O N Singh vs Union Of India And Ors

$~1

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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Date of decision: 18 May, 2026
+ W.P.(C) 7245/2017 & CM APPL. 47311/2022

O N SINGH .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Rahul Shukla and Mr.
Ramandeep Singh, Advocates with
Petitioner (in-Person).
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Mukul Singh, CGSC with Mr.
Aryan Dhaka, Mr. Vikrant Badesra
and Ms. Sunidhi Tyagi, Advocates for
R-1.
Ms. Tatini Basu and Ms. Sneha
Mondal, Advocates for R-2.
Mr. Uttam Datt, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Sonakshi Singh, Mr. Kumar
B. and Mr. Naman Kumar, Advocates
for R-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral)

1. The Petitioner, former Director (Finance) of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam
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Ltd. [“ SJVN ” or “ the Corporation ”], has filed this petition challenging the
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disciplinary proceedings initiated against him by memorandum dated 15
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March, 2004, and the order dated 30 July, 2009, whereby the penalty of

1
formerly known as Nathpa Jhakri Power Corporation Ltd. (NJPC).
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dismissal from service along with forfeiture of retiral benefits was imposed.
The Controversy
2. The controversy arises out of certain payments released to M/s
Jaiprakash Hyundai Consortium [“ JHC ”], the contractor engaged for
Contract No. 3.0 of the Nathpa Jhakri Hydro Electric Project. The project
involved, inter alia , construction of Pressure Shafts and Power-House
Complex. The contract, awarded in June 1993, was governed by contractual
provisions, including those dealing with variations, extra items and
substituted items.
3. The payments which form the subject matter of the disciplinary
proceedings were released between 1996 and 1998 in relation to claims
raised by JHC during execution of the contract. The circumstances in which
those payments came to be processed and released constitute the principal
basis of the charges framed against the Petitioner.
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4. The charge-sheet memorandum was issued on 15 March, 2004. The
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Petitioner ceased to hold the post of Director (Finance) on 16 March, 2004.
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The inquiry report was submitted on 11 May, 2006 and the penalty order
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was passed on 30 July, 2009. The Petitioner’s earlier writ petition [W.P.(C)
4620/2004] challenging the disciplinary proceedings remained pending for
several years and, as the inquiry resulted in a penalty order, was ultimately
withdrawn in 2017, whereafter the present writ petition was instituted.
Factual Background
5. The Petitioner was appointed as Director (Finance) of SJVN by order
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dated 18 November, 1996. The appointment order stated that, in pursuance
of Article 32(a) of the Articles of Association, the President of India was
pleased to appoint him as Director (Finance) for a period of five years from
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the date of assumption of charge, or until the date of superannuation, or until
further orders, whichever was earlier. The order further stated that the terms
and conditions governing the appointment would be issued separately.
6. The Petitioner’s initial tenure expired in November 2001. Thereafter,
the Ministry of Power issued orders from time to time permitting him to
continue to hold charge of the post of Director (Finance) for specified
periods, or until approval of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet
[“ ACC ”] for regular extension was received, or until further orders,
whichever was earlier. The Petitioner continued to function in that capacity
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until 16 March, 2004.
7. The first payment under consideration in the disciplinary proceedings
was of INR 5.90 crore. A proposal processed in December 1996 recorded
that claims raised by JHC had been examined at the project level and
recommended release of INR 5.90 crore, representing 60% of the amount
then assessed as admissible i.e., 9.94 crore, pending detailed examination
and finalisation of the claims. The proposal moved through various levels of
the project hierarchy, including the General Manager and Director (Civil).
The Petitioner, while recording his concurrence, noted that the work had
been executed and regularisation of claims was pending. He observed that,
in the interest of ensuring that the progress of the project was not adversely
affected, the amount could be released as recommended, but further directed
that regularisation be completed by the end of February 1997, failing which
recovery could be effected in one instalment. The proposal was thereafter
approved by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director [“ CMD ”].
8. The second payment under consideration was of INR 12 crore. A
proposal processed in February 1997 recorded that claims raised by JHC had
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been assessed at the project level and recommended release of INR 12 crore
as an interim measure, after factoring in the earlier payment of INR 5.90
crore. The proposal was recommended by the concerned project authorities,
including by the Engineer-in-Charge and the General Manager, concurred
with by the Petitioner and approved by the CMD.
9. The third payment followed a slightly different course. A proposal
processed in 1998 recorded that claims raised by JHC remained under
consideration and that earlier payments aggregating INR 17.90 crore had
already been released. During consideration of the proposal, differing views
emerged regarding the admissibility and quantum of JHC’s claims. The
matter was ultimately placed before the Board of Directors and considered at
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its 70 Meeting held on 20 June, 1998. In that Meeting, the Board was
apprised of the nature of JHC’s claims, the complexity involved in their final
determination, the delay in settlement, the contractual framework governing
the project, and the contractor’s cash flow constraints. The Board ultimately
approved the proposal subject to specified safeguards, including an
undertaking from JHC that the payment would not amount to admission of
its claims, that any excess amount found payable upon final determination
would be refunded or adjusted, and that no further ad hoc payment would be
released until settlement of the pending claims.
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10. A fax communication dated 22 June, 1998 recorded the Board’s
decision. The communication noted that the admissible amount had been
assessed at INR 44.44 crore and that, after adding average escalation of INR
8.64 crore, the total worked out to INR 53.08 crore. After adjustment of
earlier payments aggregating INR 17.90 crore, the balance amount was
reflected as INR 35.18 crore, out of which INR 24.56 crore was proposed
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for release. The communication also recorded the conditions subject to
which the proposal had been approved.
11. The record further indicates that, during consideration of the third
proposal, in the relevant proposal, the Petitioner recorded that repeated ad
hoc payments were not in consonance with principles of financial norms/
propriety and suggested that, if payment was considered necessary, it be
structured as “ temporary financial assistance ” recoverable with interest. The
matter was thereafter placed before the Board of Directors for consideration.
12. The transactions relating to release of payments to JHC subsequently
became the subject matter of vigilance scrutiny. Material relating to the
transactions was examined by the Ministry of Power and was thereafter
referred to the Central Vigilance Commission [“ CVC ”]. In this regard, on
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19 January, 2004, the Ministry of Power issued an Office Memorandum
[“ O.M. ”] to CVC, recording its examination of the matter. Subsequently, on
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19 February, 2004, the CVC issued its first-stage advice concerning the
transactions and the role of the officers involved therein. It observed that
payments had been released to the contractor “ in gay abandon ” on the
pretext of maintaining cash flow and that adequate safeguards had not been
adopted. It further recorded that the power to approve such payments vested
in the Board of Directors, that the Board had been bypassed on the first two
occasions, and that the payments had been made without proper examination
of JHC’s claims. The note also observed that the officers concerned had
unduly favoured JHC at “ substantial cost to the Corporation ”. It further
observed that, as Director (Finance), the Petitioner was expected to
safeguard the financial interests of the Corporation and commented
adversely upon his role in the transactions.
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13. On 15 March, 2004, the Ministry of Power issued a chargesheet
memorandum proposing to hold an inquiry against the Petitioner under Rule
25 of the SJVN Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules [“ CDA Rules ”]. The
memorandum enclosed six articles of charge and called upon the Petitioner
to submit a written statement of defence within ten days of receipt thereof.
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On the following day, i.e., 16 March, 2004, the Ministry issued an order
stating that, as decided by the competent authority, the Petitioner ceased to
hold the post of Director (Finance) of SJVN with immediate effect. SJVN
issued a consequential order on the same date.
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14. The record also contains an internal Ministry note dated 15 March,
2004, concerning issuance of the charge-sheet and cessation of the
Petitioner’s tenure. The note records that the proposal for initiation of major
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penalty proceedings had been submitted for approval on 12 March, 2004
and that the charge-sheet was required to be issued “ before an order
regarding cessation of his tenure is issued ”. The note further records that the
Department of Legal Affairs had informed the Ministry that the Petitioner
had instituted a writ petition challenging the proposed discontinuation of his
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tenure and that the matter was likely to be listed before this Court on “ 16
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March 2004 or latest by 17 March 2004 ”. The note proceeds to record that,
lest the Court stays issuance of the charge-sheet or cessation of his tenure, it
was necessary that the charge-sheet be issued “ today itself ” and the order
regarding cessation of tenure be issued before the writ petition was taken up
for hearing.
15. Following issuance of the charge-sheet, a departmental inquiry was
instituted. An Inquiry Officer [“ IO ”] was appointed and the proceedings
continued. The Petitioner participated in the inquiry proceedings, cross-
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examined management witnesses and examined witnesses in defence. Upon
conclusion of the evidentiary stage, the matter was fixed for submission of
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written briefs. Subsequently, the IO submitted his report on 11 May, 2006,
holding all six articles of charge proved. The report records that the
Petitioner had sought extension of time for filing his written brief and had
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requested that time be granted up to 15 June, 2006. The IO, however,
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granted time up to 28 April, 2006 and thereafter proceeded to finalise the
report upon recording that the written brief had not been received within the
stipulated period.
16. The record indicates that, following submission of the inquiry report,
the Petitioner addressed communications requesting that his written
submissions be taken into consideration. The issue also became the subject
matter of proceedings before this Court in W.P.(C) 4620/2004. By order
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dated 23 November, 2006, this Court recorded the statement of Respondent
No. 1 that the IO had been directed to take into consideration the Petitioner’s
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written representation. Subsequently, by order dated 1 May, 2007, this
Court directed compliance with the earlier order and disposal of the
Petitioner’s representation.
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17. By communication dated 4 April, 2007, the CVC took the position
that once the inquiry report had been submitted, the IO ceased to have any
further role in the matter. The CVC advised that the Petitioner’s submissions
could instead be examined by the disciplinary authority while considering
whether the findings returned by the IO warranted acceptance.
18. The Ministry thereafter sought second-stage advice from the CVC in
relation to the disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. By
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communication dated 19 September, 2008, the CVC advised imposition of
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the major penalty of dismissal from service along with forfeiture of retiral
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benefits. By O.M. dated 29 December, 2008, the Ministry referred the
matter back to the CVC, noting that the Petitioner’s tenure as Director
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(Finance) had ceased on 16 March, 2004 and seeking clarification
regarding the manner in which the proposed penalty was to be implemented
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in those circumstances. Subsequently, by communication dated 5 May,
2009, the CVC reiterated that the penalty was to take effect immediately.
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19. By memorandum dated 28 May, 2009, the Ministry supplied to the
Petitioner copies of the CVC’s second-stage advice and the related
communications and invited his representation. In response, the Petitioner
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submitted a detailed representation dated 12 June, 2009. Upon
consideration of the inquiry report, the Petitioner’s representation, the CVC
advice and the record before it, the Ministry passed the impugned order
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dated 30 July, 2009, concurring with the findings returned by the IO and
imposing upon the Petitioner the penalty of dismissal from service along
with forfeiture of retiral benefits with immediate effect.
Petitioner’s Contentions
20. In support of the petition, Mr. Rahul Shukla, counsel for the
Petitioner, makes the following submissions:
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20.1. The chargesheet memorandum dated 15 March, 2004 and the
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cessation order dated 16 March, 2004 cannot be treated as independent
events. The memorandum granted the Petitioner 10 days to submit his
response, yet on the very next day he was removed from office. The internal
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Ministry note dated 15 March, 2004 reveals that the authorities intended to
issue the charge-sheet and cessation order before this Court could consider
the Petitioner’s then pending challenge. An order styled as cessation of
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tenure was, thus, employed to impose a punitive consequence.
20.2. The Petitioner continued as Director (Finance) under specific
extension orders. His case for regular extension had been recommended but
remained pending on account of vigilance clearance. The cessation of tenure
was not a routine consequence of expiry of term. It followed immediately
upon the adverse vigilance advice and issuance of the charge-sheet
memorandum.
20.3. The disciplinary proceedings could not have been continued under the
CDA Rules once the Petitioner ceased to be in service. Rule 2 applies the
Rules to employees and Rule 3 defines an “ employee ” as a person in the
employment of the Corporation. There is no provision authorising
continuation of disciplinary proceedings after cessation of employment or
empowering forfeiture of retiral benefits thereafter. Reliance is placed on
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State Bank of India v. A.N. Gupta & Ors. , Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of
3 4
Directors, OSFC & Ors. , and UCO Bank & Anr. v. Rajinder Lal Capoor ,
in support of the submission that continuation of disciplinary proceedings
after retirement or cessation of service, and the power to impose
consequential penalties affecting retiral benefits, must be founded upon a
specific statutory or regulatory provision. In the absence of such authority,
disciplinary proceedings cannot ordinarily continue after the employee has
ceased to be in service and penalties such as dismissal, removal or forfeiture
of retiral benefits cannot be imposed thereafter.
20.4. Although the Petitioner participated in the inquiry, he was denied a
meaningful opportunity at the stage of written briefs. The request for

