Anil Maan vs Delhi Pollution Control Committee & Anr.

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of Decision: 01 September, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010887612024
+ W.P.(C) 16765/2024 & CM APPLs. 70946/2024, 27707/2025
ANIL MAAN .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Amit George, Mr. Ankit
Sinsinwar, Mr. Ravi Kumar, Ms.
Muskan Shalya, Ms. Rupam Jha, Mr.
Amal A.R., Ms. Tanushree, Mr.
Zubin M. John and Ms. Medhavi
Bhatia, Advocates.
versus

DELHI POLLUTION CONTROL COMMITTEE & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Biraja Mahapatra and Mr. Abhay
Singh, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
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1. The Petitioner joined the Delhi Pollution Control Committee as a
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Junior Environmental Engineer on 6 December, 2021. His appointment
was on probation for two years. Before that period expired, his services were
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terminated by order dated 10 March, 2023. The order is brief. It refers to
his temporary appointment and period of probation and, invoking Rule 5(1)
of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, terminates
his services forthwith with one month’s pay and allowances in lieu of notice.

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“DPCC”
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It makes no reference to his conduct or any allegation against him.
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2. The Petitioner’s appeal dated 9 May, 2023, was rejected on 13
September, 2024. He has challenged both orders and seeks reinstatement
with consequential benefits and a declaration that he be treated as a
confirmed employee.
3. The objection of delay raised by DPCC need not detain the Court. The
Petitioner had challenged the termination departmentally in May 2023. His
appeal remained pending until September 2024, and the present petition was
instituted shortly thereafter. The intervening period cannot, in these
circumstances, be treated as abandonment of the challenge. DPCC itself
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acknowledges the appeal and its rejection on 13 September, 2024.
4. Nor is the status of the Petitioner in dispute. He was a probationer.
Clause 1 of his appointment memorandum expressly permitted the
appointment to be terminated by one month’s notice from either side,
without assigning any reason. A probationer has no indefeasible right to
continue merely because the period of probation has not expired.
5. But that proposition does not conclude the case. The power to
discontinue a probationer because he is found unsuitable and the power to
punish him for misconduct is distinct. A clause permitting termination
simpliciter can be used for the former. It cannot be used to give an
innocuous form to the latter.
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6. The issue arises because the order dated 10 March, 2023 does not
disclose any reason for the termination, whereas the record preceding it
contains several complaints concerning the Petitioner’s conduct, show-cause
notices describing some of that conduct as misconduct and insubordination,
and replies furnished by the Petitioner. DPCC maintains that this material
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was considered only while assessing whether he was suitable to be
continued on probation. The Petitioner contends that DPCC had, in fact,
accepted the allegations of misconduct and terminated him on that basis,
without holding the disciplinary inquiry which such an action required. It is
in this context that the distinction between motive and foundation assumes
significance.
What separates motive from foundation
7. Much of the argument has turned on the familiar expressions
“motive” and “foundation”. They can sometimes obscure a fairly simple
proposition.
8. Complaints against a probationer may legitimately affect the
employer’s assessment of whether he should be retained. The employer is
not required, every time something adverse comes to its notice, to embark
upon disciplinary proceedings. It may decide that it does not wish to
adjudicate or decide the complaint at all and that, taking the employee’s
work and conduct as a whole, it would rather not continue him during
probation. In such a case the complaint becomes the basis for the employer’s
dissatisfaction, but the employee is not being punished upon a
‘determination’ that the complaint is true. The complaint is then just the
motive for the action.
9. The position changes where the employer crosses that line. If it
examines the accusation, rejects the employee’s defence, accepts that the
alleged act was committed and then terminates his services on that basis, the
misconduct has ceased to be merely the occasion for considering suitability.
It has become the factual basis of the action. That is what the law describes
as the foundation.
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10. A simple example illustrates the distinction. Assume that a
probationer is accused of threatening a superior. The employer may say:
there are serious complaints concerning this officer; I do not propose to
decide whether the threat was in fact made, but I am not satisfied that he
should continue on probation. That is ordinarily a case of motive.
11. If, however, the employer considers the allegation and the employee’s
explanation, concludes that he did threaten the superior, characterises that
act as misconduct or insubordination, and terminates him because of that
conclusion, the result is different. The employer has punished him for an act
which it has treated as established. Calling the eventual order a termination
simpliciter does not alter what has in substance occurred.
12. The difference, therefore, does not lie in the existence of a complaint.
Nor does it lie merely in the fact that the complaint prompted the
termination. The question is whether the employer left the allegation
unresolved and assessed suitability, or accepted the misconduct as an
established fact and acted upon it.
13. This also explains why the Court is permitted, in an appropriate case,
to look beyond the language of an innocuous termination order. If the
Court’s examination ended with the words of the formal order, an employer
which had in fact found a probationer guilty of misconduct could avoid the
safeguards attending punitive action simply by omitting that finding from
the final communication. The law does not make the character of the action
depend upon drafting.
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14. Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India , therefore holds that where
an apparently simple discharge is in reality a cloak for punishment, the court
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may ascertain its true character from the circumstances and the material
which formed the basis of the action. The Supreme Court ultimately found
in that case that the alleged misconduct was the real foundation of the
discharge.
15. The same principle appears in A.P. State Federation of Cooperative
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Spinning Mills Ltd. v. P.V. Swaminathan . The order there was innocuous
on its face. The Supreme Court nevertheless examined what had actually
prompted the employer and held, on the attendant material and the assertions
made in the counter affidavit, that the termination was founded upon
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misconduct. In State Bank of India v. Palak Modi , also, the Supreme Court
held that if misconduct forms the basis of the final decision to dispense with
the probationer’s services, the Court can look through the form of a non-
stigmatic order and identify the action as punitive.
16. There is one further point which is important in applying this doctrine.
A formal departmental inquiry culminating in a finding of guilt is the
clearest case in which misconduct becomes the foundation. It is not,
however, an indispensable condition.
17. At the same time, the mere issuance of a show-cause notice does not
make every subsequent termination punitive. A preliminary examination of
a complaint does not preclude the employer from thereafter deciding not to
continue a probationer.
18. This is where the decisions relied upon by DPCC assume
significance. In Governing Council of Kidwai Memorial Institute of

