality is endowed with intrinsic worth, and that living with dignity is
an absolute constitutional imperative, not a luxury granted by state grace.
When an untried prisoner is left to wither in a cell, his reputation is
shattered, family structure is annihilated, and humanism is paralyzed.
Ergo, the law must maintain that pre-trial detention remains an
extraordinary exception, and prolonged incarceration prior to conviction
an intolerable contradiction of the Rule of Law.
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xxx xxx xxx xxx
9. Pertinently, except for a few scattered procedural directives
contained within certain special enactments, the statutory law(s)
contains no express legislative provision guaranteeing “speedy trial” as
a codified, standalone right. Yet, under the expansive and humanistic
interpretation accorded to Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon (supra) elevated speedy
trial from a mere procedural aspiration to an indelible, fundamental
constitutional guarantee. It was firmly established that any procedure
which fails to ensure a reasonably expeditious trial cannot be regarded
as "reasonable, fair, and just," and consequently falls foul of Article 21.
This constitutional imperative assumes its most grave and poignant
dimension when the accused is forced to endure pre-trial/under-trial
detention while awaiting the conclusion of his trial. In such
circumstances, prolonged judicial custody directly strikes at the cardinal
pillar of criminal jurisprudence: ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui
negat, i.e. the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts, not upon him
who denies. The doctrine of the presumption of innocence is a golden
thread of the criminal law, and where an accused languishes behind bars
without a conclusive verdict of guilt in sight, the passage of un-
adjudicated time hollows out this presumption. As pre-trial incarceration
stretches across months and years, this presumption begins to weigh
heavily against the legitimacy of continued detention and in the absence
of a formal judicial verdict of guilt, the prosecuting agency/State loses
the moral and legal authority to keep the individual captive. In case(s),
where the trial ultimately culminate in an acquittal, the loss inflicted
upon the individual, i.e. the irreparable rupture of liberty, the destruction
of social standing, and the irreversible atrophy of human life, constitutes
an injury for which no state treasury can provide restitutio in integrum.
9.1. Pertinently, recognising the noxious character of under-trial
detention and seeking to align statutory rights with evolving liberty
jurisprudence, the legislature explicitly codified statutory relief against
delayed trial through Section 436-A Cr.P.C., (introduced via the
Criminal law Amendment Act, 2005 and subsequently retained under
section 479 BNSS with a further concession for release on bail on
completing one-third of the maximum punishment prescribed for first
time offenders). This reflects as a formal acknowledgment by the
legislature for un-adjudicated custody, if left unchecked, becoming an
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instrument of oppression.



