The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ashok Kumar Tiwari

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33016
1 WA-3602-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
&
HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE ANURADHA SHUKLA
th
ON THE 27 OF OCTOBER, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 3602 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC030276882026
THE STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Versus
ASHOK KUMAR TIWARI
Appearance:
Shri Manish Saxena - Government Advocate for appellants/State.
Shri Ieeshan Sharma - Advocate for respondent.
ORDER
Per: Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
This writ appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha
Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, has been filed
against the order dated 26.02.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P.
No.1188/2016.
2. Heard on I.A. No.14266/2026, an application seeking condonation of
delay of 126 days in filing the present writ appeal (though as per office report, the
appeal is barred by 125 days).
3. It is stated in the application that after passing of the impugned order
dated 26.02.2026, the matter was referred for legal opinion regarding filing of the
writ appeal vide letter dated 09.03.2026, and the same was received on
24.03.2026. Thereafter, the matter was processed through various departmental
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM

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Authorities, and ultimately on 09.07.2026, the Law Department issued a letter to

the office of Additional Advocate General Gwalior for filing writ appeal.
Thereafter, the Officer-in-Charge approached the Office of the Additional
Advocate General, Gwalior on 18.09.2026. Certain service records and additional
information were thereafter collected, and the present writ appeal was filed on
30.09.2026.
4. Counsel for the appellants/State submits that the delay occurred due to
departmental procedures, movement of files between various Authorities,
obtaining legal opinion and collection of relevant service records. It is, therefore,
prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned.
5. Counsel for the respondent opposed the application and prayed for the
rejection of the application.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Ramkumar
Choudhary decided on 29/11/2024 in SLP (C) Diary No. 48636/2024 has held as
under:-
"6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State
machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in
handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/ applications/
appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials
in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one
such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in
preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials
functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery
touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before
the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the
Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33016
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scrupulously."
(Emphasis supplied)


8 . The Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others Vs.
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School, reported in 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 191, has held as under:
"13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the
legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to
enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have
considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag
v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably liberal
approach which this Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it
is not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a
justice oriented approach is indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks
condonation of delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v.
Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14
and quoted the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another
aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually
affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest.
The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions
and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as
for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-
purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes
“sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33016
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the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental
decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their
making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible.
It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government
must have “a little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to
put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects
in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental
functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making
process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law
officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament
and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers
should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its
law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by
this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach while
dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the last decade
and a half became discernible starting with the decision in Postmaster
General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a delay of 427 days in
filing the relevant special leave petition was not condoned. University of
Delhi v. Union of India12 is another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of
this Court) where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding
the decision of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone
the delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner, a
coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13 very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the
object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation remains
pending for an indefinite period. It was also held, departing from the earlier
view, that the merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of
considering the application for condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
India authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other decisions
following the same while not interfering with an order of condonation of
delay passed by the relevant high court. However, it was observed that a
distinction ought to be drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’
that is proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized
that a different approach has to be adopted while this Court is considering
an application for condonation of delay in presentation of an
appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of
the high court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of
the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas
in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour
of grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions
post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM

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the exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club,
Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior counsel for
the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993 is delayed
by 264 days. For quite some time in the past, this Court has been
making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on
the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a
few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in
November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better be set out
in petitioner's own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition
drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for
approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record
on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was not approved
by the Board. The Board after approving the draft SLP sent this
file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable
ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters
might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help
a litigant even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of
limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of
granting relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as any
other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions
to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-
tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the
explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its
common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped
affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does
not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even
where it affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred
by time.
(emphasis in original)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this Court
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33016
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to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism that
matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible
support for such optimism and the Court's patience having been tested to
the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the courts
cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference is the Government."

9 . In the present case, the impugned order was passed on 26.02.2026,
whereas permission to file the writ appeal was granted on 09.07.2026. The
appellants have not satisfactorily explained as to why the writ appeal was not filed
with due promptitude. Mere movement of files between different Authorities,
departmental procedures and administrative formalities cannot, by themselves,
constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The State cannot be treated as
a privileged litigant.
10. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the appellants have failed to furnish plausible explanation for the delay.
11. No sufficient cause has, therefore, been made out for condonation of
delay.
12. Accordingly, I.A. No.14266/2026 is rejected.
13. Consequently, the writ appeal is also dismissed as barred by limitation.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
(ANURADHA SHUKLA)
JUDGE
JUDGE
Aman

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AMAN TIWARI
Signing time: 29-10-2026
05:51:33 PM