2
(1997) 8 SCC 60.
3
(1999) 3 SCC 666.
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extension of time was occasioned by bereavement and personal difficulties.
The IO nevertheless finalised the report without considering the Petitioner’s
written brief. The Petitioner thereafter approached both the disciplinary
authority and this Court. The Respondents informed this Court that the IO
had been directed to consider the Petitioner’s written representation. Yet the
course ultimately adopted, on the basis of subsequent advice received from
the CVC, prevented any reconsideration by the IO. Rule 26(1) of the CDA
Rules empowered the disciplinary authority to remit the matter for further
inquiry or reconsideration, but that power was never exercised despite the
procedural infirmity being specifically brought to its notice. Reliance is
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placed on Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar & Ors. to contend
that the right to receive the inquiry report and make a representation against
the findings recorded therein is an integral facet of the reasonable
opportunity afforded to a delinquent employee in disciplinary proceedings.
20.5. The disciplinary authority did not independently consider the
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Petitioner’s defence. The punishment order dated 30 July, 2009 merely
reproduces the charges, inquiry history and procedural developments, but
does not meaningfully engage with the Petitioner’s principal defence
founded upon the contractual provisions, contemporaneous note-sheets and
correspondences. There is no proper consideration of Clause 52 of the
General Conditions of Contract, Clause 9.2(iii)(d) of the Delegation of
Powers, the note-sheets relating to the first and second payments, the
Petitioner’s objections to repeated ad hoc payments, the Board’s approval of
the third payment, or the repeated communications seeking recovery. The

4
(2007) 6 SCC 694.
5
(1993) 4 SCC 727.
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order records conclusions without adequately disclosing any reasoning.
20.6. Even prior to the issuance of the charge-sheet, the Petitioner’s
explanation was not meaningfully considered by the vigilance authorities.
While the allegations against the Petitioner were examined in detail, the
contemporaneous documents and explanations furnished by him were either
ignored or cursorily noticed without substantive analysis. The vigilance note
and the subsequent CVC advice do not reflect any fair consideration of the
Petitioner’s defence or the documentary record relied upon by him.
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20.7. Reliance is placed upon the O.M. dated 19 January, 2004 issued by
the Ministry of Power. The Ministry itself recorded that one could not be
certain of any vigilance or integrity angle and that, at best, the matter
disclosed an administrative lapse. Despite this assessment, the matter was
subsequently projected as a serious vigilance misconduct warranting major
penalty proceedings and eventual dismissal from service.
20.8. The first two payments as per charge-sheet were not unlawful
advances. They were provisional payments made against claims arising from
works already executed, deviations and extra items. The first payment was
initiated by the Assistant Executive Engineer, recommended by the
Executive Engineer, General Manager and Director (Civil), and approved by
the CMD. The Petitioner’s concurrence was expressly conditional.
Regularisation was specifically required by February 1997, failing which
recovery could be effected in one instalment. The second payment followed
a similar course.
20.9. The Petitioner never recommended release of a third ad hoc payment
in the manner alleged. On the contrary, he specifically recorded that
repeated ad hoc payments were inconsistent with principles of financial
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propriety and proposed only “ temporary financial assistance ” recoverable
with interest if interim relief to the contractor was considered unavoidable.
The matter was thereafter placed before the Board of Directors. The Board,
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in its 70 Meeting, considered the claims and approved payment. Thus,
liability cannot be fastened upon the Petitioner for a decision ultimately
taken by the Board and after his objections had been expressly recorded.
20.10. Charge 5 is wholly unsustainable. The Petitioner repeatedly pressed
for recovery or adjustment of the amounts released to JHC. This was done in
April 2001, July 2001, July 2003 and again in March 2004. The Ministry
was also informed that recoveries were not being permitted by the CMD and
the Board. A person who repeatedly insisted upon recovery cannot
simultaneously be accused of deliberately avoiding or delaying recovery
unless the disciplinary authority first deals with those communications and
rejects them on cogent grounds.
20.11. The entire disciplinary action was substantially influenced by the
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CVC O.M. dated 19 February, 2004. The language employed therein,
particularly the observation that the Petitioner acted more as an “ Agent of
the contractor ” than as “ Finance-chief of the Company ”, demonstrates that
the matter was prejudged at the vigilance stage itself. The O.M. did not
fairly consider the contractual framework, the chain of technical
recommendations, the role of the CMD and Board, the Petitioner’s
objections in relation to the third payment, or the subsequent correspondence
relating to recovery.
20.12. The Petitioner has been singled out. Officers who initiated,
processed, technically examined, recommended or released the payments
were either not charge-sheeted or were ultimately exonerated. Particular
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emphasis is placed on the fact that the first and second payments were
approved by the CMD, while the third payment was approved by the Board
of Directors after consideration of the matter and subject to specified
safeguards. Yet neither the CMD nor the members of the Board were
subjected to comparable disciplinary proceedings. The Petitioner alone was
visited with the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of retiral benefits.
20.13. Reliance is also placed on the cases of K.K. Gupta and S.K.
Sharma, who were associated with the processing of the first and second
payments and whose cases culminated in exoneration or findings not
warranting any major penalty, the disciplinary authorities having taken note
of the peculiar circumstances prevailing at the project, including its World
Bank-monitored nature, the possible impact of delayed payments on timely
commissioning and the approvals accorded at higher levels. Reference is
further made to the case of G.S. Rao, who was proceeded against in relation
to release of the amount of INR 24.56 crore, but whose lapse was ultimately
treated as procedural in nature without any finding of financial loss to the
Corporation.
20.14. Reliance is placed on M. Raghavelu v. Government of A.P. &
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Anr. and Rajendra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. to contend
that where officers charged in relation to the same incident and on the same
evidence have been exonerated, or where a co-delinquent with a more
serious role has been awarded a lighter punishment, the delinquent cannot
ordinarily be singled out for adverse treatment without a justifiable
distinction.

