SRI RAMANJANAPPA vs SRI MUNIYAPPA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
®
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 15 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO. 117 OF 2026 (IO)
BETWEEN:
SRI RAMANJANAPPA
SINCE DEAD BY LR’S
SMT.RATHNAMMA
W/O LATE NANJAIAH
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS
R/OF BIDARAHALLI VILLAGE AND HOBLI
BENGALURU EAST THALUK
BENGALURU – 560 067.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI V.D.RAVIRAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
SRI MUNIYAPPA
S/O LATE RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.
2. SRI DODDE GOWDA
S/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS.
3. SRI AMBRISH
S/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS.
Digitally signed
by SUVARNA T
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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4. SRI MANJUNATH
S/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS.
5. SMT. MUNINARAYANAMMA
W/O LATE RAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS
SL.NO.1 TO 5 ABOVE ARE
R/OF AKKIMANGALA VILLAGE
S.K.HALLI POST, CHITHAMANI TALUK
CHIKKABALLAPURA – 563 125.
6. SMT. BYRAMMA
D/O LATE RAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
R/OF SONNENAHALLI
SHIDLAGATTA TALUK
CHIKKABALLAPURA – 562 105.
7. SMT. VENKATALAKSHMAMMA
D/O LATE RAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/OF DASAGANDANAHALLI VILLAGE
DODDABALLAPURA TALUK
BENGALURU RURAL- 561 203.
8. SRI MUNIHANUMAPPA
D/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS.
9. SRI B.N.NAGARJ
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS.
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10.
SMT. GOWRAMMA
W/O SREENIVAS B.
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
SL.NO.8 TO 10 ARE
R/OF BIDARAHALLI VILLAGE AND HOBLI
BENGALURU EAST THALUK
BENGALURU – 560 067.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI Y.R.SADASHIVA REDDY, SR.COUNSEL FOR
SRI AKKI MANJUNATH GOWDA K., ADVOCATE FOR
R1 TO R7)
THIS CRP IS FILED UNDER SEC.115 OF CPC., AGAINST
THE ORDER DATED 12.01.2026 PASSED ON IA IN OS
NO.593/2025 ON THE FILE OF CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC,
KRISHNARAJAPURA., ALLOWING THE INTERIM APPLICATION
FILED UNDER SEC.151 OF CPC., SEEKING TO REOPEN OS
NO.1633/2006.
THIS CRP HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
11.06.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI
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CAV ORDER
Aggrieved by the order passed in I.A. in
O.S.No.593/2025(old No.1633/2006) dated 12.01.2026 by the
Civil Judge and JMFC, Krishnarajapura, Bengaluru Rural
District, Bengaluru, the petitioner/defendant No.3(a) is before
this Court .
2. The respondent No.1/plaintiff had filed a suit for
partition in O.S.No.1633/2006 before the Principal Senior Civil
Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, claiming that the plaintiff and
defendants are lineal descendants of late Hanumanna, the suit
schedule properties are ancestral joint family properties, and
they have definite shares. The petitioner herein and the other
defendants together filed the written statement contending that
the father of the plaintiffs left the family house when they were
12 years old, the suit schedule item Nos.1 to 3 are self-
acquired property of Narayanappa, and the house property
detailed in suit schedule item Nos.4 to 6 is the only ancestral
house property. Later, the plaintiff included his children and the
sister and daughter of late Narayanappa as additional plaintiffs.
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The petitioner herein is brought on record as LR of the
deceased defendant No.3.
3. With the intervention of common friends and relatives,
the parties to the suit settled the dispute and filed a
compromise petition, and the compromise decree was passed
on 16.04.2010. Under the compromise, the parties have
admitted the relationship of the parties to the suit and that the
suit schedule item Nos.1 to 3 are the self acquired and
absolute properties of late Narayanappa. To compensate the
plaintiffs in so far as suit schedule item No.4 to 6 (house
properties), the defendant Nos.1 to 3 agreed to pay a total sum
of Rs.15,00,000/- out of which they paid an amount of
Rs.1,75,000/- by cash and issued 06 post-dated cheques to the
plaintiffs. In the compromise, it is specifically agreed that in
case of non-payment of the amount under the cheque, the
parties are barred from seeking cancellation of the compromise
order and are at liberty to recover the amount through due
process of Court . The writ petition challenging the same also
came to be dismissed as withdrawn. In the meanwhile, the
cheques issued under compromise petition got dishonoured.
