THE COMMISSIONER FOR HOUSING AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY, vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

Court
Karnataka High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

TH
DATED THIS THE 18 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO.100674 OF 2023 (S-DIS)

BETWEEN:
THE COMMISSIONER FOR HOUSING AND
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY,
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD,
CAUVERY BHAVAN, KG ROAD,
BENGALURU.







…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. BASAVARAJ SABRAD, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. SHARMILA M. PATIL, ADVOCATE)

AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
R/BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU – 01.

2. B.Y.NILUGAL,
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: ASST. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
DISTRICT PROJECT OFFICE,
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD, BAGALKOTE
ST
R/O: H.NO. 943, 1 CROSS, SAPTAGIRI LAYOUT,
POST: GADDANKERI, TQ & DIST: BAGALKOTE.








Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. GIRIJA S. HIREMATH, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI. SUNIL S. DESAI, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
29/11/2019 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN
W.P.NO.112000/2019 AND ETC.

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

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ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

The appellant–Karnataka Housing Board is before us
calling in question an order dated 29.11.2019 passed by the
learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.112000 of 2019.

2. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri. Basavaraj
Sabarad, appearing for the appellant–Karnataka Housing
Board, and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.


3. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. Basavaraj Sabarad,
representing the Karnataka Housing Board, would submit that
the order passed by the learned Single Judge is erroneous. He
would further submit that considerable time was consumed in
examining the matter and taking a decision as to whether an
appeal ought to be preferred, which has resulted in a delay of
1,327 days in filing the appeal. The initial affidavit filed in
support of the application seeking condonation of delay reads
as follows:
“IN THIS. I. Laxminarayan Hegde, Age: Major, Occ:
Executive Engineer, KHB, Hubli, R/o: Hubli today at
Dharwad, do hereby state on solemn affirmation as
under:

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1. I am the Executive Engineer in the Appellant Board.
I am authorized to file this appeal. I know the facts of the
case based on records maintained by the Board. Hence, I
am swearing to this affidavit
2. I state that the appellant has filed the above
mentioned writ appeal challenging the order passed by
the learned single judge in WP No. 112000/2019 vide
order dated 29.11.2019.
3. I state that the appellant has raised number of
grounds in the accompanying memo of writ appeal and
the same may kindly be read as part and parcel of this
application.
4. It is respectfully submitted that, the respondent
was working in the Kamataka Housing board and was
dismissed after an enquiry being held. After hearing the
Hon'ble Single judge has set aside the dismissal order.
The appellant being aggrieved by the said order prefers
this appeal.
5. I state that the disposal of the writ petition the
Commissioner has forwarded letter to the secretary
Housing Board vide letter dated 07.02.2020, seeking
direction for further action and the same was deliberated
in the proceeding on 07.01.2020 and decided to prefer
the writ appeal. After detail deliberation it was decided on
17.08.2023, to prefer the writ appeal and direct the panel
advocate o prefer the appeal. Thereafter on 20.10.2023,
official authorization letter was sent to the panel advocate
with instructions to prefer the writ appeal. Accordingly
present writ appeal is filed.
5. I state that after passing the impugned judgment
there is a delay in preferring the appeal. I state that the
delay caused is due to official communication and
movement of the file in the government office. I further
state that after obtaining legal opinion from the advocate
the decision was taken to file appeal after consulting the
government. It is for this reason there is delay. The delay
is neither intentional nor deliberate but for the bonafide
reasons stated above. Due to pandemic covid 19 the
offices were not working Regularly.

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6. I state that the impugned judgment is directly
contrary to the judgment passed in R.F. Hudedavar and
ors Vs. The state of Karnataka and others cited at 2021
(6) Kr KJ 385. The balance of convenience is our favour
and I state that no loss or injustice would be caused to
respondent if the accompanying application is allowed as I
have got a bonafide case..
Wherefore, it is prayed that, this Hon'ble Court may
kindly be pleased to allow the accompanying application,
in the interest of justice and equity.”


