The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Nanulal Pal

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
th
ON THE 9 OF JULY, 2026
REVIEW PETITION No. 1043 of 2026
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Versus
NANULAL PAL
Appearance:
Smt Monika Mishra - Govt. Advocate for State.
Shri Vibhor Kumar Sahu - Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
The present review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure has been preferred by the petitioner/State seeking review of the order
dated 13.05.2025 passed in W.P. No.16936/2023, whereby this Court directed the
revenue authorities to correct the revenue entries by deleting the expression "non-
transferable" from Column No.12 of the Khasra pertaining to land bearing Survey
No.22/17/1 admeasuring 0.88 hectares, situated at Village Laldant, Patwari Halka
Umri, Tehsil and District Guna.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the State submits that the review petition
has been filed primarily on the ground that the land in question was originally
granted to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent by way of patta under
Section 62 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007,
and therefore, the provisions contained under Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code, 1959 are not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the
present case. It has been contended that under the scheme of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code, particularly Sections 158(3) and 165(7-B), prior permission
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of the competent authority is a mandatory precondition for transfer of land granted

by way of patta and, in the absence of such permission, any transfer effected in
respect thereof could not have been recognized as valid in the eyes of law.
3. It is further submitted that entries in the revenue records are merely fiscal
in nature and neither confer nor extinguish title. Consequently, disputed questions
relating to title and ownership could not have been adjudicated in exercise of writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel has
also urged that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately
thirteen years in challenging the revenue entries, inasmuch as the mutation entries
were recorded in the year 2010 whereas the same came to be assailed only in the
year 2023. It is, therefore, contended that the claim was highly belated and was
liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that, in
a review petition arising out of similar facts and circumstances, namely, R.P. No.
1039/2026 (State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Janki Bai and Others), this
Court, vide order dated 15.05.2026, has already considered and rejected identical
contentions raised by the State and dismissed the review petition both on merits as
well as on the ground of limitation. It is further submitted that the Patta in
question was not granted under Section 62 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue
and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, as sought to be contended by the petitioners, but
was in fact granted under Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code, 1959. Learned counsel further contends that the grounds sought to be urged
in the present review petition do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the
record so as to warrant the exercise of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is submitted that the petitioners are
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merely seeking a rehearing of issues that have already been considered and

adjudicated, which is impermissible in the exercise of review jurisdiction.
Accordingly, it is prayed that, in the light of the aforesaid order passed in State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Janki Bai and Others and in the absence of any
new, compelling, or exceptional circumstance warranting interference, the present
review petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. At the outset, it is necessary to notice the scheme of Section 162 of the
Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 as it existed prior to its deletion and
the Rules framed thereunder. Section 162 and the Rules made in exercise of
powers under Section 258 read with Section 162 were merely enabling provisions
prescribing the procedure to be followed by the Collector while disposing of
Government land for agricultural purposes and allotting the same to eligible
persons in accordance with the prescribed priorities.
7. The relevant Rules framed under Section 162 contemplated allotment of
unoccupied Government land to landless persons and co-operative societies of
landless persons in the order of priority specified therein. Rule 7 specifically
provided the authorities competent to make such allotments, namely:-
(i) Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars exercising powers of Tahsildar - in
respect of allotment to individuals;
(ii) Sub-Divisional Officers - in respect of allotment to Co-operative
Societies; and
(iii) Collectors with approval of the Commissioner - in respect of
persons other than those specified above.
8. A conjoint reading of Section 162 and the Rules prevailing at the relevant
point of time clearly establishes that Government land could be allotted for
agricultural purposes in bhumiswami rights by the competent Revenue Officer.
Thus, where an allotment was made by the Tahsildar to an individual under the
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then prevailing statutory scheme, such allottee acquired bhumiswami rights from

the very inception and did not hold the land merely as a Government lessee.
9. In the present case, the material available on record demonstrates that the
original allotment in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent was
made in the year 1960 by the competent authority and the allottee held the land in
the capacity of a bhumiswami from the very beginning. Therefore, the land was
not held under a lease arrangement attracting subsequent statutory restrictions
regarding transfer.
10. For proper appreciation, Sections 158(3) and 165(7-B) of the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code are reproduced hereinbelow:-
158 (3)[ Every person- (i) who is holding land in bhumiswami right by
virtue of a lease granted to him by the State Government or the
Collector or the Allotment Officer on or before the commencement of
the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1992
from the date of such commencement, and (ii) to whom land is allotted
in bhumiswami right by the State Government or the Collector or the
Allotment Officer after the commencement of the Madhya Pradesh
Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1992 from the date of such
allotment, shall be deemed to be a bhumiswami in respect of such land
and shall be subject to all the rights and liabilities conferred and
imposed upon a bhumiswami by or under this Code :

[Provided that no such person shall transfer such land within a period of
ten years from the date of lease or allotment and thereafter may transfer
such land with the permission obtained under sub-section (7-b) of
section 165.] [Inserted by M.P. Act No. 17 of 1992 (w.e.f. 28-10-
1992).]

