Super Bazar vs D.D.A.

$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on:12.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on:01 .07.2026
+ W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003
SUPER BAZAR ...Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Mr.
Ruchir Mishra, Mr. Sanjiv Kr. Saxena, Mr.
Mukesh Kr Tiwari, Ms. Reba Jena Mishra,
Ms. Urmi H. Raval, Ms. Poonam Shukia,
Ms.Shrestha Narayan, Advs.

versus
D.D.A ...Respondent
Through: Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Shashi Pratap Singh, Ms. Shagun
Sabharwal, Ms. Anamika Tyagi, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
J U D G M E N T

1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has approached this Court
seeking quashing of the ordersdated 06.08.2002 (“impugned Order”)
and 22.10.2002 whereby the lease of property bearing Plot No. 20
situated at District Centre, Rajendra Place (“subject property”) has
been cancelled and the request of the petitioner for extension of time
Digitally Signed
By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
18:23:31
W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 1 of 26

for construction of proposed building on the subject property has been
rejected.
FACTUAL MATRIX AS PER THE PETITIONER
2. The petitioner namely, Super Bazar, the Co-operative Stores Ltd. was
established in the year 1966 by the Government of India and was
functioning as a Consumer Co-operative Society under the aegis of
Ministry of Consumer Affairs to ensure availability of quality
consumer goods to the citizens of Delhi at reasonable rates.

3. The respondent by way of a lease deed executed on 13.10.1998
granted perpetual lease of the subject property admeasuring 677.61 sq.
mtrs. in favour of the petitioner. Even though the said property was
initially allotted in favour of the petitioner in the year 1975, by fixing
consideration of Rs. 10 Lacs as premium and fixed rent of 2.5% of the
premium per annum effective from 1978 but the possession of subject
property was handed over only on 10.09.1998.
4. Pursuant to the execution of lease deed, the petitioner entered into an
agreement with M/s. Design 'n' Design Architects, Engineers and
Planners, Hauz Khas, New Delhi (“Construction Company”) for the
construction of building at the subject property.
5. In order to scrutinize the irregularities in the aforesaid agreement
between the Construction Company and the petitioner, an
investigation was initiated by the CBI at the behest of Department of
Consumer Affairs.
6. The Under Secretary to the Government of India vide letter dated
02.07.1999 informed the petitioner to keep in abeyance all further
actions on the project in view of consideration of the matter by the
Central Vigilance Commission (“CVC”) .
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 2 of 26

7. In view of the directions of CVC and investigation by CBI, the
execution of the construction Contract between petitioner and
Construction Company was delayed and ultimately rescinded.
8. Owing to severe financial distress, CBI investigations and pending
public interest litigations against the petitioner Society, the petitioner,
vide letter dated 26.03.2001 requested the respondent for extension of
time for construction work at the subject property.
9. Disregarding the said request for extension, the respondent issued a
show cause notice dated 08.02.2002 requiring the petitioner to explain
reasons for non-construction of the commercial building even after the
expiry of 26 years.
10. The managing director of the petitioner duly replied to the show cause
notice stating the reasons for delay and also requested the respondent
for further extension of 2 years period to construct the required
building.
11. The respondent without taking into consideration the said reply to the
show cause notice issued the impugned Order dated 06.08.2002,
cancelling the allotment/lease deed on the ground of failure to
construct the proposed building, failure to furnish a satisfactory
response to the show cause notice, and failure to make rent payments
on time.
12. The petitioner vide a letter dated 31.08.2002 again requested the
respondent to grant extension of time owing to several difficulties in
completion of the construction but to avail as the request was declined
vide letter dated 22.10.2002 and the decision of cancellation of
allotment/lease deed was reiterated.
Intervening Events
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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13. Meanwhile, the petitioner owing to increasing financial strain, went
into liquidation and an official liquidator was appointed. The said
liquidation proceedings were challenged by the workers union of the
petitioner Society before this Court and on dismissal of the said
challenge, a Special Leave Petition bearing SLP(C) No. 8398-
8399/2005 was filed, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court initiated
steps for revival of the Society.
14. In an attempt for revival, the Hon’ble Supreme Court invited bids and
eventually a bid of Writers and Publishers Ltd. was accepted.
However the revival could not be effectively achieved.
15. In view of the several steps for revival, this Court vide its Order dated
06.05.2013 directed the respondent to decide the representation made
by the petitioner dated 26.09.2011 for the restoration of lease deed.
16. The respondent in compliance of the said direction passed an order
dated 17.04.2015 restoring the lease deed subject to payment of
appropriate charges which were to be communicated later to the
petitioner. The order dated 17.04.2015 is reproduced as under:
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 4 of 26

