Mount Everest Cghs Ltd vs Registrar Cooperative Socities & Ors.

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of decision: 3 September, 2026
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Uploaded on: 9 September, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010412562026
+ W.P.(C) 12733/2026
MOUNT EVEREST CGHS LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shivam Goel, Ms. Ramya S. Goel,
Ms. Sanya Sharma & Ms. Ishika
Kanyal, Advs.
versus
REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES & ORS......Respondent
Through: Mr. Shashi Pratap Singh, Ms.
Laqshyaa Saluja & Ms. Anamika
Tyagi, Advs. for R-1.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
CM APPL. 59193/2026 (for exemption)
2. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Applications are disposed of.
W.P.(C) 12733/2026 & CM APPL. 59192/2026 (for interim relief)
3. The present petition has been filed by the Petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, inter alia , assailing the impugned judgement
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dated 2 April, 2026 passed by the Delhi Co-operative Tribunal in
(hereinafter, ‘DCT’) in Appeal No.102/2024/DCT as also the impugned
award dated 3rd April, 2023 passed by the Respondent No. 3 in Arbitration
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12733/2026 Page 1 of 10
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

Case No.72/DR/ARB/21-22 .
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4. Vide the impugned judgement, the arbitral award dated 3 April, 2023
(hereinafter, ‘the impugned award’) has been upheld by the DCT.
5. The brief background is that the Respondent No. 2- Mr. Sudhanshu
Dutt had obtained membership of the Petitioner-society namely Mount
Everest C.G.H.S. Pvt. ltd. (hereinafter, ‘the Society’) and the said Society was
to allot flats to the members, some time in June, 2000.
6. Respondent No.2 had made payment of a sum of Rs. 8,60,110/- to the
Society, against the application, admission fee and demands of the Society.
However, due to various reasons, the Delhi Development Authority
(hereinafter, ‘DDA’ ) had blacklisted the Society. At that stage, Respondent
No.2 is stated to have sought withdrawal of the amount paid to the Society
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along with interest vide letter dated 9 September, 2000. The relevant extract
of the said letter reads as under:
“ To
The Hon. Secretary,
The Mount Everest Co-operative
Group Housing Society Ltd.
K-9, Khirki Extension,
Malviya Nagar, New Delhi-110017
Sir,
We want to withdraw xxx. Society due to difficulty face by
xxx. ervicing the loan taken for xxx. of the cost of the flats.
Therefore my request that the amount paid by us may be
refunded to us along with 15% interest which is paid by us
to HDFC and other lenders.
Thanking you.
Yours faithfully
Sudhanshu Dutt
Surabhi Dutt”
Signature Not Verified
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

7. The Society, however, had communicated to the member that he would
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be refunded the amount along with interest @7%, vide its letter dated 30
September, 2000. The relevant extract of the said letter reads:
“Mr. Sudhanshu Dutta
Ms. Surabhi Dutt
615, Ranka Court
18 Cambridge Layout
Bangalore-8
Sub: Withdrawal of membership & refund of deposited
amount
Dear Member,
Please refer to your letter dated 9t hSeptember, 2000
regarding withdrawal from the membership of the society &
refund of deposited money.
This is to confirm that your request has been accepted by
the society & the deposited money will be refunded
alongwith interest 7% as per rule applicable as soon as we
have the replacement of your membership.
Thanking you,”
8. A sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- is stated to have been refunded to the
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Respondent No.2 vide letter dated 5 October, 2000 as part payment. The
remaining amount of Rs. 3,60,000/- remained unpaid.
9. In respect of the said amount, which was unpaid, various letters were
written by Respondent No.2 seeking refund.
10. Litigation ensued between the Managing committee of the society and
the Respondent No.2, however, no progress was made in respect of the refund.
11. Thereafter, a writ petition was filed by the Respondent No.2, being
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W.P.(C) 6540/2007 which was decided on 3 August, 2010. Since the
Respondent No.2 had requested to withdraw from the society and as part
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