4. A further affidavit is filed, which reads as follows:
“I R.Lokanath S/o S.H. Ramachandriah, Age
53 years, secretary, Karnataka Housing Board, Kaveri
Bhavan, Bengaluru do hereby state on solemn
affirmation as under;
1. I am the appellant in the above
writ appeal. I know the facts of the case based on the
available records and hence I am competent to swear
to this affidavit.
2. I state that the respondent no 2
Shri B.Y. Nilugal, Asst. Executive Engineer (retd.)
while in office commited financial
irregularities/malpractice to the tune of Rs.
1,23,47,500/- while acquiring 46 acres of land in
Kustagi village, Koppal dist. For the benefit of the
Board to form a housing scheme. He colluded with
middlemen and caused loss to farmers. One person
by name Mohammed saab The Deputy Belanatti of
Koppal lodged complaint to the DC, Koppal. The
Deputy Commissioner instructed Asst. Commissioner
to conduct enquiry and submit repot Based on the
report instructions were issued to the Police Sub-
Inspector, Koppal to register a criminal case.
Accordingly a case bearing crime no. 36/09 was
registered under sections 409 and 420 IPC. Further
the DC submitted a proposal to the Government to
transfer the case to the CID. Consequently the Home

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Department (Crimes) Government of Karnataka,
transferred the said case to CID for investigation on
15.03.2011. (Document no. 1 copy enclosed).
3. Thereafter, to prosecute the officer in
the Court sanction was granted by the DGP. CID
Bengaluru on 11.04.2012(Document no. 2 Copy
enclosed) and charge sheet filed before the Dist. and
Session Judge Court, Koppal. The Hon'ble Upa
Lokayukta conducted a preliminary enquiry in
thematter and submitted a repo (Document no. 3
Copy enclosed). To conduct the departmental enquiry
in the case, it was entrusted to the Hon'ble Upa
Lokayukta on 4.10.2012 to hold enquiry.(Document
no.4 Copy enclosed). The Upa Lokayukta conducted
enquiry and recommended in the enquiry report
dated 11.10.2018 that he be dismissed from service.
Accordingly he was dismissed on 25.06.2019.
(Document no. 5 Copy enclosed). Challenging the
dismissal order the respondent no. 2 filed writ
petition no. 112000/2019 before this Hon'ble Court.
The Hon'ble Court delivered the judgment on
29.11.2019 and allowed the petition. (Document no 6
Copy enclosed).
4. On 18.12.2019 the respondent no. 2
submitted a representation along with the copy of the
Court requesting to reinstate/continue him in service.
A letter was addressed to the Government on
07.02.2020 to issue appropriate orders. (Document
no. 7 Copy enclosed). In the letter by the Housing
department dated 28.07.2020, it was conveyed to
reinstate the officer in accordance with the order of
the Hon'ble Court and to take further appropriate
action. (Document no. 8 Copy enclosed). / The
respondent no. 2 was reinstated on 30.07.2020 and
posted to Bidar Dist. Project Office. (Document no. 9
copy enclosed). Following the quashing of the
dismissal order letters dated 07.02.2020, 24.04.2023
and 28.06.2023 were written seeking department's
opinion regarding the further course of action.
(Document no. 10 Copy enclosed). The Government
letter dated 21.07.2023, opinion was obtained from
the Law dpt. And the DPAR were forwarded.
(Document no. 11 Copy enclosed) Further in

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connection with the letter received from the
government, the legal opinion of the Board's Legal
Advisor was sought. The Legal Advisor tendered his
opinion and opined to file writ appeal explaining the
delay Accordingly the above writ appeal was filed
before this Hon'ble Court. Relevant extract of file
containing legal opinion is enclosed herewith as
Document No. 12.
5. I respectfully submit that, though
there is a delay in filing the appeal the same is not
intentional or deliberate. The delay is caused only due
to the administrative reasons explained in above
paragraph and since after receiving the copy of the
order passed by this Hon'ble Court, the department
has pursued the mater over a period of time and
based on legal opinion writ appeal has been filed. The
matter involves question of jurisdiction and authority
of KHB and Housing Commissioner to impose
penalties which is taken away by reason of the writ
Court order. Hence, this Hon'ble Bench may consider
issue of delay in public interest as well as justice and
equity.
WHEREFORE, I most humbly prayed that this
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow the delay
application in the interest of justice and equity.”


5. The further affidavit is stated to be in amplification
of the earlier affidavit filed in support of the application. Neither
of the two affidavits, however, inspires confidence to persuade
this Court to condone the delay of 1,357 days. Except for
referring to the movement of files and the rendering of opinions
by various officials, there is nothing worthy of consideration
that could constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay of
nearly four years.

