SHRAWAN KUMAR AGARWAL vs W.B. HOUSING BOARD & ORS
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
(CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION)
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Partha Sarathi Sen
WPA 2129 of 2020
With
I.A. No. CAN 5 of 2026
Shrawan Kumar AGarwal
-Versus-
The West Bengal Housing Board & Ors.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Arindam Banerjee, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Sulagna Mukherjee,
Mr. Rohit Chowdhury.
For the WBHB : Mr. Tapan Coomar Dey.
: Ms. Shreya Chatterjee.
Heard on : 19.11.2026
Judgment on : 19.11.2026
Partha Sarathi Sen, J.:-
1. The subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition is the Memo
dated 19.09.2019 as issued by the respondent Housing Board whereby
and whereunder a previous Memo dated 29.10.1997 as issued by the
self-same Board was revoked on the ground that the original allotment
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as made in the name of one Jayanta Kumar Basu remained no longer
the owner of the flat no. A-3, GGUC complex.
2. For the effective adjudication of the instant writ petition some relevant
facts as involved in the instant writ petition are required to be dealt with
which are as under:-
a. At one material point of time, one Jayanta Kumar
Basu and one Anita Basu were the joint owners of
the flat no. A-3 in a multi-storied building at Galf
Green Urban Complex.
b. On 19.11.1992 the said Mr. and Mrs. Basu, made
an application with the respondent Housing Board
for allotment of a car parking space in the self-
same housing complex and along with their
application they have deposited Rs.7,000/- by way
of a cheque.
c. On 18.12.1992 the respondent Housing Board
issued an allotment letter in respect of car parking
space no. BG-3 in favour of Mr. and Mrs. Basu
provisionally subject to fulfillment of certain
conditions.
d. On 29.10.1997 the respondent Housing Board
decided to allot car parking space no. BG-9 at the
said residential complex in the name of Mr. Basu
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and the said Board expressed their intention to
prepare the deed of conveyance in connection with
the execution and registration of the said car
parking space in due course.
e. By a registered deed of conveyance dated 30.03.1993
the said Mr. and Mrs, Basu conveyed and
transferred apartment no. 3-A in favour of the
present writ petitioner and soon thereafter the
present writ petitioner came into possession of the
said apartment by virtue of a registered deed of
conveyance.
f. By issuing a letter dated 30.03.1993, the said Mr.
and Mrs. Basu assured the writ petitioner that they
will handover the car parking space to the writ
petitioner as and when the same would be allotted to
them by the Board.
g. By the impugned memo, the respondent Housing
Board declined to allot BG-3/BG-19 car parking
space in favour of the vendors of the writ petitioner,
for which the writ petitioner is aggrieved on account
of the fact that with the decision of the respondent
Housing Board, he is being deprived of getting
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possession of the said car parking space, being BG-
19/BG-3.
3. In course of his argument, Mr. Banerjee, learned senior advocate
appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, contended that on careful
perusal of the Deed of Conveyance dated 30.03.1993 read with the
allotment letters dated 18.12.1992 and 29.10.1997, as have been
issued by the respondent Housing Board in favour of the vendors of
the present writ petitioner, it would reveal that by the operation of
the said transfer, the allotment as made by the respondent Housing
Board in favour of the writ petitioner in respect of the
aforementioned car parking space automatically passes with the
apartment as sold and conveyed to the writ petitioner.
4. It is submitted by Mr. Banerjee that by issuing the impugned memo,
the respondent Board has made an attempt to curtail the right, title,
and interest of the present writ petitioner to get the said allotment in
his favour, and such an action on the part of the respondent
Housing Board is contrary to the principles of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (“the said Act” in short), more specifically Section
8 thereof.
5. It is further argued by Mr. Banerjee that when the respondent
Housing Board has issued an allotment letter in favour of the
vendors of the present writ petitioner in respect of the car parking
space number BG-3/BG-19 in the self-same housing complex and
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when, by virtue of purchase of the apartment number A3, the writ
petitioner steps into the shoes of his vendor, that is, Mr. and Mrs.
Basu, there cannot be any difficulty to construe that the writ
petitioner is entitled to allotment of the aforementioned car parking
space which was allotted in favour of their vendors, especially when
the present writ petitioner is agreeable to pay the requisite
consideration money to the respondent Board as well as the
requisite stamp duty and registration charges for conveying the said
property, that is, the car parking space.
6. Mr. Banerjee thus submits before this Court that this is a fit
case for granting the reliefs as prayed for by the writ petitioner. It is
further submitted by Mr. Banerjee that appropriate relief/reliefs may
be granted to the writ petitioner in terms of the prayers made in the
interlocutory application being CAN 5 of 2026.