payment had been made by the society, in the said writ petition, the Court in
paragraph 3 had observed as under:
“... The result of al1 the scrutiny is that there is now a
final list of 132 members. We may note that it is alleged
that there are four other members who have however
either partly or wholly taken back refund. and have not
been found to be eligible to be included in the list nor
in any litigation initiated by them pending. The result
of this is that it is these 132 members who have to be
allotted flats.”
12. In view of the fact that the Respondent No.2 was given partial refund
of the amounts deposited by him, no allotment of flat was made to the
Respondent No.2.
13. Pursuant thereto, Respondent No.2 initiated proceedings under Section
70 and 71 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 (hereinafter, ‘DCS
Act’) seeking recovery of the balance unpaid amount, leading to the impugned
award. The operative portion of the arbitral award reads as under:
“Under the circumstances, I have considered the facts of
the claimant, documentary evidence placed on record and
after hearing both parties, I deem it appropriate to pass
an award in favour of the claimant and against the
defendant society for the reliefs claimed as (i) Rs.
3,60,000-00 being Principle amount; (ii) interest @ 7%
(as per letter of the defendant society dated 30.09.2000)
per annum from 05.04.1999 i.e. the last payment made
by the claimant, till actual payment is made; (iii)
Arbitration fee of Rs. 5,000/- and (iv) costs @7½ under
Rule 85(5) of DCS Rules 2007, to be paid by the
defendant society to the claimant.
The Award is passed accordingly.
Issued under my hand & seal on this 3rd day of
April, 2023.”
14. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the Society before the DCT against
the impugned award. The DCT considered the entire matter including the
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

question of limitation and observed that the impugned award does not deserve
to be interfered with.
15. Mr. Goel, ld. Counsel for the Society has vehemently urged before the
Court that Respondent No.2 has invoked arbitration in a belated manner. It is
further submitted that the claim petition under Section 70 of DCS Act was
barred by limitation, and hence the refund could not have been granted. Mr.
Singh appearing for the RCS submits that both the orders are well-reasoned
and no interference is called for.
16. The Court has considered the matter. The issue as to whether the claim
of the Respondent No.2 was barred by limitation or not has been dealt with
by the DCT in paragraph 7 of impugned order. The said paragraph is as under:
“7 There is no dispute to the fact that respondents/ claim
petitioners deposited an amount of Rs.8,60,000/- each
towards cost of the flat. It is also not disputed that they
have been refunded an amount of Rs.8,60,000/- i.e.
Rs.5,00,000/- to Sudhanshu Dutt and Rs.3,60,000/- to
Surbhi Dutt. It is also not disputed that the balance
amount of Rs.8,60,000/- has not been refunded. As per
the best case of appellant/ Society, the claim petitioners
have not raised fresh demands after 03.08.2010, when
the writ petition came to be disposed of. It is certainly
not the case of appellant that the amount stood refunded
or that the amount was not deposited by the claim
petitioners. The refund is sought to be defended only on
the ground of delay. Referring to Sec.-70 of the Delhi
Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as
‘the DCS Act’), it is submitted that the claim petition
could have been instituted at best within 6 years of the
cause of action having accrued. Reliance has been
placed upon Suresh Chand Jain' s case (supra ) . We
have applied our minds to the law laid down in the cited
judgement. A study of the same reveals that amount of
Rs. 40,000/- which was deposited by the writ petitioner
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

towards entry fee was sought to be refunded for the first
time in the year 2009 and the deposit had been made on
07.07.1999. There was thus a delay of almost 10 years
in raising the issue for the first time. The Hon’ble High
Court, therefore, held that there was a delay and the
claim petition was time barred . The facts in the present
case are absolutely distinguishable. In the present case,
demand was raised for the first time in the year
09.09.2000 itself and the deposit had been made in the
1998-1999. There was, thus, no delay in making the
first claim for refund. Thus, there was absolutely no
delay in making the first claim for refund. Society
acknowledged its liability to refund and the fact of
deposit, vide its communication dated 05.10.2000,
when it partly refunded the amount to each of the
claim petitioners. There are on record
communications till the year 2006, when the claim
petitioners from time to time reminded the appellant/
society of its claim and society acknowledged the same.
The fact of part refund was also pleaded in writ petition
filed by the claim petitioners and noticed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, in its judgement, dated
03.08.2010. Society's challenge to the writ petition to
the judgement rendered by the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi in writ petition is stated to be still pending before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Therefore, it is
not a case where the claim of the claim petitioners has
become stale or is hit by delay and lashes. In fact, the
first argument of Sh. Tarun Aggarwal, ld. counsel that
the audit is pending and the report is expected soon, also
acknowledges the claim of the claim petitioners to be
genuine and not stale.”
17. As can be seen from the impugned order of the DCT, it has been made
clear that the payments were in 1998 and 1999 and the initial refund
application was made by Respondent No.2 in 2000 itself.
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