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(1984) 2 SCC 369
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(2001) 10 SCC 83
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(2013) 3 SCC 607
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Oncology v. Dr. Pandurang Godwalkar , the Governing Council considered
different reports concerning the probationer’s overall performance and
decided that he should not be continued. The Supreme Court held that the
employer is entitled, during probation, to take complaints and conduct into
account while assessing the employee as a whole; the action does not
become punishment merely because some inquiry had been made against
him.
19. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder
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Singh is to similar effect. It was emphasised that mere holding of an
inquiry during probation does not by itself make the resultant discharge
punitive. What matters is whether the exercise was really intended to impose
punishment for misconduct or to determine whether the probationer should
continue in service.
20. A Division Bench of this Court applied the same principle in
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Government of NCT of Delhi v. Dalbir Singh . The probationary Warder
had been found carrying a narcotic substance and an FIR had been
registered. Yet, no inquiry was undertaken by the employer to determine his
guilt. The incident and the criminal case caused the employer to conclude
that he should not be retained. The allegation thus served as motive for the
termination and was not treated as established misconduct forming its
foundation.
21. These authorities are not in conflict. They draw the same line on
different facts. An employer may be influenced by adverse conduct without
adjudicating guilt. However, it cannot find the employee guilty of the

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(1992) 4 SCC 719
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(2005) 5 SCC 569
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misconduct and then avoid the procedure which that conclusion attracts, and
remove him by issuing an order which says nothing about it.
The present record
22. With that distinction in view, the present case may now be examined.
The termination order itself passes the first test. It contains no stigma. If its
language alone were decisive, the petition would fail. But the inquiry cannot
stop there because the Petitioner has specifically pleaded that the
termination was the culmination of proceedings in which DPCC had treated
particular acts as misconduct.
23. During the Petitioner’s short tenure, DPCC issued a series of show-
cause notices. The number of notices, by itself, is not material. What matters
is the character of those notices and, more importantly, the manner in which
DPCC states that it dealt with them. The question is therefore not merely
whether notices were issued, but whether they remained allegations
considered as part of an overall assessment of the Petitioner’s suitability for
continued probation, or whether they were treated as establishing
misconduct and insubordination.
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24. The notice dated 14 July, 2022, for instance, did not merely record
that complaints had been received. After referring to allegations of threats,
physical intimidation and altercations, DPCC stated “you have failed to
maintain discipline / office decorum…” and described the conduct as “gross
misconduct and wilful insubordination or disobedience…”. The Petitioner
was required to explain why action under the disciplinary rules should not
be initiated for the “above misconduct and insubordination”.
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25. The memorandum dated 19 December, 2022 concerned an