CRM-M-37926-2026 10
9.2. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman
Antulay (supra), where the accused is behind bars, the burden rests
squarely upon the State to conduct its prosecution with reasonable
dispatch so as to avoid infringing upon the right to a speedy trial of an
accused. When the State fails in its endeavour to guarantee a swift
hearing and lacks the wherewithal to protect the fundamental rights of
the incarcerated, it forfeits its credibility to hold the individual in
custody. Pertinently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulab Nabi
Sheikh (supra) and Arvind Dham (supra) observed that, the sacrosanct
right to a speedy trial applies universally, irrespective of the nature or
gravity of the crime alleged and the severity of the charge cannot be
weaponised by the prosecution to justify procedural paralysis.
Indubitably, the seriousness and gravity of the allegations
constitute relevant considerations while adjudicating a prayer for bail.
Pertinently, allegations concerning the generation of proceeds of crime
through cheating/defrauding homebuyers are, undoubtedly, of a serious
nature and cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger consequences
alleged to have emanated therefrom. The nature of allegations, the
manner in which the alleged offence was perpetrated, the number of
persons purportedly affected and the attendant economic and societal
ramifications are all legitimate consideration; however, the gravity of
the allegations, cannot ipso facto, constitute a ground for indefinite or
prolonged incarceration, particularly when the prospects of trial
culminating in near future are very distant.
This constitutional imperative of “speedy trial” acquires its
highest urgency in cases governed by special statutes, wherein, the
legislature has provided for stringent statutory fetters on the grant of
bail. Where the operation of law renders bail a distant, almost
insurmountable goal, the state's responsibility to conduct the trial with
utmost swiftness becomes an absolute, non-negotiable duty.
9.3. To counter the menace of money laundering and safeguard the
economic fabric of the nation, the legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted
and provided for stringent bail conditions for offences under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 45,
whereof, embeds "twin conditions" by imposing heavy statutory fetters
upon the judicial discretion to grant bail. By virtue of these conditions,
the court is constrained to refuse bail unless it is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
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offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. However, a
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CRM-M-37926-2026 11
grave constitutional asymmetry arises when an accused languishes
behind bars for an offence under the PMLA while the trial remains
completely dormant or grinds along at a glacial pace. The constitutional
justification for such stringent restrictions on personal liberty
necessarily rests upon the corresponding implied obligation of the
prosecuting agency/State to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. Where
the State fails to discharge that obligation, continued incarceration
ceases to derive its legitimacy from the statute alone. In a system
governed by constitutionalism, such a dual monopoly over the freedom of
an individual cannot be countenanced. The law abhors a condition
where statutory provision(s) become an instrument of perpetual
incarceration.
9.4. The general procedural rule dictates that where an accused fails
to satisfy the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA, the court should not
enlarge him on bail. Yet, where the accused has suffered prolonged pre-
trial incarceration with no end to the proceedings in sight, an imperative
judicial duty to protect the fundamental right of the individual emerges,
so that Article 21 is not reduced to a dead letter. In such cases of
inordinate delay, the strict fulfillment of the conditions under Section 45
of PMLA must yield and recede into the background. While considering
a plea for bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration, the relief is not
premised upon a relaxed interpretation of the statute, but upon an
independent, non-negotiable right stemming directly from Article 21.
Because this right originates from the Constitution, which is the
Grundnorm, no legislative enactment can erect a wall high enough to
exclude the operation of constitutional remedies. Echoing this principle,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia (supra) and Padam
Chand Jain (supra) reaffirmed that the constitutional mandate under
Article 21 is the "higher law," and the statutory restrictions under
special laws like the PMLA cannot override the fundamental right to a
speedy trial. Addressing this friction between strict statutory thresholds
and delay in trial, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Senthil Balaji
(supra) observed that inordinate delay and a higher threshold for bail
cannot coexist. Where a statute prescribes a higher threshold for bail,
the obligation on the State to conduct a swift trial becomes
correspondingly more onerous and when the State fails to discharge this
heightened duty, the statutory threshold under Section 45 of PMLA must
give way to the constitutional imperative of freedom.
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CRM-M-37926-2026 12
9.5. The consequential question that now arises for pondering is one of
quantification; What duration of under-trial custody constitutes
"prolonged incarceration" so as to breach the sacrosanct threshold of
Article 21?
