LAXMAN MAHANTA vs STATE OF ORISSA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
CRLA/203/2015
ODHC010168932015
2026:OHC:306-DB
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK
CRLA No.203 of 2015
CNR No.ODHC010168932015
An appeal under Section 374(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
th
from the judgment and order dated 6 April, 2015
of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jajpur
in C.T. No.126 of 2009
*
Laxman Mahanta
Son of Natabara Mahanta
Of Village: Manitira, P.S.: Sukinda
District: Jajpur … Appellant
-V ERSUS -
State of Odisha ... Respondent
Counsel appeared for the parties:
For the Appellant : M/s. Uma Charan Mishra,
Asutosh Mishra,
J.K. Mahapatra,
D. Debadarsani and S. Dash,
Advocates
For the Respondent : Mr. Sonak Mishra,
Additional Standing Counsel.
P R E S E N T:
HONOURABLE
DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
AND
HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 1 of 46
Date of Hearing : 31.10.2026 :: Date of Judgment : 18.11.2026
UDGMENT
J
M URAHARI S RI R AMAN
, J.—
The appellant, Sri Laxman Mahanta, faced trial in the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jajpur in
Criminal Trial (C.T.) No.126 of 2009 for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B and
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, for short) and
Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (“DP Act”,
for short). The learned trial Court on conclusion of the
trial, found the appellant guilty of offences under Section
302 and Section 304-B read with Section 498-A of the
IPC, besides Section 4 of the DP Act and convicted him
in exercise of provision of Section 235(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, “CrPC”). The
appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life with fine of Rs.10,000/- (rupees ten thousand only),
in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one
year more under Section 302 of IPC, rigorous
imprisonment for seven years under Section 304-B read
with Section 498-A of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for
six months and fine of Rs.5,000/- (rupees five thousand
only), in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
two months more under Section 4 of the DP Act. It is
directed that all the substantive sentences of
imprisonment would run concurrently.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 2 of 46
1.1. Hence, this appeal directed against Judgment dated
06.04.2015 (arising out of G.R. Case No.543 of 2008 in
the file of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jajpur Road)
has been filed.
Prosecution Case:
2. Filing First Information Report (“FIR” for short), it was
reported to the Inspector-In-Charge of Sukinda Police
th
Station on 9 August, 2008 by Sri Baidyanath Mahanta
of Sorisapada under Gandia Police Station in the district
of Dhenkanal (P.W.10) that his daughter (Kanchan
Mahanta) married the appellant (Laxmana Mahanta) on
th
8 March, 2004 as per the Hindu rites and customs.
But, after one year of the marriage, his daughter was
subjected to cruelty in various ways and even not
allowed to visit her parent’s house. At the time of
marriage, the informant has stated to have given one
motorcycle and cash of Rs.15,000/- as dowry on
demand of the bridegroom’s family. The appellant and
his other family members also demanded further articles
like colour T.V., cash of Rs.50,000/- and a high value
motorcycle. Though on earlier occasions whenever the
deceased fell ill, a call was being received, but in the
present occasion it was not intimated to him about ill-
health of the deceased; but after the death, a call was
received by the brother of the deceased for the purpose
of taking her to hospital. The informant was intimated
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 3 of 46
by two of the villagers that his daughter has already
expired. On the basis of said report, the Police registered
Sukinda P.S. Case No.66 of 2008 under Sections 498-A,
304-B, 302/34 of IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act
against the appellant.
2.1. The Inspector-In-Charge of Sukinda Police Station
(P.W.14) after registration of the case, took up the
investigation and in the course of investigation, he
examined the informant (P.W.10) as well as other
witnesses, visited the spot and prepared a spot map. He
also examined some witnesses at the spot and intimated
th
the Executive Magistrate and after his arrival on 10
August, 2008 he (P.W.14) held inquest over the dead
body of the deceased. He also sent the dead body of the
deceased to the Community Health Centre, Danagadi
accompanied by Havildar (Jogendra Mohanty) for post-
mortem examination. The dowry articles were seized and
a seizure list was prepared. The same was handed over
in zima of the informant under zimanama (Ext.5). He
also seized the motorcycle bearing registration No.OR-
06F-2135 as dowry article under the seizure list vide
Ext.7/1 and handed over the same in zima of the
th
informant under zimanama (Ext.4). On 9 August, 2008
he had seized medical prescription along with
pathological report and malaria test card being produced
by Laxman Mahanta. The wearing apparels of the
deceased were seized after post-mortem examination. He
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 4 of 46
also received post-mortem examination report and made
a query to the doctor vide query requisition under
Ext.9/2 and he received the opinion report from the
th
doctor. The appellant was arrested on 30 January,
2009 and forwarded to the Court. Material Objects were
sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rasulgarh
through the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,
Jajpur Road for chemical examination and on
completion of investigation, he submitted the charge-
sheet against the appellant under Sections 498-A, 304-
B, 302, 406 of IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act against
the appellant.
Framing of Charge:
3.
After submission of charge-sheet, the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions. The learned trial
Court framed charges under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 302
of IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act against the appellant
and since the appellant refuted the charges, pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried, the sessions trial
procedure was resorted to.
Evidence during trial:
4. In order bring home charges against the appellant, the
prosecution examined as many as 14 (fourteen)
witnesses besides adducing documentary evidence in
support of its case. Two witnesses were examined from
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 5 of 46
the side of the defence. P.Ws.1 and 2 are the barber and
washerman respectively, who deposed about the
marriage of the appellant with the deceased. P.Ws.3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 are the relatives of the deceased
from her parental side. P.W.10 is the father of the
deceased, who lodged the F.I.R. P.W.13 is the Medical
Officer, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of
the deceased and P.W.14 is the Investigating Officer. The
P.W.4, aunt of the deceased did not turn up to face the
cross-examination despite the order of recall being
passed by the learned trial Court. D.Ws.1 and 2 are the
brother and cousin of the appellant.
