Parmal Kaur vs State Of Punjab

CRM-M-49406-2026 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
221
CRM-M-49406-2026
Date of decision : 12.11.2026
Date of uploading:12.11.2026
PARMAL KAUR ………….Petitioner
Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB …….Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
.
Present: Mr. A.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the petitioner
Mr. Jaypreet Singh, DAG, Punjab.
---
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
th
1. Present 4 petition has been filed under Section 483 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail to the
petitioner in case bearing FIR No.0018 dated 26.02.2025, registered for
the offences punishable under Sections 22 of the NDPS Act (Section 29
of NDPS Act added later on), at Police Station Pasyana (Passiana),
District Patiala.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question pertains to the recovery of
398.392 grams of Tramadol Hydrochloride.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
in custody since 26.02.2025. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent
defects. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is
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CRM-M-49406-2026 -2-
delayed and the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner.
Learned counsel has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered
incarceration for more than 1 year. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in
nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.
Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is
restricted by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same
ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record
custody certificate dated 09.11.2026 in Court, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 26.02.2025, whereinafter,
investigation was carried out and the challan was presented on
24.04.2025. Total 12 prosecution witnesses have been cited, but only 1
has been given up and 7 have been examined up till date. The rival
contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated
upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to
delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice
the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the
likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or
interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1 The petitioner is a lady aged about 41 years (as per memo of
parties appended with the petition), hence, bail petition ought to be
considered in view of proviso to Section 480(1) BNSS. It is pertinent to
mention herein that the proviso to Section 480(1) BNSS, 2023, is pari
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CRM-M-49406-2026 -3-
materia with proviso to Section 437 Cr.P.C., 1973. In this regard, it would
be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by this Court on
14.03.2024 in CRM-M-11503-2024 titled as ‘Ravinder Kaur Vs. State
of Punjab’ (dealing with proviso to Section 437 Cr.P.C.), relevant thereof
reads as under:
“It would be apposite to refer herein to the dicta of a judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of ‘Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation & Anr., 2022(10) SCC 51’ , which held as under:
51. Proviso to Section 437 of the Code mandates that when the accused is
under the age of sixteen years, sick or infirm or being a woman, is
something which is required to be taken note of. Obviously, the court has
to satisfy itself that the accused person is sick or infirm. In a case
pertaining to women, the court is expected to show some sensitivity. We
have already taken note of the fact that many women who commit
cognizable offenses are poor and illiterate. In many cases, upon being
young they have children to take care of, and there are many instances
when the children are to live in prisons. The statistics would show that
more than 1000 children are living in prisons along with their mothers.
This is an aspect that the courts are expected to take note of as it would
not only involve the interest of the accused, but also the children who are
not expected to get exposed to the prisons. There is a grave danger of their
being inherited not only with poverty but with crime as well.
xxxx xxxx xxx
58. Section 437 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to deal with all the
offenses while considering an application for bail with the exception of an
offense punishable either with life imprisonment or death triable
exclusively by the Court of Sessions. The first proviso facilitates a court to
conditionally release on bail an accused if he is under the age of 16 years
or is a woman or is sick or infirm, as discussed earlier. This being a
welfare legislation, though introduced by way of a proviso, has to be
applied while considering release on bail either by the Court of Sessions
or the High Court, as the case may be. The power under Section 439 of the
Code is exercised against an order rejecting an application for bail and
against an offence exclusively decided by the Court of Sessions. There
cannot be a divided application of proviso to Section 437, while exercising
the power under Section 439. While dealing with a welfare legislation, a
purposive interpretation giving the benefit to the needy person being the
intendment is the role required to be played by the court. We do not wish
to state that this proviso has to be considered favourably in all cases as
the application depends upon the facts and circumstances contained
therein. What is required is the consideration per se by the court of this
proviso among other factors.’
6.2. As per custody certificate dated 09.11.2026 filed by learned
State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period
of 01 year, 08 months and 12 days & is shown to be involved in other
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CRM-M-49406-2026 -4-
cases/FIRs. Indubitably, the antecedents of a person are required to be
accounted for while considering a regular bail petition preferred by him.
However, this factum cannot be a ground sufficient by itself, to decline
the concession of regular bail to the petitioner in the FIR in question when
a case is made out for grant of regular bail qua the FIR in question by
ratiocinating upon the facts/circumstances of the said FIR. Reliance in this
regard can be placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Maulana Mohd. Amir Rashadi v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (1)
RCR (Criminal) 586 ; a Division Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Calcutta
High Court in case of Sridhar Das v. State, 1998 (2) RCR (Criminal)
477 & judgments of this Court in CRM-M No.38822-2022 titled as
Akhilesh Singh v. State of Haryana, decided on 29.11.2021, and Balraj
v. State of Haryana, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 191.
th
6.3 Indubitably, the present petition is the 4 attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the
petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.04.2026 by this Court in
CRM-M-19191-2025. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual milieu
of the case in hand, especially extended incarceration of the petitioner and
no substantial progress in trial, this Court is inclined to favourably
consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this regard,
can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-2023
titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another ; relevant
whereof reads as under:
“ 10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the
following principles emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
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II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and
showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not
suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive
bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of
petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this
issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the
Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a
plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the
cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained
such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and
clearly decipherable from the said order passed. ”
6.4. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after
relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1
SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR
(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West
Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”,
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as
“Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal
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Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra
@ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“ 7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail
any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there
is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This
right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio
decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have
laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental
rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty,
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy
trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of
the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to
impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of
the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality,
could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal
are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-
dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the
prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal
jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to
the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs.
The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and
prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an
obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The
guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused
against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal
charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost
or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability
of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the
consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed
innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and
physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions.
Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail
petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep
in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985
which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin
conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the
backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to
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CRM-M-49406-2026 -7-
life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted
delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is
neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the
prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind
bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid
down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its
wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye
to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with
bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the
legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right
of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration,
without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into
punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of
justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of
life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In
other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity,
on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. ”
In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds
to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned
trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the
following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral
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or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent herself on any date
before the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on
bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit her passport, if any, with
the trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give her cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change her cell-phone number without
prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the
trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit before the concerned trial
Court to the effect that she has not been involved in
the commission of any offence after being released on
bail. In case she is found to be involved in any offence
after being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the
basis of her affidavit or otherwise, the State is
mandated to move forthwith for cancellation of her
bail, which plea, but of course, shall be adjudicated
upon on its own merits.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as
directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
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opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
12.11.2026
ja 

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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