The jurisprudence, across centuries and legal traditions, has
rejected the notion that personal liberty can be governed by
mathematical formulas or rigid, mechanical arithmetic. The law, in its
wisdom, recognizes that equity operates not through uniformity, but
through sensitive contextual calibration. A critical distinction must be
drawn between the statutory entitlement under Section 436-A
Cr.P.C./479 BNSS and the broader constitutional power of a court to
grant bail on account of prolonged incarceration under Article 21. There
can neither be a straight-jacket formula, nor a fixed statutory clock that
automatically signals when under-trial detention ceases to be lawful
custody and degenerates into unconstitutional punishment. The threshold
of “one-half/one-third of maximum punishment prescribed” provided for
in Section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNSS, constitutes minimum statutory
requirement of mandatory relief therein, it cannot be treated as a pre-
condition for the exercise of Constitutional/inherent jurisdiction where
the continued detention is otherwise rendered unjust or disproportionate.
It is pertinent to observe herein that it was never the legislative intent of
Section 436-A Cr.P.C./479 BNSS to define or restrict the concept of
prolonged incarceration nor to declare that under-trial custody becomes
constitutionally intolerable only after the specified threshold is reached.
Ergo, where the factual matrix of a case reveals that the trial is running
at snail’s pace and the prosecution is exhibiting avoidable inertia and
that prospects of a timely verdict are purely illusory, the court is
constitutionally mandated to declare such incarceration as unduly
prolonged and grant liberty, irrespective of whether the accused has
completed the statutorily prescribed one-half/one-third period.
As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan
(supra), that while it would be impossible to lay down any invariable
rule or evolve a straitjacket formula for grant of bail on completion of a
specified period of detention in custody, unduly long deprivation of
liberty pending trial strikes at the heart of Article 21. The determination
of whether under-trial confinement has crossed the threshold of
constitutional endurance rests upon a holistic, multi-factorial matrix
wherein judicial discretion is called upon to balance a constellation of
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competing factors; including but not limited to; the minimum and
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CRM-M-37926-2026 13
maximum sentences prescribed by the legislature, the prima facie role
and degree of culpability attributed to the accused, the outer limits
provided by the statute for the conclusion of proceedings and most
crucially, the present stage of the trial measured against the real
prospects of its conclusion within a reasonable time in the future.
No exhaustive set of guideline(s) to govern this aspect of the
satisfaction of a Court can possibly be laid down, however alluring this
aspect may be. It is neither fathomable nor desirable to lay down any
straight jacket formulation in this regard. To do so would be to
crystallize into a rigid definition, a judicial discretion, which has been
left, for best of all reasons, undetermined. Any attempt in this regard
would be, to say the least, a quixotic endeavour. Circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact, may make a sea of difference
between conclusions in two cases. Such exercise would thus, indubitably,
be dependent upon the factual matrix of the particular case which the
Court is in seisin of, since every case has its own peculiar factual
conspectus. Such judicial discretion, but of-course, ought to be exercised
in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
An age old adage reads, thus:
“The judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not
to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will
in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw
his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He
is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by
analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the
primordial necessity of order in the social life. Wide enough in all
conscience is the field of discretion that remains”
10. As a sequitur to above-said rumination, the following
postulates emerge:
(I) A regular bail plea on merits, in respect of an offence
under the PMLA Act, is essentially required to meet with the rigour(s) of
Section 45 of the PMLA Act.
(II) The rigour(s) of Section 45 of the PMLA Act pale into
oblivion when regular bail is sought for on account of long incarceration
in view of Article 21 of the Constitution of India i.e. where the bail-
applicant has suffered long under-trial custody, the trial is
procrastinating and folly thereof is not attributable to such bail-
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applicant.
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CRM-M-37926-2026 14
(III) There is no gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of
exercise of power by a Court, while determining whether the period of
incarceration, warrants an interference under Article 21 of the
Constitution, shall depend upon the judicial discretion exercised by such
Court in the facts and circumstances of a given case. No exhaustive
guidelines can possibly be laid down as to what would constitute
parameters for satisfaction of requirement under Article 21 as every case
has its own unique factual matrix. Making such an attempt is nothing but
a utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is best left to the judicial wisdom
and discretion of the concerned Court which is in seisin of such matter.”