17. Pursuant thereto, a letter dated 04.09.2015 was addressed to the
petitioner stating the outstanding dues to Rs. 83,70,54,798/-, to which
the petitioner raised objections.
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 5 of 26

18. This Court vide its Order dated 13.10.2015, again directed the
respondent to file a status report and at the same time also allowed the
petitioner to file its objections to it.
19. Meanwhile, on 13.10.2015, the respondent addressed another letter to
the petitioner demanding dues of Rs. 82,96,40,607/-.
20. The calculation of the outstanding dues demanded for restoration of
lease deed is further disputed by the petitioner on the ground of being
erroneous. The petitioner has also filed a reply affidavit to the status
report in accordance with the liberty granted by this Court.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
21. At the outset, Mr. Raval, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
states that the impugned Order is in violation of guidelines laid down
1
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ONGC v. CCE and
administrative instructions issued by the Union Government, wherein
it is held that the disputes between government organisations are to be
resolved by being referred to the high powered committee.
22. The impugned Order of cancellation is based on the premise that the
petitioner failed to construct the building even after expiry of 26 years
without taking into consideration that the plot was handed over to the
petitioner in September 1998 despite allotment in the year 1975.
23. The impugned Order is also vitiated because it states that one of the
grounds for the decision is that the petitioner has not paid its dues
towards ground rent, which is not true as the petitioner has paid its up
to date ground rent.

1
(2004)6SCC437.
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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24. The delay in construction of the building is not attributable to any
faults of the petitioner but to directions issued by the CVC and
investigation by the CBI.
25. It is settled position of law that in such situations the respondent ought
to have exercised its discretion to grant extension to the petitioner to
construct the building by regularising the said lapse.
26. He further states that a winding up Order dated 05.07.2002 has been
passed for the petitioner Society which categorically provides for
revival of the petitioner. In this regard, the petitioner has to discharge
its various liabilities and at this stage the cancellation of lease and
forfeiture of amount deposited such as premium and ground rent
would result in loss to the petitioner.
27. It is also stated that the impugned Order has caused grave harm to the
petitioner inasmuch as it is passed without reasons and without
considering the reply or request of the petitioner for extension of time,
and only on the ground that the petitioner failed to give a satisfactory
response to the show cause notice.
28. As per the policy of the respondent pertaining to levy of composition
fee, the allottee can apply for construction beyond the stipulated time
mentioned in the lease deed subject to payment of composition fee.
OBJECTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER TO THE
CALCULATION OF OUTSTANDING DUES
29. Mr. Raval, learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that pursuant
to the directions of this, the respondent restored the lease deed and
raised demands of Rs. 83,70,54,798/- vide letter dated 04.09.2015,
which was revised to Rs. 82,96,40,607/-. The said demand of
applicable charges is devoid of any reasons or justification.
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
18:23:31
W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 7 of 26