Appreciation of evidence:
5. P.W.3 (uncle of deceased) deposed, inter- alia, that at the
time of marriage of the deceased, as per in-laws’ demand
for dowry, the appellant was given cash and kind, and
that 3 to 4 years of the marriage, the appellant
demanded further dowry, non-compliance of which
resulted in the deceased subjected to cruelty and
torture. He further deposed that he had noticed marks of
assault and injury on the body of the deceased, lying on
a cot inside the house of the appellant. The other related
witnesses have made identical versions as of P.W.3
during their examination-in-chief. But, the defence by
way of cross-examining other witnesses as well as the
Investigating Officer (P.W.14) could elicit contradictions
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 6 of 46
in the evidence of witnesses who were relatives. The net
result is the relatives, examined as witnesses, omitted to
state before the P.W.14 regarding demand of dowry.
5.1. Now, adverting to the evidence of the informant, the
father of the deceased (P.W.10), he stated that one year
after the marriage, both the deceased and the appellant
had come to his house and at that point of time, the
deceased had complained before him regarding demand
of further dowry and torture meted to her. During cross-
examination vide paragraph-4 of his evidence, he
deposed that in presence of mediator, the issue relating
to dowry got settled and the dowry articles presented by
him at the time of marriage of the deceased with the
appellant had been enlisted in writing, signed by himself
and some gentlemen. At the same time, he admitted to
have not stated these facts before the Investigating
Officer regarding the details of dowry articles being given
by him to the appellant at the time of marriage. He
further named some of his relatives including P.W.9
(brother of the informant) witnessed giving of dowry
articles by him at the time of marriage of the deceased.
But, P.W.9, who is no other than the younger brother of
P.W.10, has stated nothing about dowry demand, giving
of dowry or dowry related torture. Ext.1 is the F.I.R.
entered into evidence through the P.W.10 as well as the
P.W.3, who scribed the same. P.W.10 neither in his
F.I.R. nor in his evidence before the Court has stated
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 7 of 46
about any dowry demand to have been raised by the
appellant at any point of time immediately before the
death of the deceased. The Ext.1 recites, inter-alia , that
one year after the marriage, demand of one colour T.V.,
one motor bike and cash of Rs.50,000/- had been
demanded from the side of the appellant and/or his
relatives. It was further alleged vide Ext.1 that the
appellant and his other relatives acted together in a
planned manner, and caused the death of the deceased.
In fact, the F.I.R. (Ext.1) was registered against the
appellant and his four other relatives, but on completion
of trial, Charge-Sheet (Final Form) was filed by the police
against the appellant alone. To put in other words, no
evidence could be collected by the Investigating Agency
to seek prosecution of any other relatives of the
appellant.
5.2. With regard to demand of giving of dowry, no
independent evidence has been adduced by the
prosecution and equally, no evidence of any other named
witness came on record to show that the deceased was
subjected to any dowry related torture prior to the fateful
incident.
6. Coming to the medical evidence produced by the
prosecution, having gone through the evidence of
P.W.13, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of
the deceased on 10.08.2008 vide Ext.8 and also Ext.9,
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 8 of 46
which was subsequently furnished by P.W.13 to meet
the query of the Investigating Officer (P.W.14), it could
be observed that during the post-mortem examination,
P.W.13 (Surgery Specialist) noticed tongue protruded out
with red coloured liquid secretion from mouth and nose,
swelling on the right side of the neck, subcutaneous
emphysema, ecchymosis, abrasion, haemorrhage in the
subcutaneous tissues, injuries on the neck, muscles and
lacerated injuries involving the larynx and upper part of
the trachea with full of blood. P.W.13 opined that death
was due to asphyxia resulting from blunt trauma to the
neck. He further stated that the injuries were
antemortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature. The said opinion of the
doctor was further affirmed through Ext.9, which was
duly proved during his re-examination.
6.1. For better appreciation the deposition of P.W.13 (the
doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on
th
the dead body of the deceased on 10 August, 2008, is
quoted verbatim:
“On 10.08.2008 I was Surgery Specialist, Danagadi
C.H.C. On the same day I conducted autopsy on the dead
body of Kanchan Mahanta, wife of Laxman Mohanty of
vill- Manitira being identified by Havildar J. Mohanty, and
Gramarakhi Satrughan Patra.
The deceased was a female aged about 49 years,
average body build. No rigor mortise was present, the
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 9 of 46
face was puffy, igamatus congested, cyanotic, tongue
protruded out with red coloured liquid secreation from
mouth and nose, Swelling of neck on right side having
subtutanious empty sane of neck with ecchymocis on the
right side of neck. A small abrasion of 1 c.m. diameter on
the right side of the neck having no ligature mark on the
neck. On dissection of the neck, hymmorage
subtutantious tissue with air bubbles seen, and abrasion
of few muscles of the right side of the neck also seen.
Lacerated injury of lyrings and upper part of tracia with
full of blood. The cause of death was due to axpicia due to
blunt trauma on the neck. Other internal organs were
intact and there was no other injury on other parts of the
body. The injury on the neck were ante-mortem in nature.
Dr. Niranjan Swain also assisted me during P.M.
examination, but I had prepared this report. This is our
report marked Ext.8 and this is my signature marked
Ext.8/1, and this is the signature of Dr. Niranjan Swain
marked Ext.8/2. The time since death was within 24 to
48 hours since the time of P.M. examination.
Such injury on the neck causes death in ordinary course
of nature. There was no symptom of any fever or malaria
fever on the dead body.
Cross-examination by defence:
The P.M. examination was conducted in the dead bouse of
the hospital, but the report was prepared in the office. I
had prepared a rough report in separate paper. This final
report was prepared from that rough report, prepared at
the time of examination. I had no submitted that rough
report to the police. The report does not disclose, whether
it was homicidal or suicidal or accidental as it was not
possible to determined. It is not a fact that without seeing
the chemical examination report on the viscera, it is not
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 10 of 46
possible to opine the cause of death. As it was a newly
married couple and in usual practice we had collected
viscera. I have not mentioned in my report that such
injury on the neck causes death in ordinary course of
nature, and I have also not mentioned that there was no
symptom of fever or malaria fever on the dead body.
Both of us conducted examination of the body jointly. It is
not a fact that we had not conducted the P.M. examination
on the dead body, and that a false report has been
submitted to oblige the police.
Drowning also causes Aspexia so also hanging. In both
the cases, it may be homicidal or suicidal, aspexia is
caused for various modes of death.
