GREENMOUNT SPICES PRIVATE LIMITED vs WIPRO ENTERPRISES PRIVATE LIMITED
- Court
- Kerala High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS
TH
TUESDAY, THE 27 DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 / 5TH KARTHIKA, 1948
FAO NO. 95 OF 2026
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10.04.2026 IN IA 4/2024 IN OS
NO.22 OF 2024 OF II ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
GREENMOUNT SPICES PRIVATE LIMITED
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT IX-21A, NEAR GREEN
VALLEY PUBLIC SCHOOL, NELLIKUZHY P.O., KOTHAMANGALAM,
ERNAKULAM 686 691 REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING
DIRECTOR, MR. K.I. PAUL, AGED 65 YEARS, S/O. LATE
ISSAC, RESIDING AT KUTTICHIRAKUDIYIL HOUSE, OONNUKAL
P.O., ERNAKULAM, PIN - 686693
BY ADVS.
SHRI.VIZZY GEORGE KOKKAT
SRI.V.BOVAN CHERIAN VARKEY
SHRI.K.HARI SANKAR
SMT.ANJALA FARHATH V.S.
SMT.LIKHITHA MANOJ
RESPONDENT/PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:
WIPRO ENTERPRISES PRIVATE LIMITED
WIPRO HOUSE, NO 8, 7TH MAIN, 80 FEET ROAD,
KORAMANGALA, 1ST BLOCK, BANGALORE, KARNATAKA 560 034
REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTE
ATTORNEY, MS. MALAVIKA B., AGED 24 YEARS, D/O.
BALASUBRAMANYAN, RESIDING AT 2ND CROSS ROAD,
RAMACHANDRA REDDY LAYOUT, ITI LAYOUT, SECTOR 2, HSR
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LAYOUT, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA, PIN - 560068
BY ADVS.
SRI.BENOY K.KADAVAN
SMT.LAYA GEORGE
SMT.MARIAM J. MANAVALAN
THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 23.10.2026, THE COURT ON 27.10.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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“C.R”
C.S.DIAS,J.
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F.A.O. No.95 of 2026
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th
Dated this the 27 day of October, 2026
JUDGMENT
The appellant is the defendant in O.S. No. 22 of 2024
on the file of the Additional District Judge-II, Ernakulam.
The respondent has instituted the suit seeking to restrain
the appellant from manufacturing, advertising, selling,
distributing, offering for sale or exporting food products,
including sambar powder, and from using the respondent’s
trade mark, or any identical or deceptively similar mark—
including ‘BRAHMINS’ or ‘BRAHMINS SAMBAR
POWDER’—on packaging, websites, as a trade name or
domain name, either independently or as part of another
mark, with or without a prefix or suffix. Along with the suit,
the respondent filed an application for temporary injunction
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seeking substantially the same relief as in the plaint. The
appellant opposed the application by filing a counter-
affidavit. By the order under challenge, the Trial Court
allowed the application as prayed for. Aggrieved by the
order, this appeal is filed.
2. I have heard Sri. Vizzy George Kokkat, learned
counsel for the appellant, and Sri. Benoy K. Kadavan,
learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted
that the impugned order is ex facie erroneous. The Trial
Court has failed to consider the legal principles on the
point and the materials on record in their proper
perspective. The appellant’s trade mark is ‘Greenmount’,
whereas ‘Brahmin Sambar Powder’ is used only
descriptively to identify the product. The Trial Court has
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the latter
expression was being used as the appellant’s trade mark.