30. The said decision of restoration of the lease deed is dependent on
arbitrary and unjustified condition of payment of unsubstantiated
charges and the same cannot be termed as restoration.
31. The respondent has been ignorant in undertaking the calculation of the
applicable charges as in the letter dated 13.10.2015, the respondent has
incorrectly stated the area of the subject property as admeasuring 7290
sq. mtrs. instead of the actual area of the subject property which is
specifically recorded in the lease deed dated 13.10.1998 to be 677.61
sq. mtrs. only.
32. It is also submitted that the demand of Rs. 66,99,02,378/- raised by the
respondent towards the payment of Unearned Increase (“UEI”) is
unsubstantiated, unjustified and illegal.
33. The imposition of UEI is submitted to be in breach of the terms of the
lease deed as the Clause No. 4(b) of the lease deed provides for
imposition of UEI only in cases where the lessee involves in sale,
transfer, assignment, subletting or parting with possession of the
subject property with prior permission of the respondent as
contemplated under Clause No. 4(a). However, in the factual matrix of
the instant case,Clause No. 4(a) is not triggered at all so as to require
permission of the respondent because no sale, transfer, assignment,
subletting or parting with possession has taken place and the subject
property (leased property) continues to remain in the name of Super
Bazar Cooperative Store.
34. The demand of UEI is devoid of any justifications because the
petitioner never sought any permission which is a mandatory pre-
requisite as per Clause No. 4(a) read with Clause No. 4(b).
35. The said permission was not required, hence was never sought,
because the revival process was carried out strictly in pursuance of the
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 8 of 26

directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the same cannot be
termed as transfer or alienation of the subject property.
36. Mr. Raval, learned senior counsel, also places reliance on circular
dated 08.05.1979 issued by the respondent itself, to contend that UEI
is payable only in cases involving a change in constitution of a
partnership firm or private limited company. In the present case, the
structure and identity of the petitioner Society remains the same as it
was prior to revival.

37. It is also stated that without prejudice to the other submissions, even
assuming that there was a change in management of the petitioner,
such change is attributable to compulsory operation of law as the
change is effected pursuant to the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. In such a situation when the transfer is effected by compulsory
operation of law, the dues fastened to the said property will not
transfer. Reliance is placed on Tayal Energy Ltd. v. Provident Fund
2
Commr., Employees' Provident Fund Organisation .
38. The respondent never disclosed any outstanding UEI in the bid
document and by raising a demand for the same at a later stage, the
respondent has taken a completely contrary stand which was not
adopted in the revival proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
In those proceedings, the respondent claimed only a meagre amount
towards ground rent dues and no alleged liability towards UEI was
ever disclosed.
39. It is submitted that the respondent has erred in calculating the ground
rent/enhanced ground rent upto 14.01.2016, as the lease deed was in
fact not subsisting (not effective) for a period of 2002 to 2016. Thus,

2
2011 SCC OnLine P&H 3614.
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 9 of 26

ground rent/enhanced ground rent is only payable for the effective
operating period of 1998 to 2002.
40. Additionally, it is stated that the demand of outstanding dues raised by
the respondent including at its serial No. 5, “License fee upto
05.06.2000 (for plot No. 9A & 23)” is totally untenable as the subject
matter of the representation and present petition including the cause of
action is qua plot No. 20 only and the respondent cannot unilaterally
enlarge the scope of present petition to raise demands with respect to
other properties. Consequently, demands of outstanding dues
mentioned at serial No. 5, 6, and 7 towards license fee and interest
emanating therefrom, concerning Plot Nos. 9A and 23 are unfounded.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
41. At the outset, Mr. Vasdev, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent, states that the petition is misconceived as the
dispute emanates from terms of a lease deed and the same stands at an
independent footing. Even if the terms are inconsistent with the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the same cannot be
invoked to override or dilute the express stipulations of the lease.
42. The physical possession of the subject property was handed over on
15.11.1975, and as per the terms of the lease (Clause No. II (3a)), the
petitioner was required to construct the building within 3 years of
acquiring possession. In addition, petitioner was also bound to pay
lease premium. The petitioner failed to construct the building within
time and also to pay its dues.
43. The petitioner on multiple occasions, requested the respondent for
extension of time for construction and the same was duly considered
subject to payment of dues of Rs. 7,13,25,862/-. However, the
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 10 of 26