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The defendant No.1 challenged the compromise by filing
Misc.No.17/2010 seeking its cancellation. The plaintiff had
submitted that there is no objection to allow the said petition.
The petition came to be dismissed on 14.12.2015.
4. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an application under
Section 151 of CPC seeking to set aside the compromise decree
and restore the suit for adjudication. The defendants filed a
statement of objection and cross-examined the plaintiff witness
on the said interim application. The trial Court allowed the
application and set aside the compromise decree and restored
the suit for adjudication. Aggrieved thereby, defendant No.3(a)
is before this Court .
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits
that the impugned order allowing the interim application to
restore the suit by setting aside the compromise decree is
unsustainable. The trial Court had completely ignored the
mutually agreed and binding terms. It is submitted that as per
the agreed terms and conditions of the compromise, in order to
put an end to the litigation and to bind all the parties to the
compromise, a specific and stringent clause was incorporated in
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the compromise petition, barring the parties from defeating the
purpose of the compromise on the ground of non-payment of
the amount. It was further agreed that the aggrieved party
would be entitled to recover the amount due, if any, through
the process of the Court under the compromise decree.
Learned counsel submits that the trial Court , while passing the
impugned order, had failed to understand the clauses in the
agreement. It is submitted that due to the confusion that
prevailed, the cheques presented by the plaintiffs were
dishonoured. Under such circumstances, the option available to
the plaintiffs was to recover the amount from defendant Nos.1
to 3 by following due process of law, by filing the execution
proceedings based on the compromise decree and seeking
attachment of the suit schedule properties. The trial Court has
no power to recall the compromise decree and the same has to
be set aside.
6. Learned Senior counsel representing learned counsel
for respondent Nos.1 to 7 submits that as per the terms and
conditions of the decree, the parties have failed to comply with
the same, as such, the trial Court had rightly set aside the
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compromise decree. It is submitted that the trial Court has
every power to pass such an order as the terms and conditions
of the compromise decree are violated by the parties. He relied
on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case
of Lakshmamma and Others Vs. T.H.Ramegowda and
1
Others on paragraph No.14, 16 and 17 which reads thus:
“14. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the
law by the Apex Court and the aforesaid statutory
provisions, the law is well settled. Once the parties
settle the disputes by way of a compromise by
presenting an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court accepts
compromise and passes a decree in terms of the
compromise, the decree passed by the Court attains
finality. Section 96 of the Code provides for appeal
from original decrees. It provides that an appeal
shall lie from every decree passed by any Court
exercising original jurisdiction to the Court
authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of
such Court . However sub-Section (3) of Section 96
provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree
passed by the Court with the consent of parties. In
other words, Section 96(3) of the Code prohibits an
appeal challenging a decree passed by the Court
with the consent of parties. • Earlier, Order 43 Rule
1(m) of CPC provided that an appeal shall lie from an
order under Rule 3 of Order XXIII recording or
refusing to record an agreement, compromise or
satisfaction. If the party wanted to treat the order
accepting the compromise itself as an order and
wanted to prefer a miscellaneous appeal, Order 43
Rule 1(m) of the Code provided a miscellaneous
appeal. However, Clause (m) was omitted by Act 104
of 1976 with effect from 01.02.1977. Now such a
course is not open to him. No miscellaneous appeal
lies against the order accepting or rejecting the
1
ILR 2015 KAR 4024
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compromise by the Trial Court . Order XXIII Rule 3A
which was inserted by Act 104/1976 which came
into effect from 01.02.1977 provides that no suit
shall lie to set-aside a decree on the ground that the
compromise on which the decree is passed was not
lawful. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions,
a regular appeal, a miscellaneous appeal and a
separate suit is not maintainable to challenge a
compromise decree. Therefore, the only remedy
available to an aggrieved person, who wants to
challenge the compromise decree is to approach the
very same Court , which passed the compromise
decree. He has to file application in the suit, in which
the compromise was recorded and a decree is passed
on such compromise. Thus, after a compromise has
been recorded, the Court concerned can entertain an
application under Section 151 of the Code
questioning the legality or validity of the
compromise. If such an application is filed, then the
Court which passed the decree shall consider the
said application after notice to either side. Then the
said Court has to decide the question as to whether
the compromise entered into and the decree passed
thereon is lawful or valid. It can also decide whether
such compromise is void or voidable. If the
agreement or compromise itself is fraudulent, then it
shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the
explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not
lawful.
16. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly
on the validity of the agreement or compromise on
which it is made. It is open to the parties to the
compromise to show that the agreement is not
lawful and by misrepresentation, fraud or mistake,
they were made to agree to such compromise. A
consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid
and binding unless it is set-aside by the Court which
passed the consent decree. The explanation to the
proviso says that an agreement or compromise
"which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract
Act.." shall not be deemed to be lawful within the
meaning of the said Rule. In view of the said proviso
read with the explanation, a Court which had
entertained the petition of Compromise has to
examine whether the compromise was void or
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voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Then, if the
compromise is not lawful, it may be either invalid
decree or a void decree. In either event, unless, the
compromise is challenged and a competent Court
declares it as invalid or void, the compromise is
binding on the parties.
17. In the instant case, the suit filed by the plaintiff
for setting aside the compromise petition dated
28.03.2005 and consequential decree passed in O.S.
No.121/2000 on the file of the II Additional Senior
Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District was challenged
on the ground that it is vitiated on the ground of
fraud and misrepresentation. Such a suit was not
maintainable. Therefore, the Trial Court was
justified in invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the Code to
dismiss the suit as not maintainable.”
7. Relying on the above judgment, it is submitted that to
question a compromise decree, a regular appeal, miscellaneous
appeal, or a separate suit is not maintainable. Therefore, the
only remedy available to the aggrieved person who wants to
challenge the compromise decree is to approach the very same
Court which passed the compromise decree. The aggrieved
party can file an application in the suit in which the compromise
was recorded and the decree was passed on such compromise.
Thus, after a compromise has been recorded, the concerned
Court can entertain an application under Section 151 of CPC,
questioning the illegality of the compromise. If such an
application is filed, then the Court which passed the decree
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shall consider the said application after notice to the other side.
Then the said Court has to decide the question as to whether
the compromise entered into and the decree passed thereon is
lawful or valid. It can also decide whether such compromise is
void or voidable. If the agreement of compromise itself is
fraudulent, then it shall be deemed to be void. Learned Senior
counsel further submits that it is open to the parties to the
compromise to show that the agreement is not lawful and by
misrepresentation, fraud or mistake, they were made to agree
to such compromise. It is submitted that in this case, as the
cheques that are issued by the parties are dishonoured and the
trial Court had rightly considered and dismissed the petition
and set aside the compromise decree, there are no grounds to
interfere.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to
7, perused the material on record. In the light of the
arguments, advanced on behalf of either of the parties, the
issues that falls for consideration is:
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“Whether a compromise decree lawfully passed
under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC can be set aside on
the grounds that the parties to the compromise
committed breach of terms and conditions of the
compromise?”
Before adverting to the respective contentions raised, it is
appropriate to look at Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of CPC,
which reads as follows:
“Order XXIII:-Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits
Rule 3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the
satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise
[in writing and signed by the parties] or where the
defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or
any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall
order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be
recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith
[so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not
the subjectmatter of the agreement, compromise or
satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:]
[Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied
by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been
arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not
adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding
the question, unless the Court , for reasons to be recorded,
thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Rule 3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree
on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is
based was not lawful.”
9. A decree that is passed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of
CPC is not an ordinary adjudicatory degree. It embodies two
distinct elements.
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1. A contract voluntarily entered into by the parties.
2. The order of the Court in incorporating such lawful
agreement into a decree.
10. Once the Court records that the compromise is lawful
and passes a decree in terms thereof, the compromise merges
into the decree. Thereafter, the rights of the parties are
governed not merely by contract but by the decree of the Court
. The legislative intent underlying Order XXIII Rule 3 is to
confirm the sanctity and finality of lawful settlement to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings. Hence, the Court will not set aside
the compromise decree except on the grounds recognised by
law. Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC authorises the Court to
record a lawful compromise and pass a decree in accordance
with law. Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC expressly bars the
institution of a separate suit to set aside a compromise decree
on the ground that the compromise was not lawful. The object
of Rule 3A is to ensure that disputes relating to the validity of
the compromise are decided by the very same Court which
recorded the compromise, not by way of an independent suit.
