Management Committee ( New Saraswati Public School) vs Rajinder Kumar Gupta And Ors

Court
Delhi High Court

$~67
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 12.10.2026
+ LPA 834/2026 & CM APPLs. 70439/2026, 70440/2026, 70442/2026
1. Management Committee (New Saraswati Public School)
through It’s Chairperson Ms. Sushila Devi
W/o Late Rajinder Singh, 126/128,
Nangloi Village, Delhi-110041 .....Appellant No. 1
2. New Saraswati Public School ,
Main Road, Nangloi Extension-2,
Delhi-110041,
through It’s Manager .....Appellant No. 2
Through: Mr. Praveen Kumar Kaushik, Adv.
versus
1. Rajinder Kumar Gupta
R/o 125/9, GF Kishan Garh, Near
Gaushala Mandir,
New delhi-110070 …Contesting Respondent
2. The Chief Secretary (Education),
Government of NCT Delhi,
Delhi Secretariat, Delhi.
3. The Director of Education,
Government of NCT of Delhi,
Directorate of Education,
Old Secretariat, Sham Nath Marg,
Civil Lines, Delhi-110054.
4. Deputy Director of Education,
Office of Deputy Director of Education (West-B),
Zone-17, G-Block, Vikas Puri,
Government Co-education Senior Secondary School,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 1 of 7

New Delhi-110018. …Performa Respondents
Through: Mr. Neeraj Kumar, CGSC with Mr.
Raghwendra Tiwari, GP for R-4.
R-1 in person.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA SAHAY SAXENA
J U D G M E N T
1. The present appeal assails the judgment dated 21.08.2026 passed by
the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 12805/2019. By the impugned
judgment, the order dated 05.08.2017 passed by the Managing Committee of
the Appellant School under Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules,
1973 (“DSER”), denying back wages to Respondent No. 1, was set aside.
The learned Single Judge granted him 50% of the back wages and
admissible allowances for the period from 16.10.2002 to 14.02.2017.
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 are proforma respondents.
2. The facts relevant for the purposes of this appeal are that, Respondent
No. 1 joined the School as an Assistant Teacher on 15.10.1993. In 1996, he
was appointed as Assistant Teacher (Computer) on the basis of a computer
diploma. By orders dated 16.10.2002 and 14.11.2002, on the allegation of
the computer diploma relied upon by him to be fake, he was terminated from
service. The appeal before the Delhi School Tribunal was dismissed on
31.07.2009. By judgment dated 15.02.2017 in W.P.(C) 330/2010, this Court
held that, even assuming he could not have continued as Assistant Teacher
(Computer), his original appointment as an Assistant Teacher since
15.10.1993 is not disturbed. The termination from service was thus set aside
for breach of Rules 118 and 120 of the DSER. He was directed to be
reinstated as an Assistant Teacher, and the question of back wages was left
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 2 of 7

to be decided by the School under Rule 121 of the DSER. LPA 396/2017,
filed by the School against the same was dismissed on 22.05.2017, with
liberty to take action in accordance with law if the School further found
Respondent No. 1 not qualified to continue even as an Assistant Teacher.
The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 07.07.2017.
3. Respondent No. 1 submitted his representation under Rule 121 of the
DSER and sought to join pursuant to the judgment dated 15.02.2017. By
order dated 05.08.2017, challenged in the present petition, the Managing
Committee rejected his claim for back wages on the principle of “no work
no pay”. It held that his absence from duty was attributable to his own act of
obtaining the post of Assistant Teacher (Computer) on the basis of a fake
certificate. Respondent No.1 was allowed to join as an Assistant Teacher
only on 11.08.2017, after directions in the contempt proceedings. By order
dated 19.04.2018, the School gave effect to his reinstatement from
16.10.2002 i.e., the date of termination of his service, but restricted the
arrears to the period from 15.02.2017, the date of judgment in W.P.(C)
330/2010. Respondent No.1 filed the present W.P.(C) 12805/2019 against
the said order dated 05.08.2017. Meanwhile, the School held an inquiry into
his qualification for the post of Assistant Teacher, and after inquiring
terminated him from service by order dated 21.02.2023.
4. The dispute before the learned Single Judge in present writ petition
was of back wages and not of second inquiry into the termination of
Respondent No.1 from service. Thus, the learned Single Judge held that the
School could examine whether Respondent No.1 was qualified to continue
as Assistant Teacher but it was not open to the School, while dealing with
the representation of Respondent No.1 for back wages, to assume the result
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 3 of 7