petitioner then requested for waiver of composition fee, which was
denied by the respondent.
44. The request of the petitioner for grant of extension of time was
rejected vide order dated 28.05.2001. Subsequently, a show cause
notice dated 07.02.2002-08.02.2002, letter dated 06.05.2002, and final
notice dated 15.05.2002 were issued to the petitioner. Thus, in this
view of non-payment of outstanding dues and violation of terms of
lease the impugned Order of cancellation of lease deed was passed by
the respondent.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
45. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
46. From a conspectus of the aforesaid facts as stated above, it is clear that
the lease deed has been cancelled by the respondent on the ground of
non-construction of the commercial building on the said plot and non-
payment of ground rent. The impugned Order is reproduced as under:
Digitally Signed
By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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47. It is the case of the petitioner that the delay in construction is not
attributable to the petitioner but due to the prevailing circumstances as
investigations were undergoing against the petitioner and it was facing
financial constraints.
48. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has failed to construct the
required building within the time fixed in the lease deed. In fact, the
petitioner also requested the respondent time and again for extension
of time.
49. Pursuant to these requests, the petitioner was granted an opportunity to
seek extension of time by paying the outstanding dues of Rs.
7,13,25,862/-. However, the petitioner opted to seek waiver of this
amount.
50. Yet again, pursuant to the Orders of this Court, the respondent
considered the representation filed by the petitioner and decided to
restore the lease deed subject to payment of outstanding dues of Rs.
82,96,40,607/- communicated to the respondent vide letter dated
13.10.2015. The same is reproduced as under:
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 13 of 26

51. The petitioner disputes the said calculation of the outstanding dues and
states that the same is devoid of any reasons or justifications. The
decision of restoration of lease deed is dependent on arbitrary and
unjustified condition of payment of unsubstantiated charges and the
same cannot be termed as restoration. Additionally, the petitioner is
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 14 of 26

ready and willing to pay the lawful charges towards the outstanding
dues to the respondent.
52. With regards to the calculation of outstanding dues for restoration of
lease deed as required, it is the case of the petitioner that the
calculation is wrong because the same is not only based on incorrect
application of Clause No. 4(a) and 4(b) of the lease deed but also the
charges stated at Serial No. 5, 6 and 7 are not payable as the petitioner
is already undergoing liquidation. These charges stated therein can
only be recovered by way of filing a claim before the liquidator as it
does not relate to the property forming subject matter of the lease deed
of which restoration was sought vide present petition i.e. Plot No. 20.
53. Qua the calculations, it is also stated by the counsel for the respondent
that in the serial No. 1 i.e., plot area, there is a typographical error and
7290 sq. mts. should be read as 7290 sq. ft.
54. I am of the view that notably, the petitioner consumer cooperative
society was established by the Union Government with the aim and
objective of making good quality consumer goods available to the
citizens of Delhi.
55. The subject property was leased out to the petitioner for the very
specific purpose of running departmental store to make available
affordable and good quality consumer goods to the public at large in
Delhi. The relevant portion of the lease deed reads as under:
“14) The plot or the building thereon shall not be used for a
purpose other than that as specified. The Lessee shall also
ensure that the purchasers of floor area units in the building
observe the general conditions of lease entered into between
the Lessor and the Lessee. The purchasers of the floor area
units shall not use or caused to be used the units/show
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 15 of 26