165 [(7-b) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a
person who holds land from the State Government or a person who
holds land in bhumiswami rights under sub-section (3) of Section 158]
or whom right to occupy land is granted by the State Government or
the Collector as a Government lessee and who subsequently becomes
bhumiswami of such land, shall not transfer such land without the
permission of a Revenue Officer, not below the rank of a Collector,
given for reasons to be recorded in writing.]
11. Section 165(7-B) was inserted by M.P. Act No.15 of 1980 with effect
from 24.10.1980, whereas Section 158(3) was inserted by M.P. Act No.17 of
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1992 with effect from 28.10.1992. Thus, the restrictions regarding transferability

came into the statute book only from the aforesaid dates and cannot be construed
to have retrospective operation. The restriction regarding non-transferability
applies to land allotted under leasehold rights or bhumiswami rights after insertion
of the aforesaid provisions, and such lands cannot be transferred within ten years
from allotment and thereafter only with prior permission of the competent
authority. Consequently, in such cases, the entry “non-transferable” is reflected in
Column No.12 of the revenue records. In the present case, however, the land in
question was originally allotted to the lessee in the year 1960 under bhumiswami
rights, much prior to insertion of Sections 158(3) and 165(7-B) of the Code. At the
relevant point of time there existed no statutory embargo requiring prior
permission for transfer of such land. Even after insertion of the aforesaid
provisions, the restriction was applicable only to those persons who held land
from the State Government or who became bhumiswami subsequent to grant of
lease by the Government under the amended statutory framework. Therefore, the
original bhumiswami was not required to obtain permission from the State
Government for transfer of the land in question. Consequently, the question of
treating the land as “non-transferable” does not arise. The land in question is thus
free from the rigours of Sections 158(3) and 165(7-B) of the Code and remains
transferable without prior permission.
12. Insofar as the contention of the State that the land was originally granted
by way of patta under Section 62 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and
Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 is concerned, the record reveals that the application
for allotment had been submitted under Section 162 of the Madhya Pradesh Land
Revenue Code, 1959 and proceedings were initiated under the said provision.
Merely because the patta was issued in the format prescribed under Section 62 of
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the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 on 10.12.1960,

the character of the allotment does not change, particularly when the said
enactment had already stood repealed upon the coming into force of the Madhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 with effect from 02.10.1959.
13. So far as the contention that revenue entries are merely fiscal in nature
is concerned, there can be no dispute regarding the settled proposition that entries
in revenue records neither create nor extinguish title. However, in the present
case, the issue pertains only to correction of an incorrect revenue entry showing
the land as non-transferable despite the statutory provisions being inapplicable.
Since the land was held by the bhumiswami independent of the restrictions
introduced subsequently, the continuance of such entry was wholly unwarranted.
14. With regard to the plea of delay raised by learned counsel for the State,
it is noteworthy that the land in question was allotted under absolute bhumiswami
rights and was completely outside the purview of Sections 158(3) and 165(7-B) of
the Code. The entry of "non-transferable" appears to have been introduced for the
first time in the computerized Khasra for the year 2007-08. Significantly, the
revenue record does not disclose any order, proceeding, case number, or authority
under whose directions such entry was incorporated in Column No.12. The
computerized Khasra traces its origin to the Khasra Panchshala for the period
2006-11, wherein the land continued to be recorded as bhumiswami land without
any reference whatsoever to any restriction on transfer. No case number or order
details pertaining to the alleged non-transferable entry are available in the record.
It is, therefore, apparent that the entry of "non-transferable" was made without any
authority of law or any order passed by a competent revenue
authority. Consequently, the doctrines of limitation and laches would have no
application where the challenge is directed against an entry that is ex facie without
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authority of law and has no legal foundation. Such an arbitrary entry cannot be