6
(1997) 10 SCC 779.
7
(2013) 3 SCC 73.
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20.15. Reliance is also placed upon subsequent developments relating to the
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disputes between SJVN and JHC. An Arbitral Tribunal, by award dated 28
April, 2008, awarded substantial amounts in favour of JHC under various
heads of claim while rejecting the counterclaims of SJVN. Further reliance
is placed upon records concerning the settlement of disputes between SJVN
and JHC, adjustment of amounts already released and approval of payments
pursuant to the settlement process. These developments demonstrate that the
claims based on which the payments were released were neither fictitious
nor illusory and materially undermine the allegation that the payments
constituted an unwarranted largesse extended to JHC or resulted in financial
loss to the Corporation.
20.16. No financial loss to the Corporation has been established as a
consequence of the Petitioner’s actions. Neither the inquiry report nor the
punishment order records any clear finding quantifying or identifying any
actual loss attributable to the Petitioner. In the absence of such a finding, the
allegation that the impugned payments caused financial prejudice to the
Corporation is unsustainable.
20.17. The matter ought not to be remanded. The underlying events are
nearly three decades old, and the charge-sheet itself is more than twenty
years old. The Petitioner has long since crossed the age of superannuation.
Co-delinquents have already been exonerated and the orders passed in their
favour have attained finality. A remand at this stage would serve no useful
purpose and would merely prolong an already protracted proceeding.
UOI’s Contentions
21. Opposing the petition, Mr. Mukul Singh, CGSC, makes the following
submissions:
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21.1. The Petitioner held a Board-level tenure post and had no vested right
to continue as Director (Finance). His appointment itself was for five years,
or until the date of superannuation, or until further orders, whichever was
earlier. Upon expiry of the initial tenure, he was permitted to continue only
through interim orders pending consideration of the proposal for extension.
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The cessation order dated 16 March, 2004 was, therefore, an administrative
decision concerning tenure and cannot be equated with a penalty.
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21.2. The charge-sheet memorandum dated 15 March, 2004 and the order
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dated 16 March, 2004 were distinct and independent actions. The cessation
order merely recorded that the Petitioner ceased to hold the post of Director
(Finance) pursuant to a decision taken by the competent authority. It
imposed no stigma and did not amount to removal from service.
21.3. Serious irregularities were noticed in relation to release of payments
to JHC. The payments were released without proper examination of
admissibility, without adherence to the applicable contractual framework,
without approval of the competent authority and without adequate
safeguards to protect the Corporation’s interests. As Director (Finance), the
Petitioner was under a heightened obligation to ensure financial propriety
and compliance with governing procedures.
21.4. The Petitioner cannot avoid accountability by contending that he was
neither the initiator nor the final approving authority in respect of the
payments. As head of Finance, he was expected to safeguard the
Corporation’s interests and provide appropriate advice at every stage.
Instead of objecting to the release of ad hoc payments, he repeatedly
concurred in and recommended their release.
21.5. The Petitioner was afforded full opportunity to defend himself in the
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departmental inquiry. He participated in the proceedings, examined
witnesses and was granted time to submit a written brief. Although he
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sought extension up to 15 June, 2006, the IO considered the request
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excessive but nevertheless granted further time up to 28 April, 2006.
Despite such extension, the Petitioner failed to submit his written brief.
21.6. The inquiry report was forwarded to the Petitioner. Although the
initial communication was returned undelivered, subsequent efforts were
made to furnish the report at the addresses available with the Ministry and
thereafter at the address subsequently indicated by the Petitioner himself.
Instead of submitting a formal representation against the inquiry report, the
Petitioner primarily insisted that his written brief be considered by the IO.
21.7. The grievance relating to non-consideration of the written brief is
misconceived. Although the Ministry initially directed that the Petitioner’s
submissions be forwarded to the IO, the CVC advised that, once the inquiry
report had been submitted, the IO ceased to have any further role in the
proceedings and that the Petitioner’s submissions could instead be
considered by the disciplinary authority while deciding whether the findings
deserved acceptance. Acting on such advice, the disciplinary authority itself
examined the Petitioner’s submissions and found no new fact or
circumstance warranting departure from the findings returned by the IO.
21.8. The disciplinary authority independently considered the inquiry
report, the Petitioner’s representations and the material placed on record
before arriving at its conclusions. The observations contained in the
vigilance advice cannot, by themselves, be treated as evidence of bias or
predetermination.
21.9. The plea of discrimination or parity is misconceived. As Director
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(Finance), the Petitioner occupied the highest financial office within the
Corporation and his responsibilities were qualitatively different from those
of other officers involved in the transactions. Exoneration of, or lesser
punishment awarded to, other officers does not confer immunity upon the
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Petitioner. Reliance is placed upon Punjab & Sind Bank v. Raj Kumar , to
contend that parity cannot be claimed merely because co-delinquents
received lesser punishment. The Supreme Court has reiterated that higher
office carries higher responsibility and accountability, and that a disciplinary
authority is justified in imposing a more stringent punishment upon a senior
officer occupying a position of greater trust, even where other participants in
the transaction are dealt with more leniently.
21.10. The Petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy under Rule 32 of
the CDA Rules by way of appeal against the punishment order. The said
remedy was not availed within the prescribed period. The present challenge
is therefore liable to be examined bearing in mind the Petitioner’s failure to
pursue the statutory appellate mechanism available under the Rules.
21.11. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, even if any procedural infirmity
is found to exist, the appropriate course would be to remit the matter to the
disciplinary authority for reconsideration. In exercise of judicial review, the
Court does not sit in appeal over departmental findings, cannot re-appreciate
evidence and ordinarily ought not substitute its own conclusions on merits or
punishment unless the decision is shown to be wholly perverse or
shockingly disproportionate.
CVC’s Contentions
22. Additionally, Ms. Tatini Basu, counsel for CVC, submits as follows:

8
2026 SCC OnLine SC 519.
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22.1. CVC acted strictly within the scope of its statutory functions.
Pursuant to complaints regarding alleged irregularities in the affairs of the
Corporation, a committee was constituted to examine the issues raised and,
based on the material received, CVC directed further investigation to
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identify the officers responsible for the lapses noticed. By O.M. dated 19
December, 2001, CVC instructed UOI and SJVN to undertake a detailed
investigation, identify the executives responsible for the irregularities and
initiate appropriate action in consultation with CVC.
22.2. The investigation reports and vigilance record relating to release of
advances aggregating INR 42.46 crore to JHC were thereafter forwarded to
CVC for consideration. Upon examination thereof, CVC rendered its first-
th
stage advice by O.M. dated 19 February, 2004. The advice was not
confined to the Petitioner alone but extended to other officers whose roles
were found to require examination in disciplinary proceedings.
th
22.3. Reliance is placed upon CVC’s O.M. dated 19 February, 2004 to
contend that the material placed before it disclosed serious lapses in relation
to release of payments to JHC. It was observed that substantial amounts had
been released without adequate scrutiny and safeguards; the Board had not
been approached on the first two occasions despite the magnitude of the
payments; and no serious effort had been made to settle or recover the
advances. Being Director (Finance), the Petitioner was viewed as bearing
primary responsibility for safeguarding the Corporation’s financial interests.
It was in these circumstances that major penalty proceedings were advised.
22.4. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, all six articles of charge were held
proved. Thereafter, second-stage advice was sought from CVC. By
th
communication dated 19 September, 2008, CVC advised imposition of the
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major penalty of dismissal from service along with forfeiture of retiral
th
benefits. Subsequently, by communication dated 5 May, 2009, CVC
clarified that the penalty was to take effect immediately.
22.5. The advice rendered by CVC was advisory in nature and did not bind
the disciplinary authority. The competent authority was required to
independently consider the inquiry report, the Petitioner’s representations
and the material on record before arriving at its own conclusions.
22.6. The Petitioner has neither specifically challenged the statutory advice
rendered by CVC nor sought any substantive relief against it. The grievance
of the Petitioner is essentially directed against the disciplinary proceedings
and the punishment order passed by the competent authority. The allegations
of mala fides , bias and prejudgment are denied.
SJVN’s Contentions
23. Mr. Uttam Datt, Senior Advocate appearing for SJVN, addressed the
following submissions:
23.1. SJVN is a Central Public Sector Enterprise functioning under the
administrative control of the Ministry of Power and is governed by
applicable Government of India instructions, Department of Public
Enterprises guidelines and vigilance requirements. Appointments to Board-
level positions, including that of Director (Finance), are made through a
process involving the Public Enterprises Selection Board [“ PESB ”],
vigilance clearance, the administrative Ministry and approval of the ACC.
23.2. The challenge suffers from substantial delay. The Petitioner ceased to
hold office in March 2004 and had earlier invoked the writ jurisdiction of
this Court through W.P.(C) 4620/2004. Though attempts were made during
the pendency of those proceedings to challenge the disciplinary action and
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punishment order, the earlier writ petition ultimately came to be withdrawn
in 2017. The present proceedings seek to reopen matters that had long since
culminated in inquiry findings and a final penalty order.
23.3. The challenge to continuation of disciplinary proceedings after
cessation of tenure is misconceived. The disciplinary proceedings had
already been instituted prior to cessation of the Petitioner’s tenure and were
thereafter continued in accordance with the applicable service framework.
Reliance is placed upon Rule 30A of the CDA Rules to contend that
proceedings instituted while an employee is in service may be continued and
concluded notwithstanding subsequent retirement or cessation of service. On
th
that basis, it is submitted that the charge-sheet having been issued on 15
th
March, 2004 prior to cessation of tenure on 16 March, 2004, the competent
authority retained jurisdiction to conclude the proceedings and pass
appropriate orders thereafter.
23.4. On the merits of the charges, substantial amounts were released to
JHC without adequate scrutiny of admissibility, without ensuring
compliance with the applicable contractual framework and without securing
timely regularisation or recovery. The contractual provisions relied upon by
the Petitioner do not authorise the kind of ad hoc payments that were
released. The findings returned in the departmental inquiry are based on
evidence and do not warrant interference in exercise of judicial review.
23.5. The Petitioner’s reliance upon the exoneration of other officers is
misplaced. The role of each officer was independently examined in
accordance with the applicable disciplinary framework. Exoneration of other
officers cannot dilute or negate the Petitioner’s individual responsibility.
23.6. The relevance of the subsequent arbitral award and settlement
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proceedings is disputed. The fact that disputes between SJVN and JHC were
subsequently referred to arbitration, that certain amounts were ultimately
found payable, or that adjustments were made during the settlement process,
does not validate the release of payments between 1996 and 1998. The
disciplinary proceedings concern the propriety of the decisions taken at the
time the payments were released and not the eventual outcome of
contractual disputes between the parties.
Issues for Determination
24. Having regard to the pleadings, record and submissions advanced, the
following issues arise for determination:
(i) What is the permissible scope of judicial review in the present
challenge to disciplinary proceedings and punishment.
(ii) Whether the present writ petition is liable to be rejected on account of
delay, the earlier writ proceedings culminating in withdrawal of W.P.(C)
4620/2004, or the Petitioner’s failure to avail the statutory remedy of appeal
under Rule 32 of the CDA Rules.
th
(iii) Whether the charge-sheet dated 15 March, 2004 and the cessation
th
order dated 16 March, 2004 were independent administrative events, or
whether the record shows that they were inseparably linked in a manner
which affected the fairness of the action against the Petitioner.
(iv) Whether, in the facts of the present case, the impugned order
adequately discloses the legal basis on which disciplinary proceedings were
continued after cessation of the Petitioner’s tenure and the penalty of
dismissal from service with forfeiture of retiral benefits was imposed.
(v) Whether the inquiry and punishment order stand vitiated by denial of
reasonable opportunity, particularly on account of non-consideration of the
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Petitioner’s written brief, the subsequent orders passed by this Court in the
earlier writ petition, and the course adopted on CVC advice.
(vi) Whether the findings recorded against the Petitioner on the six articles
of charge are sustainable on the material placed on record, having regard to
the contractual framework, the nature of the payments released to JHC, the
Petitioner’s role in the decision-making process, and the allegation relating
to recovery of the amounts released.
(vii) Whether the disciplinary authority failed to consider material
documents, contemporaneous records and explanations relied upon by the
Petitioner while recording its conclusions.
(viii) Whether the penalty of dismissal from service and forfeiture of retiral
benefits is arbitrary, discriminatory or disproportionate, particularly in light
of the treatment accorded to other officers involved in the same transactions
and the subsequent developments relating to the disputes with JHC.
(ix) If the impugned action is found unsustainable, whether the matter
should be remitted to the disciplinary authority or whether this Court should
mould final relief having regard to the age of the proceedings, the
Petitioner’s superannuation and the nature of the record.
Discussion and Analysis
Scope of Judicial Review
25. The challenge before this Court requires a careful distinction between
the existence of material sufficient to warrant an inquiry and the legality of
the manner in which that inquiry was pursued, concluded and ultimately
translated into the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retiral
benefits. Public funds were involved. The project was a public sector project
of considerable magnitude. Substantial payments were released to a
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contractor. These circumstances justified scrutiny and may well have
justified initiation of disciplinary proceedings. They do not, however,
without more, justify a disciplinary conclusion reached in disregard of
material documents, parity considerations, jurisdictional limitations and the
basic requirement of reasoned decision-making.
26. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is well settled.
The Court does not act as an appellate authority over departmental findings
and cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at an independent conclusion
merely because another view may also be possible. Judicial review is
directed to the decision-making process and not the decision itself.
Interference is warranted where the enquiry has been conducted in violation
of the principles of natural justice or the prescribed procedure, where the
findings are based on “ no evidence ”, where relevant and material evidence
has been ignored or extraneous considerations have influenced the decision,
where the conclusions are such as no reasonable person acting objectively
could have reached, where the disciplinary authority has failed to apply its
mind or assign reasons, or where the punishment imposed is so
disproportionate as to shock the Court’s conscience. These principles stand
9
recognised in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors. , Union of India v.
10 11
P. Gunasekaran and Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari .
27. The present case is not one where the Court is merely being invited to
prefer the Petitioner’s version of the facts over that accepted by the IO; the
challenge goes to more fundamental aspects of the disciplinary process. The
Petitioner contends that the proceedings, though clothed in disciplinary

9
(1995) 6 SCC 749.
10
(2015) 2 SCC 610.
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form, failed to adequately reckon with the nature of the transactions in
question, the chain of decision-making, his recorded objections and
directions regarding recovery, the treatment accorded to other officers
involved in the same transactions, and the absence of a lawful basis for
imposing dismissal from service and forfeiture of retiral benefits after he had
ceased to hold office. These contentions require examination within the
recognised limits of judicial review.
Maintainability, Delay and Earlier Proceedings
28. The objection to maintainability cannot be accepted. The earlier writ
petition, being W.P.(C) 4620/2004, was filed when the disciplinary
proceedings were still pending and before the final penalty order was
th
passed. Once the inquiry culminated in the order dated 30 July, 2009, the
Petitioner, eventually, withdrew the earlier writ petition in 2017, with the
statement that he would challenge the punishment order by initiating
separate proceedings. The present writ petition is, therefore, not a second
challenge to a finally adjudicated cause. It challenges the punishment order
and its consequential civil consequences.
29. The writ petition is also not liable to be rejected merely because CVC
has been impleaded. The Court is not called upon to issue any personal
direction against any officer of CVC. The CVC advice forms part of the
decision-making record. The Petitioner has challenged the disciplinary
process partly on the ground that CVC’s advice was strongly prejudicial and
that the disciplinary authority allowed that advice to displace independent
consideration. The presence of CVC in the array of parties, therefore, cannot
defeat the petition. At the highest, if no substantive relief is to be issued