Re-examination:
The police had made a query regarding the possibility of
death due to that injury in ordinary course. I had
submitted my opinion in the positive. This is my report
marked Ext.9, and this is my signature marked Ext.9/1.
Cross-exam, by defence
This report vide Ext.9 had been submitted on 29.1.2009.
It is not a fact that such a report has been submitted vide
Ext.9 to oblige police and it is afterthought.”
6.2. It is an admitted fact that at the relevant point of time,
th th
i.e ., in the intervening night of 8 and 9 August, 2008,
the appellant and the deceased were sleeping in the
bedroom of the house of the appellant and none else was
present there to give out any ocular account of the
alleged incident. It is brought on record at the instance
of the prosecution that on 08.08.2008 a pathology report
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 11 of 46
had been obtained showing the deceased to have been
suffering from malaria fever. The appellant in his
statement recorded under Section 313, CrPC, disclosed
that the deceased died of malaria fever. There is,
however, no explanation from the side of the defence as
to how the ante-mortem injuries, as found by P.W.13,
were occasioned on the body of the deceased.
7. The learned trial Court on appreciation of evidence,
recorded conviction of the appellant not only under
Section 302 of the IPC but also under Section 304-B
read with Section 498-A of the IPC and also under
Section 4 of the DP Act. Separate sentences have also
been awarded vide the impugned judgment. When
charges were separately framed by the learned trial
Court under Section 302 and 304-B of the IPC,
conviction and sentence separately on those counts was
not impermissible. But, the moot question is, whether
the prosecution could be able to prove the charges
during the trial.
Rival contentions:
8. Sri Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that the prosecution failed
miserably to attract the charge of murder or the charge
under Section 304-B of IPC against the appellant,
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 12 of 46
inasmuch as the ingredients thereof are found missing
from the evidence of the prosecution.
8.1. Vociferous arguments were advanced by the learned
counsel urging the Court to consider that, in light of the
undisputed fact that the deceased was suffering from
malaria and consequent physical weakness, the death
could have been accidental. As no ligature mark was
found on the neck of the deceased, as is emanating from
the evidence of P.W.13 to the effect that “A small
abrasion of l c.m. diametre on the right side of the neck
having no ligature mark on the neck”, the charges of
culpable homicide amounting to murder cannot be said
to have been proved to the hilt. Drawing attention of this
Court to deposition of P.W.13 it is submitted that the
doctor did not clarify whether the cause of death was
homicidal/suicidal/accidental. Further the said witness
was candid in his cross-examination that the injury on
the neck can cause death in ordinary course of nature.
Placing reliance on the seizure list which contained
medical prescription and pathological report of the
deceased, Sri Ashutosh Mishra, learned Advocate
emphasised that even if it is conceded for the sake of
argument, but not admitting, that the appellant did
assault the deceased, the evidence of the doctor leads to
prove that those specific injuries on the neck were not
severe enough to cause the death under normal
circumstances. Essentially, the learned counsel sought
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 13 of 46
to persuade this Court to alter the conviction from
murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
8.2. It is, thus, submitted that the conviction of the appellant
under Section 304-B of IPC as recorded by the learned
trial Court is based on no evidence. The evidence of
D.Ws.1 and 2 would show that the appellant on the
fateful day took the deceased to see a doctor in
connection with treatment of malaria fever. They clearly
have stated that the death could be caused due to such
suffering. Had there been any intention to do away with
the wife, the appellant could not have taken her to the
doctor.
8.3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
support of his submissions has placed reliance on a
decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Reg
Vrs. Govinda, (1877) ILR 1 Bombay 342.
9.
Apropos the submissions and arguments so advanced,
Sri Sonak Mishra, the learned Additional Standing
Counsel appearing for the respondent, while relying on
the circumstantial evidence as well as the medical
evidence on record, submitted that it is the appellant-
husband on application of last seen theory with cogent
material could prove that under what circumstance the
injuries were found on the neck of the deceased, as
reported by the Surgery Specialist (P.W.13).
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 14 of 46
9.1. Vehemently opposing the suggestion of Sri Ashutosh
Mishra, learned Advocate for the appellant that the case
would fall within the ambit of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 as
defined under Section 299, IPC, he proceeded to argue
that the prosecution having established the charges
against the appellant without any breach in the chain of
circumstances, there is no reason to believe that the
prosecution could not prove the fact of murder beyond
all reasonable doubt, particularly when it remained
undisputed that in the house there were none except the
deceased and the appellant and the injuries found on
the body of the deceased. He sought to clarify that the
medical evidence on record and absence of plausible
explanation from the side of the appellant regarding the
cause of the ante-mortem external injuries, which could
be found during autopsy.
9.2. Sri Sonak Mishra, the learned Additional Standing
Counsel appearing for the Respondent has supported
the conviction of the appellant and sentence recorded by
the learned trial Court.
9.3. To buttress his arguments, he cited a decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of
Andhra Pradesh Vrs. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4
SCC 382.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 15 of 46
Discussion and analysis upon re-appreciation of the
evidence and materials on record:
10. Where the criminal charge is grave warranting severe
punishment, especially capital punishment, the evidence
adduced by the prosecution needs a deeper scrutiny. In
the instant case the learned trial Court not only recorded
conviction and awarded punishment under Section 304-
B read with Section 498-A of the IPC, but also convicted
and sentenced the appellant under Section 302 of IPC.
11. Before adverting to the question as to whether the
charge under Section 302 of the IPC has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution, it is felt
expedient to delve into the question in relation to the
challenge made in the criminal appeal against the
conviction. Carefully examined the evidence on record
and diligently considered the arguments advanced by
both the sides.
12. Perusal of impugned judgment reveals that the
conclusion arrived at to convict the appellant is based on
circumstantial evidence and last seen theory.
12.1. Regard may be had to the principles illuminatingly
enunciated in Raghunatha Vrs. The State of Karnataka,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 365, wherein it has been reiterated
as follows:
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 16 of 46
Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on
“7.
circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence
has very well been crystalized in the judgment of
this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
Vrs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116,
wherein this Court held thus:
„152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the
High Court we would like to cite a few
decisions on the nature, character and
essential proof required in a criminal case
which rests on circumstantial evidence alone.