of that future exercise and make that assumption the basis for denying every
monetary consequence of a termination from service which had already been
set aside. The learned Single Judge thus allowed the present petition and
granted him 50% of the back wages.
5. Learned counsel for the Appellants submits that Respondent No. 1
obtained the post of Assistant Teacher (Computer) on the strength of a
forged certificate, and that Respondent No.1 was not qualified even for the
post of Assistant Teacher. Therefore, no right to salary can flow from either
appointment. Under Rule 121(2), full salary is payable only to an employee
who is fully exonerated, whereas Respondent No. 1 has been found
blameworthy and removed from service. The Managing Committee, it is
urged, rightly applied the principle of “no work no pay”.
6. This is an intra-court appeal. We can only examine the correctness of
the impugned judgment. In The Management of Narendra & Company
Private Limited v. The Workmen of Narendra & Company , (2016) 3 SCC
340, the Supreme Court held as under:
“5. … Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a
finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a
conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is
perverse, it shall not disturb the same . Merely
because another view or a better view is possible,
there should be no interference with or disturbance of
the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both
sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.”
(emphasis supplied)
Recently, the Supreme Court in R. Saravanan v. Periyar University Rep by
its Registrar & Ors , 2026 INSC 1136, decided on 16.10.2026, held in
paragraph 29 that “Simply put, the Letters Patent Bench cannot interfere
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 4 of 7

with the decision rendered by the writ Court which is otherwise just and
reasonable”.
7. The issue in the present writ petition is only with regard to back
wages of Respondent No.1 and has nothing to do with his subsequent
inquiry for termination as Assistant Teacher. The order dated 05.08.2017
dealt only with the post of Assistant Teacher (Computer). It recorded no
finding that Respondent No. 1 was not qualified for the post of Assistant
Teacher. On the contrary, it records that, but for the controversy over the
post of Assistant Teacher (Computer), “the Management had no reason to
terminate his service and he would have been continued as Assistant
Teacher”.
8. Before this Court, the Appellants seek to support the order dated
05.08.2017 on the ground that the appointment of Respondent as an
Assistant Teacher in 1993 was itself void, and that he was removed from the
post of Assistant Teacher also in 2023. These grounds do not find place in
the order dated 05.08.2017, which is challenged in the present writ petition.
It is settled law that the validity of an order is to be judged on the grounds
contained in the same. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election
Commissioner , (1978) 1 SCC 405, the Supreme Court held:
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a
statutory functionary makes an order based on
certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the
reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented
by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or
otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning
may, by the time it comes to court on account of a
challenge, get validated by additional grounds later
brought out. We may here draw attention to the
observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 5 of 7

‘Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a
statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of
explanations subsequently given by the officer making
the order of what he meant, or of what was in his
mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made
by public authorities are meant to have public effect
and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of
those to whom they are addressed and must be
construed objectively with reference to the language
used in the order itself.’
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they
grow older .”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Since the said grounds does not find place in the order dated
05.08.2017, the School now cannot take support of the same. The said order
must, therefore, stand or fall on its own reasons, which relate only to the
post of Assistant Teacher (Computer).
10. So far as the entitlement of Respondent No. 1 to back wages is
concerned, the learned Single Judge acknowledged that Respondent No. 1
was not free from every controversy with regard to his qualifications, while
being terminated from the post of Assistant Teacher (Computer), but was
entitled to continue as Assistant Teacher, subject to any action on the same
also. The learned Single Judge further noted in the impugned judgment that
the Respondent No.1 remained out of service for nearly fifteen years under a
termination which was ultimately set aside, that he was not allowed to join
as an Assistant Teacher until contempt proceedings were taken, his plea of
not being gainfully employed was not rebutted, and that the School itself
gave effect to his reinstatement from 16.10.2002. The learned Single Judge,
therefore, did not grant full back wages, but 50% of the same. We find that
this is a reasonable and plausible view, and it cannot, by any stretch of
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 6 of 7

imagination, be said to be perverse. Therefore, the same calls for no
interference.
11. As clarified in paragraph 44 of the impugned judgment, the legality of
the subsequent removal of Respondent No. 1 from service has not been
examined, and all rights and contentions of the parties in that regard are left
open to be decided in appropriate proceedings.
12. We, therefore, find no illegality in the impugned judgment dated
21.08.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 12805/2019. The
same is affirmed, and the present appeal is dismissed.
13. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
NISHA SAHAY SAXENA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 12, 2026
NC
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:02.11.2026
17:25:50
LPA 834/2026 Page 7 of 7