11
(2017) 2 SCC 308.
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against CVC, the petition may be moulded accordingly.
30. The objection of delay, however, must be considered with some care.
The payments relate to 1996 to 1998. The charge-sheet was issued in 2004.
The punishment order was passed in 2009. The present writ petition was
filed after withdrawal of the earlier proceedings. There is some delay, but
the Petitioner had been litigating and pursuing his grievance through
representations and legal proceedings during the intervening period. The
record does not indicate abandonment of the claim. Equally, UOI’s
objection of alternate statutory remedy of appeal under Rule 32 of the CDA
Rules does not merit rejection. The existence of an alternative remedy is not
an absolute bar to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly where
questions relating to jurisdiction, legality of the disciplinary proceedings and
forfeiture of retiral benefits are raised. More importantly, the impugned
order entails dismissal from service and forfeiture of retiral benefits. Such
continuing civil consequences cannot be shut out on delay alone when the
record itself shows that the earlier writ petition was withdrawn to pursue a
separate challenge to the punishment order.
Whether the Charge-sheet and Cessation Order were Independent Events
31. The Petitioner’s principal objection to the initial action arises from the
th th th
sequence of events on 15 and 16 March, 2004. On 15 March, 2004, the
Petitioner was served with a charge-sheet memorandum proposing major
penalty proceedings and called upon to submit a written statement of
th
defence within 10 days. On the following day, i.e., 16 March, 2004, the
Ministry of Power issued an order stating that the Petitioner ceased to be
Director (Finance) of SJVN, with immediate effect.
32. If these two documents stood alone, the Respondents’ submission that
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the charge-sheet and the cessation order were independent actions would
have merited acceptance. The Petitioner was occupying a tenure post. The
th
order of appointment dated 18 November, 1996 itself contemplated
continuation for a specified period, or until further orders, whichever was
earlier. Following expiry of the initial tenure, the Petitioner continued under
formal extension orders pending consideration of the proposal for further
extension. In that sense, the Petitioner did not possess an indefeasible right
to continue as Director (Finance).
33. The difficulty for the Respondents arises from the internal Ministry
th
note dated 15 March, 2004. The note records that the charge-sheet was
required to be issued “ before an order regarding cessation of his tenure is
issued ”. It further records that the Department of Legal Affairs had informed
the Ministry that the Petitioner had instituted proceedings before this Court
challenging the proposed discontinuation of his tenure. The note proceeds to
state that, lest this Court stay the issuance of the charge-sheet or the order
regarding cessation of tenure, the charge-sheet be issued “ today itself ” and
the order regarding cessation of tenure be issued before that petition was
taken up for hearing.
34. The language employed in the note is difficult to ignore. At the very
least, it demonstrates that the issuance of the charge-sheet and the cessation
order was administratively sequenced with reference to the pending
proceedings before this Court. The concern reflected in the note was not
merely to give effect to an earlier administrative decision. It also extended to
ensuring that both actions were taken before the Court had an opportunity to
examine the matter. A public authority is entitled to defend its actions in
judicial proceedings and, in the absence of any restraint order, is not
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precluded from taking decisions otherwise available to it in law. However,
where the contemporaneous record expressly proceeds on the footing that
action should be taken before the Court could consider the matter, the
decision-making process becomes a legitimate subject of closer scrutiny.
35. That said, the Court is not persuaded that the cessation order dated
th
16 March, 2004 can be invalidated merely on that basis or that the
Petitioner is entitled to be treated as having continued as Director (Finance)
until the date of superannuation. The post was tenure-based and the
Petitioner’s continuance after expiry of the original tenure was under several
extension orders. A writ court cannot convert a tenure appointment into a
continuing office merely because the timing or sequence of the
administrative action is open to criticism. The significance of the
contemporaneous record lies elsewhere; it reinforces the need to closely
examine whether the disciplinary proceedings that followed were fair,
independent and legally sustainable.