The most fundamental and basic decision of
this Court is Hanumant Vrs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71 = AIR 1952 SC 343
= 1952 SCR 1091. This case has been
uniformly followed and applied by this Court in
a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for
instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi Vrs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) 3 SCC 198 and
Ramgopal Vrs. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4
SCC 625 = AIR 1972 SC 656. It may be useful
to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in
Hanumant case, (1952) 2 SCC 71 = AIR 1952
SC 343 = 1952 SCR 1091:
„It is well to remember that in cases where the
evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again,
the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 17 of 46
as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there
must be a chain of evidence so far complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for a
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that
within all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.‟
153. A close analysis of this decision would show
that the following conditions must be fulfilled
before a case against an accused can be said
to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established. It may be noted here
that this Court indicated that the
or
circumstances concerned “must
should” and not “may be” established.
There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved”
and “must be or should be proved” as
was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade Vrs. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where
the observations were made:
„Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may
be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between „may be‟
and „must be‟ is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions.‟
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 18 of 46
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is
guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.‟
8. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the
prosecution that the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The Court held that it is a primary
principle that the accused „must be‟ and not merely
„may be‟ proved guilty before a court can convict the
accused. It has been held that there is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between „may be
proved‟ and „must be or should be proved‟. It has
been held that the facts so established should be
consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is
to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has
further been held that the circumstances should be
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 19 of 46
such that they exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved. It has been held that
there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and
must show that in all human probabilities the act
must have been done by the accused.”
13. For the purpose of a charge under Section 304-B of IPC,
the prosecution ought to have proved that soon before
death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or
harassment and such cruelty and harassment was in
connection with demand of dowry.
13.1.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Piyush, son of Deepak Narlawar Vrs. State of
Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 1183 = 2026 SCC OnLine SC
2308 , observed as follows:
“28. Before delving into the merits of the case and the
contentions of the parties, we find it apposite to
discuss the aforementioned sections invoked against
the appellant in the FIR. A bare perusal of the said
FIR reveals that offence of dowry death as
punishable under Section 304B of the IPC has been
invoked. To establish the offence of dowry death, the
following essential ingredients need to be
established:
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by
burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under
a normal circumstance;
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 20 of 46
(ii) such a death should have occurred within
seven years of her marriage;
(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with demand of dowry; and
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have
been meted out to the woman soon before her
death.
29. The prosecution must at first establish the existence
of the necessary ingredients for constituting an
offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. Once these
ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption
of causality, provided under Section 113-B of the
Evidence Act, 1872 operates against the accused.”
13.2. In Satbir Singh Vrs. State of Haryana, (2021) 7 SCR 269
it has been observed as follows:
“14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a
strict interpretation would defeat the very object for
which it was enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce
that when the legislature used the words, “soon
before” they did not mean “immediately before”.
Rather, they left its determination in the hands of
the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment
differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of
cruelty is quite varied, as it can range from physical,
verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not
exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be
laid down by this Court to define what exacts the
phrase “soon before” entails. The aforesaid position
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 21 of 46
was emphasized by this Court, in the case of Kans
Raj Vrs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein
the three-Judge Bench held that:
„15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is
required to be considered under specific
circumstances of each case and no straitjacket
formula can be laid down by fixing any time-
limit. … In relation to dowry deaths, the
circumstances showing the existence of cruelty
or harassment to the deceased are not
restricted to a particular instance but normally
refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may
be spread over a period of time. ... Proximate
and live link between the effect of cruelty
based on dowry demand and the
consequential death is required to be proved by
the prosecution. The demand of dowry,
cruelty or harassment based upon such
demand and the date of death should not
be too remote in time which, under the
circumstances, be treated as having
become stale enough. ”
A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder
Singh Vrs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.
15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to
determine if the period between the cruelty or
harassment and the death of the victim would come
within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the
above determination, is the establishment of a
“proximate and live link” between the cruelty and
the consequential death of the victim.
16. When the prosecution shows that „soon before her
death such woman has been subjected by such
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 22 of 46
person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry‟, a presumption of
causation arises against the accused under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused
has to rebut this statutory presumption. Section
113B, Evidence Act reads as under:
“113B. Presumption as to dowry death—When
the question is whether a person has
committed the dowry death of a woman
and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman has been subjected by
such person to cruelty or harassment for,
or in connection with, any demand for
dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.—
For the purpose of this section, “dowry
death” shall have the same meaning as in
section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860)”
17. This Court, in the case of Bansi Lal Vrs. State of
Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, emphasized the
mandatory application of the presumption under
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act once the
ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stood proved:
“19. It may be mentioned herein thatthe legislature
in its wisdom has used the word „shall‟ thus,
making a mandatory application on the part of
the court to presume that death had been
committed by the person who had subjected
her to cruelty or harassment in connection with
any demand of dowry. ... Therefore, in view of
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 23 of 46
the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the
presumption and in case of Section 113-B
relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus to
prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the
accused. …
20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of
such death have been established by the
prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a
presumption that the accused has caused the
dowry death.‟
18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are
established by the prosecution, the presumption
under Section 113-B, Evidence Act mandatorily
operates against the accused. This presumption of
causality that arises can be rebutted by the
accused.
19. The usage of rebuttable presumption of causality,
under Section 113-B, Evidence Act, creates a greater
responsibility on Judges, defense and prosecution.
They need to be extra careful during conducting
criminal trials relating to Section 304-B, IPC. In order
to address this precarious situation, procedural law
has some safeguards, which merits mentioning
herein.”
13.3. Having the delineated scope for consideration of
ingredients of constituting offence under Section 304-B
of the IPC, at this juncture it may not be out of place to
have reference to cross-examination of P.W.10, namely
Baidyanath Mahanta, who is the father of the deceased,
admitted to have settled the dowry articles to be given to
the appellant at his
“10 to 12 days before marriage”
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 24 of 46
house, but he could not divulge the exact date. Though
he stated that a list was prepared, he could not produce
the same nor did he tell “about the details of the articles
. Such arrangement is stated to be before
to the police”
the marriage, which took place in the Month of March,
2004 (stated by Purno Chandra Mahanta, uncle of the
deceased, P.W.3 and Ramesh Chandra Mahanta, the
brother of deceased, P.W.5).