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W.P.(C) 6596/2023, decided on 6 September, 2023.
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inspection during the winter enforcement drive. It recorded that the
Petitioner’s failure to serve a show-cause notice at the site “reflects doubt
about your integrity toward office works” and warned that disciplinary
action, including dismissal, could follow.
26. These notices, standing alone, would still not be enough. An
allegation remains an allegation, even when strongly worded. DPCC could
legitimately have considered the Petitioner’s responses and yet decided,
without determining guilt, that his overall conduct did not inspire confidence
for continued probation. That would bring the case within Kidwai,
Sukhwinder Singh and Dalbir Singh .
27. The difficulty arises from what DPCC itself says happened thereafter.
In its counter affidavit, DPCC states that one of the complaints was
“verifiable”, another was “supported by evidence”, and another was based
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on “factual incidents”. It further states that the Petitioner’s reply dated 25
August, 2022 was considered and “found lacking merit”, while his
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explanation dated 21 December, 2022 to the subsequent memorandum was
“found unsatisfactory”.
28. More importantly, while explaining why the Petitioner was
terminated, DPCC does not confine itself to saying that there was a cloud
over his conduct. It asserts that he “failed to maintain discipline / office
decorum”, that he was constantly picking fights, using foul language and
issuing threats, and that this constituted “gross misconduct and wilful
insubordination or disobedience under CCS (Conduct) Rule, 1964.” The
very next paragraph states “In view of above facts, the service of Petitioner
was terminated on 10.03.2023…”.
29. There is, of course, another part of the counter in which DPCC
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describes these very complaints as the “background” for assessing
suitability, and later says that the decision was based upon an “objective
assessment” of the Petitioner’s performance and overall unsuitability. But
describing an action as an assessment of suitability does not answer the
anterior question: what was the assessment actually founded upon?
30. On the record placed before the Court, DPCC has not produced any
probation report or other contemporaneous performance assessment
independent of these incidents. It refers in its counter to “performance
reports” and “contemporaneous performance assessments”, but none has
been placed on record. The RTI response, on the other hand, records that no
Annual Performance Report relating to the Petitioner had been received in
the Administration Branch. The absence of an APAR is not by itself fatal; a
probationer may be assessed through other material. What is significant is
that the independent assessment now asserted by DPCC has not been
produced.
31. This is not a case in which an otherwise valid order is sought to be
invalidated merely because the Respondent used a particular expression in a
subsequent affidavit. The Court would not assume that the pleading has
created, after the event, a punitive foundation that did not exist when the
action was taken. The legal character of the decision must therefore be
examined by reference to the basis on which the action was actually taken,
and not by treating an isolated expression in the counter affidavit as
sufficient, by itself, to alter that basis.
32. In this regard, the counter affidavit is relevant because DPCC itself
has identified the material that it says was considered; and that account is
consistent with the contemporaneous notices. The Court is therefore not
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merely relying upon the terminology used in the pleading, but upon the
material identified by DPCC as having informed its decision.
33. Read as a whole, the sequence of events cannot be reduced to a case
in which complaints were merely received, doubts were raised, and DPCC
decided not to take the risk of continuing the Petitioner’s service. DPCC’s
own case goes further. It asserts that the complaints were supported or
verifiable, that the Petitioner’s explanations were considered and rejected,
and that the conduct disclosed gross misconduct and wilful insubordination.
The reference to those matters was not incidental. DPCC expressly relied
upon the alleged facts and the character it attributed to the Petitioner’s
conduct when stating that, “in view of” those facts, his services were
terminated. The alleged misconduct therefore did not merely provide the
occasion for an assessment of suitability; it formed the substantive basis for
the decision.
34. That takes the case across the line from motive to foundation.
Case Law
35. Dalbir Singh is distinguishable. There the employer did not undertake
to determine whether the probationer had committed the alleged offence; his
involvement in the FIR was the motive for the employer not to retain him.
Here, on DPCC’s own showing, it went further and gave a verdict upon the
substance of the accusations and the Petitioner’s response to them.
36. Nor does Kidwai Memorial Institute assist DPCC on facts. There the
decision proceeded upon an overall appraisal of reports concerning the
probationer’s performance. In the present case, the supposed independent
performance assessment has not been produced, while the material which
DPCC itself identifies and defends consists predominantly of the specific
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acts which it describes as misconduct.
37. The decision of the Division Bench in New Delhi Municipal Council
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v. Rahul Kumar applies the same approach. The Court held that the
allegations constituted the foundation of the termination, notwithstanding
their absence from the subsequent termination order, since the employer’s
own case showed that the order was based on those allegations.
38. The Petitioner has also relied upon Prasant Kumar Sahoo v. Indian
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Railway Stations Development Corporation Ltd. and Nina Lath Gupta v.
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Union of India . Those cases concerned, respectively, a regular employee
and a tenure appointment and are therefore not exact parallels. They
nevertheless reiterate the general proposition that the legal character of
termination depends upon its substance and that an otherwise available
contractual power of separation cannot be used to circumvent the procedure
governing punitive action.
Rule 5
39. The Petitioner’s separate argument concerning invocation of Rule 5
may be dealt with briefly. He relies upon the Government instruction which
provides that where the appointment letter itself contains a specific
provision for termination during probation, it would be “desirable” to
terminate in terms of that provision rather than under Rule 5(1).
40. That instruction does not say that probationers stand excluded from
Rule 5 or that invocation of Rule 5 in such a case is without jurisdiction.
Indeed, DPCC’s own counter takes inconsistent positions: the termination
order expressly invokes Rule 5, whereas the counter subsequently describes