Continuation of Disciplinary Proceedings after Cessation of Tenure
36. The Petitioner has urged that, once his tenure as Director (Finance)
th
came to an end on 16 March, 2004, the Respondents lacked authority to
continue the disciplinary proceedings and thereafter impose, in 2009, the
penalty of dismissal from service coupled with forfeiture of retiral benefits.
The submission proceeds on the footing that disciplinary jurisdiction
ordinarily rests upon a subsisting relationship of employment and that any
continuation of proceedings, or curtailment of retiral benefits after cessation
of service, must be supported by a clear and lawful source of power.
37. The Respondents dispute this contention and maintain that the
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disciplinary proceedings were validly continued notwithstanding cessation
of the Petitioner’s tenure. According to them, the charge-sheet having been
th th
issued on 15 March, 2004, prior to the cessation order dated 16 March,
2004, the disciplinary process could lawfully proceed to its conclusion.
38. The Petitioner, however, contends that the present case concerns a
th
Board-level tenure appointment which came to an end on 16 March, 2004,
whereas the impugned order imposing punishment came to be passed more
than five years thereafter. It is further pointed out that the charge-sheet itself
was issued under Rule 25 of the CDA Rules and that the impugned order
does not identify the provision under which such consequences could be
imposed after cessation of tenure.
39. The Court does not consider it necessary, for purposes of the present
case, to finally pronounce upon the precise contours of the authority, if any,
available to continue disciplinary proceedings after cessation of tenure. The
Respondents have relied upon Rule 30A of the CDA Rules to contend that
proceedings instituted while an employee is in service may continue
notwithstanding subsequent retirement or cessation of service. The narrower
question arising on the present record, however, is whether the disciplinary
authority addressed that jurisdictional issue and identified the source of
power under which the penalties ultimately imposed were authorised.
40. The record indicates that this issue was not free from doubt even at
th
the level of the Ministry. By O.M. dated 29 December, 2008, the Ministry
th
recorded that the Petitioner’s tenure had ceased on 16 March, 2004 and that
he was no longer in the service of SJVN. The Ministry specifically sought
advice regarding the nature and operation of the proposed penalty in those
circumstances. The very fact that such clarification was considered
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necessary indicates that the legal basis for continuing the proceedings and
imposing the proposed penalty after cessation of tenure required
examination.
41. The same O.M. also referred to the case of one Mr. Binay Kumar, ex-
Director, NHPC, which the Ministry considered similar in material respects.
In that case also, the officer was a Board-level PSU functionary; his tenure
had come to an end; disciplinary proceedings for major penalty had been
initiated; and major penalty had been advised when the officer was no
longer holding office. The note records that CVC had advised that since the
tenure had already come to an end and the services had not been
“ terminated ”, the major penalty be kept in “ suspended animation ”, to revive
if the officer rejoined government service. Whether that case was in fact
comparable is not determinative. What is significant is that the Ministry
itself recognised the need to examine the legal consequences of imposing a
major penalty upon a person who had already ceased to hold office.
42. The Court is mindful of the principles recognised in A.N. Gupta ,
Bhagirathi Jena and Rajinder Lal Capoor , namely that the continuance of
disciplinary proceedings after retirement, the withholding or curtailment of
retiral benefits, or the imposition of any post-retiral consequence must
derive authority from a specific provision in the applicable service or
pension rules, and that the exercise of such power must remain within the
limits of the rule creating it.
th
43. The impugned penalty order dated 30 July, 2009 does not engage
with that issue. While it records the inquiry proceedings, the findings
returned by the IO and the advice received from the CVC, it does not
identify the authority under which dismissal from service was imposed after
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cessation of tenure. Nor does it indicate the provision under which gratuity,
leave encashment or other retiral benefits were liable to be forfeited. The
order is equally silent on the concerns reflected in the Ministry’s O.M. dated
th
29 December, 2008.
44. Be that as it may, the present case is not being decided solely on the
footing that no provision could ever authorise such action. The difficulty lies
in the fact that the disciplinary authority did not examine or explain the
source, scope or applicability of the authority under which it purported to
impose the penalties ultimately imposed in the circumstances of the present
case.
45. In these circumstances, the objection relating to post-cessation
jurisdiction cannot be treated as insubstantial. Where a Board-level tenure
appointee had ceased to hold office several years before the penalty order
came to be passed, and where the Ministry itself had sought clarification on
the issue, the final order was expected to disclose the legal basis on which
such consequences were being imposed. The impugned order does not do so.
46. This aspect is not, by itself, determinative of the writ petition. It
nevertheless constitutes a material circumstance bearing upon the
sustainability of the impugned order and must be considered along with the
Petitioner’s remaining challenges to the disciplinary proceedings, the
findings returned in the inquiry and the penalty ultimately imposed.
Natural Justice and Non-consideration of the Written Brief
47. The inquiry report records that the Petitioner did not submit his
written brief within the time granted and that the report was finalised
without its benefit. The Respondents contend that the Petitioner was
afforded sufficient time and that his request for extension was unreasonable.
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48. The Court is not required to hold that every refusal of extension
vitiates disciplinary proceedings. An IO is entitled to regulate the conduct of
the inquiry, and a charged officer cannot indefinitely delay submission of
written arguments. The facts of the present case, however, do not end with
the refusal of extension. After submission of the inquiry report, the
Petitioner repeatedly requested that his written brief be considered. In the
rd
earlier writ proceedings, this Court recorded on 23 November, 2006 that
Respondent No. 1 had stated that the IO had already been directed, by
th
communication dated 5 October, 2006, to take the Petitioner’s written
representation into consideration. The Court therefore observed that the
second prayer in the application stood satisfied and that the prayer seeking
quashing of the inquiry would be considered after action had been taken on
st
the said communication. Thereafter, on 1 May, 2007, this Court again
rd
directed compliance with the order dated 23 November, 2006 and disposal
of the Petitioner’s representation.
49. In the above circumstances, the record reflected that the Petitioner’s
written representation was to be considered in the manner indicated in the
statement made on behalf of Respondent No. 1. However, CVC
subsequently advised that, once the IO had submitted the inquiry report, he
was no longer concerned with the matter and that the Petitioner’s
submissions could instead be considered by the disciplinary authority while
deciding whether the findings deserved acceptance. The Ministry thereafter
proceeded on that basis.
50. The difficulty does not lie merely in the fact that the IO did not
reconsider the inquiry report. It lies in the circumstance that a statement was
made before this Court that the IO had been directed to consider the
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Petitioner’s written representation and the proceedings thereafter continued
on a different footing. Where a public authority informs the Court that a
particular procedural course has been adopted, and the Court proceeds on
that basis, a subsequent departure from that course ordinarily requires
appropriate disclosure or an equivalent procedural safeguard.
51. The Respondents submit that the disciplinary authority examined the
Petitioner’s written submissions and found no new fact or circumstance
warranting departure from the findings recorded in the inquiry report. That
submission does not fully answer the grievance raised. The Petitioner’s
complaint is that the inquiry report itself came to be finalised without
consideration of his written brief. A subsequent conclusion by the
disciplinary authority that no new fact emerged does not address the concern
that the IO returned findings on the charges without first considering the
written defence which the Petitioner sought to place on record.
52. In B. Karunakar , the Supreme Court recognised that the findings
recorded by the IO constitute “ important material ” before the disciplinary
authority and that the delinquent employee must have an effective
opportunity to point out errors, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of
relevant material or unsupported conclusions before the disciplinary
authority arrives at its own decision. In the present case, the Petitioner’s
defence rested substantially upon documentary material, including
contemporaneous note-sheets, contractual provisions, Board proceedings,
communications relating to recovery and the treatment accorded to other
officers involved in the same transactions. These were not extraneous
matters, but went to the very foundation of the charges levelled against him.
53. In the opinion of this Court, the manner in which the issue relating to
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the written brief was ultimately dealt with caused prejudice to the Petitioner
and adversely affected the fairness of the disciplinary process.
Sustainability of Findings on the Articles of Charge
54. The Court is not required to reappraise the evidence led in the
disciplinary proceedings. Some examination of the articles of charge is
nevertheless necessary, as the Petitioner alleges ignorance or non-
consideration of material documents. The inquiry is therefore confined to
whether the findings reflect due consideration of the contemporaneous
record and satisfy the standard of reasoned disciplinary adjudication.
Articles 1 and 2
55. Article 1 concerns the first payment of INR 5.90 crore and Article 2
concerns the second payment of INR 12 crore. The allegation is that the
Petitioner concurred in release of ad hoc payments without proper
examination of their justification, contractual admissibility and approval
requirements.
56. The contemporaneous notes indicate that the first proposal originated
at the project level. The Assistant Executive Engineer recorded that the
relevant issues had been examined and that an amount of approximately INR
9.94 crore was estimated to be admissible. The proposal thereafter moved
through the Executive Engineer, General Manager and Director (Civil). The
Director (Civil) expressly recorded that “ admissibility of the claims ”
required case-wise examination and called for detailed particulars to be
furnished to the Corporate Office. The Petitioner, while concurring,
recorded that the works had already been executed, that regularisation was
pending and that recovery could be effected in one instalment if
regularisation was not completed by February 1997.
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57. The note recorded by the Petitioner does not reflect an unconditional
release of funds. It reflects concurrence in a proposal that had already
undergone technical scrutiny, coupled with a stipulation regarding
regularisation and recovery. Whether such concurrence represented the most
prudent financial course is a separate question. However, the disciplinary
authority was required to examine the nature and extent of the Petitioner’s
participation in the decision-making process before attributing to him sole
responsibility for the transaction.
58. The note relating to the second payment assumes particular
significance. It records total claims of INR 67.36 crore, an estimated
admissible amount of INR 21.05 crore and expressly takes note of the earlier
payment of INR 5.90 crore while arriving at the amount proposed for
release. The proposal ultimately recommended payment of INR 12 crore.
The contemporaneous record, thus, indicates that the earlier release was
neither overlooked nor ignored while processing the second payment. In
these circumstances, the disciplinary authority was required to specifically
examine the effect of this contemporaneous material while evaluating the
allegation that the Petitioner had failed to safeguard the Corporation’s
interests in relation to recovery of the amounts already released.
59. The Respondents’ objection that the proposals did not clearly identify
the governing contractual provision or the precise source of approval
authority may raise issues of financial propriety. However, the disciplinary
findings required a closer examination of the Petitioner’s actual role in the
process, the extent to which technical assessment lay within the domain of
engineering officers, and the significance of the Petitioner’s recorded
observations regarding regularisation and recovery. The impugned order
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does not engage with these aspects in the detail that was necessary
considering the nature of the charge.
Article 3
60. Article 3 relates to the third payment of INR 24.56 crore. The charge
proceeds on the basis that the Petitioner wrongfully concurred in release of a
further ad hoc payment to the contractor. The contemporaneous record,
however, requires closer scrutiny. It shows that the proposal underwent
examination at multiple levels, including by technical authorities. During
that process, differing views emerged. The Petitioner recorded reservations
regarding repeated ad hoc payments and suggested that, if assistance was
considered unavoidable, it should be structured as “ temporary financial
assistance ” recoverable with interest. The matter was thereafter placed
before the Board of Directors.
th
61. The proceedings of the 70 Meeting of the Board of Directors
indicate that the Board was apprised of the nature of the contractor’s claims,
the additional and substituted works executed, the delay in final
determination of claims and the financial position of the contractor. The
Board ultimately approved release of funds subject to specified safeguards.
The subsequent communications also record adjustment of the amounts
already released while computing the balance amount.
62. In these circumstances, the disciplinary authority was required to
carefully distinguish between the Petitioner’s role in processing the proposal
and the Board’s ultimate decision to approve the payment. The impugned
order does not meaningfully engage with that distinction.
Article 4
63. Article 4 relates to alleged failure to ensure compliance with the
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Board’s requirement that a specific undertaking be obtained from the
contractor before release of INR 24.56 crore.
64. The record indicates that this issue subsequently arose in proceedings
against another officer, namely G.S. Rao, and was treated as a procedural
lapse that did not result in financial loss to the Corporation. While such
proceedings may not be determinative of the Petitioner’s liability, they
formed part of the surrounding circumstances that required consideration.
Even otherwise, the disciplinary authority was required to examine the
precise nature of the Petitioner’s responsibility in relation to obtaining the
undertaking and whether the obligation rested primarily upon officers
responsible for implementation of the Board’s decision.
Article 5
65. Article 5 alleges failure to pursue recovery of the amounts released to
the contractor and attributes to the Petitioner a course of conduct designed to
avoid or defer such recovery. This article requires examination in light of the
contemporaneous correspondences relied upon by the Petitioner.
66. The record includes communications of April 2001, July 2001, July
2003 and March 2004, in which the Petitioner repeatedly addressed the issue
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of recovery of the amounts released to JHC. By communication dated 12
April, 2001, he called for recovery or adjustment of the outstanding
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advances and cautioned against further delay. On 27 July, 2001, he
reiterated that recoveries should be effected in accordance with the decision
of the Board of Directors. In July 2003, he directed that recoveries be made
through running account bills, particularly in circumstances where bank
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guarantees had not proved effective. Thereafter, by communication dated 8
March, 2004 addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Power, he stated that
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his repeated requests for recovery had not been acted upon and that recovery
was not being permitted. Whether these communications were sufficient to
discharge his responsibilities is a matter that may admit debate. They,
nevertheless, formed part of the contemporaneous record and required
specific consideration before a finding could be returned that the Petitioner
had failed to pursue recovery or had deliberately sought to avoid it.
67. The disciplinary findings do not adequately engage with that record.
Where documentary material relied upon by a charged officer bears directly
upon the substance of the charge, the authority is expected to explain why
such material does not alter the conclusion ultimately reached. The absence
of such analysis materially weakens the finding recorded on Article 5.
Article 6
68. Article 6 alleges that while recommending the first and second
payments, the Petitioner did not bring to the notice of other Directors and
CMD that financial power to approve such advances vested in the Board,
and that he did so only indirectly and as an afterthought after the third
proposal.
69. The record shows that the third proposal was ultimately placed before
the Board of Directors and that the first two payments were approved after
processing through multiple levels of the organisation, including the
Director (Civil) and the CMD. If Board approval was indeed mandatory for
the first two payments, that issue was not peculiar to the Petitioner. The
CMD, Director (Civil), project authorities and other officers were all part of
the process. The Petitioner may have been under a duty to flag the issue. But
again, the question is whether this omission, when placed in its proper
context, constituted grave misconduct warranting the penalty imposed,
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particularly when the Board later broadly considered the payments and when
other officers were exonerated. The impugned punishment order does not
undertake that exercise in any meaningful manner.
70. For the foregoing reasons, the findings recorded on Articles 3 and 5
cannot be sustained on the reasoning reflected in the record. As regards
Articles 1, 2, 4 and 6, the disciplinary authority failed to adequately engage
with material aspects of the contemporaneous record, the Petitioner’s
explanation, the chain of decision-making, and other relevant circumstances
bearing upon the charges. The Court is not required to finally determine
whether every allegation levelled against the Petitioner stood conclusively
disproved. The issue is whether the findings, particularly those forming the
foundation of the penalty imposed, were arrived at after due consideration of
all material circumstances. On that test, the disciplinary conclusions suffer
from substantial infirmities. Even assuming that certain aspects of the
Petitioner’s conduct could still warrant scrutiny, the findings as recorded
cannot furnish a sustainable basis for the penalty ultimately imposed.
Failure to Consider Material Documents and Relevant Considerations
A. Effect of the CVC Note and Independent Application of Mind
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71. The CVC O.M. dated 19 February, 2004 cannot also be ignored. It
constituted the basis of the first-stage advice recommending initiation of
major penalty proceedings and reflects the vigilance perspective that
subsequently informed the disciplinary process.
72. CVC was fully entitled to examine whether the release of substantial
amounts to a contractor disclosed vigilance concerns and, if the material so
warranted, to advise initiation of major penalty proceedings. This Court does
not sit in appeal over such administrative advice rendered at the pre-inquiry
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stage. The question, however, is not whether CVC could render such advice,
but whether the disciplinary authority thereafter independently evaluated the
material placed before it.
73. The difficulty arises from the language employed in the O.M. and the
extent to which the subsequent disciplinary process appears to have
remained influenced by it. The O.M. described the payments as having been
released “ in gay abandon ”, observed that “ no precautions or safeguards ”
had been taken, stated that the officers concerned had deliberately extended
undue favour to the contractor and that mala fides were “ loud and clear ”, at
least prima facie . It further recorded that the Petitioner appeared to have
acted more as an “ Agent ” of the contractor than as a Finance Chief.
74. These were undoubtedly serious observations. They were, however,
made at the stage of first-stage vigilance advice, before commencement of
disciplinary proceedings and before the evidence and the Petitioner’s
defence had been examined in the course of an inquiry. Equally significant
is the fact that the O.M. did not engage with several aspects that later
emerged from the record, including the processing of the first two payments
through the institutional hierarchy, the Petitioner’s recorded stipulation
regarding regularisation and recovery, the treatment of the first payment
while computing the second, the differing views expressed in relation to the
third payment, the Board’s eventual approval and the Petitioner’s
subsequent communications concerning recovery.
75. The Court does not suggest that the use of strong language by CVC,
by itself, vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. Had the disciplinary authority
independently analysed the record and furnished its own reasons for
accepting the findings against the Petitioner, the language employed in the
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vigilance advice may have assumed limited significance. The concern arises
because the punishment order does not disclose any meaningful engagement
with the principal documentary defences relied upon by the Petitioner.
While recording the procedural history, the findings of the IO and the advice
received from CVC, the order does not undertake any substantial analysis of
the Petitioner’s defence.
76. The Court is not required to return any finding of mala fides against
CVC. The difficulty lies in the fact that, in the circumstances of the present
case, the disciplinary authority was expected to demonstrate a clear and
independent evaluation of the material before it, particularly when the first-
stage vigilance advice had expressed strong prima facie views on the
Petitioner’s conduct. That obligation assumed added significance when the
Ministry’s own internal notings had, at one stage, referred to the matter as
involving an “ administrative gap/lapse ” and reflected uncertainty regarding
the “ vigilance/integrity angle ”. The record, however, does not sufficiently
demonstrate such independent consideration.
B. Subsequent Arbitral Award and Settlement
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77. Reliance has also been placed on the arbitral award dated 28 April,
2008 and the subsequent settlement of disputes between SJVN and JHC.
According to the Petitioner, these developments demonstrate that the
contractor’s claims were not fictitious and that the payments released during
execution of the project did not result in the financial prejudice alleged in
the disciplinary proceedings.
78. The Respondents are correct in contending that a subsequent arbitral
award cannot retrospectively validate every procedural step taken at the time
of release of funds. Questions of financial propriety, authority and
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compliance with applicable procedures must ordinarily be assessed with
reference to the circumstances prevailing when the decision was taken. A
later award or settlement cannot, by itself, cure an otherwise irregular
exercise of authority.
79. At the same time, the subsequent developments cannot be treated as
wholly irrelevant. The disciplinary case, as framed and pursued, was not
confined to a technical breach of procedure. It proceeded on allegations of
undue favour to the contractor, injury to the Corporation’s financial interests
and conduct suggestive of deliberate protection of the contractor. The
subsequent arbitral award and the materials relating to settlement of disputes
between SJVN and JHC indicate that substantial claims of the contractor
were ultimately adjudicated upon or resolved through the settlement process.
In that context, the premise that the payments represented nothing more than
an unwarranted largesse extended to the contractor required closer
examination. These developments were plainly relevant to the issues of
financial prejudice to the Corporation, culpability and the gravity of the
misconduct alleged.
80. The Court does not suggest that the arbitral award or subsequent
settlement conclusively established the correctness of the decisions taken
during execution of the contract. Nor could the Inquiry Officer, whose report
had already been submitted in 2006, could be expected to consider
developments that occurred later. The significance of these subsequent
events lies elsewhere. By the time the punishment order came to be passed
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on 30 July, 2009, allegations of financial prejudice to the Corporation
continued to form an important part of the disciplinary narrative. Yet the
punishment order neither identifies nor analyses any specific financial loss
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attributable to the Petitioner’s conduct, nor does it indicate how the question
of financial prejudice was evaluated while imposing the extreme penalty of
dismissal from service coupled with forfeiture of retiral benefits. In these
circumstances, the absence of any meaningful examination of that aspect
assumes significance.
Penalty, Parity and Proportionality
A. Treatment of Co-delinquents and Parity
81. The treatment accorded to other officers associated with the
transactions in question constitutes a significant feature of the present case.
The record indicates that the first, second and third payments were
processed through multiple levels of the organisation. Different officers
participated at different stages by initiating proposals, examining claims,
making recommendations, according approvals or implementing decisions
relating to release of funds.
82. The record further indicates that several such officers were either not
proceeded against departmentally or were ultimately exonerated.
Proceedings concerning K.K. Gupta and S.K. Sharma, who were associated
with the processing of the first and second payments, culminated in
outcomes materially different from those visited upon the Petitioner. In
those proceedings, reference was made to the World Bank-monitored nature
of the project, the possible impact of delay in payments on commissioning
of the project and the fact that the transactions had received approval at
higher levels within the Corporation. Similarly, in the proceedings
concerning G.S. Rao, arising out of release of the amount of INR 24.56
crore without obtaining the undertaking contemplated by the Board, the
lapse was treated as not having resulted in dilution of the Corporation’s
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position or any identifiable financial loss.
83. The Court accepts the Respondents’ submission that the Petitioner
cannot claim automatic exoneration merely because other officers were
exonerated or treated more leniently. Nor can the office of Director
(Finance) be equated in all respects with positions held at other levels of the
organisation. A Director (Finance) carries a distinct degree of responsibility
and is expected to exercise independent financial judgment while also
discharging supervisory functions. In this regard, reliance placed by the
Respondents upon Raj Kumar is not misplaced. The Supreme Court
reiterated that parity cannot be claimed in the abstract and that officers
occupying positions of greater authority, trust and responsibility may
legitimately be subjected to more stringent consequences than co-
delinquents holding positions with comparatively limited powers. As
observed therein, authority carries accountability, and higher authority
carries correspondingly higher accountability.
84. That, however, does not conclude the matter. Where the transactions
arise out of the same project, involve the same payments and form part of
the same factual matrix, the disciplinary authority is required to explain why
considerations treated as mitigating or exculpatory in the case of some
officers cease to have any relevance in the case of another. The project
urgency, the approval of higher authorities, the nature of the contractor’s
claims and the absence of demonstrated financial loss were all matters which
featured in the treatment accorded to other officers. The impugned penalty
order does not explain why those considerations were wholly disregarded
while evaluating the Petitioner’s case.
85. In M. Raghavelu , the Supreme Court found it impermissible to
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sustain punishment against an officer who was only overall in-charge of the
work when the officers directly responsible for the execution of the work
had been exonerated on the same set of evidence. The Court observed that,
in the circumstances therein, there was no justification to single out the
appellant for a finding of guilt. In Rajendra Yadav , the Supreme Court
reiterated that parity among co-delinquents is a relevant consideration in
disciplinary matters and that punishment must bear a reasonable relationship
to the nature of participation and culpability established against each
delinquent. It was held that markedly unequal punishments imposed in
respect of the same incident, without a sustainable basis in the comparative
roles attributed to the delinquent officers, would not withstand scrutiny. In
12
Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Employees Association ,
the Supreme Court reiterated that while the choice of punishment ordinarily
lies within the domain of the disciplinary authority, a penalty that is grossly
excessive, unduly harsh or disproportionate remains amenable to judicial
review. These authorities do not mandate identical outcomes in every case;
they do, however, require that any differentiation in disciplinary
consequences rest on a discernible and rational basis.
86. In the present case, the Petitioner’s role was not identical to that of the
other officers involved in the transactions. Nonetheless, the disciplinary
authority was required to explain why his role was of such a different
character as to warrant dismissal from service and forfeiture of retiral
benefits, when others connected with the same transactions were either
exonerated or dealt with far more leniently. The absence of any meaningful
discussion on this aspect constitutes a significant infirmity in the decision-