According to the learned Counsel, Ext.A44 document
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demonstrates that ‘Greenmount’ is the distinctive mark and
‘Brahmin Sambar Powder’ merely describes the product;
the concurrent use of the expressions, therefore, does not
cause any confusion or deception. The learned Counsel
also argued that the Trial Court has failed to properly
interpret Section 30(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (‘Act’,
for brevity). The word ‘Brahmin’ denotes a traditional
Hindu community having a cultural association, and sambar
is an integral part of their cuisine. The expression
‘Brahmin Sambar Powder’ is generic and descriptive and is
protected by Section 30(2)(a) of the Act. Ext. B1 series
documents establish uninterrupted use of the trade name
‘Greenmount Brahmin Sambar Powder’ since 2011. The
learned Counsel further submitted that the products of
both parties have co-existed in the market for years without
any confusion in the minds of their respective customers or
consumers. The respondent’s predecessor applied for
registration only on 06.06.2008. Therefore, no exclusive
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right can be claimed over the expression ‘Brahmins Sambar
Powder’. Learned Counsel also contended that the Trial
Court has failed to consider the scope of Sections 15 and 17
of the Act. He accordingly prayed that the appeal be
allowed and the impugned order be set aside.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the
appeal. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Wander Ltd. & Others v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd.
[1990 Supp. SCC 727], he submitted that an appellate court
ought not to substitute a discretionary order passed by the
court of first instance unless such discretion has been
exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely. There is no
such infirmity in the present order. In 2023, the
respondent acquired the Brahmins group business together
with its trade mark and goodwill and is now the owner of
the trade mark ‘Brahmins’. The respondent holds 29
registrations for the word ‘Brahmins’, which is a dominant
feature in respect of food products. The respondent’s
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predecessor had launched ‘Brahmins Sambar Powder’ in
1989 using a distinctive recipe. The product is one of the
respondent’s leading products. Nearly 120 products
manufactured by the respondent are marketed in India
and abroad through extensive promotion and a wide
distribution network. The learned Counsel further
submitted that, due to continuous use and promotion, the
trade mark and name ‘Brahmins’ have acquired
distinctiveness, and is a well-known household brand.
Following consumer complaints, the respondent discovered
that the appellant had marketed products under the
expression ‘Brahmin Sambar Powder’, thereby causing
confusion in the minds of consumers. Inspite of the
respondent’s predecessor issuing a cease-and-desist notice
to the appellant, they did not stop the infringment, leading
to the institution of the suit. Annexures R1(a) to R1(m)
certificates substantiate the respondent is the owner of the
trade mark ‘Brahmins’. The Trial Court, after considering
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the rival pleadings and materials on record, has correctly
passed the impugned order. The appeal is devoid of merit
and is only liable to be dismissed.
5. The question for determination is whether there is
any error or illegality in the impugned order warranting
interference by this Court.
6. The controversy concerns the appellant’s use of the
word ‘Brahmin’ and the expression ‘Brahmin Sambar
Powder’ on its products. The respondent relies on the
certificates of registration of trade marks issued by the
Registrar of Trade Marks under Section 23(2) of the Act
read with Rule 56(1) of the Trade Mark Rules, 2017,
marked as Annexures R1(a) to R1(m), and claims ownership
of the trade mark ‘Brahmins’ in relation to various products
falling under thirteen classes, including ‘Brahmins Sambar
Powder’.
7. The statutory provisions material for the
determination of this appeal are Sections 27 to 30 and
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Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. They are
extracted hereinbelow for convenience:
“27. No action for infringement of unregistered trade mark.—(1)
No person shall be entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent, or
to recover damages for, the infringement of an unregistered trade
mark.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of
action against any person for passing off goods or services as the
goods of another person or as services provided by another person,
or the remedies in respect thereof.
28. Rights conferred by registration.—(1) Subject to the other
provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark shall, if valid,
give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive
right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is registered and to
obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the
manner provided by this Act.
(2) The exclusive right to the use of a trade mark given under
sub-section (1) shall be subject to any conditions and limitations to
which the registration is subject.
(3) Where two or more persons are registered proprietors of
trade marks, which are identical with or nearly resemble each
other, the exclusive right to the use of any of those trade marks
shall not (except so far as their respective rights are subject to any
conditions or limitations entered on the register) be deemed to
have been acquired by any one of those persons as against any
other of those persons merely by registration of the trade marks
but each of those persons has otherwise the same rights as against
other persons (not being registered users using by way of
permitted use) as he would have if he were the sole registered
proprietor.
29. Infringement of registered trade marks.—(1) A registered
trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered
proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the
course of trade, a mark which is identical with, or deceptively
similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect
of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to
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render the use of the mark likely to be taken as being used as a
trade mark.
