Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs Etc. vs The Secretary, School Education Department, State Of Maharashtra
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1241
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10193-10194 OF 2016
PRITHVIRAJ S. SINGH (DECEASED)
THROUGH LRS. ETC. … APPELLANT(S)
VS.
THE SECRETARY, SCHOOL EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. The present case illustrates how a meritorious cause was allowed to fail
by reason of inept drafting of a writ petition, the substance having been
eclipsed by form.
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2. Appellant—Prithviraj S. Singh was a senior clerk, and appellant—
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Shivadatta R. Singh was a head clerk in the respondent no. 7 . Both,
along with the in-charge headmaster—Kamalkant S. Mishra of the
school, were proceeded against departmentally for misappropriation of
public money and allied charges. The school constituted an inquiry
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.11.18
17:15:33 IST
Reason:
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in C.A. No. 10193 of 2016
2
in the connected C.A. No. 10194 of 2016
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school (run by the respondent no. 4—trust)
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committee in terms of the provisions contained in the Maharashtra
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Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981
[framed under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools
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(Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 ]. An objection was raised
by the appellants to the inclusion of a member of the committee, namely
Umesh Pratap Singh. Accepting such an objection, a new member,
namely Chandra Kumar Singh, was inducted into the committee. Still,
not satisfied, an exception was again taken to the inclusion of the new
member. On this occasion, the objection bore no fruit and was rejected.
As a mark of protest, the appellants abstained from attending the
inquiry, resulting in the inquiry proceeding ex parte . Reports of inquiry
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dated 13 November 2004 (in respect of Prithviraj S. Singh) and 11
November 2004 (in respect of Shivadatta R. Singh) were prepared by
the committee holding that the charges against the appellants stood
established. Neither the minutes of proceedings of inquiry nor the final
inquiry reports were furnished to the appellants. In due course, the
appellants were removed (terminated) from service.
3. Termination of the appellants’ services triggered litigation at their end.
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The orders of termination were carried in appeals before the School
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Tribunal, Mumbai , under Section 9 of the Act. Reinstatement in service
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committee
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the Rules
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the Act
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Appeal Nos. MUM/1/2005 and MUM/2/2005 by Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R.
Singh, respectively
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tribunal
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upon quashing of the disciplinary proceedings, including the inquiry
reports and the final orders of penalty, was sought by the appellants.
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Vide interim orders dated 10 March, 2005, the tribunal stayed the
operation of the termination orders till disposal of the appeals and
directed the school to allow the appellants to resume their service and
pay 50% of their salary.
4. Aggrieved by the interim orders, the school invoked the writ jurisdiction
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of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by presenting petitions under
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Article 226 of the Constitution . With the consent of the parties, the
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petitions were disposed of by a Single Judge on 17 March, 2005. The
brief consent order reads as follows:
At the stage of mentioning, the matter has been taken up on Board for
admission by consent.
Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners and for the First Respondent-
employee are agreed that the following order may be passed by consent in
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substitution of the impugned order dated 10 March, 2005 of the Presiding
Officer of the School Tribunal without any further reason being recorded:
(1) The First Respondent shall, without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties be paid an amount equivalent to the subsistence
allowance in accordance with law, during the pendency of the appeal before
the School Tribunal.
(2) In view of the judgment of a Learned Single Judge of this Court in
Adarsh Vidya Mandir Trust vs. Awadesh Narayan Komal Singh, 2005(1)
Bom. C.R. 786, it would be open to the Petitioners to apply before the
School Tribunal for leading evidence to substantiate the charge of
misconduct against the First Respondent. In the event that such an
application is made, the School Tribunal shall deal with such application in
accordance with law.
(3) The School Tribunal shall expedite the disposal of the main appeal and
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endeavour to do so on or before 31 July, 2005.
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(4) In view of the aforesaid arrangement, the impugned order dated 10
March, 2005 is quashed and set aside.
(5) This order shall not be construed as amounting to any expression of
opinion by the Court on the merits of the case and all the rights and
contentions of the parties are kept open to be urged in appeal.
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High Court
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Writ Petition (Lodg.) Nos. 774 of 2005 and No. 776 of 2005 against Prithviraj S. Singh
and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively
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Both the Petitions are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.
5. Despite the liberty granted to the school to file an application seeking
permission to lead evidence in support of the charges, it chose not to do
so. Curiously, the tribunal, too, did not insist upon the school leading
evidence. Instead, based on whatever material was on record, the
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tribunal dismissed the appeals vide separate final orders dated 19 July,
2006 observing similarly that since the appellants had deliberately
avoided participating in the inquiry proceedings and failed to nominate
their nominee(s) on the committee, they could neither assail the
termination on merits in view of the decision of this Court in Ranjan
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Kumar Mitra vs. Andrew Yule & Co. Ltd. & Ors. nor complain of
non-supply of documents under Rule 37(2)(a)(iii) of the Rules as the
documents relied upon were school registers and receipt books of which
they could have taken extracts had they participated. Also, it was
observed that although the committee had not recorded any finding on
the charge of misappropriation as the criminal proceeding was pending
before the Metropolitan Magistrate and the school had not led the
evidence of any witness, there was sufficient documentary evidence in
the form of service books of six employees (showing stoppage of annual
increments for the academic years 2002-03 and 2003-04) and cash book
register entries (showing failure to deposit received money in the bank
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(1997) 10 SCC 386
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account immediately or within the prescribed time limit) to hold the
appellants disentitled to any relief.