12
(2007) 4 SCC 669.
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making process.
B. Proportionality of Penalty
87. The penalty imposed upon the Petitioner was dismissal from service
coupled with forfeiture of retiral benefits. The consequence of the penalty is
severe. It affects not only the employee’s service record but also benefits
accrued over the course of service and ordinarily reserved for the post-
service phase of employment.
88. Even assuming that certain lapses could be attributed to the Petitioner
in relation to the transactions under consideration, the proportionality of the
penalty must be assessed in the context of the entire record. The payments
were not clandestine transactions but were processed through multiple levels
of the organisation. The third payment was ultimately considered and
approved by the Board of Directors. The contemporaneous record reflects
the Petitioner’s concerns regarding regularisation and recovery, and
subsequent communications show that he continued to raise issues relating
to recovery. The contractor’s claims were thereafter the subject of arbitral
proceedings and subsequent settlement. The proceedings against other
officers resulted in materially different outcomes. By the time the
punishment order came to be passed, the Petitioner had already ceased to
hold the tenure post of Director (Finance). These were all relevant
considerations bearing upon the question of penalty.
89. The doctrine of proportionality does not permit a court exercising
judicial review to substitute its own view merely because a different penalty
could have been imposed. However, where the penalty imposed bears no
reasonable relationship to the nature of the misconduct established, the
surrounding circumstances and the overall record, judicial intervention
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becomes warranted. In the present case, viewed cumulatively, the
circumstances noticed above, together with the deficiencies identified in the
disciplinary process and the treatment accorded to other officers involved in
the same transactions, render the penalty of dismissal from service coupled
with forfeiture of retiral benefits disproportionate and unsustainable.
90. The punishment order suffers from an additional infirmity. While a
disciplinary authority may accept the findings recorded in an inquiry report,
the imposition of an extreme penalty must reflect an independent and
reasoned consideration of the issues bearing upon punishment. The
impugned order does not disclose the degree of evaluative exercise that the
circumstances of the present case warranted. This omission further
reinforces the conclusion that the penalty cannot be sustained.
Remand or Final Relief
91. The normal rule is that where a punishment order is set aside on
account of procedural infirmity, violation of natural justice or inadequate
consideration of material issues, the matter may be remitted to the
disciplinary authority for fresh consideration from the stage at which the
defect occurred. This principle reflects institutional deference to the
disciplinary authority and the limited nature of judicial review.
92. Remand, however, is not an inflexible consequence. Ordinarily, where
an inquiry or punishment order is found to suffer from procedural or
substantive infirmities, the matter may be remitted to the disciplinary
authority for fresh consideration. That course, however, is not invariably
required. Where the passage of time or other supervening circumstances
render a fresh disciplinary exercise unfair, harsh, oppressive or otherwise
unnecessary, the Court may mould final relief instead of directing remand.
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13
In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors. the Supreme Court declined
remand in view of the age of the matter and the prejudice already suffered
by the employee on account of prolonged disciplinary proceedings.
Likewise, in Krishna Narayan Tewari , it was recognised that although
remand may ordinarily be the proper course where an inquiry is found
deficient, a writ court may, in an appropriate case, decline remand where
long passage of time and other supervening circumstances render such a
course unjust or unnecessary.
93. The present case is one in which remand ought not to be ordered. The
events in question relate to the period between 1996 and 1998. The charge-
sheet was issued in 2004, the inquiry report was submitted in 2006 and the
punishment order came to be passed in 2009. The Petitioner has long since
crossed the age of superannuation and ceased to hold the office of Director
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(Finance) on 16 March, 2004. The proceedings concerning other officers
associated with the same transactions have attained finality, while the
disputes between SJVN and JHC have culminated in arbitral proceedings
and subsequent settlement. The record before the Court is substantially
documentary in nature, and the issues arising for consideration have been
fully canvassed on the basis of the material already available. In these
circumstances, a remand at this stage would serve no useful purpose and
would merely prolong proceedings that have already remained pending for
nearly three decades from the underlying events.
94. The infirmities identified in the present case are also not confined to
an isolated procedural defect capable of being cured through a limited
reconsideration. They extend to multiple aspects of the disciplinary process,