7. Indubitably, the prosecution has alleged the existence of an
organized fraudulent investment network in which innocent persons were
allegedly induced to part with their hard earned money on the false promise
of assured returns from foreign exchange trading. The allegations regarding
the diversion of funds through different entities, generation of proceeds of
crime and acquisition of properties in India and abroad, are matters which
would require proper examination/adjudication during the course of trial.
The seriousness of the allegations, though an important consideration,
cannot be the sole ground for keeping an accused in custody for an
indefinite period, particularly when the investigation has been completed.
In the present case, the petitioner was arrested on 05.12.2025 and has
remained in judicial custody for a period of approximately 01 year. The ED ,
pursuant to the ECIR in question (registered on 09.02.2024) has already
completed its investigation and filed the prosecution complaint on
14.11.2025. Thereafter, supplementary prosecution complaint was filed on
02.02.2026. The case of the ED -respondent against the petitioner is
substantially based upon bank account transactions, electronic material,
crypto currency-related records, property and statement(s) recorded during
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CRM-M-37926-2026 15
the course of investigation. The relevant material, as per the prosecution
itself, has already been collected and placed on record. The investigation
insofar as the petitioner is concerned, stands concluded. Nothing has been
brought on record to indicate that any further custodial interrogation of the
petitioner is either required or contemplated.
8. The stage of proceedings before the trial Court is also a
relevant factor while considering the plea for grant of regular bail. The
prosecution proposes to examine 49 witnesses and has relied upon 147
documents running into more than 12,400 pages, while the case is
admittedly still at the stage of pre-cognizance. Undoubtedly, the prosecution
complaint is accompanied by extensive documentary material and the
respondent proposes to examine several witnesses in support of its case.
The allegations involve examination of multiple bank accounts, financial
transactions, electronic records, property statement and statement(s) of
various persons allegedly associated with the investment scheme. Given the
magnitude of prosecution evidence, it is evident that the trial is not likely to
conclude within the foreseeable future. The petitioner cannot be expected to
remain incarcerated for an indefinite period merely because the allegations
relate to an economic offence. Thus, the prolonged incarceration, coupled
with the absence of a reasonable possibility of the trial concluding within a
foreseeable period, cannot be ignored while considering a prayer for bail.
Furthermore, this Court finds no tangible material to suggest that the
petitioner is likely to abscond or evade the process of law if enlarged on
bail. Equally, the apprehension of the petitioner influencing the prosecution
witnesses remains unsupported by any substantive material. At this stage, it
AJAY KUMAR
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CRM-M-37926-2026 16
would not be appropriate for this Court to undertake a detailed examination
of the statement(s) recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA or to return any
finding regarding the correctness of the financial trail projected by the ED-
respondent. The evidentiary value of the statement(s), the electronic
material and the bank transaction(s) relied upon by the prosecution would
have to be tested at the stage of trial in accordance with law. The ED has not
furnished any list of vulnerable witness(s) muchless any tangible basis for
the apprehension that the petitioner may interfere with the prosecution
evidence. Thus, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances
of the petition in hand , in the considered opinion of this Court, the fetters
imposed by Section 45 of PMLA stand diluted in light of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
It is also not in dispute before this Court that the accused
persons, other than the petitioner (herein), are yet to be arrested/interrogated
by the ED- respondent whereupon a supplementary prosecution complaint is
likely to be filed against such accused(s), which will indubitably result in
further delay in effective culmination of the trial. It is, thus, apparent that
the trial is not likely to commence or conclude in the near future and in such
circumstances, the petitioner cannot be expected to remain in custody for an
indefinite period.
9. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual milieu of the instant
case; most pertinently the factum of petitioner (herein) has remained in
custody for approximately 01 year vis-à-vis the procrastinated nature/stage
of trial, as reflected from the extensive prosecution evidence likely to be led
(in the form of 49 witnesses and 147 relied upon documents running into
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CRM-M-37926-2026 17
more than 12,400 pages), the petitioner (herein) has never been declared as
a proclaimed offender in the ECIR in question, no list of vulnerable
witnesses muchless basis thereof being brought forward, nothing tangible
being shown that the petitioner is likely to influence any prosecution
witness(s) & nothing perceptible being brought forward that the petitioner
poses a potent flight risk; this Court is inclined to afford regular bail to the
petitioner (herein).
10. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
I. The petition in hand is granted & it is directed that the
petitioner be released on regular bail in Supplementary Criminal Complaint
bearing COMA/25/2025 dated 02.02.2026 registered under the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 on such terms and condition(s) as deemed
appropriate by the concerned Special Judge/Duty Magistrate, including but
not limited to, the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral
or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before the trial
without the prior permission of competent Court.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport with the concerned
Special Judge/Duty Magistrate.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the Investigating
Officer and shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of every
month, an affidavit, before the concerned Special Court, to the
effect that he has not been involved in commission of any offence
after being released on bail. In case the petitioner is found to be
AJAY KUMAR
involved in any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the
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CRM-M-37926-2026 18
present case, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise, the ED is
mandated to move, forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which
plea, but of course, shall be pondered upon merits thereof.
(ix) The petitioner shall also be obligated to furnish either a demand-
₹1
draft or FDR or bank guarantee to the tune of 0.00 lacs in
favour of the Court releasing him on bail. Needless to say that this
amount may be liable to be forfeited forthwith in case of any
default at his end.

II. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid stipulation(s) and
those which may be imposed by concerned Special Court/Duty Magistrate
as directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the ED
shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail hereby granted to the
petitioner.
III. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression
of opinion on the merits of the case.
IV. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.



(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE

November 13, 2026
Ajay

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No


AJAY KUMAR
2026.11.16 13:58
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document