Vikramjit Sharma vs Satwant Kaur (Deceased) Through Her Legal Representatives And Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH


CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 21.11.2026



Vikramjit Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
Satwant Kaur (deceased) through her LRs and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present: Mr. Charan Jit Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.


DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
By way of this revision petition filed under Section 15(5) of the East
Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’),
the petitioner, one of the tenants, has assailed the order dated 31.03.2023
(Annexure P-1) passed by learned Rent Controller, Amritsar, allowing the
eviction petition filed by the respondent-landlady, as also the order dated
17.09.2026 (Annexure P-2) passed by learned Appellate Authority, Amritsar,
whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The demised premises comprise a shop forming part of property
No.4335, situated at Uttam Nagar, Barsati Nala, Sultanwind Road, Amritsar.
Originally, the shop was taken on rent by Faqir Chand, father of the present
petitioner, from Hari Singh, husband of Satwant Kaur, at a monthly rent of
₹300/-. A rent note dated 17.08.1996 was executed and the tenancy
commenced with effect from 01.09.1996. Upon the death of Hari Singh,
Satwant Kaur became the landlady, whereas upon the death of Faqir Chand, his
successors continued in occupation of the demised premises as tenants.
3. Satwant Kaur instituted the eviction petition on 23.08.2018,
seeking eviction of the tenants on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of
rent with effect from 01.01.2013; non-payment of house tax/property tax; the
demised premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation; and
bona fide requirement of the premises for her own use and occupation as also
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
for that of her grandsons, namely, Maninder Singh, Jaspreet Singh, Raghbir
Singh and Karamjit Singh, so as to establish a business for earning their
livelihood.
4. The tenants contested the petition, though admitting the
relationship of landlord and tenant as also the rate of rent. It was pleaded that
the rent had already been paid for a substantial part of the period claimed by
the landlady and that the remaining rent would be paid upon assessment
thereof. The condition of the demised premises being unfit and unsafe for
human habitation was denied. The bona fide requirement of the landlady was
also disputed on the ground that she was an elderly lady and that her family
members were already engaged in their respective businesses. An objection
regarding the maintainability of the eviction petition on the principle of res
judicata was also raised in view of the earlier rounds of litigation between the
parties.
5. Upon appraisal of the evidence brought on record, learned Rent
Controller returned findings in favour of the landlady on the grounds of the
demised premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation and
bona fide personal necessity. The ground regarding non-payment of house
tax/property tax was, however, decided against the landlady. As regards
arrears of rent, after adjusting the payments already made by the tenants, an
amount of ₹7,592/- was found outstanding, for payment of which two months'
time was granted. Independently thereof, an order of eviction was passed
against the tenants on the other grounds established by the landlady.
6. The present petitioner alone preferred an appeal against the
aforesaid order of eviction. During the pendency of the appeal, the original
landlady expired and the proceedings were continued through her legal
representatives. Learned Appellate Authority, upon reconsideration of the
evidence, affirmed the findings recorded by learned Rent Controller and
dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present revision petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has been heard at considerable
length and the impugned orders have been perused.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
8. The main objections raised on behalf of the tenant pertain to the
framing of additional issues regarding arrears of rent and house tax on the date
of pronouncement of the eviction order without affording a further
opportunity to lead evidence; absence of expert evidence to establish that the
demised premises had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation; and the
alleged absence of any genuine requirement of the landlady or her grandsons.
The earlier litigation between the parties has also been relied upon to dispute
the maintainability of the eviction petition.
9. Having considered the matter, this Court does not find any ground
warranting interference with the concurrent orders of eviction.
Framing of additional issues
10. Insofar as the objection regarding framing of additional issues
No.1A and 1B on 31.03.2023, i.e. the date of pronouncement of the eviction
order, is concerned, it is evident from the record that both the grounds of
eviction, namely, non-payment of arrears of rent and non-payment of house
tax/property tax, had specifically been pleaded in the eviction petition. The
tenants had filed their reply controverting these grounds and had also led
evidence in respect thereof. In fact, the present petitioner, while appearing in
the witness box as RW1, had tendered his affidavit Ex.RW1/A and relied upon