rooms or any portion thereof for any purpose whatsoever
other than that of the office show room or shop as specified
for business purposes. The lessee shall not use or caused to
be used the said unit show-room in such manner which may
or is likely to cause nuisance or annoyance to the
neighbourers of any other unit/show-rooms in the building
or to the owners and occupiers of any other adjoining and
neighbouring property. Nor shall he use the said unit/show-
room for any illegal, immoral purposes or for any
residential purposes.”
56. From a conspectus of the aforesaid, it is clear that the lease was
granted in the larger public interest for running show rooms or shops
for the benefit of the people, as per the purpose of the petitioner
Society which is to ensure availability of good quality consumer goods
to the people. The same is clearly envisaged in the Bye-Laws of the
petitioner Society, which is important and the relevant portion reads as
under:
“III. OBJECTS
4. The objects of Super Bazar are
a) to undertake wholesale and retail distribution of
consumer goods and essential commodities; and to establish
department stores;
b) to develop an effective link with between the
producers/suppliers and the consumers with the object of
transforming production on a continuous basis to suit the
changing market;
c) to raise the quality of products and maintain standards
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d) to foster the growth of new products and new
manufacturing units through market support and
management advice;
e) to lower distribution costs and to introduce fair and
better training practices such as fixed prices etc.; and
f) to provide an information service to both producers and
consumers.
5. In order to promote the above objects Super Bazar shall
a) organize or undertake the purchase, procurement,
processing or manufacture and storing of consumer
commodities and related raw materials;
b) establish trade connections, purchasing centres and
depots for the requirements of the stores; establish and run
branches directly or through representatives;
c) undertake designing and other services to improve the
quality of products;
d) own lands, buildings, vehicles, etc. or take or give them
on lease or rent;
e) undertake educational and other measures designed to
encourage in the members the spirit and practice of thrift,
self-help and mutual help;
f) undertake welfare activities for the members and
employees and their families;
g) to import and export consumer goods;
h) do all such things as are deemed essential for the
attainment of any or all of the above objectives.”
57. The long pendency of the dispute for nearly two and a half decades is
in itself a matter of serious concern. The subject property assigned for
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By:SAHAJ PREET KAUR
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advancement of public interest is left in the lurch because of frivolous
challenges being raised by the petitioner time and again. The said
subject property cannot be kept in a state of perpetual suspense
because of repeated representations and challenges by the petitioner.
58. The violation of terms of the lease deed in itself constitutes a valid
ground for cancellation of the lease deed and extension of time as
claimed by the petitioner, is only an exercise of discretion by the
respondent. The respondent duly decided the request in favour of the
petitioner to grant extension on payment of outstanding dues. The
respondent also decided the representation of the petitioner in
pursuance of the Order of this Court, to restore the lease deed subject
to payment of outstanding dues.
59. The outstanding dues were again disputed by the respondent on
multiple grounds. However, to my mind, the grievances against the
computation of outstanding dues for restoration of lease deed cannot
advance the case of the petitioner.The petitioner in the present case
cannot insist that this Court should conduct a roving inquiry into the
legality/validity/correctness of each and every arithmetic calculation
undersub-heads of the outstanding dues.
60. This Court in the present petition is neither required nor I am inclined
to conduct an enquiry into the disputed calculations, which would
require detailed factual reconciliation as well.
61. Moreover, the petitioner has been granted opportunity twice to get the
lease restored by payment of outstanding dues but the petitioner has
disputed the calculations made by the respondent.
62. I am of the view that in the light of intervening circumstances, the
disputes pertaining to calculation of the outstanding dues need not be
considered in this petition as the petitioner, an erstwhile government
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multi-state consumer cooperative society, is under liquidation and will
not be able to continue with the purpose for which the subject property
was initially allotted to it.
63. The purpose for which the subject property was leased stands
frustrated as now it can never be used by the petitioner for the purpose
it was initially allotted. This in itself constitutes a major ground for
cancellation of the said lease deed.
64. This Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction is required to keep the
interest of public in consideration. Public land is a scarce resource and
when it is specifically set out for the benefit of the public by
construction of some form of amenity or necessary structure, it cannot
be allowed to remain in a state of uncertainty on a mere hope that the
internal difficulties of the petitioner would be sorted out at some point
in future. I cannot lose sight of the fact that keeping the subject
property locked up in litigation for years without any foreseeable
fulfilment of object of allotment is nothing but making the larger
public interest suffer.
65. A Coordinate bench of this Court in the case titled as United News of
India v. Union of India through Land And Development Officer
3
Ministry Of Housing And Urban Affairs &Anr. , while dealing with
a petition impugning the cancellation of allotment for the reason of
violation of terms of allotment, relied on Center for Applied Politics v.
4
Union of India , to make the following categorical observation, which
reads as under:
“112. Reference may be made to an order dated 06.12.2024
of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Center for Applied