13.4. With respect to further demand of another motor cycle,
colour television and cash worth Rs.50,000/- as dowry
“after marriage” it is stated in the examination-in-chief
by the P.W.10 that the same was demanded after one
year of marriage. He stated thus:
“that my daughter during her visit to my house had
complained of demand of Pulsar vehicle, colour television
and cash of Rs.50,000/- and after 2 to 3 hours the
accused left my house. It is not a fact that I had stated
before the police that the accused stayed in my house for
one day.
*
Cross-examination by defence:
It is not fact I had not stated before the police that the
accused had demanded motor cycle, cash of Rs.15,000/-
and household articles and that those things had been
given at the time of marriage, and that after one year of
the marriage, I had gone to her house, and that she
complained before me that she was assaulted and
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 25 of 46
abused in demanding cash of Rs.50,000/- and a colour
television ...”
13.5. The Inspector-In-Charge of Sukinda P.S. (P.W.14) in his
cross-examination stated that:
1
“8. I had examined Ramesh Chandra Mahanta (P.W.5) .
It is a fact that he had not stated before me that they
had demanded cash of Rs.20,000/- and that after
two months of the marriage they had demanded
Rs.50,000/- with a colour television and that he had
gone to their house. *
2
9. I had also examined Kalandi Mahanta (P.W.6) . He
had not stated before me that he had tried to
convince the accused persons and that he expressed
his inability to fulfil the demand...
3
10. I had examined Susila Mahanta (P.W.7) . It is a fact
that she had not stated before me that after six
months of the marriage she had come to their house
and complained that the accused Laxman and his
family members were demanding cash of
Rs.50,000/- and a colour television and that the
parents of the deceased were not able to fulfil the
dowry demands and that they tried to convince the
accused person and the family members, but they
started torturing the deceased and that after four
years of marriage, the accused Laxman and other
family members murdered the deceased due to non-
payment of dowry. It is not a fact that she had not
stated before me that two months before her death
the deceased had come to out house and had
1
Brother of the deceased.
2
Brother of the deceased.
3
Aunt of the deceased.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 26 of 46
complained of demand of dowry by accused Laxman
and other in-laws in demanding cash and colour
television and that the deceased had sustained
number of injuries on her person.
11. I had examired Bauribandhu Pradhan (P.W.8). He
had not stated before me that he had heard
regarding demand for dowry of cash of Rs.50,000/-
and a colour television, and that in his presence the
accused and other in-laws of the deceased had
demanded cash of Rs.15,000/- and motor cycle, and
thet he had seen the dead body with numbers of
injuries on it.
4
12. I had examined Baidyanath Mahanta (P.W.10) . ...
He had not stated before me that during visit of his
daughter, she had complained of demand for dowry:
Pulsar vehicle, colour television, and Rs.50,000/-,
and that after remaining 2 to 3 hours at his house,
the accused, went away, and he had not stated that
on 08.08.2008 the elder brother of the accused had
intimated me about the illness of his daughter *
13. I had examined Laxman Mahanta (PW12). He has
been examined as Laxmidhar Mahanta. It is a fact
that he had not stated before me that the accused
had demanded cash of Rs.15,000/-, one motor cycle
and household articles, and that after one year of
the marriage, he had gone to the house of deceased,
and that she had complained she had been tortured
and assaulted and abused in demanding dowry of
cash of Rs.50,000/- and colour television ...”
13.6. Perusal of impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
it is apparent from paragraphs 24 and 25 thereof that:
4
Father of the deceased.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 27 of 46
“24. There is sufficient evidence regarding giving of
dowries of Rs.15,000/- one motor cycle, gold
ornaments at the time of marriage on demand, but
after the marriage the accused demanded a colour
television and cash of Rs.50,000/-. Two months
before death also the accused was continuing such
demand. But so far as the material aspect as to
cruelty the evidence is not clear .
*
25. There is sufficient evidence as to taking dowry of
one motorcycle, cash of Rs.15,000/- and gold
ornaments at the time of marriage, and after the
marriage also the accused was demanding further
dowries of Rs.50,000/- and a colour television. Two
months before marriage also he had demanded
dowry. The parental family members of the
deceased had come to convince the accued and had
expressed their inability. Most of the witnesses
without giving the details incidents of torture,
went on deposing that the deceased had been
torturing physically and mentally and
ultimately she had been killed by throttling. If
the deceased had not been put to cruelty in
demanding dowry, what for the parental
family members of the accused were trying to
convince the accused.
” *
13.7. This Court finds perversity in such finding of fact. On
the one hand when the learned Trial Court perceives no
clear evidence is brought forth that the deceased was
treated with cruelty, yet on the basis of interested
witnesses (parental family members of the deceased) it
was assumed that there demand of further dowry. The
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 28 of 46
deposition of Inspector-In-Charge makes it clear that the
subsequent story as to further demand of dowry after
marriage is concocted one. Neither specific date(s) or
occasion(s) were elicited by the prosecution from the
evidence of witnesses nor was any independent witness
examined to bring home the charge of offence under
Section 304-B of the IPC read with Section 4 of the DP
Act. As interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India, the words “soon before her death” employed in
Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act are significant
in order to draw presumption that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection
with, any demand for dowry. On analysis of evidence on
record, and on denial of D.W.2 (cousin brother of
appellant) regarding demand for dowry, this Court is
persuaded to hold that “soon before” the death of wife of
appellant, there was no iota of evidence available to
presume that the cruelty, if any, meted to the deceased
was on account of demand for dowry. The evidence on
record transpires that death of Kanchan Mahanta
occurred on 08/09.08.2008. The death of the deceased
took place within seven years of her marriage and the
death was otherwise than in normal circumstances are
undisputedly available on record.
13.8. Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is
linked to the charge under Section 304-B of the IPC. As
per Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 29 of 46
shall presume as to dowry death, when it is shown that
soon before her death such woman had been subjected
by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry. Needless to
mention that the presumption as contemplated under
Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act is bound to be
drawn by the Court provided the essential requirements
are present and fulfilled.