(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not
being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted
use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of-
(a) its identity with the registered trade mark and the similarity
of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or
(b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or
similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade
mark; or
(c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity
of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, is
likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely
to have an association with the registered trade mark.
(3) In any case falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2), the
court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of
the public.
(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not
being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted
use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which-
(a) is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered; and
(c) the registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the
use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is
detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered
trade mark.
(5) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person if he uses
such registered trade mark, as his trade name or part of his trade
name, or name of his business concern or part of the name, of his
business concern dealing in goods or services in respect of which the
trade mark is registered.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person uses a
registered mark, if, in particular, he-
(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof;
(b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the
market, or stocks them for those purposes under the
registered trade mark, or offers or supplies services under the
registered trade mark;
(c) imports or exports goods under the mark; or
(d) uses the registered trade mark on business papers or in
advertising.
(7) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who
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applies such registered trade mark to a material intended to be used
for labelling or packaging goods, as a business paper, or for
advertising goods or services, provided such person, when he applied
the mark, knew or had reason to believe that the application of the
mark was not duly authorised by the proprietor or a licensee.
(8) A registered trade mark is infringed by any advertising of
that trade mark if such advertising-
(a) takes unfair advantage of and is contrary to honest practices
in industrial or commercial matters; or
(b) is detrimental to its distinctive character; or
(c) is against the reputation of the trade mark.
(9) Where the distinctive elements of a registered trade mark consist
of or include words, the trade mark may be infringed by the spoken use of
those words as well as by their visual representation and reference in this
section to the use of a mark shall be construed accordingly.
30. Limits on effect of registered trade mark.- (1) Nothing in section 29
shall be construed as preventing the use of a registered trade mark by any
person for the purposes of identifying goods or services as those of the
proprietor provided the use-
(a) is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters, and
(b) is not such as to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the
distinctive character or repute of the trade mark
(2) A registered trade mark is not infringed where-
(a) the use in relation to goods or services indicates the kind, quality,
quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of
production of goods or of rendering of services or other characteristics of
goods or services;
(b) a trade mark is registered subject to any conditions or limitations, the
use of the trade mark in any manner in relation to goods to be sold or
otherwise traded in, in any place, or in relation to goods to be exported to
any market or in relation to services for use or available or acceptance in
any place or country outside India or in any other circumstances, to which,
having regard to those conditions or limitations, the registration does not
extend;
(c) the use by a person of a trade mark—
(i) in relation to goods connected in the course of trade with the
proprietor or a registered user of the trade mark if, as to those
goods or a bulk or which they form part, the registered proprietor or
the registered user conforming to the permitted use has applied the
trade mark and has not subsequently removed or obliterated it, or
has at any time expressly or impliedly consented to the use of the
trade mark; or
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(ii) in relation to services to which the proprietor of such mark
or of a registered user conforming to the permitted use has applied
the mark, where the purpose and effect of the use of the mark is to
indicate, in accordance with the fact, that those services have been
performed by the proprietor or a registered user of the mark;
(d) the use of a trade mark by a person in relation to goods
adapted to form part of, or to be accessory to, other goods or
services in relation to which the trade mark has been used without
infringement of the right given by registration under this Act or
might for the time being be so used, if the use of the trade mark is
reasonably necessary in order to indicate that the goods or services
are so adapted, and neither the purpose nor the effect of the use of
the trade mark is to indicate, otherwise than in accordance with the
fact, a connection in the course of trade between any person and the
goods or services, as the case may be;
(e) the use of a registered trade mark, being one of two or
more trade marks registered under this Act which are identical or
nearly resemble each other, in exercise of the right to the use of that
trade mark given by registration under this Act.
(3) Where the goods bearing a registered trade mark are
lawfully acquired by a person, the sale of the goods in the market or
otherwise dealing in those goods by that person or by a person
claiming under or through him is not infringement of a trade by
reason only of-
(a) the registered trade mark having been assigned by the
registered proprietor to some other person, after the acquisition of
those goods; or
(b) the goods having been put on the market under the
registered trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
(4) Sub-section (3) shall not apply where there exists
legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further dealings in
the goods in particular, where the condition of the goods, has been
changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.