7. Mr. Dey, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent
Housing Board, in course of his submission, contended that the writ
petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for either in the
instant writ petition or in the pending interlocutory application being
CAN 5 of 2026, inasmuch as the writ petitioner has miserably failed
to substantiate that with the passing of the right, title and interest of
the vendors of the writ petitioner in favour of the writ petitioner in
respect of the apartment number 3A in the said complex, the writ
petitioner is also entitled to allotment of any car parking space. In
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course of his submission, Mr. Dey draws the attention of this Court
to the schedule of the Deed of Conveyance dated 30.03.1993. He
says that in the said schedule, there is no whisper regarding transfer
of any car parking space in favour of the writ petitioner by his
vendors.
8. This Court has meticulously gone through the entire materials
as placed before it. This Court has given its due consideration over
the submissions of the learned advocates for the contending parties.
9. Since in course of his submission, Mr. Banerjee, learned senior
advocate, places much reliance upon Section 8 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (“the said Act”, in short), this Court proposes to
look to Section 8 of the said Act, which is reproduced hereinbelow in
verbatim:-
“8. Operation of transfer :- Unless a different intention is
expressed or necessarily implied, a transfer of property
passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which
the transferor is then capable of passing in the property
and in the legal incidents thereof.
Such incidents include, where the property is land, the
easements annexed thereto, the rents and profits thereof
accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the
earth;
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and, where the property is machinery attached to the
earth, the movable parts thereof;
and, where the property is a house, the easements
annexed thereto, the rent thereof accruing after the
transfer, and the locks, keys, bars, doors, windows, and
all other things provided for permanent use therewith;
and, where the property is a debt or other actionable
claim, the securities therefor (except where they are also
for other debts or claims not transferred to the transferee),
but not arrears of interest accrued before the transfer;
and, where the property is money or other property
yielding income, the interest or income thereof accruing
after the transfer takes effect.”
10. On careful perusal of the provision of Section 8 of the said Act, it
appears to this Court that it is the intention of the legislature that upon
transfer of a property, the transferee of such property immediately gets
the said property and the legal incidents thereof. In the said section,
the said legal incidents have been well explained and described, namely;
the easement annexed to the said property, the rents and profits thereof
accruing after the transfer, and all things attached to the earth, and
where the property is a house, the easement annexed thereto, the rent
thereof accruing after the transfer, and the locks, keys, bars, etc.,
provided for the permanent use of the said property, etc.
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11. Keeping in mind the aforementioned legislative enactment, if I look to
the factual aspects as involved in the instant writ petition, it appears
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that by virtue of the registered deed of conveyance dated 30 March,
1993, the Apartment No. 3A on the third floor in the aforementioned
housing complex, consisting of bedrooms, kitchen, verandah, dining,
and toilet, along with all fittings and furniture of the said apartment,
was conveyed and transferred to the writ petitioner. The said schedule
however does not speak about any car parking space.
12. In course of his argument, Mr. Banerjee, in his usual fairness, did not
say that the said car parking space, which is proposed to be transferred
to the writ petitioner's vendor, became part and parcel of the property
conveyed; rather, it was contended that the said car parking space,
which was proposed to be conveyed in the name of the vendor of the
writ petitioner, ought to be allotted to the writ petitioner on account of
the purchase of the said apartment in view of the provision of Section 8
of the said Act.
13. This Court considers that such argument as advanced on behalf of the
writ petitioner is not tenable since the writ petitioner has miserably
failed to substantiate that the car parking space, which is the subject
matter of the instant writ petition, is an inseparable incident of the
property which has been conveyed to the writ petitioner, and that the
said car parking space forms an incident of the property within the
meaning of Section 8 of the said Act. Materials have been placed before
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this Court that though the respondent Housing Board agreed to allot the
aforementioned car parking space in the name of the vendors of the
present writ petitioner, for some reason or other, such transfer of the
car parking space could not be effected. In the considered view of this
Court, in the event, on account of non-transfer of the said car parking
space, if anybody is aggrieved, that is the vendors of the writ petitioner,
and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the writ petitioner is
aggrieved.
14. In other words, this Court is constrained to hold that on account of
transfer of Flat No. A3 in the said housing complex in favour of the writ
petitioner, the writ petitioner cannot claim allotment of the
aforementioned car parking space, which was proposed to be
transferred in the name of the vendors of the writ petitioner, since
neither the respondent Housing Board conveyed the said car parking
space in favour of the vendors of the writ petitioner, nor does the
schedule of the registered deed of conveyance as executed in favour of
the writ petitioner make any whisper regarding the automatic transfer of
car parking space along with the transfer of Apartment No. 3A.
15. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds no merit in
the instant writ petition. Consequently, W.P.A. No. 2129 of 2020 is
hereby dismissed.
16. Consequently, CAN 5 of 2026 is also dismissed.
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17. Consequently, the interim order as passed earlier and as has been
extended time to time stands hereby vacated. There shall be no order as
to costs.
18. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Partha Sarathi Sen, J.)
SM [AR(C)]