13.9. Now, reverting to the case at hand, the question arises,
as to whether the deceased was subjected to any cruelty
or harassment having relation to any demand of dowry
soon before the case incident. The question also arises
is, whether the appellant was able to rebut the
presumption, if any, that could have been drawn against
him under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
13.10. As has already been observed hereinbefore, the
prosecution failed to adduce sufficient or cogent
evidence to prove the charges of dowry demand, such as
cash of Rs.50,000/-, a colour television and a
motorcycle. There is absence of sufficient material to
indicate that the injuries sustained by the deceased have
nexus with the dowry related torture. There was no
independent corroboration regarding dowry demand, nor
was there any oral or circumstantial evidence to show
that the deceased was subjected to any torture or
harassment owing to dowry. There is nothing on record
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 30 of 46
to show that with regard to the alleged dowry demand or
dowry related torture, either the deceased or her
parental side had made any complaint before the police,
any other forum or at least village gentries. Rather, as
shown by the prosecution itself, on the day preceding
the night of the occurrence, there was a pathological test
of the deceased at the instance of the appellant
wherefrom it is discernible that the deceased was
suffering from malaria fever. In these circumstances, the
charge under Section 304-B of the IPC cannot be held to
have been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt against the appellant, inasmuch as no credible or
acceptable evidence was elicited in the examination of
the witnesses. No independent witness could be
produced for examination during the trial regarding
dowry demand or dowry related torture soon before the
death of the deceased. Rather the father of the deceased
candidly admitted to have settled the dowry related
issues before the marriage; but regarding subsequent
demands he admitted not to have disclosed neither
before the police nor before any other independent
witness. Hence, the conviction and sentence of the
appellant recorded by the learned trial Court under
Section 304-B read with Section 498-A of the IPC as well
as the charge under Section 4 of the DP Act cannot be
sustained.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 31 of 46
14. Now, adverting to the challenge against the conviction
and sentence under Section 302 of the IPC, having gone
through the evidence of P.W.13 (Surgery Specialist) and
his reports vide Exts.8 and 9, it is disclosed that there
was a swelling of neck on the right side of the deceased
having “subtutanious emptysane of neck with
ecchymocis on the right side of neck” besides “a small
abrasion of 1 c.m. diametre on the right side of the neck
having no ligature mark on the neck”. It is categorically
stated by the P.W.13 that no ligature mark was present
on the neck of the deceased. As to the internal injury,
the evidence of P.W.13 is that on dissection of the neck,
“haemrrhage subtutantious” tissue with air bubbles
seen, and abrasion of few muscles of the right side of the
neck were also seen. Lacerated injury of lyrings and
upper part of trachea with full of blood. Vide Ext. 8, he
reported that the cause of death was asphyxia resulting
from blunt trauma to the neck. Though in his
examination-in-chief the P.W.13 stated that the nature
of injury found on the neck of the deceased could be the
cause of death in ordinary course of nature, but
admitted, that part of his opinion was missing from
Ext.8. In cross-examination it has been admitted as
follows:
“I have not mentioned in my report that such injury on the
neck causes death in ordinary course of nature, and I
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 32 of 46
have also not mentioned that there was no symptom of
fever or malaria fever on the dead body.”
14.1. Nonetheless, during re-examination the prosecution
proved through him (P.W.13). The P.W.13 had given
written opinion that:
“The police had made a query regarding the possibility of
death due to that injury in ordinary course. I had
submitted my opinion in the positive. This is my report
marked Ext.9, and this is my signature marked Ext.9/1.”
14.2. Thus, there was possibility of death due to the aforesaid
injury in ordinary course of nature. Although the
defence was critical on Ext.9 on account of delay, it is
evident on record that since the P.W.13 in his injury
report vide Ext.9 had not given any specific opinion as to
whether or not the external injury found on the neck
could have caused death in ordinary course of nature,
subsequently the Investigating Officer (P.W.14) had
made a specific query in that regard, and in response
thereto, the P.W.13 submitted the report vide Ext.9, on
the basis of the particulars embodied in Ext.8. This
Court, hence, finds no reason to disregard or discredit
the evidence of Surgery Specialist, which is entirely
above board. Hence, without any hesitation, it can be
held that the deceased died of asphyxia resulting from
the external injury found on the neck.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 33 of 46
14.3. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence on record, and in
the case of present nature there could be no
independent witness as in the house/bedroom none
were present except husband (appellant) and wife
(deceased). As suggested by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the cause of death could be due to duel or
quarrel between the husband and wife. In that view of
the matter, the learned trial Court has rightly taken aid
of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
14.4. Notice of provisions of Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act can be taken. Said section stands thus:
“ 106. Burden of proving fact especially within
knowledge.—
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of
any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon
him.
Illustration.—
(a) When a person does not act with some
intention other than that which the character
and circumstances of the act suggest, the
burden of proving that intention is upon him.
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway
without a ticket. The burden of proving that he
had a ticket is on him.”
14.5. A plain reading of this provision along with the
illustrations leaves no doubt in the mind of the Court
that if a person has knowledge about any particular fact,
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 34 of 46
then the burden of proving that fact is upon him. In the
facts and circumstances of the present case, the burden
is, thus, shifted to the appellant to explain as to how the
deceased received proven injuries on her neck which
were fatal in nature.
14.6. The lame explanation offered by the appellant or the plea
taken by him in defence that the deceased died due to
malaria fever cannot be treated a plausible much less
satisfactory explanation to discharge his burden under
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Such an
explanation, on the other hand, is found to be grave
incriminating circumstances against the appellant in the
face of the medical evidence on record and the
explanation proffered from the side of the defence
regarding the cause of the ante-mortem fatal injuries on
the neck of the deceased is not acceptable.
14.7. In Trimukh Maroti Kirtan Vrs. State of Maharashtra,
(2006) 10 SCC 681 it has been succinctly held that
based on circumstantial evidence where no eye witness
account is available, the principle that is to be followed
is: “when an incriminating circumstance is put to the
accused and the said accused either offers no
explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be
untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the
chain of circumstances to make it complete”. In the said
case the appellant had taken the plea that the death was
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 35 of 46
caused due to ailment, which was found to be false by
the medical evidence of the doctor. In the present case
like that of the reported case, injuries were found on the
neck of the deceased and this Court having found no
plausible explanation by the appellant the
circumstantial evidence borne on record leads to one
conclusion that the appellant committed the offence.