18. Thereafter, the Society had agreed that it would refund the unpaid
amount. Correspondences ensued till 2006, and since then, Respondent No.2
has been entangled in litigation with the Society.
19. Thus, the Respondent No.2 never gave up his claim for the unpaid
refund and continued to be engaged with the Society or litigate with the
Society. In the opinion of this Court as well, it cannot be held that the claim
of the Respondent No.2 was barred by limitation.
20. Moreover, the scope of writ jurisdiction against such orders is also quite
limited, and this Court ought not go into the factual aspects. There is no
perversity or incorrect exercise of jurisdiction either by the arbitrator or by the
DCT. This Court, in Jagdish Singh Chauhan v. Lt. Governor of Delhi , 2025
SCC OnLine Del 8783 , which was a matter involving a dispute between a
claimant who was a member of the Society and the Society, arising under
Section 70 of the DCS Act, has held that this Court, exercising its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, will not interfere, absent any
infirmity in findings of the arbitrator and the DCT. In Jagdish Singh
Chauhan (supra) , the Court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court
in Ajay Singh v. Kacheru, 2025:INSC:9 , and observed:
“[…] 33. The orders passed by Arbitrator, thereafter
confirmed by the DCT are clear, though concise, it cannot
be faulted, for the reason that this Court does not find any
infirmity with the finding that no evidence has been
provided. Moreover, claims were also made before the
District Consumer Forum, which were also dismissed by
both the District Consumer Forum, as well as, by the State
Commission in Appeal.
34. In these circumstances, the Court is not going to
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction for this purpose. In
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

this regard, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ajay
Singh v. Kacheru, 2025:INSC:9 may be noted as under:
‘17. It is a well-established principle that the High Court,
while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, cannot reappreciate the evidence
and arrive at a finding of facts unless the authorities below
had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely.
18. On the said settled proposition of law, we must
make reference to the judgment of this Court in
Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram. The
relevant portion thereof reads as under:
"16. … It is well settled that the High Court can set
aside or ignore the findings of fact of an appropriate
court if there was no evidence to justify such a
conclusion and if no reasonable person could
possibly have come to the conclusion which the
courts below have come or in other words a finding
which was perverse in law. This principle is well
settled. In D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee [(1952) 2
SCC 619] it was laid down by this court that unless
there was any grave miscarriage of justice or
flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it
was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is
evidence on record on which a finding can be
arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself
either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power
under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution,
the High Court should refrain from interfering with
such findings made by the appropriate authorities.
…"
(Emphasis Supplied)
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Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20

20. Observations similar in nature were made in
Krishnanand v. Director of Consolidation, wherein
it was held that:
"12. The High Court has committed an error in
reversing the findings of fact arrived at by the
authorities below in coming to the conclusion that
there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did
so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. It is a settled law that such a
jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating
the evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless
the authority which passed the impugned order does
not have jurisdiction to render the finding or has
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is
patently perverse. …"
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. In our considered view, the High Court has
committed an error of law and facts in setting aside
the concurrent findings in both the impugned
judgment and order. There was no basis for the
High Court to ignore the findings of the authorities
and come to its own conclusion by appreciating the
evidence on record. The same was outside the
purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India
in the absence of any perversity or illegality
afflicting the findings of the authorities .
(Emphasis Supplied)”
21. Applying this settled principle to the facts of the present case, the DCT,
in paragraph 7 of the impugned order, extracted hereinabove, has itself
undertaken a detailed examination of the record and found, as a matter of fact,
that the deposit of Rs. 8,60,000/- and the part-refund were never in dispute,
that the demand for the balance amount was raised without delay in the year
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
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2000 itself, and that the Society had continued to correspond with and
acknowledge its liability towards Respondent No. 2. These are findings of fact
arrived at on an appreciation of the documentary record, and it cannot be said
that they suffer from any perversity, or that the DCT or the arbitrator exceeded
their jurisdiction in arriving at them.
22. Under these circumstances, this Court is not inclined to entertain the
present writ petition. The same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any,
are also disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 3, 2026
dj/sm
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) 12733/2026 Page 10 of 10
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:09.09.2026
15:26:20