documentary evidence concerning the payment of rent.
11. The separate order dated 31.03.2023 passed by learned Rent
Controller specifically records that both the parties had already led evidence
and addressed arguments on the said aspects and that omission to frame
formal issues in that regard had subsequently come to its notice. The additional
issues were thus framed to bring the issues formally in conformity with the
pleadings and evidence of the parties.
12. It is well settled that absence of a formal issue would not, by itself,
vitiate the adjudication where the parties were conscious of the controversy,
understood the rival stand and had adequate opportunity to lead evidence in
support of their respective claims. Reference in this regard may be made to
Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, AIR 1963 SC 884 , wherein
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that omission to frame an issue is not fatal
where the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led evidence in
support of their respective contentions.
13. The petitioner has not shown any real prejudice occasioned to him
on account of belated framing of the additional issues. Significantly, the issue
regarding non-payment of house tax/property tax has been decided in favour
of the tenants themselves. Besides, the order of eviction rests upon two other
independent grounds, in respect of which specific issues had already been
framed. Therefore, the objection regarding the framing of additional issues
cannot furnish a ground for setting aside the eviction order or for remanding
the matter.
Demised premises being unfit and unsafe for human habitation
14. Coming to the ground of the demised premises having become
unfit and unsafe for human habitation, the most material piece of evidence is
the admission of the present petitioner himself. The landlady produced on
record the certified copy of the deposition of Vikramjit Sharma in the earlier
litigation titled as Ex.A4. As noticed by
Hari Singh v. Chanchal Rani and others
learned Rent Controller in paragraph No.11 of its order, the present petitioner
had categorically admitted therein as under:
“ It is correct that condition of roof of demised shop is dilapidated and it can fall
also.”
The petitioner had further admitted that the building was 40/50 years old.
15. The aforesaid admission is of considerable importance, particularly
because it emanates from the person, who is himself in occupation of the
demised premises and is, therefore, well acquainted with its physical condition.
Though an admission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted, it
constitutes substantive evidence against its maker and can legitimately form
the basis of a finding unless satisfactorily explained or shown to be erroneous.
Reference in this regard may be made to Nagiadas Ramdas v. Dalpatiam
Ichharam alias Brijram, (1974) 1 SCC 242.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
16. Nothing has been brought to the notice of this Court to indicate
that the aforesaid admission was subsequently explained by the petitioner or
that any substantial repairs or reconstruction had been undertaken so as to
render the demised premises structurally safe. A bare denial of the dilapidated
condition of the premises in the subsequent proceedings cannot, in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, efface the unequivocal admission made
by the petitioner in the earlier proceedings.
17. The landlady had also approached the Town Planning Department,
Amritsar, vide application Ex.A2, bringing to its notice the dilapidated condition
of the premises and the apprehension of loss of life and property. She herself
appeared in the witness box as AW1, besides examining Ravinder Pal Singh as
AW2, Prabhjot Singh as AW3 and Arwinder Singh, Civil Engineer/Draftsman, as
AW4, who prepared the site plan Ex.A3 after visiting the spot.
18. Though the site plan prepared by AW4 cannot, by itself, be treated
as a structural stability report, the absence of a formal report from a building
expert is not necessarily fatal to the case of the landlady. Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of
the Act does not prescribe expert evidence as the exclusive mode of proving
that a building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Such a
finding may be recorded on the basis of other reliable evidence, including the
testimony of persons acquainted with the condition of the building and, more
particularly, admissions made by the tenant himself.
19. No doubt, mere old age of a building is not sufficient to conclude
that it has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. However, in the
present case, the finding is not founded merely upon the age of the building.
There is a specific admission regarding the dilapidated condition of its roof and
the possibility of its collapse. The roof constitutes an essential structural
component of the building and its precarious condition directly bears upon the
safety of the occupants. The fact that the tenant continues to run a general
store in the demised premises does not necessarily establish its structural
safety.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
20. It is also not necessary for the landlord to wait until the building
actually collapses or some unfortunate incident involving loss of life or property
takes place before seeking eviction on this statutory ground. The very object of
the provision would stand defeated if the landlord were required to await the