3
W.P.(C) 5363/2023, Judgment pronounced on 20.03.2026.
4
W.P.(C) 16309/2024.
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Politics v. Union of India, W.P.(C) 16309/2024, wherein, in
somewhat similar circumstances, it was held as under:
“7. The terms of the allotment, as outlined in the
Agreement to Lease, are unambiguous and place an
unequivocal obligation upon the Petitioner to construct
an office building and five single-seated rooms within
24 months of taking possession of the land. These
facilities were envisaged to advance the cause of
education in Political Science, Administration, and
Diplomacy. Despite being in possession of the land for
nearly five decades, the Petitioner has not fulfilled this
fundamental purpose. Such a prolonged lapse of time
exhibits Petitioner’s gross failure to meet its
contractual obligations and erodes any claim to equity
in their favour.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Public land, when allocated for a specific purpose,
must be utilized in strict conformity with the terms of
allotment. The Petitioner’s inaction has entirely
frustrated the purpose of the allotment, which was to
establish a hub for education and scholarship in
Political Science. In a rapidly urbanizing city like
Delhi, where land is both scarce and valuable, the
effective utilization of public resources assumes
importance. The L&DO, as a trustee of public land, is
duty-bound to ensure that such lands are utilised
meaningfully for public purposes. Unfortunately, in
this instance, it appears to have faltered in acting with
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the urgency required to prevent the misuse of this
resource. Nonetheless, permitting the Petitioner to
retain possession despite their flagrant non-
compliance would be countenancing misuse of public
resources which would set a concerning precedent
emboldening other allottees to disregard their
obligations with impunity. Therefore, this Court finds
no reason to condone such a breach or to invoke its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to aid a party that has wilfully
and persistently violated the terms of the Agreement to
Lease.”
113. In LPA No. 95/2025, emanating from the aforesaid
order, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court, vide
judgment dated 10.02.2025, as under:
“7. The Agreement to Lease placed an obligation upon
the appellant to construct an office building and five
seated rooms within 24 months of taking possession of
the land. It is obvious that the sanctioned building
plans ought to have been obtained by the appellant
within the stipulated period noted above. Despite
passage of five decades, the application of the
appellant seeking sanction of building plans has not
seen the light of the day. Clearly, the delay is
attributable only to the appellant. Reference to a notice
dated 28.12.2007 issued by MCD does not come to the
rescue of the appellant nor does it enure to its benefit.
Rather, it only explains andestablishes that the
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W.P.(C) NO. 491/2003 Page 21 of 26

appellant has been absolutely negligent and
lackadaisical in completing its obligations both
towards the L&DO and towards the MCD. Nothing has
been placed either before the learned Single Judge or
before this court evidencing any documentation to
prove the active engagement of the appellant with the
MCD for approval of its building plans. This appears
to be a case of gross and blatant disregard of the
obligations under the terms of the allotment letter as
also the Agreement to Lease dated 02.07.1977.”
114. The aforesaid observations are squarely attracted in
the facts of the present case as well. This Court simply
cannot countenance a situation where public land continues
to be occupied for decades together, without fulfillment of
the conditions of license.”
66. As per the petitioner the subject property is a valuable asset of the
petitioner and is now required to discharge the dues of the petitioner.
However, if the subject property is restored to petitioner, the same
would be dealt with in liquidation/would be sold for the satisfaction of
its liabilities. The same, to my mind, cannot in any way be
countenanced as serving the larger public purpose for which the
subject property was initially leased nor it would in any way advance
the object of the lease in a meaningful manner.
67. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Dalip Singh v.
5
State of Haryana , held that in cases of failure to satisfy necessary
conditions governing allotment, the cancellation of allotment can be