14.8. The following is the ratio of the decision rendered in the
case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vrs. State of
Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 :
“It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the
weakness of the defence. This is trite law and no decision
has taken a contrary view. What some cases have held is
only this: where various links in a chain are in themselves
complete than a false plea or a false defence may be
called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In
other words, before using the additional link it must be
proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do
not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where
there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case,
the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or
a plea which is not accepted by a Court.”
14.9. In the case of Reena Hazarika Vrs. State of Assam,
(2018) 13 SCR 1108 it has been held as follows:
The essentials of circumstantial evidence stand well
“8.
established by precedents and we do not consider it
necessary to reiterate the same and burden the
order unnecessarily. Suffice it to observe that in a
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 36 of 46
case of circumstantial evidence the prosecution is
required to establish the continuity in the links of the
chain of circumstances, so as to lead to the only and
inescapable conclusion of the accused being the
assailant, inconsistent or incompatible with the
possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with
the innocence of the accused. Mere invocation of the
last seen theory, sans the facts and evidence in a
case, will not suffice to shift the onus upon the
accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
1872 unless the prosecution first establishes a
prima facie case. If the links in the chain of
circumstances itself are not complete, and the
prosecution is unable to establish a prima facie case,
leaving open the possibility that the occurrence may
have taken place in some other manner, the onus
will not shift to the accused, and the benefit of doubt
will have to be given.”
14.10.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Sudru Vrs. State of Chhatisgarh, (2019) 8 SCC 333 held ,
failure of the accused to furnish satisfactory explanation
regarding the injury can be considered under Section
106 of the Indian Evidence Act and a false implication by
the accused can fortify an already established finding of
guilt. The following observations found in said judgment
may profitably be quoted hereunder:
“5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that,
the trial court as well as the High Court have erred
in convicting the appellant and dismissing the
appeal. It is submitted that, the case rests on
circumstantial evidence and the prosecution has
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 37 of 46
utterly failed to prove the incriminating
circumstances and in any case has failed to
establish the chain of incriminating circumstances,
which leads to no other conclusion than the guilt of
the appellant. It is further submitted that, the star
witness Janki Bai has turned hostile and as such
there is no evidence to sustain order of conviction.
6. No doubt, in the present case all the witnesses who
are related to the accused and the deceased have
turned hostile. PW 1 Janki Bai, wife of the appellant
and the mother of the deceased has also turned
hostile. However, by now it is settled principle of
law, that such part of the evidence of a hostile
witness which is found to be credible could be taken
into consideration and it is not necessary to discard
the entire evidence. Reference in this respect could
be made to the judgment of this Court in Bhajju Vrs.
State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 327, which reads thus:
„36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile
witnesses can also be relied upon by the
prosecution to the extent to which it supports
the prosecution version of the incident. The
evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated
as washed off the records, it remains
admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to
base the conviction of the accused upon such
testimony, if corroborated by other reliable
evidence. Section 154 of the Evidence Act
enables the court, in its discretion, to permit the
person, who calls a witness, to put any
question to him which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party.‟
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 38 of 46
7. From the evidence of PW 1 Janki Bai it would reveal,
that insofar as that part of the evidence wherein,
she has stated that there was a quarrel between her
husband and her, she left the room with the other
two children and the deceased and the appellant
were alone in the room and that when she reached
the house in the morning, she saw her son Ajit
covered with the blanket and after opening the said
blanket seeing Ajit to be dead is concerned, the
same has remain unshattered. It could thus be seen
that, from the evidence of PW 1 Janki Bai, it can be
safely held that there was a quarrel between PW 1
Janki Bai and appellant and after the quarrel, she
went to the house of her brother-in-law with two
younger children and that the deceased was left
alone in the company of appellant and on the next
day morning the deceased was found to be dead.
8. In this view of the matter, after the prosecution
has established the aforesaid fact, the burden
would shift upon the appellant under Section
106 of the Evidence Act. Once the prosecution
proves, that it is the deceased and the
appellant, who were alone in that room and on
the next day morning the dead body of the
deceased was found, the onus shifts on the
appellant to explain, as to what has happened
in that night and as to how the death of the
deceased has occurred.
”
14.11. It is true that as per the settled principle of law,
Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not relieve
the prosecution of its primary burden, and it is required
to first establish the circumstances from which a
reasonable inference of guilt can be drawn against the
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 39 of 46
accused. As discussed above, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the present case it is admitted that the
deceased was suffering from malaria fever and that the
appellant was present in the house/bedroom along with
the deceased in night of 08/09.08.2008. Further, the
appellant, who had the knowledge about the incident
that took place at the relevant point of time, did not
disclose the same, and rather in the face of the
unimpeachable medical evidence on record that the
deceased died of the fatal injury, those were found on
the person of the deceased, gave a false implication that
the deceased died of malaria fever, instead of explaining
the cause of such injury.
14.12. In the case of Reg. Vrs. Govinda, (1877) ILR 1 Bom
342 it was held as follows:
In the present case the prisoner, a young man of 18,
“8.
appears to have kicked his wife (a girl of 15) and to
have struck her several times with his fist on the
back. These blows seem to have caused her no
serious injury. She, however, fell on the ground, and
I think that the evidence shows that the prisoner
then put one knee on her chest, and struck her two
or three times on the face. One or two of these
blows, which, from, the medical evidence, I believe to
have been violent and to have been delivered with
the closed fist, took effect on the girl's left eye,
producing contusion and discoloration. The skull
was not fractured, but the blow caused an
extravasation of blood on the brain, and the girl died
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 40 of 46
in consequence either on the spot, or very shortly
afterwards. On this state of facts the Sessions
Judge and the assessors have found the prisoner
guilty of murder, and he has been sentenced to
death. I am myself of opinion that the offence is
culpable homicide, and not murder. I do not think
there was an intention to cause death; nor do I think
that the bodily injury was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. Ordinarily, I think,
it would not cause death. But a violent blow in the
eye from a man's fist, while the person struck is
lying with his or her head on the ground, is certainly
likely to cause death, either by producing concussion
or extravasation of blood on the surface or in the
substance of the brain. A reference to Taylor‟s
Medical Jurisprudence (Fourth Edition, p. 294) will
show how easily life may be destroyed by a blow on
the head producing extravasation of blood.”