135. Relief in suits for infringement or for passing off.-
(1) The relief which a court may grant in any suit for
infringement or for passing off referred to in section 134 includes
injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and at the
option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits, together
with or without any order for the delivery-up of the infringing labels and
marks for destruction or erasure.
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(2) The order of injunction under sub-section (1) may include
an ex parte injunction or any interlocutory order for any of the
following matters, namely:-
(a) for discovery of documents;
(b) preserving of infringing goods, documents or other
evidence which are related to the subject-matter of the suit;
(c) restraining the defendant from disposing of or dealing
with his assets in a manner which may adversely affect plaintiff’s ability to
recover damages, costs or other pecuniary remedies which may be finally
awarded to the plaintiff…………………………………”
8. Sections 27 and 28 of the Act delineate the
framework for trade mark protection. Section 27(1) bars
proceedings for infringement of an unregistered trade
mark, while Section 27(2) preserves the independent
remedy of passing off. Under Section 28, a valid
registration confers on the registered proprietor an
exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the goods or
services for which it is registered and to seek relief for
infringement, subject to the provisions under the Act and
any conditions or limitations attached to the registration.
Section 29 identifies the circumstances under which the
use of a mark may constitute infringement. Section 29(2)
addresses the relevant combinations of identity or similarity
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between the marks and the goods or services, and the
likelihood of confusion or association. Section 30 lays down
the effect of a registered trade mark. Section 30(1) permits
use for identifying the proprietor’s goods or services only if
the use accords with honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters and does not take unfair advantage of,
or cause detriment to, the distinctive character or repute of
the mark. Section 30(2)(a) excludes infringement where the
use genuinely indicates the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, geographical origin, time of production or
other characteristics of the goods or services. Section 135
provides for the reliefs available in suits for infringement or
passing off, including injunctions, damages and specified ex
parte or interlocutory orders.
9. At the interlocutory stage, this Court is not required
to decide whether the respondent would ultimately
establish the infringement after trial. The immediate
inquiry is whether the materials on record satisfies the
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trinity parameters, including a prima facie case, to sustain
the temporary injunction granted by the Trial Court.
10. The principal plank of the appellant’s defence rests
on Section 30(2)(a) of the Act. According to the appellant,
the product is marketed under the distinctive mark
‘Greenmount’, while ‘Brahmin Sambar Powder’ is used only
to describe the product, which is a popular cuisine of the
Brahmin community, over which the respondent cannot
state any claim. Therefore, the appellant has not infringed
the respondent’s mark. The appellant further relies on its
alleged continuous use of the above name, and the absence
of any confusion in the minds of consumers. The
respondent, on the other hand, claims that it acquired the
Brahmins group business, including the trade mark and
goodwill, in 2023 and is the proprietor of the mark
‘Brahmins’. It relies on 29 registrations for the word
‘Brahmins’ and representations in which the said word is a
dominant feature, in relation to food products. The
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respondent asserts that its predecessor launched
‘Brahmins Sambar Powder’ in 1989 using a distinctive
recipe, and relies on the registration certificates, produced
as Annexures R1(a) to R1(m), in support of its claim to have
registered rights across thirteen classes of products.
11. Section 30(2)(a) does not confer an unrestricted
licence to use a registered expression merely because the
user characterises it as descriptive. Its application turns on
whether, viewed in its context, the expression is genuinely
used to indicate the kind or another characteristic of the
goods. Conversely, the existence of a registration does not
relieve the proprietor of the obligation to establish the
elements required by the statutory provision. The
competing claims must be assessed in the light of the
registration particulars and the overall presentation of the
product, including the prominence, placement and relative
size of the words and the presence of other distinctive
features. These matters can only be decided after a full-
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fledged trial and not at the interlocutory stage.
12. Ext. A1 inauguration notice dated 13.07.1987,
prima facie indicates that Brahmins food products was
launched in 1987. Ext. A2 municipal licence dated
04.07.1987, supports the respondent’s case that its
predecessor was licensed to manufacture curry powder.