actual collapse of the building despite credible evidence of its unsafe condition.
21. In these circumstances, the concurrent finding recorded by the authorities
below regarding the demised premises having become unfit and unsafe for
human habitation is founded upon relevant and cogent evidence and cannot be
termed perverse or otherwise unsustainable in law.
Bona fide personal necessity
22. As regards the ground of bona fide personal necessity, it was the
specific case of the original landlady that she required the demised premises
not only for her own use and occupation but also for establishing her four
grandsons in business. The landlady stepped into the witness box as AW1 and
her version was supported by her son Ravinder Pal Singh, appearing as AW2, as
also by Prabhjot Singh, appearing as AW3. Both the authorities below have
found their testimony worthy of acceptance.
23. The contention that the landlady was of an advanced age and,
therefore, could not have genuinely intended to establish a business proceeds
upon an erroneous assumption. There is no legal prohibition against a person
commencing a business at an advanced age. More importantly, the
requirement pleaded was a composite requirement of the landlady and her
grandsons, who intended to establish a business for earning their livelihood.
24. Equally untenable is the contention that the grandsons could not
be considered dependent upon the landlady. Dependency in the context of
bona fide requirement under rent control legislation is not necessarily confined
to financial dependency. A member of the landlord's family may be financially
independent and yet dependent upon the landlord for suitable accommodation
to establish or expand a business. The expression ‘own use’ has to be
understood in a realistic manner, having regard to the circumstances of the
family concerned.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
25. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397, while
interpreting the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression ‘for his own use’ is not to
be construed narrowly as being confined to the personal use of the landlord
alone. Depending upon the facts and circumstances, it may comprehend the
requirement of members of the landlord's family and persons whose
requirement the landlord considers himself morally obliged to fulfil.
26. Similarly, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.,
(1998) 8 SCC 119, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that once the landlord
establishes a prima facie case of bona fide requirement, the Rent Controller
ought not to proceed with a presumption that the requirement is not genuine.
It is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord the manner in which the latter
should adjust his requirements. Reference may also be made to Prativa Devi v.
T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353, reiterating the principle that the landlord is
ordinarily the best judge of his own requirement.
27. In the present case, except for making a general assertion that the
family members of the landlady were already earning handsomely, the
petitioner failed to furnish any particulars regarding the nature or place of
business allegedly being carried on by the grandsons of the landlady. No
suitable alternative commercial accommodation available to them within the
urban area of Amritsar was established. Even otherwise, engagement of a
family member in some business or occupation would not, by itself, disentitle
him from seeking to establish an independent business in premises belonging
to the family.
28. This Court is conscious of the fact that the original landlady
expired during the pendency of the appeal. Ordinarily, bona fide requirement is
to be examined with reference to the date of institution of the eviction
petition, though a subsequent event having the effect of completely
extinguishing the requirement may be taken into consideration. Reference in
this regard may be made to Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC
604, and Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, (2004) 5 SCC 772.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
29. In the present case, however, the requirement pleaded by the
original landlady was not exclusively personal to her. It extended to the
requirement of her grandsons for establishing a business. Consequently, her
death cannot, by itself, lead to an inference that the entire requirement
forming the basis of the eviction petition stood extinguished. There is nothing
in the impugned judgments to indicate that the requirement of the grandsons
was shown to have subsequently ceased to exist.
30. Be that as it may, even if the effect of the death of the original
landlady upon the ground of personal necessity were to require further
examination, the same would not materially advance the case of the petitioner,
inasmuch as the eviction order is independently sustainable on the ground of
the demised premises having become unfit and unsafe for human habitation.
The latter ground relates to the physical condition of the property and is wholly
unaffected by the death of the original landlady.
Plea of res judicata
31. The objection regarding the eviction petition being barred by the
principle of res judicata has also rightly been repelled by learned Rent
Controller. The earlier litigation between the parties, as noticed in paragraph
No.19 of the order passed by learned Rent Controller, pertained to the grounds