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2026:DHC:6505-DB
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that reference as a clerical error and says that the action was really under the
appointment condition. Nothing turns on that controversy. Whether DPCC
acted under Rule 5 or Clause 1 of the appointment memorandum, neither
provision authorised it to impose, in substance, a punishment for misconduct
without the procedure which punitive action required.
Mala fides
41. The Petitioner has also alleged that the action was retaliatory because
he had complained of corruption against certain officers. Some complaints
were undoubtedly made while he was in service. He has also relied upon
criminal and vigilance proceedings which arose subsequently.
42. It is neither necessary nor appropriate to determine those allegations
in this petition. The subsequent registration of criminal proceedings against
some officers cannot retrospectively establish that the Petitioner’s
complaints were true or that the termination in March 2023 was actuated by
mala fides. Conversely, nothing said in this judgment amounts to a rejection
of any matter which may independently be under investigation. The
termination fails for the narrower reason already recorded.
Relief
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43. The termination order dated 10 March, 2023 and the order dated 13
September, 2024 rejecting the Petitioner’s appeal are accordingly set aside.
44. The Petitioner shall be reinstated in service within four weeks.
Reinstatement shall not amount to a declaration that the Petitioner stood
confirmed merely by expiry of the original period of probation. His status,
confirmation and further continuation shall be governed by the applicable
rules and lawful orders passed thereunder.

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45. The conclusion reached by the Court does not exonerate the Petitioner
from the allegations made against him. Their truth has not been adjudicated
here.
46. DPCC shall also remain at liberty, if so advised, to proceed in respect
of the allegations already made against the Petitioner in accordance with the
disciplinary procedure applicable to him. Nothing in this judgment shall
prejudice either side in such proceedings.
47. The Petitioner has sought arrears of salary for the entire intervening
period. There is, however, no pleading or material before the Court that he
remained without gainful employment after termination. Back wages do not
follow automatically from the setting aside of an order of termination.
Having regard also to his status as a probationer and to the fact that the
allegations themselves have not been adjudicated, the prayer for back wages
is declined. He shall, however, have continuity of service for other service
purposes, subject to the clarification regarding confirmation in paragraph 44
above.
48. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms. Pending applications,
if any, stand disposed of.

SANJEEV NARULA, J
SEPTEMBER 1, 2026/ as
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