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6. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA
v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH
1
SCHOOL , rejected the appeal filed by the State of Odisha on
the score that there was a delay of 291 days totally in filing the
appeal. The Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has
been shown for exercise of discretion in favour of
the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation in
the application for condonation of delay is such that
with much ado, the proceedings could be closed.

13. However, since there is a long line of decisions
of this Court propounding the law that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature in Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice and in view of the
submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.

14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it is
not being followed by the courts lower in the hierarchy,
mandated that a justice-oriented approach is indeed
called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.

15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had

1

2026 SCC OnLine SC 191

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referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the
following passage therefrom:

“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay …

It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to legalise
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to
do so.”

Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:

15. In litigations to which Government is a
party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps,
cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by
Government are lost for such defaults, no person
is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
of Government are collective and institutional
decisions and do not share the characteristics of
decisions of private individuals.

16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the
same for a private citizen as for governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant
must take responsibility for the acts or omissions
of its officers. But a somewhat different
complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public
interest was shown to have suffered owing to
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its
officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it.

17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause” for
purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are

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proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the
process of their making. A certain amount of
latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility of
Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in
the very nature of governmental functioning is
procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High Court,
the conduct of the law officers of the Government
placed the Government in a predicament and that
it was one of those cases where the mala fides of
the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law
officers. …

16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited ,
where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant
special leave petition was not condoned. University
of Delhi v. Union of India is another decision (of a
three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of
916 days was not condoned. While upholding the
decision of the relevant high court under challenge
refusing to condone the delay of 5659 days in
presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a
deceased landowner, a coordinate Bench in
Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA) very
recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal
remedy is put to an end so that no litigation
remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the

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stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay.

17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a
host of other decisions following the same while not
interfering with an order of condonation of delay
passed by the relevant high court. However, it was
observed that a distinction ought to be drawn
between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is
proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.

18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in
any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda
(supra) adopting a liberal approach is the exasperation
and consequent lament expressed by none other than
Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of authoring a
brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and admonishing officers of
the “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order
was made within six years of the decision in Ramegowda
(supra). We can do no better than quoting the same in its
entirety hereunder:

1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.

2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past, this
Court has been making observations as to
the grave prejudice caused to public
interest by appeals brought on behalf of

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the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been
made for over a few years in the past. But
there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present
petition which is filed in November 1993.
The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out in petitioner's own words:

“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record got the
special leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to
the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the
case file. ( h ) The Board returned the case file
to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993
who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP
was not approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent this file to
CAS on October 1, 1993.”

3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing
a judicially acceptable ground for
condonation of delay. After the earlier
observations of this Court made in several
cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to
be no visible support for this optimism.
There is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under
the shackles of bureaucratic indifference.
Having regard to the law of limitation
which binds everybody, we cannot find
any way of granting relief. It is true that
Government should not be treated as any
other private litigant as, indeed, in the
case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions
necessarily bogged down by the proverbial
red-tape. But there are limits to this also.
Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely
serves to aggravate the attitude of
indifference of the Revenue in protecting
its common interests. The affidavit is
again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that
the Revenue does not seem to attach any

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importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest.

4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special
leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.

(emphasis ours)

19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in doubt
that it did not take much time for this Court to lose hope.
It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down in
Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much
optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and
the Court's patience having been tested to the extreme
limit, held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the
Government.

20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before
the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.

21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite
all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown
here by the State of Odisha is not an explanation
but a lame excuse. No case for exercise of
discretion has been set up.

22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the result
that the special leave petition stands dismissed as time-
barred.”

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7. The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds
that the State of Odisha was utterly lethargic, tardy and
indolent in filing the appeal. The Apex Court further holds that
condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right, it
is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone
the delay. The Apex Court rejected the appeal filed on the
score that the cause sought to be shown by the State is not an
explanation but a lame excuse.


8. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances, this
Court finds no justification to condone the inordinate delay.
Consequently, the application seeking condonation of delay
stands rejected. Resultantly, the appeal also stands rejected on
the ground of delay.


Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE

RSH/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 28