permitted to continue merely on the ground of delay.
15. The scope of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is
extremely limited. Review can be entertained only upon discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, despite due diligence, was not within the
knowledge of the applicant at the time of passing of the order, or where there
exists an error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient
reason. In the present case, no new material or evidence has been brought on
record which could not have been produced earlier despite due diligence. No error
apparent on the face of the record has been demonstrated. The petitioner has
essentially sought rehearing of the matter on merits, which is impermissible in
review jurisdiction.
16. In Board of Control of Cricket India Vs. Netaji Cricket Club reported in
AIR 2005 SC 592, it was observed that "the words "sufficient reason" occurring
in rule 1 is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or
even an advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of
invoking the doctrine 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'".
17. Similarly, in Union of India Vs. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., reported in
AIR 2008 (Gau) 161, it was observed that the review is not an appeal in disguise.
The scope of review as well as the appeal is completely different. While the
review petition is limited the appellate jurisdiction is wide.
18. In Akhilesh Yadav Vs. Vishwanath Chaturvedi & Ors. reported in AIR
SCW 1316, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that scope of review petition is very
limited and submissions made on questions of fact cannot be a ground to review
the order. It was further observed that review of an order is permissible only if
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some mistake or error is apparent on the face of the record, which has to be

decided on the facts of each and every case. Further held that an erroneous
decision, by itself, does not warrant review of each decision.
19. The scope of review of an order by a Court of Civil Judicature, is
circumscribed by Section 114 of the Code which provides that a review of an
order is permissible upon a discovery of new and important matter of evidence.
But in the present case no new and important matter has been brought before the
Court by the petitioner. It is also well settled that only errors apparent on the face
of record are liable to be reviewed and such errors must state one in the face where
no elaborate arguments are necessary to pinpoint those errors. [See: Abhijit Tea
Company Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Terai Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1995 Cal
316)].
20. Apart from the aforesaid, the present review petition has also been filed
with a delay of 334 days accompanied by an application (IA No.4547/2026) under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay.
21. The explanation furnished in the application is wholly vague, sketchy
and bereft of material particulars. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not
demonstrate as to when the certified copy of the order under review was obtained
or the stage at which the matter was processed for legal opinion. The application
lacks bona fides and does not disclose any sufficient cause preventing the State
from approaching this Court within the prescribed limitation. Law as regards
scope and jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of condonation of delay under
section 5 of the Limitation Act is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the
various High Courts.
22. In the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR 1962
SC 361, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 7 has held as under:-
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"7. In construing Section 5 (of the Limitation Act) it is relevant to bear
in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the
expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal
gives rise to a right in favour of the decreeholder to treat the decree as
binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of
limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond
challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder
by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other
consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for
excusing delay in shown discretion is given to the court to condone
delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately
conferred on the court in order that judicial power and discretion in that
behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice."

23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P.K. RAmachandran Vs. State of
Kerala reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556 , has held in para 6 as under:-
"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the
courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds."
24. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlilk Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs.
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 has
held as under:
"26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In
Halsbury's Laws of England,4th Ed., Vol.28,p.266,para 605, the policy
of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least
three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation,
namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the
stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should
pursue them with reasonable diligence."
27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as 'statutes of peace'.
An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and
uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This
court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [(1973)
2 SCC 705] has observed : (SCC p.712, para 18)
"18. The object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by
long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,
negligence or laches."
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27. In Motichand vs. Munshi [AIR 1970 SC 898], this court observed
that this principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be
end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to
ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening
diligence and preventing oppression.
28. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time
limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal
remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that
the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies
promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy."

25. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and
others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under:
"19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel.
At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in
this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in
considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of
sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is
well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. 1987 AIR 1353.
The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the
discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by
this Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8
SCC 685 , as follows:-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive
liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of
reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The
purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the
concept of "reasonableness" as (State of M.P. and others Vs. Chhavi
Ram) it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite
consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These
principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on
the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has
accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party
to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it
will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the
applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence,
default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties
equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has
been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it
will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that
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has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have
impelled (State of M.P. and others Vs. Chhavi Ram) the High Court to
condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The
concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach",
"substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law
of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there
is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted
by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and
restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any
lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case,
not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High
Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong
intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly
disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering
applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary
powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to
be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The
discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by
reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and
should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. "

26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a decision rendered in Maniben Devraj
Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held
in para 24 as under:-
"24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the
factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature
of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence
on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not
lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is
thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."
27. In a very recent decision the Apex Court while hearing a Special Leave
Petition (civil) in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary
reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3612 had dismissed the SLP holding that the
law of limitation is also applicable to the State with full vigour and the delay if not
explained with a sufficient cause, would entrail dismissal of the case.
28. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of law as regards
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object, scope, extent, limitation and the discretionary power to be exercised under

section 5 of the Limitation Act laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is
of the view that the delay of about 334 days caused in filing the petition by the
petitioners/State is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is
shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to be
to the satisfaction of this Court.
29. Accordingly, I.A. No.4547/2026 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act seeking condonation of delay is dismissed. Consequently, the Review Petition
also stands dismissed both on merits and on the ground of limitation.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
ojha

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