of non-payment of arrears of rent and house tax and subletting. The earlier suit
for permanent injunction instituted by the tenant had merely resulted in a
decree restraining his forcible dispossession except in due course of law.
32. Dismissal of an earlier eviction petition does not confer upon the
tenant an indefeasible right to remain in occupation of the tenanted premises
for all times to come. The principle of res judicata would operate in respect of a
matter directly and substantially in issue and finally adjudicated upon in the
earlier proceedings. However, a subsequent eviction petition founded upon a
fresh cause of action or materially changed circumstances would not be barred
merely because an earlier eviction petition between the parties concerning the
same premises had failed.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
33. In Surajmal v. Radheyshyam, (1988) 3 SCC 18 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court recognised that bona fide requirement of a landlord may arise
from time to time and that dismissal of an earlier eviction petition would not
necessarily bar a subsequent petition founded upon changed circumstances.
34. The condition of a building may deteriorate with the passage of
time and the requirement of the landlord or members of his family may
undergo a change. Such subsequent developments may furnish an independent
statutory cause of action. The petitioner has failed to establish that the grounds
upon which the present order of eviction has been passed had already been
adjudicated upon between the parties on the same factual foundation in the
earlier proceedings.
35. Further, the decree of permanent injunction restraining the
landlord from dispossessing the tenant except in due course of law cannot be
construed as prohibiting the landlord from availing the statutory remedy of
eviction. By instituting the present eviction petition, the landlady has precisely
resorted to the due process of law contemplated by the earlier decree. Thus,
the plea of res judicata is devoid of merit.
Arrears of rent
36. As regards the arrears of rent, learned Rent Controller assessed an
amount of ₹7,592/- as payable by the tenants after giving adjustment of the
rent paid pursuant to the provisional assessment dated 07.02.2019 and the
amount paid in pursuance of the earlier compromise Ex.R1. Two months' time
was afforded to the tenants to pay the outstanding amount.
37. However, considering that the eviction order is independently
sustainable on the ground of the premises having become unfit and unsafe for
human habitation, this Court does not consider it necessary to undertake a
detailed examination of the computation of arrears of rent or to rest the
eviction order upon the alleged default in payment thereof. Consequently, the
eviction order is being sustained independently of the findings concerning
arrears of rent.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
Scope of revisional jurisdiction
38. It needs to be emphasised that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 15(5) of the Act, though wider than the revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 CPC, cannot be equated with the jurisdiction of a regular Appellate
Court. The revisional jurisdiction is intended to ensure the legality and
propriety of the orders passed by the authorities below and not to provide
another opportunity to the unsuccessful litigant to seek reappreciation of the
entire evidence merely because another view may conceivably be possible.
39. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh,
(2014) 9 SCC 78 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
examining the scope of revisional jurisdiction under various rent control
enactments, including the Act applicable to the present case, held that the High
Court cannot interfere with findings of fact merely upon re-appreciation of
evidence. Interference may be justified where the finding is perverse, is based
on no evidence, results from misreading of evidence, ignores material evidence
or otherwise suffers from an illegality resulting in miscarriage of justice.
40. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, the
concurrent finding regarding the demised premises having become unfit and
unsafe for human habitation does not suffer from any such infirmity. Rather,
the finding is substantially supported by the admission of the petitioner
himself. No material evidence is shown to have been ignored, nor has any
manifest illegality or perversity been demonstrated so as to warrant
interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
41. The protection afforded to a tenant under the rent control
legislation is intended to safeguard him against arbitrary eviction and not to
enable him to perpetuate his occupation notwithstanding the establishment of
a statutory ground of eviction. Once such a ground stands established in
accordance with law, the landlord cannot be deprived of possession of the
premises merely on account of the length of the tenancy.
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CR-8661-2026 (O&M)
42. Consequently, finding no merit in the present revision petition, the
same is hereby dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall
also stand disposed of.

21.11.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)

Yogesh
JUDGE


Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No

Whether reportable: Yes/No



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