However, Rule 3A does not enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court
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to reopen every compromise decree. The jurisdiction is confined
to examining whether the lawful compromise existed at the
time when the decree was passed. The enquiry is directed to
decide questions such as fraud, coercion, undue influence,
impersonation, want of authority, misrepresentation inducing
the compromise, absence of consensus ad idem and illegality
rendering the compromise void or voidable. However,
subsequent breach of the compromised terms is all together a
different issue.
11. When the compromise is validly entered into by the
parties, and subsequently one of the parties fails to perform his
obligation, the compromise remains valid only until its
performance is breached. Failure to honour the terms, i.e.,
dishonour of cheques, does not retrospectively render the
original consent involuntary. The legality of the compromise
must be judged on the date on which the Court recorded it and
not basing on the subsequent conduct of the parties. If the
contentions as put forth by the learned senior counsel for the
respondent are accepted, it would destroy the sanctity and
certainty attached to the compromise decree. Every default
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after the decree would become a ground to reopen the
concluded litigation. This will defeat the very purpose and
purport of Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. If the terms and
condition of the compromise decree are violated as it is an
executable decree, decree holder can execute the decree under
Order XXI of CPC. He has a remedy under the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. The legislature has never intended that
breach of compromise shall result in recall of the decree itself.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the
judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Krishna Kumar
Ojha vs Jitendra Chaudhary arising out SLP (C) No.
13671/2025. He relied on paragraph Nos. 6, 6.3 to 6.6 which
reads as follows:
“6. On the aspect of delay, prima facie the gap
between 1994 and 2022 is egregiously large and it
requires to be examined in detail. To that end, we
must consider the application filed under Section
151 CPC and the reasoning on this aspect given both
by the Civil Court and also the High Court .
*
6.3 The Sub-Judge-01(East) Muzaffarpur in
Miscellaneous case no.07 of 2022 rejected the
ground of limitation observing that the case of the
applicant is that he came to know of the allegedly
fraudulent compromise decree, just shortly before
filing the said application. Whether or not this was
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the case, is a matter of evidence to be decided at
trial. Further, it was observed that the law of
limitation applies against act of parties and not
action of the Court . It was also observed that
assuming truth to the matter of knowledge being
subsequent, the power under Section 151CPC can be
exercised by the Court for the ends of justice
especially where fraud is alleged to have been
perpetuated and the same cannot be defeated due to
irregularity in procedure.
6.4 The aspect of delay was not gone into by the
High Court and instead the order overall was
affirmed as there was no illegality or jurisdictional
error therein.
6.5 In our view, if the delay had been the ground to
dismiss the miscellaneous case, the effect would be
to perpetuate something which is not in accordance
with law. The same cannot be permitted. The law of
limitation, while undoubtedly an important facet of
the legal system, cannot be used as a means to
defeat substantive rights. In this case, although the
compromise was not signed by him, defendant no.5’s
rights in the property which is not miniscule were
directly affected by the compromise.
6.6 There is another aspect that requires to be noted.
All of the essential facts which form the basis of the
compromise are itself contested. One party says that
they are not family members while the other, in the
objection via family chart demonstrates them to be
relatives; One submits that the defendant no.5 had
been made party only because his name had been
inadvertently recorded in the survey register, while
the other says that they have full right over the
property and no part of the disputed property had
been given up by them; there is also a statement
regarding the complete lack of authorisation any
which way, to the counsel for defendant no.5; the
appellants submit that they/their father (defendant
no.5) were not aware of the suit proceedings
whereas the other party submits that defendant no.5
knew about all of the going-ons that led to the
compromise decree. It was nearly 22 years after
defendant no.5 died, which was in itself eight years
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after the decree of 1994, that the respondents
sought to dispossess the appellants thereby setting
into motion the present proceedings. Clearly, the
most basic facts are disputed. This, along with the
fact that the compromise decree is not in accordance
with law gives us enough reason to agree with the
reasoning of the Court below. It is for the
aforenoted reasons that the delay of 25 years has to
be given a go-by in the facts of this case. It is not in
all cases that such large delay can be set aside.