14.13. Referring to the aforesaid decision in Govinda
(supra) , the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur in the case of Bhagwat Kumre Vrs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2026:MPHC-JBP: 79297 held as
follows:
“ 19. The legal position with regard to the distinction
between murder and culpable homicide not
amounting to murder has been settled through a
catena of decisions. One of the earliest authorities on
the subject Reg. Vrs. Govinda, (1877) ILR 1 Bom
342, wherein the distinction between Sections 299
and 300 of IPC was explained with reference to the
different degrees of intention and knowledge. Where
an act causing death is accompanied by the
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 41 of 46
intention of causing death, or by the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, the case, where it does not amount to murder,
falls within Section 304 Part I. On the other hand,
where there is no such intention, but there is
knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, the
case falls within Section 304 Part II.”
14.14. Under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, any
fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or
preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. In case
of Prem Kumar Vrs. State of Bihar, (1995) 3 SCC 228 , it is
held as follows:
“Very often, a motive is alleged to indicate the high degree
of probability that the offence was committed by the
person who was prompted by the motive. In our opinion,
in a case when motive alleged against the accused is fully
established, it provides a foundational material to connect
the chain of circumstances. We hold that if the motive is
proved or established, it affords a key or pointer, to scan
the evidence in the case, in that perspective and as a
satisfactory circumstance of corroboration. It is a very
relevant and important aspect:
(a) to highlight the intention of the accused and
(b) the approach to be made in appreciating the totality
of the circumstances including the evidence
disclosed in the case.”
14.15. In case of Surinder Pal Jain Vrs. Delhi
Administration, 1993 Supp.(3) SCC 681 , it is held as
follows:-
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 42 of 46
“11. There is no motive established in this case by the
prosecution for the appellant to commit murder of his
wife and the evidence of Tara Chand father of the
deceased as well as the sister of the deceased and
the tenants living in the same house disclosed that
the relations between the husband and wife were
cordial. In a case based on circumstantial evidence,
motive assumes pertinent significance as existence
of the motive is an enlightening factor in a process of
presumptive reasoning in such a case. The absence
of motive, however, puts the court on its guard to
scrutinise the circumstances more carefully to
ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not take
place of legal proof.”
14.16. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong
it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on
the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An
accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty
5
beyond a reasonable doubt.
14.17. On the facts the wordy quarrel between the
husband and wife, who was suffering from fever, in the
night of 08/09.08.2008 cannot be ruled out and in the
circumstances, it can be culled out from the attending
circumstances that there was no premeditated mind of
the appellant to do away with his wife. There is reason to
believe that due to altercation between the appellant and
his wife, sudden hit at the neck could have caused
5
See, Raghunatha Vrs. The State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 365.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 43 of 46
injury found. However, the appellant was the best
person to say about such injuries sustained by his wife
when none else was present in the room in the night.
14.18. This Court draws support from Jayantilal Verma
Vrs. State of M.P. (Now Chhatisgarh), (2020) 12 SCR 411
wherein it has been laid down as follows:
The High Court in the given situation, apart from
“9.
relying on the testimony of PW-1, turned its attention
to the post-mortem report. In this context, it was
noted that there was blood oozing from both nostrils
and mouth of the deceased, there was swelling over
the right cheek, marks of ecchymosis at epiglottis
region and back of the neck, bruise present at left
axillary of cheek and there was depression mark of
a mala on the left side of the neck. It went on to
state that since the incident had taken place inside
the privacy of the house, the onus was on the
persons residing in the house, to give an
explanation. In such situations, it was noted that it
is difficult for the prosecution to lead any direct
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. In this
regard, the High Court referred to Section 106 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as
the „Evidence Act‟), which reads as under:
*
It, thus, opined that in such cases, while the initial
burden to establish the case would be upon the
prosecution, it would be of a relatively light
character. There would be a corresponding a burden
on the inmates of the house to give cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed.
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 44 of 46
They could not get away by keeping quiet and
offering no explanation.
*
25. We are confronted with a factual situation where the
appellant herein, as a husband is alleged to have
caused the death of his wife by strangulation. The
fact that the family members were in the home some
time before is also quite obvious. No explanation has
been given as to how the wife could have received
the injuries. This is a strong circumstance indicating
6
that he is responsible for commission of the crime.
The appellant herein was under an obligation to give
a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the
death in the statement recorded under Section 313
of the Cr.P.C. and mere denial could not be the
answer in such a situation.”
14.19. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case and in view of the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and in other cases
referred to above, this Court is of the considered view
that the overt act of the appellant attracted Section 304,
Part-II of the IPC and not Section 302 of the IPC,
inasmuch as there was absence of intention/motive even
though the appellant had knowledge that the act
committed by him was likely to cause death. Hence, this
Court feels it to be a fit case to alter the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 of the IPC to one under
Section 304, Part-II of the I.P.C.
6
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vrs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 = (2006)
Supp.7 SCR 156 .
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 45 of 46
Conclusion:
15. To conclude, the conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 of the IPC is altered to one under Section
304, Part-II of the IPC and the conviction and the
sentence recorded by the learned trial Court against the
appellant under Section 304-B read with Section 498-A
of the IPC and Section 4 of the DP Act are hereby set-
aside. There shall be no sentence of fine for the offence
under Section 304, Part-II of the IPC. Since the appellant
is reportedly in custody for more than 12 (twelve) years,
which exceeds the punishment provided for the offence
under Section 304, Part-II of IPC, he is directed to be set
at liberty forthwith, if his detention in jail custody is not
required for any other case.
16. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed in part.
(MURAHARI SRI RAMAN)
JUDGE
ANJEEB ANIGRAHI
S K P , I agree.
J.—
(SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI)
JUDGE
Signature Not
Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY
Designation: Personal Assistant
(Secretary in-charge)
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 18-Nov-2026 18:00:34
High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
th
The 18 November, 2026//MRS/Bichi/Aswini
CRLA No.203 of 2015 Page 46 of 46