The respondent has also relied on Exts. A9 to A28
documents to prove the registrations for products
incorporating the word ‘Brahmins’ in different classes. Ext.
A23 is a status page and registration certificate relating to
the application to substitute the respondent as the
subsequent purchaser of the trade mark. Going by the
appellant’s own case, use of the name ‘Greenmount
Brahmin Sambar Powder’ commenced only in 2011. At this
stage, these materials lend prima facie support to the
respondent’s claim of prior use. The appellant’s reliance on
the mark ‘Greenmount’ does not, by itself, answer the
question of infringement: a product may bear one mark
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identifying its manufacturer while another expression may
be presented in a manner that suggests a commercial
association. Equally, the mere appearance of a word on
packaging does not establish infringement. The relevant
consideration is how the average consumer is likely to
perceive the mark and the product as a whole, in the
context of the goods concerned. The appellant’s plea of
prior or continuous use must likewise be tested against the
precise mark used, the goods for which it was used, the
nature and extent of the use, and the applicable
registration particulars. Nor does the assertion of peaceful
co-existence, by itself, settle whether the impugned use is
lawful or whether confusion is likely. The respondent’s
registration and claim of longstanding use, as well as the
appellant’s defence of descriptive use, are matters to be
adjudicated.
13. The Trial Court, after analysing the facts, the
materials on record and the principles laid down in the
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decisions in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai
and Others [2022 KHC 6064], Pernod Ricard India Private
Limited & Another v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra [2025 SCC
Online SC 1701], Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v.
Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories [AIR 1965 SC 980],
A.C. Krishnan v. Nambisans Dairy Pvt. Ltd. [1997 KHC 32]
and Rajeev K.P. v. Unais K.K. [2025 KHC 2308], has arrived
at a conclusion that the respondent had satisfied the three
fold principles for an order of temporary injunction, and
has granted the relief sought.
14. In Shruti Manav Sharma v. Sunanina Singh [2026
KHC OnLine 6611], the Supreme Court has explained the
principles governing the grant of an order of temporary
injunction, and the limited scope of appellate interference
with discretionary orders of the said nature. The relevant
passages are extracted below:
“22. The Indian formulation, adopting the American Cyanamid
language, is found in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra), where this Court held
that the interlocutory remedy is intended "to preserve in status quo the
rights of the parties which may appear on a prima face case." This
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preservative purpose is echoed in the structure of the statute itself: Order
XXXIX R.1(a) speaks of property "in danger of being wasted, damaged or
alienated," and S.94 of the Code speaks of preventing "the ends of justice
from being defeated." This Court (Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 388) explained that an interim order
is intended to protect the subject - matter of the proceedings until disposal
of the case, so that the ultimate relief, if the party succeeds, is not
rendered meaningless.
VIII. PRIMA FACIE CASE: A SERIOUS QUESTION TO BE TRIED
24. The threshold for a prima facie case is a modest one. It does not
require proof of title; it requires only that the claim not be frivolous or
vexatious - a serious question to be tried. A prima facie case does not
mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be
established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were
believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made
out, the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was
possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and as to whether that was
the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence (Martin
Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79).
25. The classic modern statement is Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh,
(1992) 1 SCC 719:
"The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the
enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the
grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be
confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on
evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial
question raised, bona fide which needs investigation and a
decision on merits."
26. This Court elucidated the meaning of expression 'prima facie
case' in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) to mean that the Court
should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the
hearing, and there is a probability that of plaintiff obtaining the relief at
the conclusion of the trial on the basis of the material placed before the
Court. The expression 'prima facie case' means a substantial question
raised bona fide which needs investigation and decision on merits and the
Court, at the initial stage, cannot insist upon a full proof case warranting
an eventual decree (Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad & Ors.;
(2001) 5 SCC 568, Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi &
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Ors.; (2024) 11 SCC 351 and State of Kerala v. Union of India; (2024) 7
SCC 183).