6. Crestfallen, the appellants then invoked the High Court’s extraordinary
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writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution . The prayer
clauses of Writ Petition No. 2506 of 2006 read:
(a) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction be issued calling for the records and proceedings of
Appeal No. 1 of 2005 from the file of Ld. School Tribunal, Mumbai, and after
examining the proprieties and legalities of the impugned Judgment and
order dated 19.7.2006, be pleased to quash and set aside the same;
(b) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction be issued calling for the records and proceedings of
the so-called Enquiry Proceedings, and after examining the proprieties and
legalities of the same, be pleased to quash and set aside the same;
(c) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
Writ, order or direction be issued directing the Respondents jointly and
severally to reinstate the Petitioner as Senior Clerk in Respondent No. 7
School with all the consequential benefits such as full back wages till the
date of reinstatement;
(d) That a Writ of Certiorari, Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate
Writ, Order or direction be issued directing the Respondents jointly and
severally to extend all the consequential benefits to Petitioner which are
available to a permanent employee as if the Petitioner’s services were not
terminated;
(e) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the
Respondent Nos. 6&7, be ordered and directed to deposit the amount of Rs.
1,45,086.00 as per the High Court Orders, in this Hon’ble Court and the
Petitioner be granted liberty to withdraw the aforesaid amount on the terms
and conditions which may be specified by this Hon’ble High Court;
(f) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the Petition, the [ sic,
Respondents] jointly and severally be ordered and directed to allow the
Petitioner to resume his duties as Senior Clerk in Respondent No. 7 School
with a further direction to allow him to work and to pay regular monthly
salaries;
(g) That ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer (e) & (f) be granted;
(h) Cost of the Petition be kindly provided;
(i) Any other just and further relief, which this Hon’ble High Court, may
deem fit to grant in the interest of justice.
7. Inexplicably, the appellants in their respective writ petitions neither
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alleged brazen violation of the consent order dated 17 March, 2005 of
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Writ Petition Nos. 2506 of 2006 and 2507 of 2006 filed by Prithviraj S. Singh and
Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively
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the High Court by the school in not leading evidence to support the
charges of misappropriation and allied charges nor challenged the
tribunal’s omission to consider, sans the evidence, that the earlier order
of penalty of termination was unsustainable in law and hence of no
effect. The principal foundation on which the writ petitions rested was
this: the in-charge headmaster, who was proceeded against
departmentally along with the appellants, had been similarly terminated
from service and, having challenged such order, the tribunal converted
the penalty of termination to compulsory retirement. Appellants,
accordingly, claimed similar treatment.
8. The outcome of the appellants’ writ petitions, in the circumstances, was
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quite obvious. By a detailed common judgment and order dated 17
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June, 2016 , a Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appellants’
writ petitions, holding, inter alia, that the in-charge headmaster and the
appellants did not stand on the same footing. The in-charge headmaster
was dealt with a bit leniently by the tribunal on account of his impending
retirement after having served the school for about three and a half
decades, whereas the appellants had completed only a few years by the
time they committed the alleged misconduct.
9. We have heard Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned senior counsel for
the school. Perusing the case pleaded in the writ petitions presented by
the appellants before the High Court, and as rightly pointed out by Mr.
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impugned judgment
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Choudhary, the entire part of Mr. Marlapalle’s arguments touching upon
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the merits of the separate orders dated 19 July, 2006 of the tribunal
dismissing the appellants’ appeals, is found to be beyond the pleadings.
A party is under obligation to plead its case by making the requisite
averments/assertions in support of the relief that it claims, whereas a
court is under no obligation to entertain a plea if the same is not
supported by the necessary averments/assertions in the petition. In light
thereof, no exception to the impugned judgment can be taken by the
appellants to the effect that the Single Judge did not deal with the aspect
of the school’s omission/neglect in leading evidence before the tribunal
to establish the charges afresh, as well as the tribunal’s failure to return
findings against the school for such omission/neglect. We could have,
thus, upheld the impugned judgment and dismissed the appeal by a
short order.
10. However, what has engaged our attention and is a matter of serious
concern is the circumstance arising from the High Court’s consent order
th
dated 17 March, 2005. Why the terms thereof were not adhered to
and/or complied with by the school is not forthcoming since Mr.
Choudhary, in his usual fairness, did not seek to justify such omission.
11. What, therefore, emerges is that there was no evidence worth the name
before the tribunal resting whereon the charges against the appellants
could be held ‘established’. That apart, despite the appellants not having
been furnished the final inquiry reports by the school prior to their
services being terminated, which constituted a serious flaw in the
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process of taking disciplinary action against them, the tribunal
proceeded to hold that there was no infirmity in the proceedings. Though
law is well-settled that a high court cannot grant any relief under Article
226 to a litigant who has approached it without pleading an appropriate
case for relief, this is a fit case where the appellants deserve to be
granted some relief based on the principle that an action/order which is
wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of
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competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted .
12. Appellant—Prithviraj S. Singh—is no more, while the appellant—
Shivadatta R. Singh—is stated to be surviving. Ex debito justitiae , the
appellants would have been entitled to larger relief if only their writ
petitions had been appropriately drafted and the right points had been
argued. Since that stage has passed, we exercise our power under
Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the school to pay to each of
the appellants Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakh) only as lump sum
compensation for wrongful termination of their services within three
months from the date of receipt of this order from the heirs/legal
representatives of late Prithviraj S. Singh and from Shivadatta R. Singh
or his authorised representative. Such payment of compensation shall
be treated as full and final settlement of all the dues of the appellants
and no further claim shall be entertainable in this behalf. In default of
payment within three months, as aforesaid, the school shall be liable to
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See: Ram Saran Varshney v. State of U.P. , (2016) 3 SCC 724
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pay interest at 12% per annum on such sum until payment is actually
released.
13. The appeals are disposed of on the above terms.
14. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.
…………………………….J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
…………………………….J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 18, 2026.
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