5
(2019) 11 SCC 422.
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affected after following due process. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment read as under:
“21. The allotment of Industrial Plot No. 306, Industrial
Area, Phase II, Panchkula in 1984 to Rabinder Nath was in
his capacity as Managing Director of M/s Shiva Dairy &
Oil Mills. The plot was thus allotted to the partnership firm.
The appellants have not been able to show as to how they
stepped into the shoes of the partnership firm, apart from
the mere fact that they are legal heirs of Rabinder Nath. As
discussed earlier, at the time of making application for
allotment of industrial plot, the applicant has to clearly
disclose all the facts regarding the type of industry to be
started, licence if necessary under law, project report,
estimated cost of project, details regarding time required in
completing the project, details of employees required,
source of fund, etc. The project so submitted is then
approved by the competent authority after considering its
viability. The applicants are then issued letter of
intent/provisional allotment letter with condition to
complete the other formalities within the stipulated period of
time and after completion of formalities, regular allotment
letter is issued in favour of the applicant. As pointed out
earlier, the undertaking of the production as per the
approved project is the foundation for the allotment of the
industrial plots which is with twin object of economic
development and generation of employment opportunities.
Over the years, the State has undergone substantive changes
and economic growth. Land/industrial plots now becoming
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very scarce, governed by the present EMP, the appellants
cannot seek for revocation of resumption by contending that
they are ready to pay the current market rate.
22. The court can interfere with the revocation of
resumption of land only if the executive has not carried out
its duty or acted in violation of the procedure. Clause 11 of
the terms and conditions of allotment clearly stipulates that
in the event of breach of any of the conditions of transfer,
the Estate Officer may resume the land in accordance with
the provisions of Section 17 of the HUDA Act, 1977. The
order of resumption of the plot is as per the terms and
conditions of the allotment order and the High Court rightly
refused to interfere with the order of the revisional
authority. The appellants having failed before all the forums
including the High Court and also the revisional authority,
we do not find any serious infirmity or illegality in the order
of resumption of the plot and therefore, this appeal is liable
to be dismissed.
(Emphasis Supplied)
68. Restoring the said lease in favour of the petitioner would not serve the
public purpose for which the subject property was leased, it would just
result in conversion of the subject property into a liquidation asset, and
the same can never serve the purpose, the lease and the petitioner
society was meant to serve.
69. The petitioner has also raised a contention that the show cause notice
dated 08.02.2002 issued by the respondent to the petitioner prior to
cancellation of lease deed was based on erroneous understanding of
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the situation and without considering the fact that the possession of the
subject property was handed over to the petitioner in September 1998.
70. Even assuming that the subject property was, in fact, handed over in
1998, there is neither any progress made by the petitioner nor any
steps have been taken to show the construction of the building for the
purpose of running a consumer goods store for the benefit of the
people. The said object can now never be achieved as the petitioner is
under liquidation. The entire exercise is academic in nature.

71. To my mind, valuable piece of land (subject property) in the heart of
the city, if not an asset owned by a company in liquidation, should not
be made available to the company in liquidation (herein the petitioner
Society under liquidation) for satisfying its liquidation debts over the
interest of public and if so permitted, the same would also be contrary
to the purpose of the lease.
72. Additionally, the obligation to complete the construction in time was a
contractual obligation and the fact that the delay in construction as it
can be seen from the reply of the petitionerto the show cause is
because of internal mismanagement and investigations. The same
cannot be said to be something not attributable to the petitioner.
73. The petitioner however was not remediless against this decision and
the available remedy of seeking extension of time was in fact sought
by the petitioner. Grant of such extension however is not a matter of
right and is only a discretionary exercise of power. The request for
extension of time was later accepted by the respondent subject to
payment of outstanding dues but the petitioner sought waiver of those
dues.
74. It is also stated that the petitioner already paid up to date ground rent
and thus, the show cause notices and the impugned Order are vitiated
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in law. I am of the view that once it is satisfied that there has been a
violation of a term of lease as explained above i.e., non-construction
of building within 3 years, this in itself is sufficient to support the
validity of the impugned Order of cancellation.
75. Therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioner cannot seek any
advantage from the pendency of the dispute or the fact that the plea for
restoration has been accepted subject to payment of dues or its
challenges to the said show cause notices, as the essence of the matter
would remain that the subject propertycannot be utilized for the
original intended purpose. The restoration of lease in such a situation
would be nothing but an empty formality.
CONCLUSION
76. The purpose of the lease deed, in view of the series of events that have
transpired, can no longer be fulfilled. If the petition were to be
allowed, the inevitable consequence would be that the said subject
property would be converted into an asset of the petitioner for being
placed at disposal in the liquidation proceedings, thereby defeating the
very purpose and object for which the subject property was leased out
to the petitioner.
77. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, in the aforesaid terms.
78. The interim directions contained in the Order dated 20.01.2003, shall
continue for a period of 3 weeks from the date of pronouncement of
this judgment.

JASMEET SINGH, J
JULY 01, 2026/SS
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