IX. BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
28. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for injunction has also
to advert itself to the second essential ingredient for grant of injunction
viz. 'balance of convenience'. In order to determine whether the balance of
convenience lies, the Court must weigh two matters. The first is to protect
the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not
be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the
uncertainty were to be resolved in his favour. The second matter is that
the defendant's need to be protected against injury resulting from his
having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he
could not be adequately compensated by an undertaking if the uncertainty
were to be resolved in defendant's favour at the trial (Halsbury's Laws of
England, Fourth Edition, Vol– 24, para 856, American Cynamid Co. and
Ethicon Ltd.; (1975) 1 All ER 504 and Fellowes and Son v. Fisher; (1975) 2
All ER 829).
29. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated with approval by this
Court in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) and it has been held that need to
protect the plaintiff against the injury by violation of his right for which he
cannot be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the
uncertainty were to be resolved in his favour has to be weighed against
the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury
resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his legal rights
for which he would not be adequately compensated. The Court, therefore,
must weigh one need against another and determine where the 'balance of
convenience' lies.
IRREPARABLE INJURY
31. The Court, while dealing with the prayer for grant of injunction
is required to consider the third essential ingredient viz. irreparable
injury. This Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. (supra) has held that
the Court is required to satisfy itself that the party seeking injunction
needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury and the
injury is such which cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. Thus, the Court is required to satisfy itself that in case an
injunction as prayed for is not granted, the party seeking the same will
suffer irreparable injury.
32. A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of
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right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a remedy which is
discretionary in nature. However, such a discretion has to be exercised on
the touchstone of trinity test viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience
and irreparable injury (Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi & Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 161). It is equally well settled legal proposition
that the temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to
grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free
from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands (Seema Arshad
Zaheer & Ors. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors., (2006) 5
SCC 282).
33. This is precisely the injury that is irreparable in the sense in
which equity uses that word. Loss of controlling shareholding in family
companies, or the creation of third - party rights in properties acquired
with the proceeds of disputed transfers, that a subsequent decree cannot
unwind, is the paradigm of such injury; it is not mere financial loss
capable of computation and recovery from a solvent party, of the kind that
courts, following Evans Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola SA ([1973] 1 WLR
349), have held to be adequately met by an award of damages. No decree
for money could restore to the appellants the specific shareholding and
properties in question, once alienated to third parties during the pendency
of the suit.
XI. THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE INTERFERENCE
36. An order on an application for temporary injunction is a
discretionary one, and an appellate court does not ordinarily substitute its
own discretion for that of the court of first instance, save where the
discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely, or in
ignorance of the settled principles governing the grant or refusal of such
relief. The principle laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) which has
been approved by subsequent decisions of this Court (Shyam Sel and
Power Limited v. Shyam Steel Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC 634 and
Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra)), has been guiding the appellate courts
in the country for decades while exercising the appellate jurisdiction
considering the correctness of the discretion and jurisdiction for grant or
refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The order of the learned Single Judge,
resting as it does on seven specific findings addressing the nature of the
original plaintiff's interest under the Will, the doubt surrounding its
finality, the plea of undue influence, and the alter - ego character of the
defendant entities, cannot be said to be arbitrary, capricious or perverse,
nor to have been passed in ignorance of settled principle. It is, on the
contrary, an order squarely anchored in the three conditions that govern
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the grant of interim injunction. The Division Bench's substitution of its
own appreciation of the Will, of the parties' conduct, and of the
applicability of statutory provisions bearing on the final merits, for the
exercise of discretion by the learned Single Judge, was not warranted on
the standard it had itself correctly recited, and constitutes precisely the
kind of interference that Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra) forbids.
(emphasis given)
XII. THE VICE OF THE MINI – TRIAL
37. Before parting with these appeals, we consider it necessary to
record our disquiet at a recurring feature of orders passed under Order
XXXIX of the Code, and of appellate orders reviewing them, that reach this
Court. Such orders are, with increasing frequency, running into pages of
close analysis of the rival documents, weighing the probable outcome of
issues of title, undue influence or fraud, and expressing views, in
substance, on which party is likely to succeed at trial. Orders become
lengthy for a single reason: the court passing them has, whether
consciously or not, entered upon the final merits of the controversy and
conducted what is, in substance, a mini - trial upon affidavits and
documents that properly await the leading of evidence.