Whether or not a particular case warrants taking
such a view is to be determined after a detailed
examination of the record in each case.
13. Coming to the facts of the case, the Court , while
setting aside the compromise decree, observed that the
material on record clearly establishes that out of 6 cheques
issued under the compromise, 4 were in the names of persons
who were not parties to the suit or to the compromise
proceedings. Two cheques were issued in the name of Kamala,
the daughter of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and 2 cheques were
issued in the name of Ramyashree Enterprises. There is no
explanation in the compromise petition as to why cheques
belonging to third parties were issued, nor is there any material
to show the legal relationship of those third parties to the suit
transaction, which is not denied by the defendants. Defendant
No. 1, within a span of 30 days from the date of passing of the
compromise decree, filed a Miscellaneous Petition No. 17/2010
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challenging the compromise decree on the ground that it was
obtained without his knowledge and by playing fraud, and it
was dismissed on technical grounds. The Court also observed
that defendants No. 1 and 2 admitted before the police that he
was initially unaware of the compromise and had issued
cheques belonging to his daughter, and later instructed the
Bank to stop the payment. The Court further observed that the
rd
plaintiff is left without any remedy as the cheques belong to 3
parties and they cannot initiate recovery proceedings. The
inclusion of Clause 7, which bars the cancellation of
compromise decree, defeats the very object of Order XXIII Rule
3 of CPC. Instead of bringing finality to the litigation, it has
resulted in multiplicity of proceedings and accordingly, set aside
the compromise decree.
14. This Court has perused the miscellaneous application
filed by the respondent herein dated 26.03.2021. In the
affidavit in support of the application, it is stated that the
cheques issued by the defendants are dishonoured, the terms
of the compromise are violated and the compromise decree has
to be set aside. The compromise decree is dated 16.04.2010,
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cheques are dated 25.07.2010 and after 10 years in 2021, the
present petition is filed. There is no explanation forthcoming,
and the Court has also failed to record any reasons in this
regard. Under the compromise petition, defendant No.1 had
issued 2 cheques belonging to his daughter, and defendant
No.3 had issued 2 cheques. The details of the said cheques
were specifically mentioned in the compromise petition and
were accepted by the plaintiffs, in the presence of their
counsel, before the Court .
15. The cheques were presented before the Court and
accepted by the parties on 16.04.2010, though dated
25.07.2010. The trial Court has confused breach of compromise
with invalidity of the compromise. A breach does not
retrospectively make the compromise unlawful. The learned
judge has not recorded any finding that the compromise was
vitiated by fraud, coercion, or any other circumstance that
renders it unlawful. The sole basis for recalling the decree is
that the cheques belong to the defendant's daughter were
dishonoured. Such subsequent defaults may give rise to a
remedy available in law, but they do not become a basis to
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annul a compromise decree validly passed under Order XXIII
Rule 3 CPC. The learned judge exercised jurisdiction not vested
in it by law in setting aside a valid compromise decree. The
compromise remained lawful when it was recorded, and
subsequent breach will not invalidate the decree.
16. The Court shall exercise extreme circumspection
before recalling the compromise decree and shall bear in mind
that the procedural law encourages the settlement of disputes
and that the confidence of litigants in Court -annexed
settlements depends on the certainty that a lawfully recorded
compromise will not be reopened except on legally recognised
grounds
17. In the considered opinion of this Court, the trial Court
set aside the compromise decree on unfounded grounds, which
is not permissible, and the issue raised is answered in favour of
the petitioner. In that view of the matter, this Court is passing
the following:
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ORDER
i. The order passed on I.A. in O.S.No.593/2025
dated 12.01.2026 by the Civil Judge and JMFC,
Krishnarajapura, Bengaluru Rural District,
Bengaluru is set aside and the compromise
decree passed in O.S.No.1633/2006 dated
16.04.2010 is restored.
ii. This order will not preclude the respondents
from executing the decree in accordance with
law
iii. Accordingly, the Civil Revision petition is
allowed.
iv. All I.As. in this petition shall stand closed.
SD/-
(LALITHA KANNEGANTI)
JUDGE
MEG
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1