13
(2006) 5 SCC 88.
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including non-consideration of material documents and explanations,
deficiencies in the findings recorded on important charges, failure to
adequately address the jurisdictional objection arising from cessation of
tenure, and issues bearing upon parity and proportionality of punishment. In
these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that a fresh round of
disciplinary proceedings would meaningfully advance the matter or serve
the interests of justice.
95. The Court is therefore of the view that the interests of justice would
be better served by granting final relief rather than directing a fresh round of
disciplinary proceedings.
Conclusion and Directions
96. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is allowed in the
following terms:
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(i) The order dated 30 July, 2009 imposing the penalty of dismissal
from service and forfeiture of retiral benefits upon the Petitioner is hereby
quashed and set aside.
(ii) The Respondents shall treat the impugned penalty as non est for the
purpose of retiral and post-retiral benefits.
(iii) The Petitioner shall be entitled to all retiral dues and consequential
retirement benefits which would have been payable to him in accordance
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with law but for the punishment order dated 30 July, 2009. Such benefits
shall include gratuity, leave encashment, admissible post-retirement medical
benefits and all other consequential benefits, if any, payable under the
applicable rules.
(iv) The Respondents shall compute the amounts payable to the Petitioner
within eight weeks from the date of this order and release the same within
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four weeks thereafter.
(v) The Petitioner shall be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on the amounts found payable, calculated from the date on which
each amount became due until the date of actual payment. In the event the
amounts are not released within the period stipulated above, the outstanding
amount shall thereafter carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the
date of default until payment.
(vi) This order shall not be construed as directing reinstatement of the
Petitioner or as treating him to have continued as Director (Finance) beyond
the date on which his tenure came to an end. Nor shall it be construed as
entitling the Petitioner to salary or allowances attached to the tenure post for
any period after such cessation. The relief granted is confined to setting
aside the disciplinary penalty and its consequential civil consequences,
including forfeiture of retiral benefits.
(vii) No remand is ordered for the reasons recorded in this order.
97. The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.


SANJEEV NARULA, J
MAY 18, 2026/ as
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