38. This is not what Order XXXIX requires, nor what the law
permits - whether of the court of first instance or of an appellate
court reviewing it. Lord Diplock's caution (American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396), that the interlocutory stage is not the
occasion to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit or to decide
difficult questions of law calling for mature consideration, has been
consistently accepted in India. This Court (Colgate Palmolive (India)
Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 1), emphasised the
court's reluctance to decide difficult questions of law or fact at the
interlocutory stage. The scope of examination on an application
under Order XXXIX - and, equally, of an appeal against an order
made on such an application – is confined to the limited and
threshold question whether the plaintiff has shown a serious dispute
meriting investigation at trial; it does not extend to an examination
of the final effect, probative value or ultimate merits of the
documents annexed to the pleadings, which is the trial court's task,
to be undertaken after evidence and not before.”
15. In Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. and Another
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v. Sudhir Bhatia and Others [2004 KHC 467], the Supreme
Court held that, in cases involving infringement of a trade
mark or copyright, an injunction would ordinarily follow.
Applying the principles laid down in the afore-cited
decisions to the facts and materials on record, and for the
reasons set out herein above and in the impugned order, I
am satisfied that the respondent has established a prima
facie case, supported by materials indicating prior
commercial use of the ‘Brahmins’ trade mark. The balance
of convenience is also in favour of the respondent. If the
impugned use is ultimately found to infringe the
respondent’s rights, its continued use may erode the
distinctiveness of the trade mark and cause injury not
readily compensable in damages. These conclusions are
tentative and shall not prejudice the final adjudication of
the suit. I find no arbitrariness or perversity in the
impugned order warranting inference by this Court. The
appeal is meritless and is accordingly dismissed. The Trial
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Court is directed to decide the suit, in accordance with
law, untrammelled by any observation made either in the
impugned order or in this judgment.
Sd/-
C.S.DIAS, JUDGE
rmm/24/10/2026
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APPENDIX OF FAO NO. 95 OF 2026
RESPONDENT ANNEXURES
Annexure R1 (a) True Copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5820846 in class 3
issued to the Plaintiff dated 18.05.2025
Annexure R1 (b) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5820851 in class 5
issued to the Plaintiff dated 17.10.2024
Annexure R1 (c) True copy Of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with NO. 5820853 in class 29
issued to the Plaintiff dated 05.02.2026
Annexure R1 (d) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with NO. 5820855 in class 30
issued to the Plaintiff dated 01.05.2026
Annexure R1 (e) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5820857 in class 43
issued to the Plaintiff dated 27.11.2025
Annexure R1 (f) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with NO. 5786278 in class 29
and 30 issued to the Plaintiff dated
02.08.2025
Annexure R1 (g) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5786281 in class 29
and 30 issued to the Plaintiff dated
07.06.2025.
Annexure R1 (h) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with NO. 5786283 in class 29
and 30 issued to the Plaintiff dated
21.09.2024
Annexure R1 (I)
True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5786284 in class 29
and 30 issued to the Plaintiff dated
19.04.2025.
True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No.4541270 in class 43
issued to the Plaintiff dated 04.05.2024
Annexure R1 (k) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No.4541265 in class 29
issued to the Plaintiff dated 06.12.2023
Annexure R1 (j)
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Annexure R1 (l) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5908270 in class 29
issued to the Plaintiff dated 04.10.2025
Annexure R1 (m) True copy of the Trademark Registration
Certificate with No. 5908271 in class 30
issued to the Plaintiff dated 02.05.2024.
Annexure R1 (n)
True copy of the interim order dated
21/3/2025 in I.A No. 4/2025 in os. 15/2025.
True copy of the Judgment dated 25/
11/2025 in O.S 15/2025.
Annexure R1 (o)
Annexure R1 (p) True copy of the Compromise Decree dated
25/ 11/2025 in O.S 15/2025.
Annexure R1 (q) True copy of the notice dated 01.02.2023
issued by the Respondent and the response
dated 02.03.2023 from Manjilas Food Tech
Private Limited.